

Participatory Urban Planning Approaches in the Arab Region

Case Studies: City Development Strategy (CDS) in Aleppo and
Alexandria (2003-2010)

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MSc. Siba Said

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Vorsitzender der Prüfungskommission: Prof. Dr. Agr. Kai Tobias

Erste Berichterstatterin: Prof. Dr.-Ing. habil. Karina Pallagst, Technische Universität
Kaiserslautern

Zweite Berichterstatterin: Prof. Dr.-Ing. Astrid Ley, Universität Stuttgart

Technische Universität Kaiserslautern D 386

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Abstract

Participatory urban planning approaches (PUPAs) are seen as key methodological tools to develop plans and strategies that can help in alleviating urban poverty and improving urban planning and governance. Given that, there is a need for a deeper understanding of the PUPAs adopted and implemented in the Arab cities to define the challenges that led to the weak impacts of these approaches in the examined cities and to identify their potentials for improvement in the future. Yet, adopting PUPAs in restrictive political and institutional settings like the ones in the Arab region proved to be ineffective, either in improving urban planning and governance or in including urban citizens in planning decision-making processes.

This research examines PUPAs in the City Development Strategies of two big cities in the Arab region between 2003 and 2010: Alexandria in Egypt and Aleppo in Syria. The research investigates whether PUPAs are adopted and supported by the institutional and legal framework in the cities under study and whether they are implemented successfully. For this purpose, the research identifies first the challenges and successes in implementing PUPAs in the two cities based on an in-depth analysis of the structures and actors of governance and planning. Second, it explores the effects of the PUPAs on the participatory process and vice versa.

The main findings of the research have shown that PUPAs can only be effective when the political, institutional, and social contexts are supporting participation, which is lacking in the two examined cities. Yet, the different PUPAs implemented in these cities indicate that local actors and planners have a great potential for developing innovative communication strategies and participatory mechanisms that could have positive impacts on urban planning, urban governance, and the society.

1. Introduction

1.1. Research Background and Problem

Participatory approaches in urban planning are seen as key methodological tools to elevate urban poverty, achieve sustainable development, and contribute to good urban governance (Imparato and Ruster 2003). In theory and practice, participation is defined and interpreted in different ways. In line with democratic principles, participation is a process in which all citizens are given the power to influence governance and lead political change (Lombard 2013; Connelly 2010: 334). In the field of development, the term participation mainly refers to the need to include the marginalized social groups, especially from the poor, in the development process and give them the power to decide over their environment and resources (World Bank 1994; IDB 1997a cited in Imparato and Ruster 2003; Connelly 2010: 334). By this means, participatory approaches are intended to counter traditional top-down development strategies by calling for the inclusion of the poor in the decision-making process (Rahnema 2010). Adopting participation as an instrument for inclusion and empowerment of the poor has been extensively applied in rural as well as urban development measures. For this purpose, different participatory methods were developed and used in many planning and development programs and projects, like the methods for Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), which were introduced by Chambers in 1983.

Yet, adopting participation as an instrument in planning and development in Developing Countries (DCs) was criticized for being ineffective, resulting in more exclusion and marginalization, particularly in uncertain political and institutional contexts. Hence, different discourses on participation, in the past decades, have shown the need to consider the political aspect in developing and realizing participatory approaches, particularly in undemocratic political systems, in which participation is not supported, leading to maintaining the existing power and control in these contexts. (Hickey and Mohan 2004, Piffero 2009, Connelly 2010, Lombard 2013). In DCs, political power affects the existing governance structures that underpin the planning process by adopting top-down technocratic approaches. On the contrary, participation in planning in a democratic political system is usually supported by solid legal and institutional frameworks, where urban planning decisions should be legitimized by the citizens.

Participatory planning concepts developed in Industrialized Countries (ICs) were transferred to the DCs through development approaches. Many of the emerged planning models in ICs have raised the need for communication in planning, like in the advocacy planning or collaborative planning models. They also focus on the changing role of planners and the governance process. Accordingly, planning as a governance process requires communication and interaction to reach consensus among all stakeholders (Healey 1996). The model of collaborative planning emphasized two elements: the role of the actors involved including the planners, the institutions, and the citizens; and the role of information and knowledge combined in a sustainable framework of action. Hence, in order to support the participatory approaches, the concepts raised in collaborative planning were adopted in development practices.

In this respect, City Development Strategy (CDS) is considered as a form of collaborative planning, since it provides a framework for applying participatory urban planning methods and promotes dialogue and consensus in dealing with urban challenges in the cities of DCs.

Some Arab cities have pursued CDSs to improve urban planning and governance and to tackle urgent urban challenges, resulting from uncontrolled urban growth and weak governance structures at both the national and local level. These challenges were represented by urban informality, poverty,

unemployment, environmental problems, inadequate infrastructure, and lack of public services. Facing these challenges, in the last decades, Arab governments have focused on offering social housing programs and new growth-oriented urban development projects without tackling the real problems rooted in the weak planning systems and urban governance. Although these actions have offered short-term solutions, they failed to provide a holistic vision in dealing with the problems. Hence, while targeting the social, spatial and economic development of a city, CDS aims to assess the city problems by involving the city key stakeholders in this process and in developing a vision for the future development of their city. Thus, key stakeholders are expected to experience how to jointly create a vision for their city and to develop action plans that are realistic and strategic as well as maintaining their collaboration and commitment to implement them within an effective policy framework (CA 2006: 21; CMI 2011). The collaboration and commitment of the city stakeholders are some of the purposes of adopting PUPAs in a CDS that can lead to improving urban governance and urban planning. In this respect, PUPAs can be considered both, as a tool and as an outcome of the CDS process.

Adopting the PUPA as a novel approach in the Arab cities revealed the untapped potentials on the local level as well as the challenges imposed on its development and sustainability. It was associated with difficulties that hindered their effective implementation and impact on urban planning and governance. Still, on the local level, awareness was raised among the local actors involved in urban governance to the importance of the PUPA in the CDS or future urban planning and development. They underline, in particular, the need to promote partnerships, collaboration, and consensus among city key stakeholders and to integrate participation as a formal instrument in urban planning.

However, the ineffectiveness of PUPAs introduced in the Arab cities was called into question, in particular regarding the absence of political and institutional support of participatory practices and the applicability of participatory planning concepts and related methods in these cities.

There are many doubts regarding transferring participatory concepts and tools from ICs without adaptation to the given local contexts in the Arab countries. CDSs based on PUPAs in the ICs have been successfully practiced, which does not necessarily lead to positive outcomes in the Arab countries. Adopting participatory approaches in development endeavors in the Arab cities has been an instrument to exert international pressure for political transformation and institutional reform that mostly overlooked the national and local settings in these countries. Recognizing the need for reforms, national governments intended to adopt PUPAs prescribed for conducting development projects despite the absence of political and institutional support of participatory planning in practice.

Based upon this background, there is a need to understand how the PUPAs were developed and implemented in the Arab cities in the past and to identify the factors that led to their ineffectiveness as well as the potentials of adopting them in the future.

To understand the conditions under which the PUPAs in the Arab cities were adopted, this research analyzes PUPAs in the CDSs in Alexandria and Aleppo and compares them. It also examines the urban governance settings and urban planning systems in order to understand, how participatory processes can work in the restrictive political and institutional frameworks inherited in the Arab region. In addition, the research explores the participatory practices in the framework of the CDS in the two cities. The review of the past strategies and practices is expected to contribute to the discourses on participatory planning approaches in the Arab region, especially in the aftermath of the political developments in the region since 2011. The outbreak of public protests in different Arab countries in the course of so-called “Arab Spring” was triggered by a series of political, social and economic imbalances, including political repression, social injustice and failure of socioeconomic development

policies. Thus, protesters called for political freedom, justice and participation in decision-making at national and local level. In this regard, ineffective urban governance and lack of participation in urban planning are considered some of the most important causes of the protests that resulted political instability in the Arab region since 2011. This has called for meaningful efforts for improving urban governance through democratization of the social life and claiming the right for participation in the decision-making processes.

Against this background, there is an increased awareness for the need for participation in the Arab region triggered lately by the claims for social and political changes after 2011. Participation has the potential to become a tool and an objective in supporting sustainable urban change of the Arab cities in the future. Hence, this research is a significant contribution not only to identify the shortcomings of urban planning, governance and development in the Arab cities in adopting participation in the past, but also to develop new participatory tools that support future efforts for redevelopment and reconstruction of Arab cities.

1.2. Research Questions and Objectives

The main objective of this research is to develop an in-depth understanding of the PUPAs in the Arab region based on analyzing two case studies from the Arab cities and to contribute to the discourse of adopting participation in urban planning and development in these cities. In this regard, the research driving questions are:

- How did PUPAs influence urban governance' structures and actors underpinning urban planning processes?
- How have PUPAs been developed and implemented in the local context?
- To answer these questions, the PUPAs adopted in the CDSs in the two Arab cities: Alexandria in Egypt and Aleppo in Syria will be examined. Hence, the secondary objectives of the research are:
 - To explore participatory planning concepts and their practices in development approaches,
 - To examine the urban governance settings that affect PUPAs at the national level (in Egypt and Syria) and at the city level (in Alexandria and Aleppo),
 - To detect the success and challenging factors in implementing PUPAs in the CDSs in the cities Aleppo and Alexandria, and
 - To identify the commonalities and differences.

The aim of analyzing the given case studies is to understand the governance and planning settings underpinning the PUPAs and the arrangements and tools used in realizing the participatory approaches in urban planning and development. The case studies allow detecting the challenging and success factors of the PUPAs in each city, which can provide valuable lessons for cross-national learning and exchange. For analyzing the case studies, key factors were developed, based on the analysis of different concepts and methods of participatory planning in the conceptual approach.

Comparing the PUPAs in the two cities intends to identify the commonalities and differences in implementing the PUPA in different local settings that were approached similarly by DAs. Syria and Egypt share common aspects in their institutional, historical, and political contexts of planning, and in the existing urban governance frameworks in their cities. Yet, to understand how the PUP approaches have been applied, it is important to examine these assumptions on the national and local levels. By adopting the comparative approach, lessons learned can help in developing PUPAs as effective tool in

planning practices in the Arab cities. Finally, this research addresses the need for undertaking more comparative research in planning and urban studies in the Arab region, especially for examining PUPAs and detecting innovative tools for modernizing traditional planning systems.

To answer the research questions and achieve the objectives, qualitative methods for collecting and analyzing the data were adopted. Both primary and secondary sources were considered for collecting the data needed for the research. For the primary data collection, a field study was carried out, where semi-structured and open-ended interviews were conducted with city stakeholders from the administration and local planners and experts. In terms of collecting the secondary data, a main source of information were the reports published by the DAs, who were involved in the CDS and projects. These include interim and final reports prepared mainly by the city administrations in cooperation with the main partners from DAs, like the World Bank and the GTZ in the case of Alexandria and the Cities Alliance and the GTZ in the case of Aleppo. Further secondary data sources were collected, like articles and books regarding participatory planning approaches and their methodological approaches in DCs.

The research seeks to contribute to urban planning research and urban development practices in the Arab region by adopting an evidence-based approach and presenting an in-depth analysis of the case studies. Moreover, it intends to raise the awareness of the planners in ICs to the urgent issues in urban planning and governance in Syria and Egypt. This contribution is of value, not just for the planning research in general, but also for planning practices in the field of development. Developing an understanding of urban planning and governance in these countries will help in supporting development efforts and making them more efficient, particularly in restructuring the planning systems in the Arab countries and the reconstruction of the Arab cities in the future.

1.3. The Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation has been organized into five chapters. The introduction to the research and its structure are in chapter I. The theoretical framework in chapter II focuses on exploring participatory urban planning approaches as well as the evolvement of the concepts of participation and the methods applied in practice. In addition, the methodological approach of the research is explained in 2.4, where the methods for data collection and the comparison are described. The conceptual approach in 2.5 presents the identified factors for the analysis and comparison. In Chapter III, urban governance and the planning systems underpinning the PUPA are analyzed on the national level, and the participatory approaches in the CDSs in the Arab region are reviewed. Chapter IV presents the analysis and comparison of the case studies as well as the findings of the analysis and comparison in 4.3. The research conclusions are drawn in Chapter V, where the research questions are answered, in addition to the recommendations for improving PUPAs in practice in the Arab region as well as future research are presented.




Figure 1: The Structure of the dissertation, illustrated by the author.

2. Theoretical Framework: Exploring Participatory Urban Planning Approaches (PUPAs)

This chapter provides the theoretical framework concerning participation in planning and development. It focuses on understanding participation in planning and development, and presents an overview on the methodological framework of participatory urban planning approaches. Based on the findings, the conceptual approach for analyzing and comparing the case studies has been developed and presented in the last section of this chapter.

2.1. Understanding Participation in Planning and Development

Participation is defined, interpreted and adopted in different contexts. Understanding participation is usually linked to the related fields of practice. Particularly in this research, participation is referred to in its practices in urban planning and development approaches in DCs.

Participation was getting particular importance in the last three decades in planning and development, connecting it to acknowledging and activating the power of the citizens in the face of the power of the state in planning and governance processes. While the term has been broadly defined, conceptualized and discussed in academic and development literature, for the purpose of this research, selected definitions of participation and participatory approaches are going to be explored in relation to the indicated context¹². Participation is defined in Oxford English dictionary as “*The action of taking part in something.*” (Oxforddictionaries 2015). As a process, it is presented in relation to the act of involving a broad variety of stakeholders in the decision-making process regarding their common concerns.

Since the 1980s and 1990s, many scholars, mainly by Healey and Forester, have deliberately discussed the evolving of the concept of participation in planning theory. Healey had raised the participation approach in communicative and collaborative planning. This approach had brought a new planning paradigm that is based on dialogue and interaction among the citizens, inspired from Habermas notion in raising the need to advance democracy through collective communicative action of free citizens (Healey 1990).

In discussing participation in urban planning, the participatory approaches intend to include the public in the planning process. This is referred to in terms, like “...*public involvement, advocacy planning, citizen participation, collaborative planning, inclusive partnerships...*” and civil engagement (Healey 2008: 379). In collaborative planning, stakeholders seek to achieve consensus over their interests through dialogue (Healey 1997), particularly through contributing with knowledge and information and provide the chance for mutual learning among them. Bringing the stakeholders to be actively engaged in decision-making over their environment and social interests leads to producing plans that are accepted by all participants (Mahjabeen et al. 2009 based on Healey and others). Public participation should not be discussed as a practice without considering its political framework (ibid,

¹ The research focuses mainly on development projects, referring to the application of participation in planning and development. Other implications for the term participation considers political aspects, like public participation.

² The context of this research, as explained in the introduction, refers to the adopted Participatory Urban Development Approaches (PUPAs) in DCs for improving urban planning and governance, mainly the participatory approaches planned in the City Development Strategy (CDS) and related urban development projects in the Arab cities Alexandria and Aleppo. It focuses on examining the planning, and governance processes in the time preceding the political unrest in Arab countries Egypt and Syria.

Healey 1997; this was also cited in Mahjabeen et al. 2009 and Mohammadi 2010: 30). Healey emphasized the institutional and the political contexts dealing with power and conflict in the process. Relating the society to the institutional capacity, Healey referred to the creation of a *“civic capacity”* where the citizens develop their capacity and have the power to manage their issues in the planning process (Healey 1999 cited in Mahjabeen et al. 2009). In addition raising the awareness of the planners of their role in the political decision-making of planning (ibid).

In the development field, participation is intended to empower people, particularly the poor, to take part in governance and influence the policymaking in managing their resources and furthering the development process. A participatory process is *“a democratic process in which people, particularly the weak and the poor, are not passive receivers of a development project In the end of a top-down approach, but are requested to identify their needs, voice their demands, and organize themselves so as to improve their livelihood with the help of the financial, technical, and human resources offered by the development project, as well as their own.”* (IFAD, IDB 1997a, cited in Imperato and Ruster 2005, 19-21). It eventually aims to allow them lead the planning process, formulate the policies and be part in the implementation and monitoring of the development process. This is mostly the focus in the multiple definitions by development institutions and organizations among others are the UN, the World Bank, the IFAD and the GTZ (Imperato and Ruster 2005: 19-21). The World Bank has defined participation: *“Participation is a process through which stakeholders’ influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them”* (World Bank 1994). In this definition, the stakeholders are empowered through participation to take the control for managing the development process. Yet, considering the diversity of societies and the resulting conflict of the different interests, the participatory process is expected to be inclusive of all these interests, while bridging the differences between the diverse groups to achieve a consensus on common issues for the public good. Hence, several definitions of participation have considered the need for the consensus-building approach. The UN-Habitat has defined participation as: *“[...] the process of decision-making and problem solving, involving individuals and groups who represent diverse interests, expertise and points of view and who act for the good of all those affected by the decisions they make and the actions that follow.”* (Fischer 2001: 15; cited also in Connelly 2010: 344). Likewise, the focus of participation in the work of the GTZ is to collectively and innovatively find solutions for development problems and change. In this sense, bringing different actors together is essential to achieve this approach: *“Participation means bringing national and local agencies, local community organizations, the private sector, and academic institutions together in a search for innovative development ideas that lead to reform.”* (GTZ cited in Abdrabo 2008, Alexandria GTZ).

In different development interventions and projects, the participatory approach is adopted as an instrument in the planning and implementation processes, where the stakeholders are empowered and given the resources and political support to take part in the decision-making process. The resultant structures and built capacity of the poor should be maintained as a basis to independently initiate and implement further development projects. In this regard, a participatory approach is: *“a self-help approach characterized by the involvement of target groups in project design, implementation and evaluation, which aims to build the capacity of the poor to maintain structures created during project implementation and continue their own development.”* (CIDA, IDB 1997a cited in Imperato and Ruster 2005: 19-21).

Participation in development has been criticized while failed in many cases to achieve its aims of empowerment, improve governance and democratization that are essential to advance the development process. the prevailing form of 'participation in development' since the 1980s puts more importance on the interests of the locals, and transforming the role of the development agents from technocratic role to facilitating and enabling role, as well as transforming the roles of the state and the local in relation to the development matters (Hicky and Mohan 2004: 11). Power relations regarding the development matters was in this sense the core of the discussion in the 1990s (Hicky and Mohan 2004, 11). The concept of participation today has a "*diffuse [...] and fragmented*" connotations, it is related to taking part in group activities, for instance, social or economic, which concern the group and its common sense. It is at the same time related to notions that are challenging the concept of shared identity groups (Huxley 2013: 1531 cited from Patton 2005: 253-4). This contradictory character of participation is also seen in its implications in the planning practices and policies (Huxley 2013: 1531).

Participation in practice need to be critically examined regarding the perception of and approaching the participatory process:" *[...] participation could be either transitive or intransitive; moral, amoral or immoral; either forced or free; either manipulative or spontaneous [...]*" (Rahnema 2010). This view of participation refers to the need to examine how participatory processes in the development interventions have been developed and implemented. Particularly, there is a need to look on the outcome and impact of the participatory approach in development in addition to the beneficiaries of adopting this tool.

Viewing different discourses on participation in development and planning, the participatory approach has been criticized, while it is mostly developed and adopted as a top-down approach. In most cases, this form of participation leads to a passive participation where as an outcome, social activism is sought to be encouraged to induce a sustainable change. Through this approach, the bottom-up forms of participation, for example the self-help approach or 'autonomous participation' are usually not considered. This is because most of the debates are based on the central role of the state in the participatory planning, without taking into consideration informal forms that are based on 'autonomous participation' through self-organization in dealing with urban problems, and the importance of these forms in influencing urban governance (Lombard 2013: 139 cited from Ziccardi: 2004; Beebeejaun and Vanderhoven: 2010).

2.1.1. Background on Participation in Planning: Evolving of Participatory Planning Approaches

Participatory planning represents a methodological approach that is developed and practiced in ICs, and through its development, its ideas have been transferred to DCs within similar or different circumstances (Watson 2007; Connelly 2010). In understanding the conditions in which participation in planning has been developed, there is a need to look at emerging of participation in the key planning models; from rational to collaborative planning.

Participation has been presented differently on venues such as political studies, social planning, and administration. Public participation in planning started to appear in the literature in the sixties, focusing on actions of participation regarding social or civil rights concerns, for example; movements against urban renewal decisions, issues that rational planning couldn't handle (Huxley 2013: 1531). Participation as an objective in planning should provide equal chances for all citizens regardless their differences to take part in the decision about their environment. From this point, different planning forms based on communication and collaboration have formed the foundation of planning today (Huxley 2013: 1532). Participation is, therefore, viewed as being an objective and instrument at the

same time in planning practices. Yet, researchers started in the last three decades to give more attention to theorizing participation and including it in the planning theory.

Understanding planning in theory is mostly a problematic issue, since the work to theorize planning dates back to the mid of the 20th century, which resulted in unclear definition of planning as an individual field in academia, but with acknowledging the interdisciplinary character the planning has in relation to other fields, like economy, politics, sociology and public administration (Friedmann 1998). Some general challenges in drawing up planning theory are the strong correlation of planning to politics and addressing power relations in addition to difficulty in choosing between the different modes of planning theory "*normative, positive, critical, and paradigm-shifting*" (Friedmann 1998: 247). The process of planning is related closely to governance and requires in its activities a great amount of interaction (Haeley 2003: 107). In this sense, planning is a governance process to manage the space "*I understood planning as a governance activity occurring in complex and dynamic institutional environments, shaped by wider economic, social and environmental forces that structure, but do not determine, specific interactions. By governance, I meant the processes by which societies, and social groups, manage their collective affairs*" (Haeley 2003: 104). Conflict of interests and power relations in the space should not be ignored. In addition, planners are called to give more attention to the role of politics in city development processes specially power relations with civil society role „[...] *acknowledging that the production of urban space involves the interaction of conflicting interests and forces, not least the growing force of organized civil society itself*" (Friedmann 1998: 252-253).

These challenges are encountered in theorizing participation in the planning, which in most cases need to be connected with the planning practice and vice versa. Bridging the theoretical and practical knowledge in planning is an issue referred to through emphasizing the importance of projects and case studies in supporting theorizing in the planning domain away from normative mode (Friedmann 1998). In this regard, there is a need to connect between planning theory and practice through planning theory; which imply documenting what is happening in practice in planning theory (Pallagst 2007: 37; Schönwandt 2008: 16). An example is the valuable contribution of Rebecca Abers' writing on participatory municipal budgeting to the rising theory on participation in planning (Friedmann 1998: 249). The concepts of planning in theory and practice, although they seem to have no relation to one another, they are in fact connected to each other and they develop and build upon each other "*interdependent rather than competitive*" (Pallagst 2007). Moreover, this connection between the theoretical knowledge in planning and the planning practice although not clearly evident, it needs to be identified and acknowledged and the involved challenges should be addressed (Pallagst 2007: 37-38).

Considering the understanding of the participatory approach in planning, the role of participation in planning resonates mostly and innately with the role of planning stated by Friedmann 1998; the role of planning is to mobilize the efforts of all actors; the state, the civil society and economy to create the ideal urban habitat for all citizens. Planning should consider studying the social and spatial characteristics of an "*urban habitat*" in addition to other interacting dynamics in the city. These dynamics are socio-spatial processes that create the urban habitat: "*urbanization, regional economic growth and change, city-building, cultural differentiation and change, the transformation of nature, and urban politics and empowerment*" (Friedmann 1998: 251) and planners' task is to understand the inter-linkages between these processes before beginning with planning (Friedmann 1998; Healey

1999). In this regard, planning activity is referred to as governance process “*all planning activity involves some interactive relation and some kind of governance process*” (Healey 2003: 107).

Focusing on communication in planning process was raised by John Forester, whose views were influenced by Jürgen Habermas³. Forester talked about communication and mediation between conflicting interests. Influenced by Forester, Leonie Sandercock has also brought political conflict issues and social inequalities into planning debate through social planning. Negotiation in case of conflicted interests presents planning as the medium in the politics where planners mediate the society interests with other actors; the state, the private sector and civil society (Friedmann 1998: 252). The change of the role of planning in favor of entrepreneurial planning, referred to by Healey 1996, marks a shift where an enabled civil society is rising and the role of the state and the market are diminishing (Healey 1996).

2.1.1.1. The Ladder of Participation

To understand participation in planning, there is a need to understand the local and national contexts of democracy and citizenship. For example in the UK in the sixties, divided views of participation as a tool for more effectiveness in the local government was a transformative concept in planning. empowerment of the citizens and grassroots movements to lead the planning process raised by Arnstein, and the UK attempt to formalize and include participation in the existing central system, have presented different frameworks for evolving participation in planning and local governance (Huxely 2013: 1535). Relating participation to planning practices, the ladder of participation has been recognized in the literature in various fields, like planning and development while connecting participation to interdisciplinary fields, e.g., cultural, political, and administrative. Arnstein, the founder of the ladder, was an urban activist in a low-income neighborhood in America in the 60's (Huxely 2013: 1532; Lombard: 2013). The eight levels of participation explained in the ladder start from non-participation to empowering people for full participation in the decision-making process. The ladder (figure 2) shows the shift of traditional decision makers' control of power to citizens taking responsibility over the decision- making process (Arnstein 1969; Carver 2001: 62). The active involvement of people in formulation and implementation of state policies constitutes the highest level of participation (Arnstein, 1969, cited in Lombard, 2013). However, according to Arnstein, the eighth level can not be reached in the current societies, while the government have the central role controlling the needed resources (Huxely 2013: 1533). These levels of the ladder are elaborated in appendix 1.

³ Habermas has contributed to the social theory with his views on communicative rationality and the public sphere, which has also influenced the planning theory, in terms of initiating dialogue between the people and the state in the governance process of the space elaborated later in the collaborative planning.




Figure 2: The "eight rungs on the ladder of citizen participation" (Arnstein 1969).

2.1.2. Evolving Participatory Approaches in the Models of Planning

Detecting the participatory approach in the models of planning, selected models of planning, which have been identified in the last decades, are going to be examined in relation to the emerging concepts of participation in planning. The examined aspects in these models mark the ascendance of the concepts of participatory planning and can explain the conditions that affect the participatory approach in the planning regarding:

- a. The process of planning and methods
- b. The actors and stakeholders
- c. The role of planners
- d. The approach to power and power relations

The models of planning have been discussed by several scholars⁴ while trying to link them to planning theories and practices. Starting with the seven models of planning. These models are all normative and political models of planning. They have been developed based on each other within four decades and they are still used today. Each of the models has its methods and characteristics, but in practice, they tend to work in complementing to each other (Schönwandt 2008: 3-18). The models are; the rational model of planning, the advocacy model of planning, the (neo) Marxist model of planning, the model of equity planning, the model of social learning and communicative action, the radical model of planning and the liberalistic model of planning (Schönwandt 2008: 3). In addition to these models, the collaborative planning discussed by Healey and its relation to governance and policymaking will be examined.

⁴ The author will focus on the contributions of Schönwandt 2008, Pallagst 2007 and Haeley 2006.

2.1.2.1. *The Basic Model of the Rational Planning*

Tracing the emergence of the rational model in the 1950s and 1960s and even during the seventies in ICs, this model is known as the predominant or the basic planning model (Pallagst 2007; Schönwandt 2008) and the following models have been developed based on it, or as a response to it (Schönwandt 2008).

The rational planning model has been discussed in planning theory in relation to the Meta theory of modernism (Pallagst 2007: 41). This model is denoting the transition from the physical planning and urban design after the second world war, characterized by producing “*master plans*” for functional purposes, to “*system analysis and procedural approaches in planning*”, as the turn to the ‘rational planning’ model (Pallagst 2007: 41-43). Unlike the dominating ideas of the physical planning, from the fifties, which considered the cities as inflexible systems, system analysis dominated from the sixties through the eighties, presented cities as dynamic and interrelated “*complex systems*” influenced by their changing aspects, which need technological methods to plan, design and manage for further developments. Pallagst 2007 has stated this: “*System analysis and procedural planning theory were the hegemonic discourses in planning during the 1960s and 1970s [...] planning relied to a wide extent on technical solutions and the application of rational decision-making.*” (Pallagst 2007: 41-43).

Rational model focuses in this respect on applying science and technology in planning; processing data and managing operations (Pallagst 2007: 41; Schönwandt 2008). From this point, planning was presented in the seventies with this “*methodological or process approach*” (Pallagst 2007: 42). The main steps the rational planning proceeds are: “1) Analyze the situation; 2) establish goals; 3) formulate possible courses of action to achieve those goals; 4) compare and evaluate the consequences of these actions.” (Schönwandt 2008 cited from Meyerson and Banfield 1955).

However, some weaknesses of the model have been recognized regarding different issues, which led to an awakening starting in the seventies to the importance of these issues in the planning process:

- The model provides, often, inflexible solutions, while ignoring the given conditions for planning in their variable and compound elements.
- The missing socio-political aspects in the planning process while focusing on the technocratic approach. The social and political aspects have been totally ignored by the rational model in favor of the use of science and technology, which makes it unrealistic when it comes to the implementation.
- The role of the planners was criticized and seen as political role. This role implies aspects of manipulation in situations of conflicted interests, while planners tend to utilize the support of the regulative system to serve particular interests mostly the politician’s rather than applying their expertise and knowledge to respond to the public’s needs. This situation depends on their ethical values and consideration of different social inclusion-exclusion aspects in the planning process.
- The use of the word “public” in the rational planning refers to the masses, without considering any kind of differences between them and their related interests. (Pallagst 2007: 43-46; Schönwandt 2008: 3-7).

Despite the weaknesses of this model, planning in practice continues to apply it (Pallagst 2007: 43-46; Schönwandt 2008: 3-7). Hence, this model was described as “*too positivistic, [...] ahistorical and [...]*

apolitical”, in addition to perpetuating central “top-down” against democratic approaches in planning, which leads to support existing political values instead of promoting positive social changes. Therefore, the steps of rational model have remained the working method of planning (Schönwandt 2008: 3-7). In this regard, the rational model implies dominating political aspects despite the prevailing technological approach “*Planning relies upon, and proceeds through, various practices regarded as rational or objective, but which are in fact highly ideological and political*” (Escobar 2010: 154).

Identified aspects in the rational model of planning	
Process of planning and methods	top-down and too technocratic, science, and technological methods in producing master plans
Actors and stakeholders	politicians and planners/ officials
Role of planners	technocrats, room for manipulation imply additional political role
Approach to power and power relations	top-down decision-making, a central role of the state (no participation)

Table 1: Identified aspects in the rational model of planning, summarized by the author.

Within these conditions, the state has the central role in decision-making regarding the planning process, and planners are supporting the top-down approach of the planning system. The stakeholders from the locals have no voice in the process, and accordingly, there is no participation. This model is also a predominant model in most of the DCs until today and it still guides the planning processes and the colonial and post-colonial planning traditions, while it favors the central role of the state in power relations. The role of planners is mainly as technocrats and political agents for the state. Today, the governance mode combined with the planning traditions brings forward more variety to the planning cultures in DCs based on the political framework and the planning level, still with further adopting the rational model as the basis for the planning process.

2.1.2.2. The Rise of Communication in Planning

The followed postmodernist approach in planning has been criticized for its general view and focus on scrutinizing the setbacks of the rational planning, like fragmentation, difference, and power. Another point is, the lack of the link to the planning practice dismissing the variety and complexity of the social and cultural aspects. Planning as a decision-making process is expected to take into account these aspects in addition to the related institutional structures within the given context (Pallagst 2007: 46-49). From the Meta theory perspective, acquiring the knowledge in the planning process has emphasized the political role of planners considering who controls the information and how the information would be understood and used (Pallagst 2007: 46-49; Schönwandt 2008; Healey 2008). The new role of the planners focuses in this respect on the importance of the interaction and transfer of information in the practice.

Hence, the models followed the rational planning have been emerged based on advocacy planning. The advocacy planning model was developed in the mid-sixties as a response to the top-down approach in the rational model. In this model, the role of the planners as “*Equity Planners*” is raised to represent the disadvantageous groups in the planning process (Davidoff 1965). The model regards the differences the public has as groups with multiple interests and needs and not as a homogenous group “the public” targeted in the rational model. The developed plans are in this case multiple plans that matches the interests of different groups. The role of planners here is to shift focus to the political sphere, to find out which group’s interest, does really represent the “public interest” in the rational model (Schönwandt 2008).

Planners in this role support the rights of the disadvantaged and provide their knowledge and expertise to plan for them (Davidoff 1965): “*planner acts as a voice for the voiceless*” and they communicate their ideas and plans with planning authority and city administration. This role has been criticized for lacking the power to realize these plans, and that their role as mediators in political conflicts has hindered the projects instead of facilitating them. The higher aims of advocacy planners are questioned specially in case of manipulation, where planners seek own interest or professional path rather than the needs of the poor and they try to avoid political conflict and serve political control over the weaker groups. Another critical point on this model, that it didn’t provide methodological solution to resolve conflicts of different interests and it didn’t help to change the existed power relations although it focused on the changing role of the planners (Schönwandt 2008: 7-9).

Identified aspects in advocacy planning	
Process of planning and methods	multiple plans to match diverse interests groups
Actors and stakeholders	politicians, Officials and planners as representatives of the public
Role of planners	mediators and communicators: New role of the planner as a mediator to political activist, representing mainly the interest of the disadvantaged as the “public interest”
Approach to power and power relations	top-down decision-making, taking into account the diversity of interests’ groups (informing)

Table 2: Identified aspects in advocacy planning, summarized by the author.

Considering further actors and roles in the planning process, in addition to new methods in supporting communication among the groups of stakeholders, this model marks the outset of participatory planning. Although the process of planning and the role of planners is changing, the outcome and the product of planning remains in the control of the state.

Further models have been developed based on the advocacy-planning model. Some of these models are the “(neo) Marxist model” which focuses on “*planning in capitalist society*”, “*the model of equity planning*” where the planner’s work is supported by politicians, and the “*model of social learning and communicative action*”, which defines new role of planners and the shared process of producing the plans (Schönwandt 2008). In addition to the rise of communicative planning in the eighties (Healey 1992: 2-4), the “*radical model of planning*” where planning was mainly dedicated for the disadvantaged ignoring the institutional components of the planning process, and the “*liberalistic model of planning*” where the market’ interests are predominant in the planning (Schönwandt 2008: 9). Accordingly, and with relevance to participatory planning referred to in this research, the concepts of political power, the role of planners, and the rise of dialogue and communication are detected in the following models (see also appendix 2):

- a) In the “*model of equity planning*”, the locals are empowered and they get access to the needed resources to participate in the planning. Planners representing the rights of the disadvantaged are considered the experts or “*primary agents*” and they work together with their supportive politicians on the high levels of administration. This unlike the advocacy planner, who works mainly and closely with the locals. Dialogue is central in this model with both the local administration as well as the stakeholders from the locals. The task of the planner is to gather the data, analyze them and define the problem. In addition, the planner mediate the results with the authority (mayors and city council, etc.) (Schönwandt 2008). The activism of planners at the local government is particularly encouraged in this model because planning is not about law or

tradition, but it is about the planners in their initiatives for equitable planning, which can affect the power dynamics in the city development process (Krumholz 1982). The power of the planner is in the possibility to raise particular problems or highlighting them and discuss them with authority. While largely relying on the support of the administration, the risk in this process is when one of the supportive authority members is replaced, leading to ineffective role of the planner and invalidity of the proposed plans (Schönwandt 2008: 11).

Identified aspects in equity planning	
Process of planning and methods	integrative of local interests in addition to the political interests through dialogue in the planning process
Actors and stakeholders	politicians, officials, citizens and planners (as mediators among them)
Role of planners	mediators, professionals and political agents
Approach to power and power relations	top-down decision-making while considering the input/interests of the locals

Table 3: Identified aspects in equity planning, summarized by the author.

The remarkable aspect in this model in relation to the emerging of participation in planning, is rising the need to give more power and voice to the marginalized groups represented by an essential role of planners who act actively in the political sphere of planning and power relations.

- b) In the “model of social learning and communicative action”, the planning process turns to a process of learning and knowledge exchange between the planners or experts and the people or stakeholders that ensure the mutual acceptance of the results. Knowledge possessed by the locals is essential and interaction is a key in the whole process (Schönwandt 2008: 12-14). The interaction required particular rules to be arranged between different actors, e.g., respect, even power assertion, open mutual criticism of the other’s suggestions, etc. (Schönwandt 2008: 14 cited from Flyvbjerg 1998).

This model has also marked the rise of the concept of communicative planning which started in the eighties for considering planning as new form of democracy. The challenge in this aspect is to consider social issues like, gender, race, and culture in the democratic approach of planning (Healey 1992: 2-4). In this model, planning as “communication practice” was emerged between the 1970s and 1980s, influenced by Habermas’s and Forester’s 1989 ideas of communicative action in planning (Healey 1999; Schönwandt 2008). This model based on opening the dialogue with different involving groups “inhabitants” for mutual learning. The planner should understand the social needs and the political dynamics to be able to act upon them. For this purpose, planners need to have the skills to help opening up interactive channel for exchange instead of applying planning professional knowledge and expertise. The planner’s task here is to critically reflect upon and assess the collected data rather than the facts in deciding on the planning action. Eventually, the product of the communicative planning process is expected to achieve mutual acceptance of all involved parties (Schönwandt 2008: 12-14). The emerged communicative planning theory, based on these concepts, was also discussed by Forester, Innes, Hoch and Baum (Healey 2003: 106). In this model, power does exist in the planning process, where inequality in the society exists. The discussion about power in this term takes the form of influencing the existing power in the planning process instead of possessing and exercising it (Schönwandt 2008: 14, referring to Flyvbjerg 1998 and Foucault 1982).

Identified aspects in the communicative model of planning	
Process of planning and methods	planning as “communication practice” based on dialogue and mutual learning
Actors and stakeholders	all sectors, planners and the citizens
Role of planners	mediators, communicators and political actors
Approach to power and power relations	top-down, still seeks to influence the existing power in the planning process through negotiations and consensus building

Table 4: Identified aspects in the communicative model of planning, summarized by the author.

The participatory approach in planning has emerged from the concepts and practices of this model. However, there is a need to understand the practices, contexts, outcomes and related risks of this model.

- c) In the “liberalistic model of planning”, planning functions to serve the well-being of the individuals, ensures that individuals get their rights protected in the free market system. Planning to the minimum is maintained from the economic perspective, where resources for planning are also used to the minimum. In this model the critical point is its exclusivity; the limited accessibility to the free market to different social groups, which pose the question of equity and also supporting “public planning” in this model, which, in turn, means restriction of the participation of the private actor (Schönwandt 2008: 17). This also refers to the rise of issues of exclusion and segregation, while focusing on the profit through privatization and lack of democracy. Participation takes a form of a pro forma consultation, lacking transparency and resulting in weakening the social capacity (Sager 2011).

Identified aspects in the liberalistic model of planning	
Process of planning and methods	planning with limited resources responding to and corresponding with the market demands, mostly pro-growth
Actors and stakeholders	The elite and ruling groups in the market (exclusive) with minimum role for the state
Role of planners	Actors in economic development process; (mega) projects
Approach to power and power relations	Top-down decision-making, leading role of politicians and investors, conflicted social and economic interests

Table 5: Identified aspects in the liberalistic model of planning, summarized by the author.

In this model, an adopted participatory approach can be characterized by masking the neoliberal approaches of economic growth and competitiveness of cities. Therefore, the results are unreliable and the participatory planning approach ends mostly up with social exclusion and marginalization.

2.1.2.3. The Collaborative Planning Model

The communicative approach in planning marked the American and European planning discourses in the 1980s and 1990s, referred to in its different terms as “*collaborative planning, discursive planning or communicative planning.*” (Pallagst 2007: 49). Collaborative planning is originated from the social theory of structuration from Giddens 1984, referring to the mutual interaction between structure and agency in the planning practices (Haeley 2003: 106). This model focuses particularly on Habermas’ idea of communication, which affects planning practice on the regional and urban level (Haeley 2003: 105; Pallagst 2007: 50).

Planning in practice was seen in its limited focus through taking quick decisions in arranging the places. Centralized planning, based on controlling on the national level, is proved to be economically and socially ineffective and undemocratic where the roles of other actors are not considered in the decision-making process (Healey 2006: 11). In the collaborative planning, the main characteristic,

which is different from that of the rational model and post-modernist approach, is being action-oriented in the practical field (less focus on theory) with concentrating on the interactions between the actors in the planning process that deal directly with power issues and conflict situations (Pallagst 2007: 49-55).

The collaborative planning acknowledges the power issues while seeking for democratization and legitimization of the decision-making in the process of planning. Governance issues are raised clearly in this process, where diversity of culture in the space, economic interests and the environment need to be conciliated (Healey 2006: 321). The role of planners is highly emphasized in this model. It is associated with ethical values, especially when it comes to conflicted interests and raising those of the powerless in decision-making processes. Planners as communicators or mediators, listeners and moderators between different parties, play a political role with their aggregated knowledge rather than just being technical experts (Pallagst 2007: 49-55). In this sense, information is their source of power to manage their political role in democratizing the planning actions or the related decision-making, which leads to shifting the whole approach of the planning to a more qualitative approach (Pallagst 2007: 51-52).

a. Raised Governance Issues in Collaborative Planning

In collaborative planning, transformative approaches to governance and policymaking were introduced. The traditional form of governance and government are changing. The failure of the government to deliver the needed product, due to lack of funding or capacity, leads to the need to connect its efforts to that of the social and economic actors for effective performance. Upgrading governance forms is essential to achieve democratic forms that are more enabling, inclusive and responding to social needs and values (Healey 2006).

This development of governance can be achieved through decentralizing the process of policymaking, by engaging the citizens in managing the resources together with the state (Healey 2006: 319-320). Transformation expected of the collaborative process is also expected to change the place, its culture and practices and to demonstrate a socially inclusive process (Healey⁵ 2003: 108).

Understanding planning in practice is linked to how the elements of urban and regional planning are interwoven with that of governance in practice (Healey 2006: 4). The 'Planning project', is a form of governance, where in the process of policymaking, the social and environmental aspects are integrated in developing the space. Developing collaborative endeavours in governance help to go beyond the technical approach to deeper recognition of physical conditions as well as the social values and interests in developing policies and projects (Healey 2006: 336-337). The main issue is how policies can help to improve spaces and at the same time achieve social justice (Healey 2003: 104). Collaborative process is conducted through:

- Engaging different actors who share equal power in the matter⁶ and share mutual respect to each other.
- They use their local experience and knowledge systematically (scientifically and technically).

⁵ Healey referred to the different definitions of collaborative process given by the authors; Innes and Booher (1999a, 2003), Fung and Wright (2001), Gunton et al. (2003) and McGuirk (2001) (cited in Healey 2006: 332).

⁶ Healey defines that episode as a period, where the collaborative effort work on developing a project, program or strategy, like urban regeneration project.

- They use the resultant knowledge or the developed capacity in creating new solutions for the matter in hand where they all agree on.
- The developed capacity of the actors supports the capacity building of the involved institution, and the institution legitimizes the outcome.
- The condition of 'inclusion' is fulfilled when all stakeholders are involved and social and environmental sustainability are supported (Healey 2006: 332).

There are various dynamics of difference to be considered in the process, among others, urban and regional aspects, unequal power relations, and different social, economic, and environmental interests. Hence, the change in the relationships between space, time, people, culture, and economy through information technology has brought varied interests to places and with that also conflicted political interests (Healey 2006: 315-316). The diversity in culture in the space generates conflict within the cultural mixture and with power structure of economy implied in the (state) governance structure. The challenge in planning is how to achieve, within this environment of diversity, the coexistence in the shared spaces. Collaborative processes and deliberative democracy are fields of practice applied in ICs to face this challenge (Healey 2006: 321). In this regard, collaborative efforts seek to achieve coexistence and resolve conflicts that may arise from this diversity in the space. People's role, in this process, is to manage the conflicts and establish a form of governance that meets the existing global and local conditions (Healey 2006: 199).

b. Critique on Collaborative Planning

Collaborative planning is criticized while it cannot be considered a theory dealing with a particular state of affairs in planning, which makes it difficult to generalize or produce models of solutions in practice (Pallagst 2007: 53). Unlike the rational model which deals with analytical work, collaborative planning concentrates on the process itself of deliberation and decision-making (Haeley 2003: 110; Pallagst 2007: 53), in this respect " *[...] it focuses on processes of negotiation, deliberation and decision-making rather than providing 'real' analysis.* " (Pallagst 2007: 53, Based on the argumentations by Tylor 1999 and Fainstein 1995). This process does not necessarily consider the social and environmental sustainability as aims of the collaborative approaches outcomes (Haeley 2003). In these processes, it seems that the planners role is the central aspect rather than the 'outcome or the context' of the process (Pallagst 2007: 53). The Process should not be understood separately from that of the essence it has, they are one thing. Moreover, as a process, it aims to produce specific results in the end, like in the case of involving people in governance, which is expected to result in incrementally building their capacity for the next project or the next 'governance episode' (Haeley 2003: 111).

Moreover, collaborative planning with the high aims of democratization is an 'idealistic concept', because in reality managing the participatory process ends up as a top-down action, where planners in the practical field or the collaborative process after all are the ones who decide on the participants in the decision-making process (Pallagst 2007: 53). It is mostly the case that collaborative approaches and their purposes can be seen as another face for corporatism. Practices of inclusion are seen as cover for support existing powers in legitimizing their policy plans (Healey 2006: 320-323). Therefore, in any case study, the interaction between the institutions and the people and the particular conditions should be analyzed, since without specification, communicative or collaborative approach can result in maintaining the power structure existed rather than promoting inclusive urban governance process. Hence, it depends on the practical approach of what focus the planner has in the communicative or

collaborative endeavor. When it is really about the inclusivity of the urban governance process, then there should be a deep analysis of the qualitative indicators of a space, of how the collaborative or communicative process helps to achieve this aim and then corresponding criteria for this aim can be developed (Healey 2003: 111-112). Communication should be considered as means to support the existing interests rather than adopting the ‘democratic consensus building’ recommended in the postmodernist perspective of Flyvbjerg (1998) (Pallagst 2007: 53).

In ‘collaborative planning’ or ‘collaborative policymaking’, dialog is important between different forces in governing collective action to achieve coexistence in shared spaces. However, in the planning process, there is a struggle between these forces, which in ideas and practice they try to return to the rational and corporatist modes, or a new mode of entrepreneurial consensus (emerged through neoliberalism) rather than regulatory governance (Healey 2006: 320).

Finally, in analyzing the governance processes, power relations should be examined and the result of consensus should be critically examined. In case of conflict over strategies, there is the risk that through the process of consensus building a process of 'co-option' of participants to agree on the arguments of the dominant participants (Healy 2003: 114). Another risk of the collaborative process that when seeking consensus, avoiding situations of conflict does not seem to lead to a real change of existing powers (Healy 2006: 320).

Identified aspects in collaborative planning	
Process of planning and methods	focus on the democratic planning process with qualitative approach based on communication and dialog
Actors and stakeholders	all actors are included; all sectors, institutions and citizens
Role of planners	mediators, communicators and moderators
Approach to power and power relations	mostly a top-down decision-making, negotiations, consensus building and conflicts resolution

Table 6: Identified aspects in collaborative planning, summarized by the author.

In sum, collaborative planning has raised new concepts on the processes of participatory planning and governance, focusing on the role of the actors involved including; the planners, the institutions, the citizens, in addition to the role of information and knowledge combined in a sustainable framework of action. Some risks were identified, which can undermine the participatory approach in collaborative planning, like avoiding conflicting interests in the process aiming at consensus building that leads to exclusion, in addition to that a top-down decision-making is mostly the outcome of the process.

2.1.3. Connecting the Concepts of Participatory Approaches in Planning and Development

In the view of the development of communicative planning and collaborative planning, channeling these concepts into the development field had dominated the methodological approaches of the DAs in DCs in the last decades. The deliberative approach in the communicative planning forms was not just criticized in planning practices in ICs, referring to the discussion above; the implications of the concepts of participation have been also problematized in development in DCs.

The participatory approach in planning developed in ICs has been adjusted to the development approaches adopted by DAs in DCs. In practice, the role of the participatory approach was evident merely in exposing the social inequalities in DCs (Watson 2007; Connelly 2010; Huxley 2013: 1532). Transferring participatory practices that were seen as solution for problems of ineffectiveness of planning policies required studying the spatial and conditional time-related properties (Huxley 2013: 1537). Particularly in the political sphere and regarding power relations, examining the planning

practices need to consider the political, socio-cultural settings of a country “*Different political cultures produce very different kinds of planning.*”, because travelling ideas of planning to other places and the differences in the political frameworks define the planning process and the product of planning (Friedmann 1998).

Raising the governance issues in participatory planning discourses, the participation is considered a governance action to solve particular spatial related problems through dialogue: “*The ubiquitous debates about participation in planning indicate that participation is a governing statement in a problem-space within which particular kinds of issues have been identified, questions raised and solutions argued over.*” (Huxley 2013: 1536). In this regard, there is a need to examine the participatory approach in planning in each particular context, where the basic elements of governance can be examined. Hence, the following section will focus on understanding participatory planning and the PUPAs in DCs in its methodological realization in development in theory and practice.

2.2. Participatory Approaches in Urban Planning and Development

The planning practice in DCs returns to the history of colonialism and today’s planning theories transferred through development approaches (Escobar 2010: 149-150; Booth 2011: 20). In this regard, development endeavors provided the channel where the advanced thinking and experience were applied in different fields, like planning and science (ibid): “*Science and planning [...] are seen as neutral, desirable and universally applicable, while, in truth, an entire and particular rationality and civilizational experience being transferred to the third world through the process of ‘development’.*” (Escobar 2010: 149-150).

Participation in planning indicated in the development endeavors in DCs have been developed in Chambers’s papers and methods in the eighties and have been adopted in the framework of rural development projects. However, the conception of participation in development had started even before introducing of the PRA. The Brazilian educationalist, Paulo Freire (1921–1997). With his concepts on the need for dialogue in development projects, in the fifties, he raised one of the influential concepts to participatory development. His focus was on the concept of dialogue with people and the poor to understand the social, political and economic circumstances before taking action for helping them. His ideas have influenced the NGOs highlighting the necessity to access to information and the importance of participation to achieve better living conditions (Dee et al. 2010). This approach started to dominate the development discourses of the fifties among the DAs, also the rise of the words “participation” and “participatory” in the development (Rahnema 2010). The projects workers realized that excluding people from formulating and realizing the development projects is the reason why these projects failed and as a result led to more poverty in DCs. This reality led to promoting the engagement of the people by development actors, planners, and NGOs in the development projects to promote their success. The change in the strategy was adopted by the DAs as well as national governments in DCs, even in countries where governments do not support democracy, like in authoritarian regimes (Rahnema 2010: 128-129).

Participatory development and its techniques were introduced in the eighties by Robert Chambers. Chambers called for including the marginalized in the development process by his paper *Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)*⁷ (Guijt 1998; Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari 2001: 5; Anthony Bebbington: 2006).

⁷ There is a need to differentiate the acronym PRA in definition and application between Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) and the Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA) (see appendix 3).

Robert Chambers' papers and methods were recognized as a pioneering reference for the participatory approaches in development (Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari 2001: 5). With Chambers' critical view of the attitude of development actors and practitioners dealing with the problems of the poor in the rural areas, he called for a critical approach to their work. He refers to the need for a reversal in learning using the knowledge of the poor in evaluating and solving the problems, while developing the methodologies for that purpose in the *Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA)*, that had provided a new view for development (Chambers 1983).

Opposing to the prevailing top-down approaches, Chambers called for empowering local people and engaging them in decision-making to find solutions for their problems that are consistent with their cultural environment (Chambers 1983). Chambers considers participation as an instrument and as an objective at the same time. Since the eighties, he claimed the need to give the poor and the marginalized the right to decide on the solution of their problems, and empower them to participate and decide on the policy-making and implementation processes (Chambers 1983). Empowerment is perceived in the ability to share the power and to collaborate and participate in the decision-making process (Kreisberg 1992). Yet, as an objective, empowerment depends strongly on the existing power relations, which can change and expand (Page and Czuba 1999).

Hence, "Participatory Development" emerged from conditions where the development efforts have failed in the eighties to empower the poor. The state's top-down modernization approaches and post-colonial political structures were the conditions for emerging of participation in development (Hickey and Mohan 2004: 9). In this regard, adopting participatory approaches in development in the 1980s and 1990s was connected to the ideas of sustainability and empowerment of the poor to take part in improving their living conditions (Hickey and Mohan 2004). Understanding participation in respect thereof, ranges from being a tool for undertaking the development project effectively and as a goal to achieve social justice, where social marginalization exists (Tuftte and Mefalopulos 2009: 4).

2.2.1. A Critical View on Participatory Approaches in Planning and Development

Participatory approaches in the nineties showed a need to critically observing the power dynamics between "institutions" and "communities" (Frances 1999: 600-609). While looking on the technical approach of participation adopted in development, there should be an examination of the political constraints and power dynamics imposed on participatory approaches (Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari 2001: 5; Hickey and Mohan 2004: 4). Furthermore, lacking an examination of the political constraints and power dynamics confronting participatory approaches, these approaches have implied a "tyrannical" element by supporting existing power structures, where a real empowerment of the marginalized is disregarded (Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari 2001: 5; Hickey and Mohan 2004: 4).

Participatory approaches in development can only be successfully applied when they are supported politically (Hickey and Mohan 2004: 9). Therefore, the effectiveness of participation in DCs is contested compared to the potentials and favorable outcomes seen particularly in ICs. It has been shown that the aims of participation are usually unclear and the involved risks are underestimated, like reinforcing existing political structures and increasing of social inequalities and marginalization (Hickey and Mohan 2004). Especially in neoliberal conditions, participation is seen to play a role in political change through empowerment in governance but this role is rather in conflict with the aims for social justice versus fulfilling its role expected in a neoliberal environment (Connelly 2010: 334).

Participatory development has been criticized for being focused on the locals and the work of the development experts and where participation is applied as technical method of development rather than as “*political methodology of empowerment*” (Hickey and Mohan 2004: 11). In responding to the critique of participatory development, Hickey and Mohan (2004) mentioned three approaches that need to be adopted in development to embrace their potentials. These approaches are: (1) the participatory approach need to be scaled up and the methodologies of participation should be verified, (2) the political limitation of participation can be dealt with through a new conceptualizing of participation in the form of participatory governance. This through considering the institutional structure and focusing on ensuring the political rights and citizenship, (3) participation as it is should be completely rejected and alternative development and new forms for development without participation as it is recent form should be adopted (Hickey and Mohan 2004: 12).

In the planning realm, development projects provide the platform to apply participatory approaches in practice. These approaches have been also questioned in planning practices and the related participatory development concepts. In development projects, participatory approaches are seen to offer solutions to the development problems in DCs. Yet, solving development problems in this case depends on taking part in community activities for decision-making, a condition that disregards the political content of the participatory processes (Huxley 2013: 1536-1537). This assumption has started only recently to be discussed in planning (Hickey and Mohan 2004; Roy 2008: 93; and Rankin 2009; and Huxley 2013: 1535).

The participatory approach was recognized in its potential to empower people to take part in the project and formulate strategies for implementation to contribute to the project effectiveness. This contributes to social inclusion, raises a sense of ownership and responsibility and promotes empowerment and democratization. However, it has been argued that after twenty years of adopting participatory approaches in development, they resulted in exclusion, dis-empowering and reinforcing marginalizing aspects (Hickey and Mohan: 2004; Piffero 2009). The participatory approach in development projects has been criticized in the last years, due to its mandatory aspect, where people have to participate in projects initiated by others, like planners, politicians, NGOs, etc. (Huxley 2013: 1536). In this respect, participation has been used as a technical tool rather than a political method for empowerment (Hickey and Mohan 2004). The participatory approach with its liberal basis, methods, as well as its effects, has just showed the inequalities in DCs (Huxley 2013: 1535). It has rarely led to giving up the power to the people in the decision-making process; yet, it had rather the form of consultation and gathering of data. Hence, for successfully applying participatory planning approaches, important pre-conditions have to be considered, e.g., the local governance settings, social and political frameworks, and the financial resources (UN-Habitat 2009: 65; Connelly 2010: 333).

Moreover, participation is considered a northern approach and the participatory approach in the inherited and practiced planning cultures in DCs does not exist (Connelly 2010: 335; Lombard 2013: 136), even in the social culture and institutional structures in DCs. In dictatorship regimes, participation does not exist and traditional society do not have participation while modern society has it (Rahnama 2010). Participation was introduced formally by the international development agencies, whose actors play the main role in introducing, designing, developing and implementing the participatory planning process. The question posed, in this respect, is on the appropriateness of the participatory approach considering the differences in the character of the urban problems and the given institutional and political frameworks in DCs and ICs (Watson 2009; Connelly 2010: 335). In the professional field of

development, risks and deficits are lying in practice, where participation for empowerment is used as a buzzword to gain the required funding for development projects (Page and Czuba 1999). Accordingly, empowerment exists as a new way to legitimize development without scrutinizing the context (Rahnema 2010). When political and social settings are not examined before adopting the participatory approach, participation can be seen as an instrument to gain financial support for development projects.

Furthermore, the perception of *"The power of the powerless"* in development is mostly understood as non-power. Yet, it exists differently in its social context, for example in the form of informal networks, like in the family or clans (Rahnema 2010: 135). The fact against empowerment principle is that, the poor are usually excluded or do not have access even to civil associations. Therefore, in the decision-making process, governments would still exclude them and focus merely on the role of the civil associations (Abers 1998: 40). According to their power, people need different tools of empowerment in order to lead an effective development process (Dee et al. 2010: 28). This can only happen with political support, because participation in development is a process that cannot happen without the political will. Moreover, any success of participation in development would not be attributed to specific innovation in institutional initiatives but to the political will for a radical approach to development (Hickey and Mohan 2004: 3).

To sum up, participatory approaches in development and planning decision-making processes are mostly used as technical instruments, which had led to disempowerment of the local people in the past. Participatory approaches had led to more exclusion, while disregarding the political framework and power relations. Viewing the participatory approach as a transferred approach from ICs, there is a need to consider the social settings in terms of evolving informal networks and initiatives and understanding the governance structures and power relations, for example, based on the organizational system and governance modes.

2.2.2. Participatory Development and Governance

A new understanding of development theory links the common aspects between participatory development and governance, like; the role of development, state, democracy and civil society, particularly, the role of DAs in the participatory process. From the mid-nineties, social capital for economic development was the focus, while the end of the decade marked a rise of participatory governance and citizen participation through involving the citizens, the civil society, the private sector, and state institutions. Furthering the participatory approach and methods of governance, forms of partnerships need to be developed in institutional reforms and should be adopted through decentralization, promoting bottom-up cooperation as well as social empowerment: *"Convergence of social and political participation, scaling-up of participatory methods, state civic partnerships, decentralization, participatory budgeting, citizens' hearings, participatory poverty assessments, PRSP consultations"* (Hickey and Mohan 2004: 8-10).

In understanding the role of the civil society and citizens in participatory governance, there are two dimensions to consider regarding citizenship; the political participation (national level) and the community development approach through civil society activities in the planning process (Hickey and Mohan 2004: 9). Citizenship is about *"legal rights and responsibilities conferred by the state"* (Hickey and Mohan 2004: 12), *"Citizenship is multiple ranging from membership in the human community and the national polity down to city and neighborhood."* (Friedman 1998: 27; cited from Holston 1995). It includes both engagements in decision-making on community level and active political role on the

institutional level. Participatory governance is the pool to include the political dimensions in redefining citizenship role in the transformation of development approaches (Hickey and Mohan 2004: 12). Yet, citizenship entails also rights and responsibilities, which can come to conflict with each other, but as an ethical duty we should commit to it (Friedman 1998: 27). Promoting citizenship is essential for participatory approaches to be transformative. However, if citizenship cannot be achieved, these approaches will still be favored if they consider a gradual approach in the participation transformative effects (Hickey and Mohan 2004: 20).

Participation role in transforming development practice and political relations is perceived in eliminating social and institutional limitations that can lead to social exclusion and support those, which ensure social inclusion. In this regard, participatory development seeks a kind of transformation of political structure or powers, which is mostly unrealistic especially when transformation is not deliberated with regard to the levels, time span and principles (Hickey and Mohan 2004: 13, 21). The structural transformation in the development discourses is understood in the need for democratization, decentralization, partnerships and public participation. Practices of political participation in different countries, when integrated into practices of democracy, can lead to involving people in governance along with different actors from the government and other sectors. Spatial practices provide a good example for democratic practices of public engagement and social change: “[...] *Thinking spatially can help towards building strategies for more genuinely transformative social action [...]*” (Cornwall 2004: 75). They can also serve as platforms that show different power dynamics. Negotiations in case of conflicted interests in the planning field presents planning as the medium in the politics, where planners mediate the society interests with other actors, as the state, the private sector and civil society (Friedmann 1998: 252). In cases of conflicted interests, participatory planning approaches means moving to deliberative mode of planning that leads to empowerment through participation (Silver et al. 2010) cited in Lombard, 2013). Citizen participation poses the question of how to apply democracy, highlighting the potential of participation in building democracy and ensuring the rights of the poor in the development. Yet, development projects tend to present participation in development through community participation, which does not discuss the relation of community participation and citizenship (Gaventa 2004 in Hickey and Mohan 2004: 25).

Facilitating the transformation in planning and policy through democratization is presented in the practices of participatory governance. The widespread practices of participatory governance in Latin America were an outcome of the political transformation from an autocratic to a democratic government. In Brazil, for example, the democratic transformation had paved the way to mobilize an active civil society and acknowledge its role in policy formation on the local level through participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre in 1989 (Irazábal 2009). However, the political transformation in the Latin American case did not necessarily lead to change the planning traditions through adopting the participatory planning approach. This is because the political elites do mostly control planning through the technocratic approach, despite the lack of planning expertise. Similar outcomes were witnessed in other regions in the world; the weakness of the governments in Asia, the lack of resources and capacity at the local level, and in some cases outdated legal framework as well as corruption within government institutions had hindered effective participatory processes. Likewise in Sub-Saharan Africa, introducing participatory planning approaches in the eighties had failed due to the weakness on the institutional level in planning and management (UN-Habitat 2009: 97-99). Dealing with institutional weaknesses, the move to participatory governance in development presents a transformative form of participation

and a new definition of citizenship in the political realms; a form of “*multi-scaled citizenship*” that is essential for forming a legitimate participation in development (Hickey and Mohan 2004: 12). In participatory governance, the role of civil society is essential for deliberations to affect policymaking through citizens’ mobilization: “*Civil society provides the citizen-based mobilization necessary to create vibrant public deliberations as well as to engage in incremental policymaking processes.*” (Wampler and McNulty 2011: 14). To ensure a successful participation of civil society, active citizenship and equity should be politically promoted. In addition, providing the legal framework for participation, empowering the local government and local experts, promoting transparent information systems among the actors, particularly for local communities, all these elements are crucial to support an effective participatory process (UN-Habitat 2013: 17 based on cases studies from different countries).

The role of the civil society in adopting and managing participatory approaches vary from one country to another and the understanding of its role do vary inherently in DCs and ICs. Civil society refers to the voluntary forms of organizations between the state and the citizens represented by NGOs, non-profit associations, informal organizations concerning with public interests and self-help organizations (based on Mitlin (1999: 5) cited in Herrle et al. 2016: 14). Since the nineties, the role of the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) was given more attention through the collaboration with grassroots organizations and NGOs and their work is recognized in urban development projects and housing (ibid). When talking about civil society, the word *community* is used in general terms. The last decades have witnessed a new awakening of civil society, particularly in Latin America and Eastern Europe, with growing tendency in the world to develop an “*inclusive participatory model of democracy*”. This has brought civil society in a very close link to the existed political values (Friedmann 1998: 251). Particularly in the northern context, the change of the role of planning in favor of entrepreneurial planning, referred to by Healey 2006, marked a shift where an enabled civil society was rising, and the role of the state and the market were diminishing (Healey 2006).

International development agencies have adopted a “*New Policy Agenda*” since the end of the Cold War in 1989, where the role of the NGOs and GROs is given more importance in poverty reduction, social welfare and the development of civil society, in addition to their role in democratization. Accordingly, each DA has its agenda adjusted to their development focus area (Robinson 1993 cited in Eiweida 2000: 38 and Edwards. M. and D. Hulme 1998: 6). Promoting the activities of the private sector in service delivery and producing goods (for economic growth), which involve the “*local NGOs and GROs*” was one of the approaches of the development agencies in DCs. Despite the imperfection of the private sector, it is favored compared to the imperfect role of the state in DCs (Colclough and Manor 1991: 7 cited in Eiweida 2000: 38 and Edwards, M. and D. Hulme 1998: 6). CSOs can be non-governmental and non-market bodies, they vary according to their purpose and philosophy, expertise and scope of activities. Most familiar forms are service-oriented organizations, community organizations and professional groups like syndicates. They have a structural governance and organizational framework; they operate according to legislative regulations and defend the public interest without being politically influenced. Since in practice, political interests interfere with their areas of public interest, forms of semi-governmental CSOs arise, like social agencies or state based unions, which lack freedom in action and operate under state supervision (UNDP 2008: 5). The role of the CSOs was getting more importance in the last decade. An active civil society helps in accessing the benefits in the city for underrepresented groups of women, youth and the poor. Therefore, CSOs contribute immensely to development projects and community development. On one hand, through

implementing planning projects which are of priority for the poor, and improving governance on the other hand through the pressure on the local government to ensure an effective utilization of the resources for implementing these projects (Eiweida 2000: 37).

2.2.3. Participatory Urban Governance: Aims and Practices

Planning and governance have been discussed closely in collaborative planning discourses in ICs or where different planning aspects, if urban or regional, are linked to the governance process in practice. Aside from the technical approach of planning, the 'planning project', as a form of governance, should consider social values and environmental aspects in policymaking, while trying to achieve an inclusive process of all actors (Healey 2003; 2006).

Examining these ideas in urban development practices, participation had more representation in the urban reform strategies through participatory urban governance since the nineties (Hickey and Mohan 2004; Wampler and McNulty 2015). Governance is participatory, when citizens are allowed to influence the public policy and participatory governance differs from direct democracy and deliberative democracy in ICs in that it allows citizens to directly influence local policy decisions (Wampler and McNulty 2011: 6). Through urban governance, diverse and conflicting interests of all actors should be considered in planning and managing the common affairs of the city, including not just formal institutions but also informal structures and the social capital of citizens (Pieterse 2000: 12).

The participatory governance approach is perceived in relation to today's urban development trends and strategies, like sustainable development and good urban governance (Connelly 2010; Lombard 2013). This is embedded in the aims of the UN-Habitat approaches of the UMP in achieving democratic and effective municipal performance, empowering the civil society and providing the environment for a dynamic private sector. These three actors should eventually have the tools to act together in urban planning and governance processes (Pieterse 2000: 17). Participatory governance has been presented by the UN in equivalence to good governance; where the citizens should be involved in meeting the good governance criteria⁸, *inter alia*, trust and mutual political responsibility, inclusiveness, active role of the citizens, accountability, transparency in policy decision-making and the rule of law (Pieterse 2000: 11-13).

The participatory approach of governance has its roots in the need for democratization and decentralization to effectively manage public affairs. Therefore, it has been adopted, in most cases, in response to the challenges of democracy deficiencies (Wampler and McNulty 2011: 7). The participatory process is embraced as a reform approach where political and economic conditions are challenged, like lack of transparency or the urge for political change is needed through democratization (*ibid*). Decentralization requires a competent centralized state in coordinating with other governmental levels, in addition to a strong civil society to enable knowledge exchange and participation. It also needs organized political force that can act independently from the central state and have the tact working-together with the social movements which support decentralization (Heller 2001: 139). Hence, the preconditions to enable participatory governance are sought in ensuring the political support and regulatory frameworks on all levels and among the actors, institutional reform through decentralization and municipal capacity building, integrating participatory governance

⁸ Criteria of good governance (UN): participation, rule of law, transparency, consensus orientation, equity, effectiveness, efficiency and accountability and strategic vision (UN-HABITAT 2017a).

approaches to urban management through “*clear incentive systems*”, clear plans and monitoring measures, inclusive participation and empowering the citizens (Pieterse 2000: 19).

The dimensions of participatory urban governance include the national, urban and local scales, in addition to the external relations. On each of these scales, interventions should be taken in the policy decision-making to support participatory governance. For example, on the national level the regulatory framework and decentralization arrangements should be provided (Pieterse 2000: 20). On the urban level, participatory urban governance is an option, when rapid urbanizations raise the challenges on local policy (Paul Smoke in Wampler and McNulty 2011: 16). Collaborative action between urban actors through consultation and formalization the related processes should be supported. On the local level, citizens should be engaged in municipal policy reforms and management to ensure among others effective service delivery. Through external relations, partnerships with the private sector, CSOs and other citizenry organizational and non-organizational bodies will be built, and they will be engaged in the planning and implementation of the municipal plans (Pieterse 2000: 20 see appendix 4).

In the context where participatory urban governance has been adopted, participatory arrangements and structures are initiated to facilitate implementing the participatory process. Participatory institutions are usually assigned structures from the national level to facilitate the participation of different actors and citizens in the policy decision-making or the project.

This can be attributed to having unqualified representative institutions, where the local government is incapable to fulfill their duties due to the lack of skilled staff or resources, is one reason for initiating these institutions. Another reason is the lack of trust between the involved actors and the governmental institutions, due to a history of lack of transparency, unaccountability or ineffective political role (Pieterse 2000; Wampler and McNulty 2011). Participatory governance institutions should include representatives of all participatory parties or stakeholders from the government, elected leaders from the citizens, CSOs and CBOs, businesses and external actors from DAs as moderators. The effectiveness of the participatory institutions to influence the policy or achieve the expected impact is determined by the state capacity. Therefore, such institutions are required in cases of policy reforms where the state policies are ineffective or the local governments are weak. However, when the state is ineffective, these institutions would rather have no impact (Wampler and McNulty 2011: 11).

The economic environment is also important for supporting the participatory approach. For example, scarce resources can hinder the benefits of participation, especially when the majority of the locals are poor and cannot pay the taxes. Therefore, a functioning participatory process requires financial backing, where people contribute to public revenues and support the state capacity through their organizational activities. Participatory budgeting is one example of participatory governance, where the economic environment allows participatory governance. On the contrary, lack of resources in many DCs, in addition to having poor conditions for education and economic development, hinder the civil society from thriving, who lacks the resources to operate in participatory institutions. Yet, active groups in the civil society can play the role of propelling the economy through their active participation (Wampler and McNulty 2011: 15).

The challenges of participatory urban governance, as mentioned above, are particularly posed in the efforts for democratization, decentralization and in affecting political power dynamics especially in a neoliberal environment. There are doubts around the difference democracy can make for development, chiefly in addressing the social and economic inequalities in DCs. Dealing with these

issues and at the same making the democratic transition, require ensuring a solid basis of the grassroots movements, which need to be supported by the state to claim their social and political rights. In most of the cases, the collective action of the locals is disempowered due to the authoritarian power, income inequalities, through capital accumulation and social divergences (Heller 2001). Moreover, in the contested urban space, managing power relations requires tools and policies that consider the different interests of the actors and ensure promoting environment for participation (Pieterse 2000: 14). Measures for decentralization are usually led by DAs and mostly end up with the domination of neoliberalism, where the state remains in the background but the bureaucracies increase and social services turn to be subject to the market dynamics (Heller 2001: 131-132). Participation as an essential component in the decentralization and improving local governance, it plays an important role in the political transition and democratization through empowerment in governance. This role is rather in conflict with the aims for social justice versus fulfilling the expected role of participation in a neoliberal environment (Connelly 2010: 334) through focusing consensus building and political co-option of social groups. Furthermore, democracy in DCs is limited to elections and social development, empowerment and promoting citizenship to practice participation in governance is not supported (Heller 2001: 131-132). The shift to decentralization is expected to replace the centralized and bureaucratic structures of the state, where the local government is empowered for more efficiency, accountability and participation (Pieters 2000; Heller 2001). This, however, does not ensure a democratic mode of governance where people are given the power to participate and make decisions in governance, as Heller (2001) expresses it "*to govern is to exercise power*" (Heller 2001: 132).

2.2.3.1. Expected Impact of PUG Practices and Programs

Initiating participatory institutions intends to allow the people to claim their rights in deciding on the policy decision-making process, particularly in undemocratic or authoritarian contexts (Wampler and McNulty 2011: 26).

The impact of implementing the programs of participatory governance is supposed to achieve tangible improvements for all groups. This, in turn, is hard to evaluate in terms of the impact of the process itself in these six areas:

- (1) Individual-level capabilities
- (2) Civil society publics
- (3) State reform
- (4) Democracy (Interest mediation, Representation and Deliberation)
- (5) Public policy outcomes
- (6) Social well-being

Analyzing the impacts in these areas should take into consideration the intersection between them (Wampler and McNulty 2011: 27). Since energy, resources and time are invested in participatory governance programs, evaluation of the impact helps not only to improve these programs, but it also helps the recipients of the governments and citizens to act effectively drawing the ultimate benefits of the outcomes (Gaventa and Barrett 2010; Wampler and McNulty 2011; 2015).

Recent studies have presented remarkable results of analyzed case studies and their impacts on citizen engagement in the participatory governance programs, like the research by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS). The researchers took 100 case studies from 20 countries for analysis and

evaluation of the impact. They considered the following factors in their examination to develop a typology for better democratic development: "(a) the construction of citizenship, (b) the strengthening of practices of participation, (c) the strengthening of responsive and accountable states, and (d) the development of inclusive and cohesive societies." (Gaventa and Barrett, 2010: 5; Wampler and McNulty 2015: 6). The results have shown that the impact in 75% of the cases was positive (Gaventa and Barrett 2010: 25; Wampler and McNulty 2015: 6).

Another study by the World Bank on evaluating the World Bank programs, which focus on participation, have unfolded different outcomes. Positive impacts were seen on the resources sustainability and infrastructure quality when community involvement is increased especially in developed and politically supported regions (Mansuri and Rao 2013; Wampler and McNulty 2015: 6). Project design and implementation are important factors that lead to include just strong local governments and exclude the poor ones. Weak impacts were observed in the emerged inequalities, lack of local management capacity of infrastructure and natural resources. When decentralization was adopted, the central government tend to exercise more control depriving the local level of incentives and limiting the benefits from the resources for the community (Mansuri and Rao 2013).

Comparative research of Brazilian cities has shown that the cities, which adopted participatory budgeting, compared with other cities which did not adopt this approach, had positive effects on the civil society' active role and communication with the government in changing the urban policies (Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva 2011; Wampler and McNulty 2015: 6). The impact is observed in social improvements in these cities, like in health, education and sanitation. These are some areas on which the municipal budget has been spent, in addition to improved policy actions and governmental performance. Where political support of the leftist party was attendant, improved life conditions were attained, which is attributed to the institutionalizing of the participatory governance and the resultant policies (Wampler and McNulty 2015: 7 cited from Touchton and Warnpier 2014).

2.2.3.2. *Patterns and Practices of Participatory Urban Governance*

The participatory governance approach is usually adopted as a response to the economic or political challenges. It accompanies institutional reform in cases like corruption or an urgent need for political change through democratization. In the case of local policy problems, adopting participatory urban governance emanates as an approach to deal with uncontrolled urbanization processes. The adoption of participatory governance can be observed in patterns such as: top-down, bottom-up or a mix of both forms (Wampler and McNulty 2011: 16):

- Bottom up: evolves from the local level organically as a response to the local or citizen's needs. This form shows that organizations of citizens take the action in getting the knowledge on legal rules of the government to be able to contribute to the policy reforms, like participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre in Brazil.
- Top-down: is usually fostered by the national government in its constitutional reform, or by international development actors, e.g., institutionalized participation in Uganda, Peru, Bolivia (see appendix 5).
- Mixed of both previous patterns: a spectrum of both patterns still need to be sorted considering the settings of the individual case study, e.g., Kerala "*People's Campaign for Decentralized Planning*" implemented within the national framework of decentralization and

institutionalizing rural participation of India, in addition to a well-developed local and civic activism (Wampler and McNulty 2011).

From these examples, participatory urban governance practices in Kerala/ India and Porto Alegre/Brazil were successful and turned to be leading models transferred to other countries. Other cases, like in Uganda⁹, the participatory governance in practice had faced many challenges, among others: ineffective decentralization, lack of technical expertise, corruption and patronage (Francis and James 2003; Steiner 2006; Wampler and McNulty 2011).

In this respect, the practices of participatory urban governance in Kerala and Porto Alegre will be described and the success factors will be examined, mainly regarding the political and institutional support, the civil society nature and activities, the participatory process and participatory structures or institutions.

i. Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil

Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a participatory governance practice and a planning approach adopted on the local level. It is seen as a revolutionary approach for municipal reform in developing and developed countries. It is considered a model for participatory governance and essential practice in urban management and development. PB seeks to raise the awareness of the government to the needs of the poor communities through decentralizing of public investments. The aim is to build an institutional structure that promotes public participation that can empower people for decision-making and anchor a culture of participation to improve governance through eradicating corruption and clientelism (UN-Habitat 2001a: 70).

Through the yearly process of PB, local stakeholders¹⁰ attend meetings to deliberate, negotiate with representatives of the government and make the decision on where and how the municipal budget should be spent. They decide regarding the public policies and urban, social and economic projects, which should be implemented by the local government. They represent through the process public interests, particularly of the poor on the neighborhood and city level. The implementation of the policies and the projects are carried out under the oversight of a committee of elected community representatives (Abers 1998, 2006; World Bank 2002: 124; Wampler and McNulty 2011).

The governmental influence in the PB' program is reduced and the work is delegated to the associations and individuals in the society regarding the costs and mobilization. This can be easily organized on small-scale projects, where in the framework of big development projects, national resources to mobilize and enable civil organizations are required (Abers 1998: 39). Moreover, priorities for development and resources reallocation are arranged according to the local needs, with taking into consideration the city needs. They are negotiated and adjusted accordingly each year in the budget plan (Heller 2001: 141). Participatory forums are initiated to discuss regional, city and sectoral budgeting plans, for example, on the city level, the allocation of resources for urban planning and development, and sectoral forums to discuss the needs for spending on education or health, etc. (Heller 2001: 141; Baiocchi 2001; Abers 2004: 4).

⁹ It is worth to mention that throughout the implementation of the participatory approach, different challenges could emerge, which need to be analyzed individually in each case, and elaborated in a comparative study (for comparative cases see Heller 2001; Goldfrank 2011, Wampler and McNulty 2011; 2015; Mansuri and Rao 2013; Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva 2011). This research focuses mainly on comparing two case studies in the context of the Arab region.

¹⁰ Stakeholders from general public, women, poor and vulnerable groups, civil society associations, the private sector, representative assemblies or parliaments, and donors (World Bank 2002: 124).

In the three stages of participatory budgeting, citizens have an essential role in:

- 1) analyzing and formulating the budget, including identifying priorities regarding local needs and evaluating the governmental policies and accountability,
- 2) monitoring the funds flow to the implementing agencies, and
- 3) controlling the quality of the service delivery, compared to the invested resources (World Bank 2002: 124).

The preconditions for achieving PB in Porto Alegre are embodied mainly by the political and institutional support of the process and the active civil society and social movements. The supported political framework is represented by the democratization process that took place in the eighties induced by vigorous social movements supported by intellectuals and politicians (Heller 2001; Abers 1998, 2004, 2006). It is until 1989 when the leftist party¹¹ came into power in the city of Porto Alegre, that the PB put into action. The leadership of the party changed the areas of expenditures to small-scale projects, so the excluded groups were included and empowered (Abers 1998: 40). The ruling leftist party with the civil society worked together, put the rules of the PB and formalized the corporate work with the citizens for policy decision-making process (Heller 2001; Abers 1998, 2004, 2006).

The success¹² of PB is the PB process itself. The outcome is expressed through institutionalizing and transferring the PB, issuing new pro-poor policies and implementing projects, which have been prioritized by the participants, targeting improvements in the poor neighborhoods (Abers 1998; World Bank 2002: 124). For example, regarding urban development is initiating *"The Right to the City campaign in Brazil"* which allowed more improvements in the urban planning. For example, the support of local government of land use reform, giving the poor land use rights. Moreover, according to the law, by institutionalizing the participatory process, it gave them the right to participate in planning their physical environment (Gaventa and Barret 2010: 44 cited from Avritzer 2010).

The impact of the participatory approach in Porto Alegre is seen in the improved local government performance and efficiency, which is attributed to the intensive and constructive interactions throughout the PB between the involved actors from the society and the local government. The mutual influence and complementary roles are emphasized in the exchange of technical and local knowledge between the state and civil society in managing the participatory process (Abers 1998: 41; Heller 2001). Particularly the formed synergies were maintained through continuity of the communication and dialogue between council representatives and municipal administration, which bridged the gap between technocratic approach and participation (Heller 2001: 140). Well- educated participants in the councils have influenced the local government performance through providing feedback and deliberating over the technical details in the proposals (Heller 2001: 140, Abers 2004: 4).

The number of the CSOs have been increased since the initiation and institutionalizing of PB and respectively the participatory practices (Heller 2001: 140; Baiocchi 2001). The positive impact is noticeable, particularly in the cities which adopted the PB, where the dialog was encouraged between

¹¹ *"Created in 1980, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT or Workers' Party) was a democratic socialist party comprised of a diverse coalition of social movements and radical union groups."* (Abers 2006: 82).

¹² The outcome of PB had an incremental success with time: *"In a typical year only 200 of the 1,500 requests for public projects received can be financed. Between 1996 and 1998 more than \$260 million was spent on projects selected by participants, the vast majority of them carried out in underserved and poorer districts. As of June 2000, it was estimated that nearly 100 municipalities and five states in Brazil are implementing some aspects of citizen engagement in budgetary allocations (World Bank 2002, 33). "[...] by 2011, hundreds of municipalities across Brazil adopted participatory budgeting and adapted the basic rules associated with the program to meet local needs [...]"* (Wampler 2007).

the government and the society, civil society was empowered and effective public policies were developed (World Bank 2002: 124; Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva 2011; Wampler and McNulty 2015). Promoting participation and reaching consensus in this process had helped to develop pro-poor policies and reform policies especially in developing the economy and achieving a good governance through improving the effectiveness of the government (World Bank 2002: 124).

Still, some aspects had led to limited impact of the PB approach. These impediments are related to issues of “social justice”. While most of the public resources were invested to serve the poor neighborhoods, middle and upper classes were not equally benefiting. Participants who regularly participated and dedicated themselves in time and resources, they had the advantage of acquiring more skills and power over other groups. Therefore, the participatory process should be well planned and organized to maintain balance in power among different groups (Abers 1998: 40).

ii. Participatory Development Planning in Kerala, India

As a participatory governance and planning approach in the rural areas, the participatory development planning process “*People’s Campaign for Decentralized Planning*” has been launched in 1996 in the state of Kerala (Vijayan 2004; Wampler and McNulty 2011: 13; George and Balan 2011; UN-Habitat 2013: 17). In this process, 2.5 million¹³ people have participated in the Grama Sabhas¹⁴ to take part in the policymaking process and planning for development (Isaac 2000; Heller 2001).

Having a history of social development and active popular movements in Kerala, mobilizing participation was called up naturally through the planning process, as Isaac 2000 described “*Planning as an Instrument of Social Mobilization*”. Thereby, participatory planning practice of the campaign turned to be embedded in Kerala’s “*New Civic Culture*” (Isaac 2000) (Isaac 2000; Heller 2001). This communal awareness and the commitment of the communities to the participatory process helped to recognize a participatory culture by the government and to include participatory planning process in the institutional framework¹⁵ (Vijayan 2004).

The participatory process was supported by the regulatory framework as a component of decentralization and rural participatory governance, as indicated in the constitution since 1993. The amendments to the constitution in 1993 have led to a mandatory action in including the Local Self Governing Institutions (LSGIs) in the government including seats for women (Vijayan 2004): “[...] *in 1993, the 73rd and 74th amendments to the Constitution was passed making Local Self Governing Institutions (LSGIs) mandatory as part of government. [...] In addition to one-third of the seats at all levels of local government was reserved for the election of women [...]*” (Vijayan 2004: 30).

Nonetheless, the participatory approach was not realized in practice until it gained a political impulse led by the leftist party, who supported the participatory process in the campaign in Kerala (Wampler and McNulty 2011: 13). The Left Democratic Government (LDF) was elected in Kerala in 1996. It has allocated 35 to 40% of the expenditures of the national plan for projects and programs, which are decided on by the local self-government institutions (Isaac 1999 cited in Vijayan 2004). The active parties in the region of Kerala took the initiative for a participatory development planning process

¹³ As reported in 1996 by the planning board of the campaign.

¹⁴ Grama Sabha is the meeting of the citizens to discuss the development needs of the ward.

¹⁵ “*The State Government of Kerala initiated steps for administrative re-organization and statutory change in order to institutionalize the process of local level planning and implementation by setting up an administrative reforms committee. According to their report, necessary staff was deployed and powers devolved to make the local bodies truly LSGIs.*” (Vijayan 2004: 31).

“People’s Campaign for Decentralized Planning” in 1996 (Vijayan 2004; Wampler and McNulty 2011: 13; George and Balan 2011; UN-Habitat 2013: 17).

The participatory planning and budgeting were proceeded in six stages. All the stages were participatory and had involved the people where the proposals were discussed on higher levels, and the presence of the people to take part in the discussions was essential (Vijayan 2004; George and Balan 2011). In addition, the documents were accessible to the public as set in the legal framework of the local body (George and Balan 2011). Briefly described, these stages were:

- 1) Collecting suggestions for intervention on the level of local electoral unites (wards¹⁶) by a special committee and transfer them to the local body ¹⁷;
- 2) Holding a one-day development seminar for discussing the proposals in each local body and publish a development report. The participants were from elected representatives, officials, experts and individuals from the locals/people;
- 3) Creating working groups (WG), which represent different sectors, e.g., poverty reduction, education, health, etc. The WGs translate the discussed ideas and proposals to projects. Volunteers from the locals are involved in the working groups besides the elected official of the Panchayat¹⁸ and specialist officials from the local government (Heller 2001; George and Balan 2011);
- 4) A final development plan will be prepared on the ward level/ local electoral unit. The document encloses priority projects which are nominated through a democratic process;
- 5) The plan will be approved on the district level and a technical advisory committee will examine the applicability of the priority projects and forward the changes to the local level/ ward level without influencing the decision regarding the projects;
- 6) Implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The implementation by local body, institutions, agencies and contractors. Monitoring by the local unite level or Ward, where the decision has been made (George and Balan 2011).

The projects were planned to be implemented after the government departments had made consultation meetings with the organized participatory local bodies. These local bodies can ask for professional technical consultation if they need in order to prepare the projects for implementation. In the end, the state had allocated about 35-40% of funding in the financial plan to projects developed and implemented by the LSGIs (Vijayan 2004).

Positive impacts were observed in the participatory approach in Kerala, particularly on the institutional framework. Administrative improvement was backed by decentralization measures and the constitution of new participatory structures, like the Planning Board and the Pilot Agency, which was in charge of the people’s campaign. The Planning Board has the role in setting the new structures and processes required for participatory planning. Moreover, it urged the enhanced performance of the local administration, where structures of participatory governance initiated and improvements

¹⁶ The first level of participation takes place in ward level general assemblies- Grama Sabhas_ presided by elected local panchayat officials. The citizens define development needs and elect sectoral development committees to prepare a development report (Heller 2001).

¹⁷ In the local government divisions, there are three levels, in urban areas: corporation/ city, municipality, district, local body/panchayat, ward. in rural areas: district; taluk/block (a cluster of villages); and village level (Vijayan 2004).

¹⁸ Represent the council of the local unit, for example, a village.

undertaken in the regulatory framework and good governance measures to ensure accountability, transparency, and the efficiency of the local administration (Heller 2001: 141; UN-Habitat 2013: 17). The lesson learned from the Indian case was in involving the local self-government institutions proactively in preparing the plan to take their devolved role into practice. This was achieved through providing the training for capacity building to the local bodies, preparing the database and coordinating horizontally between other departments (Heller 2001; Vijayan 2004). The successful approach in this model was the supportive role of the government to the people initiatives through training of the local bodies, providing information and coordination. This was offered regardless the preparation of the administrative capacity and needed structures (Vijayan 2004).

Further impact is through developing and reinforcing democratization and decentralization processes through participation and consultation on the local level. The development plans on the local level have been prepared and realized through a participatory process, focusing mainly on inclusiveness and improved living conditions for marginalized groups from the poor and women (Heller 2001; Vijayan 2004; UN-Habitat 2013). The success of the process of participatory planning brought forth changes, like giving more national grants and strengthening fiscal devolution to the municipal level (UN-Habitat 2013: 17). This has resulted in increased number of trained volunteers in development committees and in the working and technical groups. The council members (in Panchayat) have more power regarding their tasks and resources, besides adopting new mechanisms for accountability (Heller 2001: 142).

In this process, there were some challenges to the participatory process, like the lack of institutional capacity or administrative capacity that led to ineffectiveness in the managing of the financial funds. In addition to the conflict between the government actors and the elected political due to the gaps in experience and education. Moreover, the absence of technical expertise needed for the planning and implementation had affected the level and consistency of participation (Heller 2001).

Finally, the national support was essential in undertaking the participatory process, without the state support, the local government could not get the delegated power and tasks from the national level (Vijayan 2004). This had made the process of participatory planning in Kerala a remarkable approach for social development. However, it is argued that democratic participation in Kerala wasn't necessarily of a great support of the economic development where high unemployment was detected in addition to limited private investment, poor service efficiency and low income per capita (Heller 2001; Vijayan 2004: 29). Moreover, the redistributive mechanisms supported by the history of social development in Kerala were hard to maintain under the pressure of globalization, the need for economic growth and market liberalization (Heller 2001: 132).

iii. Comparing the Parameters of PUG in Kerala and Porto Alegre

The political and institutional support, in addition to the civil society nature and activities, as well as the participatory process and structures or institutions were examined in both cases. Participation helped to promote conditions for democracy, where the working class was mobilized and empowered to drive political transformation and subsequently, the public sector became more powerful. The working class is cohesive and possesses the needed organizational capacity and representation in solid labor unions and powerful political leftist parties (Heller 2001: 131). The worker's party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, P.T.) in Brazil and the Communist (Marxist) Party of India (CPM) have contributed significantly to the social development and equity. Participatory local governance has been used as a tool in facing the challenges of financial crisis and the pressure for liberalization (Heller 2001: 139;

Wampler and McNulty 2011). As an objective of deepening democracy, participation of different social groups, especially the marginalized, in the decision-making over public themes has been promoted. In Kerala and Porto Alegre, the character and success of the political parties, are attributed to their history. These parties were emerged from revolutionary actions by the masses on dictatorship. Working and middle classes provided the full support to fulfill its political function and to be organized as a social democratic party (Heller 2001: 139-140).

In both cases, the institutional reform of the local government brought success to the participatory process. In Porto Alegre, participatory structures were formulated, and participation was practiced in the decision-making by the local governance councils. Through adopting decentralization mechanisms in both cases, the local government has been empowered to manage the participatory process within financially and socially encouraging environment (Heller 2001: 140).

These cases fulfilled the preconditions of decentralization having consolidated democracies in its institutional configuration and firm state capacity in its well-developed administrative and bureaucratic structures. Democracy was initiated from grassroots movements, where civil society is actively developed. In Kerala, it is based on the social development for powerful civil society, where in Brazil the democratization was promoted by the active social movements from the locals (Heller 2001: 139). The councils¹⁹ were initiated on the district and city levels. They were composed of elected representatives on the district and neighborhood levels (Heller 2001: 140; Baiocchi 2001). They had an essential role in the participatory budgeting, managing different activities, like coordination between associations, mediation among associations and between them and the local government, and distributing the collected resources on the intended projects to solve the regional problems (Baiocchi 2001).

Through the practice of participatory governance and new institutions of local government, new civic life has been promoted. While in Porto Alegre, the data over long time showed that CSOs have increased (Abers 1998); it is hard to prove these results in Kerala, due to the lack of consistent data. Through the local development planning, women self-help organizations have been increased and mobilized, in addition to advocate NGOs of the leftist party, for instance, housing NGO, its members were from the planning board (Heller 2001: 142). The participatory governance practice of the planning campaign has induced more and more civic (formally and informally) groups of the locals to participate and influence the policy decision-making. The remarkable aspect in Kerala is the adherence of the local to support the local government in the process, contributing with time and resources to collectively take action (Heller 2001: 142-143). The contribution of grassroots in Kerala and Porto Alegre was not to be ensured without the state political support (Heller 2001: 158; Vijayan 2004).

Latterly, the success in Kerala and Porto Alegre in their participatory approaches²⁰ was based on the successful democratic decentralization that has been progressively developing. This was mainly through the constantly constructive negotiations and deliberations between the state and the civil society associations on the PB process, its aims and procedures. The asset in this process was the utilization of the synergies between the state and civil associations. Both cases did not emerge from the technocratic reform and institutional restructuring and they did not have a systematic planned

¹⁹ The popular councils are defined as “[...] Autonomous institutions that hold regular regional meetings on a weekly or bi monthly basis for representatives of neighborhood associations as well as independent citizens wishing to discuss the region’s problems [...]” (Baiocchi 2001).

²⁰ Represented by the PB and the people’s Campaign for decentralized planning.

development. These cases were the fruit of course of efforts and negotiations, dealing with conflicts of interests. Achieving social empowerment and equity was demonstrated in the history of the case of Kerala, which was promoted through the effectiveness of the redistributive instruments, whereas the embraced reforms in Brazil for social equity were not realized. However, Kerala has faced several challenges in maintaining the success in its social development approach under the pressure of increasing demand for economic growth, market liberation and improving its poor service efficiency (Heller 2001: 132).

2.2.4. Co-production and “*New Partnerships*”

Co-production is found in contexts where the state and the civil society are equally engaged in leading the urban development and restructuring the planning in DCs (Watson 2014: 63; Herrle et al. 2016: 2-3). It is initiated to find new ways for engagement, where the formal ones are not effective or are not available (Watson 2014: 71). Through negotiation, all partners are involved; particularly CSOs, who have the same power, as a partner in the participatory process. In this sense, they are also involved in the formal participatory activities and in taking responsibilities equal to the state. Co-production refers to setting priorities and goals and deciding on the actions plans and resources in a negotiations-based process where all the stakeholders are equal partners. Particularly the CSOs are essential development partners in these “new partnerships”, and their contributions and activities are crucial for the whole process (Herrle et al. 2016: 2-3).

There are two differentiated forms of co-production; state initiated and social movements initiated. The state initiated type is based on charity efforts and volunteerism and it is interested in the outcome rather than community empowerment. In the social movements form, the outcome is the acquired expertise and knowledge, the communities should gain through the process, which can ensure the sustainability of the co-production efforts (Watson 2014). Co-production that is based on charity efforts relies on volunteerism of citizens in the civil society activities (Watson 2014: 65). From the perspective of the state, it is the one who leads and coordinates the process, and who preserves a balance of the power relations (Watson 2014 based on the analyzed cases). The view of co-production as a process concerned with the outcome, can be effective and cost-efficient for the state but has no interest of the impact on community empowerment (Watson 2014: 65 based on Bavaird 2007).

Co-production and related “*new partnerships*” contribute positively to urban development. It can lead to improvements in the living conditions of the urban poor and to empowering them to be actively engaged in further development processes. If they have the needed knowledge, capacity, and power, they can influence governance and urban policies. Besides, co-production is also contributing to the local government by supporting the institutions in the implementation and management of the plans and projects (Herrle et al. 2016: 3 based on the analyzed case studies). Moreover, the new partnerships under co-production approaches have a transformative effect, because they adopt pragmatic approaches and can mobilize a large number of people. In this regard, CSOs are those involved in urban development fields, like service provision and housing, including NGOs, CBOs, and groupings and associations that are informally arranged (Herrle et al. 2016: 13-14). In its dynamic stance, there is a wider role recognized of social movements²¹ in co-production approaches to the field of planning and

²¹ Watson mentioned the definition of social movements “*a process of mobilization that is sustained across time and space, rather than as a specific organization. [They]...include the more nebulous, uncoordinated, and cyclical forms of collective action, popular protest and networks that serve to link organized and dispersed actors in processes of social mobilization...[and*

urban development. There are NGOs, who can be active in housing, public services and employment and they want to change the outdated ways of governance managed by the state institutions (Watson 2014: 66). When co-production is initiated by NGOs through using set of practices, like mapping, self-enumeration, learning exchange, savings schemes, and building relationships with the city governments, they would be supported in their efforts. All of which would be carried out by the communities, with the support from universities in technical issues, from the government in trunk infrastructure, land provision, and co-funding. Professionals of planners support the communities through their technical expertise, by teaching them, but not through practicing their authority as experts. This ensures the sustainability of the process with the required tools provided to the poor for self-help in the development projects (Watson 2014: 67-69).

The participatory approaches in communicative and collaborative planning and co-production have in common that they aim at social change in incremental ways by influencing the state to change its actions. They share the need for democracy to be initiated and adopted, where the people are actively engaged (Watson 2014: 69-70). Co-production can have similarities and differences with the former forms of state-society engagement of communitive and collaborative planning developed in ICs based on the cases in practice. Yet, most of co-production cases and concepts are observed mainly in the public administration and development studies, but rarely in planning studies (Watson 2014: 63-64). Co-production as a concept in planning theory is recognized as marking a "Post Collaborative" phase (Brownill and Parker 2010 cited in Watson 2014). It supports innovative practices from DCs, which can add to planning theory and help to internationalize it. The new planning ideas are essential in facing urbanization challenges in DCs, represented by the outdated urban planning system, which is inherited from colonial eras and ignores the physical and social problems in the cities (Watson 2014: 63).

The challenges through co-production are mainly posed through the lack of addressing the power issues and the pragmatic stance in the approaches (Watson 2014; Herrle et.al. 2016). The consensus-oriented, state-civil society partnerships are dismissing the neoliberal agenda "[...] *they are not challenging neoliberal tendencies in state practice.*" which leads to ignoring the power dynamics in the dealings between the local and the national government (Herrle et.al. 2016: 11). Moreover, the global power affects urban development leading to marginalization and exclusion through the pro-growth tendencies. It also affects the flowing of ideas and, in turn, influences the co-production. In this regard, power issues and the need for democratization should not be overlooked in the process. There are different forms of democracy "*in nature and form*" that can be found around the world, which depends largely on the political conditions of a country (Watson 2014: 74). In terms of transformation, Co-production approaches can bring conflicting parties, also institutions together in the transformation process, where in defining participation as practice of citizenship is associated with the need to change the power relations (ibid). Looking at different case studies, another challenge is the degree, civil society organizations and NGOs are organized as partners in the co-production process, which make them legitimate partners. International NGOs support the local networks of NGOs in Asia and Africa, which gives them more advantages than the informal and unorganized NGOs (Watson 2014). In many cases, informal organizations of the new partners lack structure for formal requirements of the international development organizations. For instance, they choose leaders, who sometimes tend to

can be]...several networks and organizations aiming to change elements of the political, economic and social system." (Watson 2014: 66 based on definitions by Bebbington, Mitlin, Mogaladi, Scurrah, and Bielich (2010: 1306).

manipulate their electors from the poor communities. In addition, their dealings with the local, national and international partners lack transparency (Herrle et al. 2016: 12). The standards of the IDOs or DAs are too high to be a cooperative partner with the civil organizations. Therefore, they tend to commit their cooperation to the formal governance systems, who can ensure the required legitimacy. In response to these weaknesses, informal arrangements should network with local, regional and international networks to gain their support in defending their rights, the needed resources, and circulating their knowledge. Particularly formal structures, like the local government, political stakeholders and sponsors (ibid: 13).

2.3. The Methodological Framework of Participatory Approaches in Urban Planning and Development

Participatory planning in the interventions for urban development is mostly applied as an instrument in development practices to ensure a successful implementation and a sustainable impact of the development projects. However, in many development interventions, participation is considered also an objective to achieve political change and social development, which are preconditions for good and participatory urban governance. Participation in urban development practices have been developed, addressed and evaluated based on variable methods set up by DAs. They were intended to help in achieving quick and tangible results in timely limited project cycle, which usually can focus on solving the most urgent urban problems (Eiwida 2000; Kunzmann 2005). Within such methodological framework, the PUPAs are challenged in development practices, especially while affected by prevailing planning traditions and practices in DCs. The latest are usually based on the traditions of planning and administration inherited from the colonial times in addition to a set of reactive planning measures to deal with urban challenges, mostly undertaken with the support of DAs expertise and funding. Traditional or Master Planning, as a dominant model in DCs, represents the rational planning model with its methods that have been developed in ICs in the fifties of the last century (see 2.1.2). With the lack of skilled staff, resources and technical expertise in DCs, master planning has failed in the past in dealing with the emerging urban challenges. Conversely, the efforts for modernization of the planning systems are usually challenged in DCs by urban growth problems and bad urban governance. Through development interventions, different planning models have been introduced, like inclusive planning, comprehensive planning, incremental planning or strategic planning as alternatives to the master planning.

Strategic planning, which was adopted in several modernization approaches, intended to extend the scope of planning to future needs and provide a flexible approach in responding to different challenges sustainably. Participation in the strategic planning is an essential tool from the onset to the implementation. Still, in different development practices, applying strategic planning and the participatory approach were not effective, particularly in achieving poverty alleviation and sustainable development. Since without preparing the political and institutional frameworks to adopt it, these practices remained pilot projects and individual successful cases that were hard to be sustainably maintained or transferred to other contexts (Eiwida 2000; Madbouly 2009; Hasan 2012).

Two different participatory approaches were adopted by many DAs in urban development:

- community participation on the local level
- participatory urban governance approaches on the city level

Yet, more success cases of PUPAs were observed on smaller scale on community level. Participatory urban governance is intended to mobilize the city key stakeholders to share managing the development plan of their city. This approach is challenged by the need to define the scope and ensure inclusiveness required for an effective PUPA. In community participation, the undertaken participatory development projects through local planning or action planning are decided on in a top-down process. Yet, implementing the participatory approach that intended to mobilize and empower the local communities, CSOs and local NGOs, has mostly resulted in empowering the marginalized groups leading to a more sustainable impact than that on the city level (based on different case studies presented by Pieters 2000; UN-Habitat 2006; Soliman 2013).

Participatory traditions and methodologies have been developed for undertaking rural community development, through which the needed information can be efficiently and rapidly gathered from the locals while adapting to the limitation of the time and resources allocated for the development process (Chambers 1984). These approaches have been developed from being adopted for rapidly gathering information to “*participatory*” targeting community involvement and recognition of the role and contribution of the locals with their local knowledge to the development process (Mitlin and Thompson 1995). Adopting and implementing these approaches in urban areas, particularly in programs to develop low-income settlements was growing in the last two decades and has been adopted by governments and DAs in a formal process. This however has to be differentiated from the participatory approach in local planning adopted by community organizations and from adopting this approach by the government and the DAs, which was intended to gather information through RPA or PRA in rural areas (Mitlin and Thompson 1995).

The participatory approach was observed in two ways. On the one hand as an enabling approach to access resources by the poor without institutional constraints, and on the other as an instrument that is just accessible to governments and donors to reinforce the existing power resulting in social exclusion (Mitlin and Thompson 1995; Hicky and Mohan 2004, Connelly 2010). In this regard, scrutinizing this approach requires the examination of the role of the decision makers and their exercised power on the participatory process, in addition to the involved actors and the potential beneficiaries of the whole approach (Mitlin and Thompson 1995). The participatory approaches in urban areas have potentials and challenges, as examined by the authors Mitlin and Thompson 1995, who considered case studies from the UK, Sri Lanka, India and South Africa. Success was seen in the effect on the communities and the DAs who implemented the participatory approach. The community was empowered through realizing their capacities and ability to negotiate with other parties and institutions, their ability to develop strategies and to resolve conflicts within itself. Challenges were mainly identified in the limited period planned to perform the participatory process and to mobilize the locals for taking part in the process. Besides, there was a difficulty in examining the participatory approach, if it was participatory or an imposed approach, and if it influenced the higher level of planning and the policymaking process (Mitlin and Thompson 1995).

Hence, participatory approaches are not seen as mere tools to gather data, but as an essential part of social development and institutional change. The participatory approach requires time and commitment to foster these goals and ensure the sustainability of the programs, which adopted it, especially in offering training for governmental and local actors, who also represent the key players in local planning and development (Mitlin and Thompson 1995). Participatory approaches can be very efficient when the involved community is well organized and possess the power to apply them in

furthering its development (Mitlin and Thompson 1995; Hamdi and Goethert 1997). Therefore, empowering poor communities starts with the efforts to enable them to express their needs through working with them (Chambers 1983). This requires time and skills in social relations to open the communication channels with them. Building the capacity of the community to take part in local planning should be encouraged by the municipality who can promote this approach through a flexible institutional framework. The growing interest of adopting participatory approaches in urban areas requires re-guiding existing institutional structures and policies or initiate new ones that can facilitate participatory approaches and ensure their sustainability. Local governments need to be guided to develop flexible planning processes, which consider the local potentials of the communities, in turn, requires transformation in the whole governance structures (Mitlin and Thompson 1995: 249-250).

From this perspective, the following sections will focus on exploring development practices with PUPAs through strategic planning and action planning in cities.

2.3.1. Action Planning with Community Participation

In responding to the failure of traditional planning in DCs in practice, alternative planning instruments have been developed to support fast and inventive ways to implement development plans and projects focusing on problem solving approaches.

Action planning with community participation presents an alternative solution to get projects and plans implemented, as opposed to the “orthodox planning”, which had usually failed to unfold tangible outcomes of the developed plans and projects especially for the poor. Orthodox planning had focused on plan making and regulatory norms. It lacked flexibility in facing changes and globalization challenges (Pallagst 2007), in addition to relying on actors from the elite, like development and governmental professionals as well as on development financial aid. The alternative planning “Community Action Planning” was presented as a dynamic and entrepreneurship- promoting form of planning in responding to market demands and globalization challenges. In addition, it contributed to achieve benefits for the disadvantaged groups of the local communities while involving them in the planning and urban governance processes. In this process, the role of the planners turns in this process to support the poor with service delivery and providing the environment to help them help themselves (Paul 1987; Hamdi and Goethert 1997). Particularly in post disaster or post conflict situations, community action planning turns to be a process that led and managed by the community. The community decides and plans for the reconstruction activities. These can be managed with the support of the local government and development actors who help through building the community capacity to undertake the planning process (UN-Habitat 2006).

Focusing on the community in the methodological approaches of planning was not considered in the planning practices of DAs, who mainly conducted prescriptive planning procedures, objectives and methods and played fixed roles. This “reductionist thinking” approach in the development projects did not allow space for the community contributions and for expressing their needs. Moreover, a development plan or policy prior to action plan lacks a realistic view and the knowledge about the real needs of the people. Hence, the documents and reports of the development actors did not give an idea about the practice while only providing accumulated data (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 19-20; Eiwida 2000). This has changed in the last decades through focusing on including the roles of the community and the CSOs. Development agencies intended to promote the work of the CSOs in their programs as well as projects for an effective implementation of the governmental policies and development projects. The projects which undertaken by CSOs contributed effectively to sustainable development.

Especially compared to state projects, which involve high costs, time and efforts in service delivery to the poor (Eiweida 2000: 38). In general, to promote the bottom-up approach in urban development projects, basic principles have to be developed that consider the capacity and power of the citizens, who will be involved in the urban management; like building trust between the public sector, the private sector, the civil society and citizens (Momeni et al. 2011).

The community participatory planning methods and tools were developed first by Chambers for rural development projects. Transferring these methods to the urban areas provided a new dimension for the participatory approaches. The change in the urban development policy for more efficient planning and good urban governance is directed mostly to emphasize involving planners in promoting the managerial urban governance in reshaping and regulating the city through enabling the private sector and running the management process. In respect thereof, an efficient plan means, among others, facilitating investment, institutional coordination, effective land and fiscal management, capacity building, in addition to build PPP and empower CSOs engagement in urban management and service delivery. This presents new definitions of public responsibility and the role of the government and development actors in moving from the model of “provider” to the model of “enabler”, while preserving mutual considerations of local interests and the city strategic needs (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 25; Mozayyeni 1997). This marks the shift in urban policy to entrepreneurialism, which is necessary for a city to present itself as competitive in the global market (OECD 2007). Yet, this shift of the role of the city and planners in DCs involves more challenges for sustainable urban development and good urban governance that contradicts with the goals intended to adopt a participatory and inclusive urban planning approach.

In this respect, the following section will focus on reviewing two approaches of community participation in cities or urban development projects. The two tools²² approaches for community participation are Community Action Planning or Microplanning (World Bank 2001) discussed and adopted by Hamdi and Goethert 1997, and ZOPP that was developed and adopted by the GTZ and conducted by many DAs. There are other approaches, like “Planning for Real” by Neighborhood Initiatives Foundation and Urban Community Assistance Team (UCAT) by the American Institute of Architecture’s U/DAT²³ approach in the United States. These methods have in common that they are problem oriented. They are based on prioritizing the issues for development considering the available resources, interactive techniques to develop partnerships. They are process-oriented that is transparent for all through the documentation of the process to support learning and monitoring processes (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 81).

2.3.1.1. Community Action Planning (Microplanning)

To decide the level of community participation, its contribution, the location, time and duration through development project stages, methodological frameworks have been developed. They define the typology of the participatory approach for community involvement in different project stages. These methods reveal also how the formed relationships between different groups of stakeholders in the project affect the level of participation as well as the expected outcome and impact. This approach

²² The term “Tools” is used by the authors Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 64 to refer to bundle of techniques used in participatory workshops.

²³ Urban Design Assistance Team.

was adopted by several DAs and organizations in their planning projects, which is based mainly on the interactive planning process with the community and further city stakeholders.

Two methodologies will be examined and compared, as examples, regarding the PUPA with the community; the microplanning adopted by Hamdi and Goethert 1997 and the ZOPP by GTZ, as these two methodologies provide the basic methodological framework of participatory approaches in urban planning and development that were later advanced by development actors. The matrix (see table 7), which has been developed by Hamdi and Goethert 1997, helps to define the appropriate type of partnership, the community would build with other city stakeholders “outsiders²⁴” through the project stages.

Faster and simpler (less community input) ↑ Levels ↓ Slower and more complex (more community input)	Framework of participation and stages of projects					
	Levels of Participation	policy oriented ← stages → technical oriented				
		Stages of projects and programs				
		Initiate	Plan	Design	Implement	maintain
	None					
	Indirect					
Consultation						
Shared control						
Full control						

Table 7: The “general framework for positioning participation efforts” developed by (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 66).

The most effective form of community action planning is the shared control in plan making (see the table below). With this tool, a dynamic framework for planning in practice with the community can be achieved, from which practitioners can develop their own tools according to the context (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 63). The matrix is based on three essential assumptions:

- Community participation is a tool (not an objective *per se*) for community development and for attaining tangible results.
- The mutual support should be ensured from the city and the community.
- For each level and stage, there is a need for a certain set of techniques.

The stages of the projects and programs are:

- 1) Initiation: projects can also be initiated from the community, and problem, objectives and scope will be defined.
- 2) Planning: is the most important stage, where decisions are made regarding budget, resources, activities and implementation.
- 3) Design: technical expertise is highly required.
- 4) Implementation: management skills are highlighted for effective execution.
- 5) Maintenance: long-term task, requires from both actors to assume their responsibility (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 72).

From the matrix above, projects show variable typologies according to the different levels of participation that serve the purpose of the project or unfold an outcome of certain conditions.

- In “*typical projects*”: the city is a main actor in all stages. Participation is not promoted and the community assumes the role as an initiator and may share the responsibility for

²⁴ The authors referred to outsiders as the city representatives of government, development, professionals, technicians, consultants, NGOs representatives, etc.

maintenance formally or informally. Community's contribution is not welcomed, due to the lack of skills, or it is mostly seen as a threat for the experts.

- In the “*common perception of participatory projects*”: the city as well as decision makers conduct all stages. The communities' labor is used as “service contractors” to implement and maintain, for example low-income housing projects.
- In a “*pro forma deference to participation*”: projects where the community is only involved in consultation sessions. The concept of participation is not yet acceptable. Decisions regarding the project are taken without involving the community; the consultation is initiated from the government to inform the community not to involve them in the decision-making process.
- In “*urgent projects*”: the community initiates the project and it demands urgency in action from the government to implement it. The focus here is rather on the outcome than on the tool.
- The “*model for participation*” represents an “*Effective Community Action Planning*”. This can be realized, when the community and the city share the control over the project. Initiated by community or city, shared decisions are very essential for all stakeholders. The innovative input of the communities is recognized in design and implementation stage. The responsibility of maintenance will be agreed on or it will be shared by the city and the community (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 77).

Levels of participation	stages of projects and programs				
	Initiate	Plan	Design	Implement	maintain
None					
Indirect					
Consultative					
Shared control					
Full control					

Table 8: A model for participation, developed by (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 77).

As a result, to consider a project as “*participatory*”, we should consider “*the stakeholder relationship at the planning stage*” (ibid).

The levels of participation, compared to those developed by Arnstein 1969, are adapted to the given settings of DCs (see the levels in table 9). (Natakun 2013). The citizens from the poor in the ladder developed by Arnstein 1969 are assumed to have the power needed for participation, and thereby, participation should help to redistribute the power. In DCs, the poor communities need to be empowered to influence policies and to get their basic services delivered through the development process. This depends mainly on the institutional framework and the role of the DAs in this process (Chonguill 1996: 433; Natakun 2013). Another ladder of participation (table 9) was developed by Chonguill 1996, which is adjusted to the context of DCs “*...ladder of community participation in the decision-making process for the implementation of development projects or programs in underdeveloped countries*” (Choguill 1996: 441).

Levels of Participation		Interpretation
1) Support	Empowerment	Communities are empowered to influence decision-making with the help of external actors ²⁵ or the government
	Partnership	Communities share the power in planning responsibilities and decision-making process.
	Conciliation	They must agree on plans decided on by the government, their representatives and external actors.
2) Manipulation	Dissimulation	Forcing communities to accept the projects without considering their real needs.
	Diplomacy	Communities, represented by CSOs conduct development with the government.
	Informing	One-way informing by the government about the tasks and rights of the community (top-down approach).
3) Rejection	Conspiracy	The poor are a problem for the government leads to opposing them and enforce own projects agenda creating conflicts.
4) Neglect	Self-Management	Communities do initiate and conduct development projects usually informally.

Table 9: Choguill's model of the ladder of community participation interpreted by the author based on Choguill 1996; Natakun 2013.

In this ladder, the role of the local government is essential in achieving the level of participation:

- 1) The supportive role of the government leads to empowerment, partnership or conciliation. Allowing the communities to initiate or ally with other parties for support, like DAs. Still, conciliation seems to give a high power and control to the government, it also indicates a technical support to the communities.
- 2) A less-supportive role of the government shows more control through legitimizing manipulating the communities to accept its decisions regardless of their needs. In case the government lacks the capacity, it accepts the initiative of the people through diplomacy. Informing still indicates the control and the top-down approach of the government to impose projects, which in many cases ends up in creating parallel systems in response to the ineffectiveness of the government. Informal systems, for example, represent the alternative and a parallel system in providing the services for the communities.
- 3) In the case of rejection by the government to the people' initiatives and their organizations, conflicts arise, projects are imposed, and communities create a force together in opposition to the efforts of the government. These efforts may involve illegal actions to satisfy their needs, with no chance for involvement or consideration from the government.
- 4) Neglecting the needs of the communities by the government leads to self-initiated projects, to fulfill the urgent needs of the people without making an impact on the policy and on the decision-making process. On this level, participation forms do not exist between the government and the community (Choguill 1996: 443).

In a similar approach, Hamdi and Goethert 1997 underline the level of interaction, which varies according to the roles of the local government and further city stakeholders (the outsiders) as well as the community in relation to the levels of participation, which is shown in the table below:

²⁵ It refers here to the DAs or the NGOs.

Levels of participation	Community roles	Outsiders roles
None	-----	Surrogate
Indirect		
Consultation	Interest group	Advocate
Shared control	Stakeholder	Stakeholder
Full control	Principal	Resource

Table 10: The roles of community and outsiders related to the levels of participation, developed by (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 68).

- On the “none” level of participation, the focus is on acquiring the technical knowledge from the outsiders and on urgency of action. Therefore, the community’ input is limited.
- Likewise, the “indirect” level depends on the expertise of the outsiders as the main responsible actors. The indirect contribution of the community through their local knowledge is planned through data collection and census needed for the analysis in order to take a quick action on the urgent problems.
- On the “consultative” level, outsiders are the active actors in collecting the data directly from the community that are required for taking the attentive action. Consultation is held in many forms for making the planning decision. It can take also the form of information gathering. Consultation can be organized in small (individual interviews) or large groups. The community’s role is as an “interest group” rather than a “stakeholder”. Interest group’ community does not have a claim for decision-making but is entitled to the results, where the stakeholders are actively involved in the planning and the decision-making process. The outsiders present information and receive feedback from the participants upon which action will be taken. This form of consultation is typical in public assemblies organized to disseminate information on large urban projects, which do not affect the community in a direct way. Therefore, the feedback is not necessarily intended. Consultation techniques can bring a large number of participants together but an ineffective participatory process could result. Hence, a smaller number of participants can affect a better feedback. Moreover, the way the outsider is presenting and asking for feedback should be inviting not threatening. In this case, closer communication with the community is required to get information through using the RPA techniques. The outsider should also possess communication skills to get the information needed for taking the appropriate planning action. While consultation is used “*as a device to rationalize public actions*”, the involved risk in holding a consultation event is in turning to a pro forma when feedback is not encouraged (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 69-70).
- On the “shared control” level, the participants from the community and from the outsiders have equal roles as stakeholders. This initial position raises the sense of ownership providing the basis for best communication and discussion between the city and the community (if both agreed on it). A small group of stakeholders as a representative group is recommended to ensure an effective participatory process. The methods (like in the ZOPP) are designed to get the maximum interaction in the shared responsibility of the participatory process.

- The “full control” level of participation marks the highest level where the community is fully empowered to take the leadership of the project, whereas the outsider is the resource of the technical expertise when required. However, involved risks are for example when the participatory process ends up in exclusion and favoritism of particular social groups (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 70-71).

These levels compared to the levels developed by Choguill (1996), are derived from the technical approach of community participation in slum upgrading projects and programs. The model developed by Choguill (1996) focuses on the role of the government in relation to that of the community and the approach to power in the participatory process. The technical approach tends to closely observe the participatory process in a workshop or in the interaction planned throughout the development project and the polarity in the roles of the community opposing to the roles of other stakeholders and DAs (the outsiders). Based on the technical experience of Hamdi and Goethert 1997, the recommended method or the tool for planning with community participation has provided a realistic approach to improve the participatory approach from the perspective of the development agents, where the model by Choguill provided a holistic evaluation of the participatory approach in DCs. Yet, both views emphasize the need to share the power and forming partnerships between the community and the city or the outsiders, in order to achieve an effective participatory approach and to promote community active participation.

2.3.1.2. ZOPP by the GTZ

The approach of ZOPP²⁶, GOPP in English, is recognized for its systematic structure for action planning and management of a development project (Hamdi and Goethert 1997; UN-HABITAT 2001a: 68). The main component is initiating a workshop with key interest groups. Through this approach the inputs, the planned activities and the outcomes are connected. This approach is essential to get funding approval for development projects. It was adopted not just by the GTZ, but also by DAC, Danish aid agency and further development agencies and programs (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 91; UN-Habitat 2001a). This method fulfills the preconditions to conduct a good action plan that has a clearly defined time frame of action and resources and is organized and explained to all involved groups of actors who are committed to the plan, its management, coordination and monitoring (UN-Habitat 2001a: 68). Despite its strengths, ZOPP was criticized due its rigidity, particularly regarding the requirement for active participation in the process, which is not always possible in the host country (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 91).

There are two main phases of the project development and management: analysis and project planning (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 92; GTZ 1988):

- 1) Participatory analysis is for stakeholders or interest groups analysis inscribing them in a chart. These groups are going to be involved in the project planning.
- 2) Problem analysis, including cause-effects cards.
- 3) Objectives analysis including identifying the problems and drafting the expected outcomes.
- 4) Alternatives analysis consider the objectives and possible alternatives according to factors, like resources, political and social risks, time, and sustainability (GTZ 1988: 15; Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 92-94). The project-planning phase is proceeded through a Project “Planning

²⁶ Goal Oriented Project Planning or Zielorientierte Projektplanung (in German).

Matrix” or “Project Logical Framework” also as an outcome. This sheet includes the main goal, the expected outcome the methods and the assessment of the results, in addition to the estimated costs (Hamdi and Goethert 1997; UN-Habitat 2001a: 69; GTZ 1988; 2015) (see appendix 6).

The ZOPP methodology should be applied in all stages of a projects’ cycle; from preparation to implementation or in each workshop, following five levels in a standard project cycle. These levels are:

- 1) Pre-ZOPP for preparation in the GTZ/GIZ to decide on the project.
- 2) Appraisal-ZOPP to develop the terms of reference.
- 3) Partner-ZOPP in the country where the results of the appraisal will be discussed with the country partners, and the project design and inputs will be determined.
- 4) Take-off ZOPP, where the plan will be prepared in the country with the responsible authorities for implementation.
- 5) Re-planning-ZOPP for plan adjustments and planning for following plans with the partners (GTZ 1988; Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 92).

Stage four and five are participatory and essential for community participation. The planned workshops vary from one day to two weeks and the location varies and depends on the planned activities. The skilled moderator of the ZOPP (an external consultant) should be prepared with special training and the workshops materials are prepared with panels, etc. The participants consist of representatives of the interest groups, technical staff, high-level authorities and community leaders from all the levels in the hierarchy (also from the national level) (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 92).

2.3.1.3. *The Tools of Participatory Planning in Microplanning and in ZOPP in Comparison*

Comparing the two tools for community participatory planning approaches and their goals, the following criteria were compared:

Criteria for comparing the tools	Microplanning / community action planning	ZOPP
Community building (Community cohesion and leadership are implicitly or explicitly promoted and tools for this purpose are developed)	The workshop as the main tool to strengthen community and promote leadership, with limited timeframe where further methods and time were not invested for community mobilization.	
Identifying problems (prioritize of the issues to deal with guide the tools)	explicitly planned	explicitly planned
Developing strategies (options and actions are decided)	explicitly planned	explicitly planned
Planning implementation (tasks and time plan are defined)	flexible/general structure	detailed structure
Continuity of the process (Step by step plan for community and municipality to keep an ongoing process)	clear agendas and tasks for the working teams to follow up on daily basis	detailed time plan and working program, not clear about time agendas and tasks with the participants
Monitoring outcomes (projects should be from time to time assessed and adjusted)	explicitly planned but not in detail about the time and place	explicitly planned but not in detail about the time and place

Table 11: Comparing both tools Microplanning and ZOPP based on Hamdi and Goethert 1997.

To assess and compare the effectiveness of these tools regarding challenges of dependency, implementation and scaling up the participatory process the following table has been illustrated:

Challenges for effective participatory process in both tools	Microplanning / community action planning	ZOPP
Dependency (regarding materials, resources, outside training and moderator, local documentation of the process)	Minimum costs regarding the materials, moderator is needed, and handbooks are available to facilitate technical tools for users to run the workshop.	Participatory process cannot be run by the community alone. This leads to high dependency on external resources and expertise of a moderator, who is trained to run the workshop, to prepare the final report and supervise the documentation.
Focus on implementation (a clear goal, particular strategies development plan, working groups to implement)	A chart will be developed to structure and guide the implementation with identified priority projects for funding. In addition to persons, time, tasks and techniques.	A great focus on detailed plan of implementation regarding staff and tasks/activities to achieve the set goals.
Scaling up of the participatory process (clear and easy to understand and practically implemented locally, require minimum training and funding)	Handbooks are easy to understand and to facilitate scaling up the participatory process to further communities. Minimum costs and tools to scale-up.	Conditioned by funding and larger program frameworks. It requires a trained moderator, identified participants and time plan for the workshop.

Table 12: Challenges for effective participatory process in both tools based on Hamdi and Goethert 1997.

In sum, in order to select the best tool for participatory action planning, various factors should be considered, among others, used methodology, costs, time and materials. In these two examples, the microplanning has provided a method that was easy to initiate and proceed through adopting a participatory approach with minimum costs. The method in ZOPP entails a strict structure for sophisticated participants through the detailed structure of projects (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 105).

Further factors to define the tools for participatory action planning is to understand the type of the community participating in the process. The community type helps to define which tools would be appropriate for community participation in the planning process. Defining the type and the tool, although this typology cannot be standardized, is useful to set a framework for the participatory process. Especially, self-identity, as a main criterion, can indicate the degree of social cohesion required to initiate the participatory planning process (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 109-111).

Communities type	Communities Subtype	Motivation/ interests	Form of participation
A) Highly organized communities (social and spatial cohesion through a sense of self-identity)	Lower income communities (ideal type)	Beneficiaries in the development project or program and willing to be involved	Ideal participatory partnership and partners
	higher income communities (reluctant type)	have little to gain while possessing the political power and the technical experts	Reluctant partners in the participatory process, but are willing to keep informed
B) Transitory communities	Transitory type	Beneficiaries of the development program	Emerging sense of community through participation and the shift to ideal participatory

(lack the sense of neighborhood, need to be organized)			partnership through mobilization
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Table 13: The typology of the participating communities and the form of participation summarized by the author based on Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 109-112.

Social cohesion can be found in the type A and less in type B. In large communities or on city level, to initiate a participatory workshop for action planning, it is recommended to form smaller groups of participants to facilitate the participatory process. The spatial pattern can be also associated to these types, for example in urban areas, upgrading projects and programs are targeting the lower income communities (ideal type) and the transitory type, who occupy the inner ring. The reluctant type representing the higher income groups occupy the suburbs. Squatter communities in the suburbs can be ideal or transitory (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 110-111). To choose the tool for the community's type, some factors should be considered such as the time and the capacity to organize themselves and to achieve the determined goals. For example, type B needs time to be mobilized and organized. For this type of community, the tool community action planning/ microplanning is recommended. This tool and the ZOPP can be chosen for ideal type communities. For reluctant communities where active participation of the communities is ensured, other tools can be chosen, like Urban Community Assistance Team²⁷ (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 111). This tool targets organized communities in ICs where is adopted, especially in the US, Eastern Europe, and the UK (World Bank 2001).

In different approaches to participatory action planning with the communities, tools are selected that match characteristics, like age, gender or social interests in addition to the common issues identified through stakeholder's analysis that can help in defining the participatory mechanisms. The size of the groups is also important in addition to their power, interests and their intended level of participation in the project to ensure their influence. For this purpose, the participatory approach should provide a flexible frame of time and context. In the end, a stakeholder participation matrix would be developed as a tool to define, who would participate in a project at which stage. In addition to determine the degree, level and intensity of participation according to the applied power and defined interests (ProAct Network and UNEP 2013). Stakeholders' analysis is most of the times very essential to select the participatory tool. Defining the factors and interests is essential to identify which tool and participatory activities considering the age, gender and social status. Moreover, the social cohesion aspect analyzed above is necessary to be furthered in relation to the spatial aspect in the action planning process. Such criteria should be considered to select the set of tools that are most appropriate to the target group of stakeholders (UN-Habitat 2001a; 2001b) or to which type of community. In relation to the spatial aspect, particularly regarding the urban areas and participatory action planning, defining the role of the communities at the city level and the role of city administration on community level are crucial steps in the participatory process (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 106).

²⁷ This tool was developed and conducted by the American Institute of Architects since 1967. It is used particularly by architects and urban planners. The outcome of the process targets mainly physical development rather than social or political improvement (World Bank 2001).

This relationship between the city and communities flows through a cycle, which in some phase shifts to a participatory relationship through communicating for information interchange or setting priorities of the planning process. The participatory activity, like the workshop in action planning replaces the task of the expert or the professional in collecting the data (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 108). In a partnership relationship (like in the tools of ZOPP and Microplanning), the workshops are for both the city and the communities to keep the continuity and momentum of the participatory planning process. Through master planning on the city level, professionals work on collecting the basic data through traditional methods. Some of the data are collected from the communities through the city or external experts. In this manner, the master plan, programs and projects will be decided on for the communities with limited participation leading to a top-down process with “none, indirect or consultative” level of participation (Hamdi and Goethert 1997; Pieters 2000). The following figures show two ways of the relationship between the city administration and the community in the master planning and in the strategic planning processes.




Figure 3: Different relationship between the communities and the city administration in the master planning and in the strategic planning, illustrated by the author based on Hamdi and Goethert (1997: 108-109).

From the overview of the tools for action planning and the participatory approach in mobilizing the communities in the process, some factors to develop an effective participatory approach are recommended. These factors include defining the community type, the structure of the planning tools or methods (methodology, costs, time and materials), the time factor, the role of the institutions and the role of the skilled moderators of the workshop or the mediators, the sustainability of the participatory process in the follow up stage, and the scale of the planning. These factors are considered in developing the conceptual approach of this research.

2.3.2. The Participatory Approaches in Strategic Planning and City Development Strategies

Approaching the planning and development processes on the city level requires another approach than the functional and the sectoral approach on the community level explained above. The change in approaching urban development projects through strategic planning (Hamdi and Goethert 1997) has

allowed for participation in planning and urban management (Pieters 2000). In this process, strategic planning supports the continuity of the planning process and assures participation as an instrument to engage city stakeholders and keep their input in a sustainable cycle of development.

Strategic planning was presented as an option that ensures addressing planning issues embedded in the dysfunctional institutional framework of a city. Through the participatory decision-making in the strategic planning, cooperation and collaboration are ensured over the multiple issues that the traditional planning cannot resolve. Yet, institutionalizing strategic planning and participatory decision-making is essential for the sustainability of the whole process (UN-Habitat 2001a: 98-99). The approach of the strategic planning in DCs is sought to be holistic, participatory, integrated and inclusive approach that is considering the poor and gender issues as well as improving local governance to achieve a sustainable urban development (UN-Habitat 2010: 6). Strategic planning should be participatory in development and implementation processes, which involve consultations, collaboration, and commitment of the stakeholders (Madbouly 2009: 26; UN-Habitat 2010). Raising ownership and commitment to the participatory approach ensures the sustainability of the strategic plan.

There are challenges for this approach on the city level, like the lack of human and economic resources, in addition to time limitation to address all critical issues of the city. Therefore, setting an agenda of prioritized themes is important, particularly those concerning sustainable city development as a whole, like spatial and land use issues, infrastructure, safety, or public services. within a defined scope in the spatial sense (UN-Habitat 2010). Inclusion, as a challenging aspect for the process, is seen as time consuming. Therefore, participatory meetings and consultation should be considered in time and stages, when to include the key stakeholders and when to include wider groups of the public. Identifying these groups, is essential not just in the detailed or action planning but also in the strategic planning and in setting the vision for the city (CMI 2011). The contribution of the DAs in this approach is to manage the planning process with their expertise and funding and further in networking with the attentive partners. Development efforts usually face challenges in adopting this approach in DCs, like the weak institutional framework and the tendency for dependency. Therefore, measures for mobilization of own resources in the city and expertise transfer are needed in the process (UN-Habitat 2010: 7).

Considering the strengths and weaknesses of the strategic planning approach, “Urban Development Strategies (UDS)” have started to be adopted to face urban growth problems in a form of pilot and urgent projects. They were intended to raise the awareness of the city stakeholders to create new ways for dealing with urban challenges and help them through this exercise to explore the best way to develop their city in a participatory process (CA 2002). From this perspective, Urban Development Strategies were developed as a methodology and a process to complement urban planning tools, which are already in action to further social, economic and spatial development of a city (CMI 2011: 91). The City Development Strategy (CDS), like the UDS, was also developed as a methodology to complement other planning tools. It targets social, spatial and economic development of a city. It was adopted as an approach for city development by the World Bank, the UN-Habitat, the UNDP and the Japanese government. The CDS is expected to include various development objectives, like local economic development and poverty reduction, reform in finance management and urban governance through consultation, in addition to spatial and physical improvement (ECON Analysis and CLG 2005: 17).

Adopting the participatory approach and the strategic planning are the main instruments in the CDS initiated by the CA since the end of the nineties. The aim of the CDS was to assess city problems by key stakeholders, who should experience through this exercise how to create a vision and develop related action plans that are realistic and strategic, in addition to maintaining their collaboration and commitment implementing them (CA 2006: 21; CMI 2011). It has emerged from the need for cities in DCs to achieve a degree of resilience in facing urban challenges resulted from climate change and rapid urbanization. Through the participatory approach, the stakeholders need to commit within an effective policy framework to realize the strategic vision and the action plans. The CDS differs from the city strategic plan in that it focuses on definite number of thrusts of themes for action (5-7 thrusts) that are intended to change national and policy frameworks and financial mechanisms. It defines action plans, projects and programs and mobilizes public and private actors in the projects. The role of the local government in the CDS is essential to catalyze and represent public interests and resources to implement the projects (CA 2006: 22). Through the CDS' participatory approach, cities are expected to learn from their successes as well as from the weaknesses that arise in the CDS process.

Although the CDS process is based on a PUPA through collaboration and negotiations, the challenges in this approach were detected in achieving an inclusive CDS process on the city level. Particularly in looking at possible challenges in initiating action planning with the participatory approach on the city level (UN-Habitat 2010). Some of these challenges in DCs are weak municipal capacity to manage public services while focusing on priority projects for particular communities, mostly in informal areas. While it can be effective to focus on development efforts in one area, these projects would be better, if linked to sectoral programs on the city level to facilitate the scaling up (Tebbal 2011). Another obstacle is defining the role and responsibilities of the institutions and the communities in the process, for instance, regarding collecting and sharing information, implementation and monitoring. Setting clear criteria by the city and the communities, to choose the projects and the targeted communities, can help to achieve equity, regardless the political accessibility and degree of organization of the community (Hamdi and Goethert 1997).

The sustainability of the participatory process should be ensured to the follow up phase. The involved communities and the local government of the city should put efforts to maintain the participatory approach even after the planned consultation sessions and workshops end (CA 2006; UN-Habitat 2010; Tebbal 2011). Ensuring transparency in information provision and exchange between the city and the communities is essential for the process. This also considers transmitting the challenges faced by the municipality regarding generating funding and acquiring technical expertise and political support. The information flow should be managed in two directions; from the national level (regarding policy and investment planning) to the city and community level (regarding the priority projects) and vice versa (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 111-116). Finally, sustaining and transferring successful participatory projects is recommended to ensure sustainable urban community development. In this regard, the relationship between the government and the community should be cultivated over time, being subject to aspects, like the change in the government and its role in the participatory process, for example, the change of the government in Brazil led to changing the way in dealing with the urban poor (Choguill 1996).

2.3.2.1. *The PUPA and the CDS*

The strategic decision-making in urban planning and management was a new development approach in DCs. It was initiated at the beginning of the 2000 as a response to the challenges of urban growth in

cities of DCs. The CDS' participatory approach developed by the Cities Alliance promotes collaboration in urban decision-making process to achieve sustainable urban development and alleviate poverty. The targeted cities varied in size from 100 thousand to 10 Million inhabitants. The results of the first processes have shown the importance of cooperation in the development process and the need to develop creative instruments through lessons-learned exchange among cities. In addition, the CDS foresees tangible results, where the involved planning process can be repeated as a cycle and can influence urban governance (CA 2002). The CDS in this regard is *"an action plan for equitable growth in a city, developed and sustained through public participation to improve the quality of life for all citizens. The goals include a collective city vision and an action plan to improve governance and management, increasing investments to expand employment and services, and systematic and sustained programs to reduce poverty."* (ECON Analysis and CLG 2005).

Upon the challenges the city has to face through globalization and increasing market demands, the CDS is sought to involve all stakeholders in drawing and following a vision that is effectively steered according to the identified priority themes in the strategy. As a future oriented strategy, it helps to manage and guide the urban growth and anticipates risks for more resilient approaches for future city development (CA 2006: 24). Thereof, the CDS is a guiding public process not a fixed plan or document. The municipality plays the role as an enabler of city stakeholders to organize themselves and participate in the process. For example, in Karu, Nigeria the local informal economic sector has been encouraged to organize itself in a consortium through a participatory process to promote the communication among them and with the state and the city administration. The informal sector has contributed to the local economy immensely and its consortium played an essential role even after initiating the CDS in keeping the process ongoing. The local government had acted through its role as a catalyst. It has represented the public interests and at the same time promoted the local economy, despite its limited financial capacity (CA 2006: 22).

The CDS is considered as a leadership instrument, a participatory tool, a strategic planning tool for social and economic development, as well as multi-sectoral guiding development plan. Achieving these goals of the CDS depends on the context, the process methodology of developing the CDS and the quality of the implementation proceeded within given national and urban governance settings (CMI 2011: 10-11). In short, the CDS can only be successful if effectively implemented and institutionalized (CA 2006: 24; CMI 2011). Johannesburg, South Africa is one of the best practices to institutionalize the CDS and to produce a strategic plan in a participatory committed process from all the sectors (CA 2006: 24-25).

In general, the methodology of the CDS process is structured in eight stages (see appendix 7 based on CA 2006). The main five themes and subthemes of CDS are:

- **Livelihood**, including business climate, competitiveness and human resources development.
- **Environmental aspects**, like air and water quality, energy efficiency and sustainable service delivery systems.
- **Spatial form and infrastructure**, including accessibility to land, social and spatial structures while linking the city spatial potentials with other aspects in the strategy.
- **Financial resources**, including financial management of public resources for city development regarding local revenues and expenditures.
- **Governance subthemes**, like national urban policy frameworks, institutional structure of the local government (administrative and political), the role of the local government based on

decentralization and its capacity, coordination within the metropolitan (urban) governance system and the relationship of the local government to the private sector and the civil society. (CA 2006: 28-40).

Participation in the CDS is an essential approach in developing and formulating the CDS. It is based on intensive and effective communication and engagement of the city stakeholders, particularly from the poor. In this regard, the CDS aims at exploring the real needs of the city stakeholders, especially the urban poor and include them in the strategy's main themes, vision and objectives. The aim is to promote an active participation in formulating the CDS and creating a platform to exchange the knowledge and creative solutions from all city stakeholders. It is expected from the participatory approach to raise a sense of ownership and commitment of the stakeholders to contribute to the implementation and sustainability of the strategy. Formal meetings and city consultation to receive comments is not what the CDS aims at. Therefore, an atmosphere of cooperation among the stakeholders need to be maintained along the process of the CDS (ECON Analysis and CLG 2005: 38).

Under the CDS' goal, "Improving Urban Governance and Management" participatory decision-making and management is denoted as an objective. In this regard, participatory decision-making is essential not just as a tool but also as an objective to build consensus between different stakeholders on the decision-making to further the urban development process. In this respect, the participatory approach is more than a process of exchange of information (Eiwida no year) but as culture to collaboratively reinvent and develop the city: "[...]CDS team needs to define stakeholders, how to bring them in, establish and maintain a dynamic participatory entrepreneurial culture [...]"(Eiweida no year). Hence, the participatory approach in the CDS is not just a tool for performing the CDS process, but it can also be considered as an outcome of the process. While applying the participatory approach as a tool turned to be habitual in the development practices today, participation as an outcome is essential for the implementation and sustainability of the strategy, i.e. to maintain the raised sense of ownership and commitment of the stakeholders to it and a collaborative environment to further the CDS.

The participatory approach in the CDS can be identified through the CDS stages (see appendix 7) according to the aim of the participatory approach, the stakeholders involved, and the participatory mechanisms and activities are organized, like, consultation, public, and working groups meetings, interactive websites, and workshops (see appendix 8). The participatory process should be anchored as an essential component of the CDS along the process. Yet, the scope of the participatory approach varies across the CDS stages, to fulfill the aim of the approach in the process of developing and implementing the CDS:

- Limited scope (core stakeholders' group): the main actors are the key stakeholders' group with the leadership of the municipality, who initiates the activities among the related institutions and further stakeholders. The stages 2, 3, 5 and 6 are intended to involve influential city actors in the process to contribute in the working focus groups and build partnerships.
- Flexible scope (selected groups): the participatory approach mainly intends to include selected groups of participants in the planned activities. The stages 1, 4 and 8 focus mainly on informing which is unilateral from the side of the CDS team or the key stakeholders group led by the municipality.
- Broad scope (public involvement): the focus is on receiving input or feedback from a wider range of institutions, the community and other city stakeholders. They are invited to

participate in variable formal meetings and communicate in interactive media platforms. Stage 7 requires a broad scope with variable inputs and interaction from the community, further institutions and external partners, to raise awareness for the CDS.

The Scope of the Participatory Approach	Stages of the CDS							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	initiate process	initial parameters	initial assessment	develop a vision	SWOT Analysis	strategic thrusts	awareness building	implement
Limited scope								
Flexible scope								
Broad scope								

Table 14: The intended scope of the participatory approach of the CDS, deduced by the author based on CA 2006.

To perform a successful, effective participatory and consultation processes, an experienced leadership needs to be developed. Different factors that can influence these processes have to be taken into account. These factors can affect the “scope of participation”, like time limitation or resources. Therefore, they have to be acknowledged through initiating consultation and participation (ECON Analysis and CLG 2005: 38).

The levels of participation expected to be achieved range from none participation to consultative (according to the levels developed by Hamdi and Goethert 1997). Yet, the CDS process is based on collaborative planning (CA 2006: 42). The participatory approach should be deliberate and consistent, especially that developing the participatory approach and its practices through consultation and participation mechanisms is considered in the CDS process an essential outcome (looking at evidence from implemented CDSs in different cities based on ECON Analysis and CLG 2005: 38). For example, the limited resources were a challenge for the CDS of Bamako in Mali, in addition to the lack of the technical expertise to further developing the CDS process. Despite the successful participatory process through an effective public workshop, the lack of funding and cutting of consulting support hindered moving to formulating action plans for implementation, which ,in turn, led to the loss of the momentum of the participatory approach by the stakeholders (CA 2006: 49 cited from Koby 2002). Furthermore, engagement of all city stakeholders is not possible at the same time, but it is planned in the CDS stages differently (see table 14). Motivation and experience of practicing participation in the meetings is also variable among the stakeholders. For that reason, possible gaps should be bridged through training.

Some CDS’ case studies in different cities²⁸ have been reviewed focusing on the undertaken participatory processes (ECON Analysis and CLG 2005). They have examined the key stakeholders’ involvement, the scope of the participatory process (if it is limited to particular or wider activities), the techniques used (public meetings, workshops, consultations, dissemination, etc.) and the way in which the participatory process has been maintained afterwards to ensure its sustainable impact. Some of the results have focused on power issues that can affect the participatory process differently. For

²⁸ Eleven cities were considered as the case studies, mainly from Asia, Africa, from Brazil and from Latvia: Colombo, Sri Lanka; the CZT Region (Changsha, Zhuzhou and Xiangtan), China, Haiphong, Vietnam; Johannesburg, South Africa; Karu, Nigeria; Kigali, Rwanda; Latvia Cities Program; Recife Metropolitan Region (RMR), Brazil; Taygaytay City, Philippines; Taguig City, Philippines; Special Region of Yogyakarta, Indonesia (ECON Analysis and CLG 2005).

example, those, who have the financial and political power, affect the participatory approach and the CDS greatly, compared to those with less influence, although both are equally stakeholders of the city and have their own experience and views about their city (ibid: 38-41). The impact of the participatory approach in the CDS is in maintaining of the participatory process and the commitment of the stakeholders even after the end of the CDS exercise. This was observed in cases, like Colombo and Tagaytay where particular working groups or committees, that adopted the participatory approach for the follow up of the CDS, contributed to the sustainable impact of the process. In the framework of CDS of Colombo, indicators for successful consultation and participation were developed (see appendix 9). Yet, it is not clear, if the participatory approach has been applied in practice, in the following stages of the CDS, or evaluated and institutionalized (ECON Analysis and CLG 2005: 40-41).

The CDS as a global approach initiated by Cities Alliance²⁹ was applied in different cities in the world in last two decades and has offered a “Model of participatory development” in the MENA region (CA 2007). The methodology of the CDS and the stages were adapted to the given regional settings, like in the example of the CDS in in the SEMC³⁰ (see appendix 7: the CDS stages based on Tebbal 2012).

2.3.2.2. *The CDS Participatory Approach in the Arab Region: An Introduction to the Case Studies*

The CDS was defined as “[...] an action plan for equitable growth in cities, developed and sustained through participation, to improve the quality of life for all citizens [...]” (Eiweida No Year). It supports a participatory decision-making to identify the city needs and vision. The goals of a CDS include a collective city vision and action plan for improving urban governance and management, developing local economic development, and for deliberately reducing urban poverty (Eiweida 2007).

Applying the CDS in a number of cities in the Arab region³¹ has shown different degrees of success and failure. Some of the successful experiences have been recognized in improvement of the communication between the local actors³² in the planning process, mainly, between the municipality and the citizens. To focus on participating of a wide range of city stakeholders to follow up a long-term vision in a limited amount of time and with limited resources was challenging. This was attributed to the restrictive local governance, which is hindered by the centralized planning system (Tebbal 2011), in addition to the limited resources as well as a weak and fragmented institutional framework (World Bank 2007b: 8). While there were more identified similarities regarding the challenges, success factors of the strategy were varied in different national and local contexts. This spectrum of experiences in the cities provides the possibility for learning and exchange across the case studies, e.g., Alexandria (Egypt) as one of the first cities to develop its CDS, followed by Amman (Jordan), Aden, Hodeidah, Mukalla and Sana’a (Yemen), Sfax (Tunisia) and Tripoli (Lebanon). The first CDS experiences have provided the reference for learning, like the experiences of the CDS in Alexandria and other first cases

²⁹ The CA represents the formed partnership between the World Bank and UN-Habitat, which was established in 1999. It sets as a target implementing the Cities without Slums Action Plan until 2020. It aims at initiating urban programs that target the urban poor through, for example, CDSs and national programs for slum upgrading (UN-HABITAT 2017).

³⁰ SEMCs refers to Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries. This research focuses on the Arab cities in the Arab region, including mainly middle and low-income countries. Therefore, further SEMC case studies like the CDS of Izmir in Turkey will not be considered in the examination of the CDS case studies.

³¹ Tetouan, El jadida, Settat (Morocco), Sfax (Tunisia), Alexandria (Egypt), Ramallah (Palestine), Amman (Jordan), Aleppo (Syria), Tripoli and Al Fayha (Lebanon) and from MENA cities Izmir (Turkey) (Tebbal 2012: 2).

³² The local actors in this research refer to the actors in the local government responsible for urban management. They include not just urban planners, but also actors from different disciplines, e.g., engineers, workers in the local administration and social field, etc.

were observed as pilot case studies or as models to draw lessons learned for other Arab cities to improve the preconditions for developing a CDS (ibid).

In the case studies of this research, the undertaken CDS in the Arab cities Aleppo and Alexandria provide the framework for analyzing and comparing the PUPAs adopted in their CDSs. In this regard, PUPA in the CDS will be examined taking into consideration certain aspects for the analysis and comparison (see section 2.5).

2.4. The Methodological Approach of the Case Studies

The objective of the research project is to provide an in-depth understanding of the participatory approaches in urban development in the Arab region. For this purpose, two in-depth case studies are selected: the PUPAs in the CDS in Aleppo and Alexandria (2003-2010), in 2005 in Alexandria, and in 2007 in Aleppo, the CDS has been formulated as a joint endeavor of different city stakeholders. The development partners in the case studies, GTZ³³ and Cities Alliances³⁴, provided the technical and methodological frameworks to formulate and implement the CDS. The analysis and comparison are based on the elaborated factors developed in the conceptual approach (see 2.5) and the analyzed participatory concepts and practices in the theoretical framework (see 2.1 and 2.3).

The methodological approach focuses on analyzing and comparing the PUPAs in the selected case studies to identify common challenges and success factors. Primarily, the research examines how urban governance and planning structures are affecting the PUPA and vice versa.

Selecting the case studies, the PUPAs in the CDSs of Aleppo and Alexandria were considered based on the assumed Commonalities in the national and local settings of the two case studies that can facilitate the transfer of lessons learned and exchange between them. The national settings are represented by the political, cultural and institutional factors, which are interlinked in time and space. Egypt and Syria are two Arab countries located in the Arab region, particularly in the Middle East or the *Mashreq* region. They share a number of historical, institutional and political characteristics (see 3.1.1). For example, both countries share cultural characteristics including the language and societal values and traditions. They also had in the past the experience of establishing a pan-Arab state (1958-1961) that affected their political and institutional structures. Yet, understanding the characteristics and culture of the place is necessary before transferring urban policy because the aspects that influence the success of a policy in one cultural setting can lead to its failure in others (Booth 2011: 26).

In relation to the local settings, the CDS was launched at close times in the recent past in Alexandria (2005) and Aleppo (2007). In addition, both cities resemble the second largest in their countries and despite their strategic role and contribution to the national economy (see 4.1.1 and 4.2.1), they lack decentralization, and had to face many institutional and urban challenges that affected the planning and governance systems, and in turn, the CDS and the PUPA.

³³ The German Technical Cooperation Organization.

³⁴ The Cities Alliance is a global partnership for urban poverty reduction and the promotion of the role of cities in sustainable development. Cities Alliance Members are Local authorities, Governments, Non-governmental organizations and Multi-lateral organizations (European Union, UN-Habitat and the World Bank). It is defined as a global coalition of cities and their development partners committed to scaling up successful approaches to poverty reduction and the promotion of the role of cities in sustainable development. The Cities Alliance was created in 1999 when 10 donor governments joined the World Bank, UN-HABITAT and the major international associations of local authorities to form a new partnership aimed at focusing on two key issues: the growth of slums and the management of cities where slum growth was taking place (CA 2017).

For the comparison, literature has been examined that discussed the importance of comparative studies in planning and urban studies (see 2.4.2) considering both commonalities and differences in the national and local settings of the case studies. In this regard, certain factors were developed to conduct the analysis that considers the planning process, urban governance, and the arrangements of the PUPAs. For this purpose, the research adopts a qualitative approach in data collection, analysis, and comparison. Moreover, the data collection in the case studies is based on empirical research.

2.4.1. Data Collection

Both primary and secondary sources were considered for collecting the needed data for the research. For the primary data collection, a field study was carried out where semi-structured and open-ended interviews were conducted with city stakeholders from the administration and from local planners and experts. In the city of Alexandria, the interviews were personally held between 11th and 30th of May in 2014 with actors from the city administration, national and regional authorities, local planners, and academia (see point 7: list of Interviewees). Some of these actors were involved in the CDS process. Through the field trip, grey materials were collected in addition to observations, photos and informal discussions with further local actors in the city. For the field research planned in the case study of Aleppo, semi-structured and open-ended interviews were carried out in April and May 2017. The interviews with the local actors from the city administration, planners and experts were arranged through communication personally and via telephone. Through the communication with the actors from Aleppo, helpful grey materials and data were obtained.

In terms of collecting the secondary data, a main source of information were the reports published by the DAs, who were involved in the CDS and the projects. These include interim and final reports prepared mainly, by the city administrations in cooperation with the main partners from DAs, like the World Bank and the GTZ in the case of Alexandria and the Cities Alliance and the GTZ in Aleppo.

Further secondary data sources were collected, like articles and books regarding participatory planning approaches and their methodological approaches in DCs. Literature regarding planning theory and the evolving of participating planning was intended to give a background on the evolvement of participatory approaches in development and urban governance. Through the literature review, participatory planning approaches in development in the last decades have been explored where contested discourses have been highlighted. In addition, successful models in DCs were analyzed and compared, e.g., PB in Porto Alegre, Brazil and community participation in Kerala, India.

2.4.2. The Comparative Approach of the Cases Studies

For comparing the data, factors have been identified in the conceptual approach (see 2.5) based on the collected data and the elaborated theoretical framework. Based on the outcomes of the comparison, each case is expected to provide an own understanding and interpretation of the adopted PUPA in the practice. This will facilitate lessons learned and exchange between the case studies. A generalization is also possible, taking into account the shared Commonalities identified above.

On the national level, both countries Egypt and Syria, share a fair number of settings in their historical, political, institutional, economic, and social components, which influence the PUPAs. The comparison of their national frameworks of the planning process provides the basis to understand the policy processes of the two case studies. The temporal sequence and historical evolvement of the planning in the two countries are to be taken into account according to the “path dependence” theory (Booth 2011: 20-22).

On the local level, comparing the PUPAs in the CDS of Alexandria and Aleppo is based on “variation-finding” in individualizing comparisons “[...] to contrast specific instances of a given phenomenon as means of grasping the peculiarities of each case [...]” (Tilly 1984: 82-83 cited in Booth 2011: 19). This to understand the function and uniqueness of the variables put in different social settings in these cities (Kantor and Savitch 2005).

A further aim of the comparison is to show the convergence aspects regarding the participatory process and a possible transfer of best practices between the two case studies (Booth 2011). Additionally, it explores how policy-making and policy implementation are conducted in different places. Comparative methods and strategies in urban policy and spatial planning need to consider the historical development of such practices in “place and process” (Booth 2011: 20). Therefore, the planning context of the case studies is analyzed and compared (Booth 2011: 15, 26). Yet, there is a need to tune scope and depth (number of case studies vs. depth of analysis), considering the cultural differences and the tools in defining the problem in the case studies, in addition to the difficulties in accessing data (Kantor and Savitch 2005: 136-137). Considering this challenge for the comparative approach, the research review case studies from the Arab region (see 3.1.3) and focused on two in-depth case studies (chapter 4). The examination of the two case studies, which have undertaken the CDS process and the PUPA within similar conditions provided by the CDS framework, will help to identify potential similar or different outcomes (Pickvance 2001: 15) that are going to be discussed in the findings (see 4.3).

Accordingly, this research explores and evaluates the policy and governance processes that affected the PUPAs of the CDS and vice versa. It anticipates a better understanding of the PUPAs in the CDS through individualizing the cases of Alexandria and Aleppo, while comparing both the national and local settings that affected the PUPA in practice.

For evaluating and comparing the data, factors have been identified in the conceptual approach (see 2.5) based on the collected data and the elaborated theoretical framework (chapter 2). Comparing the PUPAs in the CDS of Aleppo and Alexandria underlines the importance of furthering comparative studies in planning and urban studies in the Arab region while taking into account the individual characteristics of the local settings in the planning practices. Besides, understanding the factors affecting the PUPAs and defining the common and different aspects in dealing with participation in the two case studies can help in improving future development interventions.

2.4.3. Research Limitations

The research has started in 2013, which marks a time of political instability in the Arab region, particularly in Egypt and Syria, since 2011. It has been impossible to predict the outcome of the political changes and their effect on planning. Therefore, the analysis took into account the situation and participation experiences that were made in Alexandria and Aleppo before 2011. As the analysis focused on the past, accessing data, finding interview partners and winning their willingness to provide the researcher with the necessary information have posed a challenge. Accessing official data was also hindered by governmental concealment of information.

The field research in Alexandria was done in May 2014 in the time of the presidential elections, which was accompanied by many political conflicts and activism. Carrying out the second field study directly in Syria was not possible due to the military interventions and political instability, particularly in the city of Aleppo. Therefore, the data for the Syrian case study was collected mainly through interviews

conducted via telephone and internet communication means. Some of the selected interviewees could not be reached due to a change of position or missing contact information. This concerns actors from civil society, particularly the NGOs who were involved in the CDS in both case studies, and actors from the private sector. Outdated contact information was also a challenge for reaching out to partners from DAs. Therefore, only a few actors from DAs could be interviewed.

In addition, discussing the topic of PUPAs required discussing the political background of planning and governance. This issue was avoided by most of the interviewees in the case of Alexandria, who focused their talk on new plans and less on past projects, like the one in the CDS. Most interviewed actors from the city of Aleppo preferred to remain anonymous and avoided a direct discussion on rooted political settings.

The overall aim of the PUPAs in the CDS was to improve urban governance through forming partnerships and promoting collaboration and consensus building among different city stakeholders, particularly by engaging the private sector, CSOs, and representatives of social groups of the marginalized in the CDS process. Yet, holding interviews with these actors was not possible, due to the absence of a documentation of their contribution and their contact information and to the political instability that hindered the mobility for reaching them through the field research. Therefore, information on the impact of the PUPA on the local community is missing and could not be taken into account in the final assessment of the CDS' participatory approach. Instead, the research project focuses on the possible institutional change through the PUPA and its influence on producing and building a culture of participation. The related information was mainly derived from the reports and the interviews. Hence, the collected primary data sources were limited to the interviews with the leaders at the local government, local planners, urban managers, and academia. These actors' roles were analyzed, based on recognizing their potential as agents of institutional change in affecting the local communities, the private sector and the national government.

Finally, the interruption of the CDS process in later stages before the implementation, allow just considering limited information and immediate outcomes, which raised a challenge to examine the impacts of the PUPAs.

Hence, the research is limited to the case studies' achievements of the adopted PUPAs until 2011. Few reports were published on the websites of the involved DAs, like the World Bank in the case of Alexandria, and on the website Madinatuna.com for Aleppo. These documents constitute the basis for the analysis of the PUPAs in the case studies, and certain findings in the reports³⁵ were critically discussed in this research. Accessing the related reports and documents was not enough to draw up objective results and answer all the aroused research questions on how the PUPA was implemented in the practice. Therefore, further documents were collected as grey materials from the interviewed local actors. Yet, these documents did not address adequately the PUPAs and focused on the CDS process as a whole. Moreover, it had some contradictions regarding the inclusiveness of the PUPA and the participation of CSOs. For example, the reports published on the CDS in SEMC did not give a real idea about how participation was methodologically planned and managed.

In general, the limited data sources was a challenge for undertaking a quantitative research including questionnaires and criteria to effectively measure the efficiency of participation in urban development. The research dealt with case studies that were undertaken in the past. Therefore, the databases were

³⁵ The reports lists can be found in the references list.

not up to date. Finally, PUPAs were not dealt with as such in the research in the Arab region, to derive adjusted analytical and comparative methods to the given settings. Just few academic projects have discussed the topic of participatory planning approaches in Egypt and Syria. Most of them dealt with the practices of participation on community level in Egypt but hardly any³⁶ in Syria. Besides, it was hard to find urban research projects in the Arab region, which focus on comparing multiple case studies and evaluating practices, except for those undertaken in the framework of development studies. Accordingly, there is a need for more comparative urban research in the Arab cities to achieve a better understanding of the discourses on participation within the Arab context.

2.5. The Conceptual Approach for Analyzing and Comparing the Case Studies

The conceptual approach for analyzing and comparing the case studies is derived from the theoretical framework, taking into account participation in theory and practice of planning and urban development.

Learning from the collaborative planning model upon which the CDS is built (CA 2006: 42) and from the historical background of the emerging concepts of participatory planning in ICs, analyzing the PUPAs focuses on different processes of interaction in urban planning processes. This includes processes of negotiation, deliberation and decision-making in addition to any processes of interaction that intended to involve the urban actor's and stakeholders (Pallagst 2007).

The PUPAs relating to this research connect the success of participatory planning and governance in cities with the political and institutional frameworks and creative tools for including the marginalized in the urban planning process. The essentials in supporting the PUPA are political support, that promotes citizenship, a solid legal and institutional framework for participation with financially and technically empowered local government and an active and organized civil society reinforced with local knowledge (educational level and awareness), in addition to the design of the participatory process (its course of actions) (UN-Habitat 2013: 17).

To foster a deeper understanding of the PUPAs in the CDSs in the case studies Aleppo and Alexandria, the PUPAs will be analyzed based on the given CDS process methodology described and evaluated in the reports (mainly by CA 2006 and ECON Analysis and CLG 2005), in addition to the participatory urban governance dimensions and relations discussed above (see 2.2.3). Analyzing urban governance settings in each of the case studies provides an understanding of the governance context of planning in which the PUPA was developed and implemented. For this purpose, the analysis of the PUPA methodology focuses on examining the local planning settings and the interaction between the involved actors to understand the urban governance process, the PUPA, and the cooperative forms initiated through the CDS that are going to be detected to define how PUPAs was developed and realized. Finally, the impact of the adopted PUPA on the participants and urban planning and governance will be examined, mainly, maintaining the PUPA and its actors and structures in the long run that can ensure its sustainability.

Hence, these three key factors: the urban governance settings, the PUPA' methodological framework including its organization and management and its impact and sustainability are adopted in analyzing the case studies. Based on the analysis, the success and challenging aspects will be identified in

³⁶ A PhD thesis was published by Sacha Hasan in 2012 on "Civil Society Participation in Urban Development in Syria".

practice. The findings and the acquired understanding of the PUPA are sought to help in supporting developing and implementing effective PUPAs in the Arab region in the future.

The examination of these factors considers the CDS’s aim, and basic principles for adopting the participatory approach, participatory techniques, and the methodology explained in the previous section. The three key factors are summarized in the next table:

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Urban governance framework underpinning the PUPA. 2. The organization and management of the PUPA, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • participatory mechanisms and communication strategies, e.g., public meetings, workshops, consultations, dissemination, interactive platforms, PRA techniques • key stakeholders, actors and leadership • inclusiveness of the local stakeholders across the CDS stages 3. Impact and sustainability of the PUPA on urban planning, governance, and actors.

Table 15: Key factors for analyzing the PUPAs in the case studies, identified by the author based on the theoretical framework.

2.5.1. The Urban Governance Framework Underpinning the PUPA

In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the PUPA in the CDSs of Alexandria and Aleppo, there is a need to understand how the PUPA was planned and implemented. It requires not just exploring the participatory mechanisms and activities but also examining the wider context of governance underpins the participatory planning process (Williams 2004), which will be linked to the analyzed aspects in the planning models (see 2.1.2) to enable a better understanding of the planning settings and the developed participatory planning’ concepts and tools. These are the legal and institutional frameworks of planning, the planning process, instruments, and actors as well as the power relations in the process.

Understanding urban governance settings of the PUPAs requires analyzing the institutional and legal frameworks of urban planning process. Participatory urban governance provided the basis where participation is adopted in the urban reform strategies since the 1990’s (Hicky and Mohan 2004; Wampler and McNulty 2015). Governance resembles the collectively performed processes of managing public affairs, by governmental and non-governmental actors (summarized based on different definitions from the World Bank 2007, UN-Habitat 2001; Sehested 2001: 11 and Wampler and McNulty 2011). Particularly undertaking participatory governance programs and projects, which engage the citizens and the underrepresented groups of the society in urban governance, can lead to a real improvement in their lives. Participatory governance means “[...] to engage new actors in political decision-making through innovative participatory programs. [...] it involves state-sanctioned institutional processes that allow citizens to exercise voice and vote in public policy decisions that produce real changes in citizens’ lives [...]” (Wampler and McNulty 2015: 1).

Vertical and horizontal governance relations involve the municipality, the private sector and the CSOs. The vertical relations represent the municipal relations to the central government and the state agencies and downwards to the CSOs and the communities. Horizontally, they are intended to engage the municipality with other municipalities and with local agencies of the line ministries, with CSOs and with the private sector. When these relations are improved, urban governance can be better performed. Participatory governance is based on building these relations on different levels, or through developing each of the governance dimensions; the national, the urban and the local (see appendix 10: dimensions of participatory urban governance based on Pieterse 2000: 20). The national dimension should ensure supporting policy frameworks, where the urban dimension focuses on developing the needed instruments and urban policies. The local dimension intends to improve the

functions of the municipality through enhancing its institutional structure and its relationship with other governance actors on the local level to support the participatory urban governance approach (Pieterse 2000: 18-19). In this regard, urban governance settings are expected to support the participatory approach and hence should be ensured as preconditions to developing the PUPA on the local level.




Figure 4: Vertical and horizontal governance relations and networks (based on Pieterse 2000: 18-19).

On each of the governmental levels or governance dimensions, there are preconditions to fulfill in order to promote participatory urban governance (see appendix 10). After changing the national framework to one that is supporting of participatory governance, transformation in the urban and municipal frameworks is required to shift from a traditional model to a strategic model of urban planning and management.




Figure 5: Comparison between the traditional and the strategic models of urban management (Based on Pieterse 2000: 24; CA 2006 and Hamdi and Ghoethert 1997).

Developing a PUPA and achieving effective and inclusive participatory processes that can improve urban planning and governance requires supporting political, legal and institutional frameworks of participation.

The context in which the case studies Alexandria and Aleppo are examined imply particular governance settings, which affect the PUPA significantly. The influence of these settings on the PUPA need to be explored and vice versa, the impact of the PUPA on the governance settings. Examination of the urban governance settings is necessary to develop the PUPA, whether at the national or the local level (Pieterse 2000). Urban governance plays an essential role in supporting or hindering participation (Healey 2003; Tebbal 2011) as well as the political system of a nation (Watson 2015). In this respect, in each of the selected case studies, there is a need to analyze and compare urban governance settings on the national and local levels. Among other aspects, the political commitment of the national government to the participatory component of the CDS in agreement with the DAs and the commitment of the local government for managing the participatory processes, considering its leading role in urban management.

Moreover, defining urban governance actors in the PUPA requires exploring not just the role of the institutions, but also the role of the local economy and the civil society. In addition, developing inclusiveness forms of the vulnerable groups in the city in the participatory planning processes is essential and can indicate the awareness of the governance actors of participation. Accordingly, forms of inclusiveness and empowerment of the vulnerable groups in the CDS process need to be investigated as well as informal structures and networks. In this regard, the developed mechanisms

and strategies to reach out, include and enable the marginalized in the decision-making process will be detected.

Hence, three groups of aspects will be examined on the national and local planning levels in the case studies in relation to the political support and commitment to the PUPA, supporting institutional and legal frameworks of planning to PUPAs and the involved actors in urban governance and planning.

Examined aspects on planning levels	National level	Local level
Political support and commitment to the PUPA	To examine: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - how the state promotes participatory practices in planning - how political actors or parties influence the decision-making process in planning - the challenges imposed by the political system on urban governance, for example, through scarcity of funds 	To examine: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - if the political system allows for decentralized decision-making - if political actors support the PUPA - the change induced by the outcome of the PUPA on local government, urban policies and decision-making process
Supporting institutional and legal frameworks of planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - how the legal and institutional frameworks support or hinder PUPAs and their forms - involved instruments, resources and actors for supporting PUPAs - if the civil society and its activities are supportive legally 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - planning instruments promote PUPAs - supporting institutions or participatory institutions (temporarily or permanently) - available municipal capacity, including qualified institutions and urban managers and resources to realize the PUPA - the main actors and decision-makers on the PUPA - the possibility to build partnerships, collaboration and cooperation across sectors and on different levels
Involved actors in Urban governance and planning	the role of the national government and institutions on the national level in the planning process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the role of the local government, local economy and civil society - If there is trained staff to manage the participatory processes and techniques - If forms of active civil society do exist that represent local communities and the marginalized and how they are activated and included and influencing the decision-making process - If Informal forms of participation are promoted

Table 16: Examined aspects of urban governance on the national and local level of planning in the case studies, identified by the author based on the theoretical framework.

Above all, the political support at all levels should be ensured, in addition to the regulatory framework that support the collaboration among the city stakeholders. Decentralization as a mechanism to improve municipal capacity and local governance allows empowering the local government with skills and resources. In addition, a strong civil society and empowered citizens need to be included in the process. Empowering the civil society through the legal and political support can provide a transparent atmosphere for communication and information exchange among them (Pieterse 2000: 19; UN-Habitat 2013: 17). These preconditions are very important to ensure before developing and implementing the PUPA and they will be examined in this research.

2.5.2. The Organization and Management of the PUPA

After acquiring an understanding of urban governance, in which the PUPA was developed, the PUPA in practice will be examined in each of the CDSs in Alexandria and Aleppo. In the CDS, different levels of participation and inclusiveness of city key stakeholders should be achieved. The PUPA is supposed to bring different city stakeholders together to collaborate in formulating the CDS and its action plans. By this, it helps in raising the awareness and ownership and building consensus among the key stakeholders over the CDS, in addition to empowering the marginalized and the civil society, which ensure the sustainability of the CDS process. As an outcome, the developed PUPA, its mechanisms, arrangements and actors will have a great value in furthering the CDS stages and other development projects. Therefore, in sustaining the PUPA and scaling it up, it needs, in the end, to be institutionalized.

Developing the CDS through participatory processes has proved to be a realistic sustainable and easy approach to implement. The participatory mechanisms used in the CDSs through the planning process are necessary to manage the negotiation among different actors, like the municipality, the investors, and the developers. In this respect, the participatory mechanisms in the management process need to consider different communication forms among the established and the new institutional structures if that vertically or horizontally (UN-Habitat 2001a: 15). Examining the CDS plan regarding realizing the participatory approach, although not explicitly described in each of the CDS stages, it indicated the need for different levels of participation and inclusiveness of city key stakeholders (see 2.3.2). For example, in the initiating stage, the mayor and his office should be advocates, and a small group of key stakeholders who represent the key interest groups in the city should guide the process. In awareness building and dissemination, more groups of the community should be reached out via different means of media, like the internet, TV, newspaper, etc. (CA 2006: 8-10). In developing the strategic plan of the CDS, the process should be “[...] involving local actors that shape the city, in government, the private sector, and civil society, and their international partners (development agencies, international investors and NGOs) [...]” (CA 2006: 12).

Hence, the organization and management of the PUPA will be explored in terms of the involved stakeholders and actors in the CDS process, the organization of the PUPA, and its outcome. These aspects will be examined through the CDS stages, which should be detected independently from the CDS process itself. The outcome of the PUPA in the CDS should be differentiated from that of the CDS and related projects, for example, reaching consensus over a CDS’ issue can be an outcome of an undertaken participatory process, where a project can have a tangible outcome, like physical improvement or delivering services. Still, some of these aspects overlap in both the CDS and the PUPA.

The Organization and Management of the PUPA	
Key stakeholders and actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - define the stakeholders, e.g., businesses, institutions, NGOs, DAs - the role of the leading actors or institutions in developing and managing the participatory process - included groups from the vulnerable groups of the society
The organization of the PUPA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - terms of selecting the participants and representation in the meetings - themes open for participation along the CDS stages - communication strategies to reach out different city stakeholders - participatory mechanisms, for example for community participation or only consultation based - forms of inclusiveness of the vulnerable groups

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - participatory activities, type, number, periodicity selected locations and scope in addition to the number of participants and level of participation
The outcome of the PUPA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - organized groups of stakeholders - consensus over issues open for participation and approving the CDS - commitment of the key stakeholders to the CDS - raise awareness among all stakeholders to the CDS - build cooperation and collaboration across sectors and with decision makers on higher levels and with the local communities - forming networks and partnerships - mobilizing stakeholders from the marginalized groups in the CDS

Table 17: Analyzing aspects in the organization and management of the PUPA, identified by the author.

Considering the definitions of the participatory approach in different development interventions, participation is adopted as an instrument in the planning process, where the stakeholders are empowered and provided with the resources and political support to take part in planning and development processes (see 2.1 and appendix 11). Based on the CDS' conceptual approach, the CDS process is based on the collaborative planning (CA 2006: 42). In this regard, the aim of the participatory approach in the CDS is to build consensus, partnerships, and a shared vision through developing the CDS that can be sustained along the following phases to the implementation. By meeting the Habitat agenda and sustainable development goals (CA 2006), participation should not just adopted as a tool, but also as an objective to be attained in the framework of the strategy. Participation is intended in this regard to be achieved as equal to empowerment of the city actors whose potentials and roles are traditionally overlooked in the planning and governance processes.

2.5.2.1. The Management Plan of the PUPA

The management plan of the PUPA through the CDS development stages is intended to be maintained for managing and implementing the action plans and projects in the CDS.

The focus in the first stage is on mobilizing the actors and the stakeholders and gain their commitment, where in the following stages; the focus is on initiating participatory activities and events and undertaking participatory mechanisms along the CDS stages to keep the participatory process ongoing.




Figure 6: The participatory approach through the CDS stages with increasing actors' mobilization and commitment in the following stages (illustrated by the author based on UNCHS Habitat 2001: 5 and CA 2006).

The first stage (Initiating the Process) concentrates on stakeholder's mobilization including stakeholders' analysis; define vulnerable groups, raise gender issues and define the key issues for participation. In this stage, stakeholders working groups are formed to perform the stages two and three. In the fourth stage (Formulating a Vision), the stakeholders' commitment is formalized. This stage focuses on collaboration and reaching consensus among the stakeholders in addition to gaining their commitment to the agreed strategy formally through city consultation. In the stages five and six, the stakeholders working groups proceed the planned activities through workshops and focus groups

meetings. Stage seven (Awareness Building) is dedicated for awareness raising of the public to the CDS outcomes through dissemination and public hearings. Stage eight (Implementation), the stakeholders negotiate and agree on the action plans, develop a demonstration or initiative projects, work on conflict resolution and on implementing the action plans (Based on Participatory Decision-Making Process: Application by Phase UN-Habitat 2001a: 5 and CA 2006 on the stages of preparation and development of the CDS (see appendix 12). In this process, the PUPA tends to be extended in scope in the following stages through mobilizing more actors into the process, where the first stages had limited scope through focused key stakeholder groups. This demonstrates the need to further the participatory mechanisms in the advanced stages of the CDS. The following phase after implementation is sought for monitoring and evaluation of the action plans and for integrating new ones. Institutionalizing the CDS process including its PUPA is important to ensure its sustainability and replicability. The CDS is process-oriented, which means the participatory approach cycle can also be repeated and upgraded based on the integrated needs and the new involved actors in the follow-up phases to keep it ongoing and sustainable for future plans.

The levels of participation detected in these phases range between manipulation and support, mainly, by informing to partnership and empowerment, according to the levels defined by Choguill 1996. It is noteworthy, that the CDS participatory approach although based on collaborative and strategic planning approaches, it leads to a top-down planning approach, while focusing on the main role of the local government and the city influential actors. In this regard, approaching the community can not be planned without the agreement of the governmental actors, which most of the times hinders a real bottom-up empowerment. The cooperation of the key governance actors is essential; therefore, the PUPAs in this form lay mostly in the level of manipulation with a higher aim of attaining support through empowerment (based on Choguill 1996). Examining these levels in the case studies will give a better understanding of the limitations and potentials of the CDS and the related PUPA.

The CDS focuses on city consultation as the main participatory mechanism, in addition to key stakeholders' and working groups' meetings and workshops (see the definitions and purpose of these participatory mechanisms in appendix 13). City consultation is usually applied for consensus building on the issues that should be included in the strategy. It was applied to facilitate communication and dialogue to build consensus and gain the stakeholders' commitment (UN-Habitat 2001a). The purpose of city consultation in relation to good urban governance is to promote civic engagement and culture of participation. Stakeholder working groups intended to be organized as a mechanism to improve coordination and collaboration across the vertical and horizontal institutional structures. Demonstration or catalytic projects were intended to present the new approaches and solutions to urban development problems to demonstrate the effectiveness of the whole CDS process and the PUPA. These projects are seen as pilot and model projects that can be replicated.

Action planning presents how the strategies can be implemented within a limited time and with involvement of particular actors or target groups. The success of the undertaken projects presents the basis to approve the CDS and confirm the accountability of the whole process and the developed plans. Within the action planning processes, applying PRA techniques for community involvement is foreseen in the preparation for the demonstration projects (UNICEF 2003 see appendix 3). Yet, adopting PRA techniques through the action-planning phase and executing the demonstration projects does not necessarily lead to empowering the citizens in the CDS process. Still, if action planning is planned with community participation or as a top-down process, this determines the community participatory

methods, for example, in various development projects, the methods and stages in the ZOPP are favorable methodological framework for many DAs (UN-Habitat 2001a: 67-71, appendix 14) (see 2.3). In developing the CDS plan, there is flexibility for the local managers to adjust the tools for inclusiveness, and develop local tools for community participation, communication, and partnerships (CA 2006). Hence, the participatory activities and events will be examined in terms of their scope and level of participation. In addition, the communication strategies that have been developed will be explored as well as further participatory mechanisms in the course of the undertaken actions and projects. Yet, there is a need to examine how the PUPA continued and sustained through the action planning process.

Latterly, institutionalization of the PUPA is a very essential step to ensure its sustainability. It demonstrates that the approach is accepted and will be adopted as a practice in the future (UN-Habitat 2001a: 16; CA 2006). Therefore, the results of the city consultation and the agreed strategy should be formalized to ensure the commitment of the involved stakeholders. The formalizing process and the resultant agreement is called the “Urban Pact”, a tool that is applied in the participatory decision-making process (UN-Habitat 2001a: 58, appendix 15).

2.5.2.2. Defining the Stakeholders and Actors

Identifying the involved governance actors in the urban planning process is important to understand how the PUPA was organized and managed. Through analyzing the case studies, there is a need to define who is motivated into the participatory process and affected by it, who has the resources for the process who is participating, who has the tools for implementation and who is leading and maintaining the PUPA. A challenging task in the PUPA is to identify the vulnerable groups and ensure an inclusive process (UN-Habitat 2001a: 6-7).

The PUPA requires involving the stakeholders actively, particularly from the urban poor in the discussion on their needs and development priorities of their city. This has proved to be essential, especially in the formulation phase of the CDS, as demonstrated in many CDS case studies and reports (ECON Analysis and CLG 2005: 5). In this regard, the CDS targets a wide range of stakeholders as potential actors in urban planning and governance who can contribute to a sustainable development of the city. Particularly in the first stage of the CDS formulation, actors need to be mobilized in the participatory decision-making process. The main goal of mobilizing the stakeholders is to improve governance through raising a sense of ownership and commitment. This depends largely on the effectiveness of the organization and holding of the consultation meetings. A successful mobilization can unfold mutual understanding and commitment to the discussed issues by the participants from the city stakeholders. Conflicts of interests can be resolved through negotiation then consensus over the CDS themes and related action plans and tools, resulting in forming partnerships to implement the plans (UN-Habitat 2001a: 6-7).

The leadership of the CDS is intended to be undertaken by a key stakeholders group chaired by a governor or a mayor. The local government and its technical team are members of this group or the body but they should not be the only participants in the group. This group takes the leadership of the executive tasks of the city and develop the vision based on the analysis and by means of local media to gain inputs from the citizens. International experts assist in keeping the vision realistic based on the assessment (CA 2006: 50-51). The key stakeholders group initiate the CDS, negotiate through its making, and hence, it is the core group to guide and manage the PUPA. In this respect, the substantial

role of the local government represents the juncture in the horizontal and vertical relationships with the main city stakeholders and in managing service delivery, in addition to being the initiator and supporter of innovative urban projects for local economic development (see figure 4). In this sense, decentralization in the financial management of the municipality and building its capacity to assume its role are part of the prepared governance framework for the CDS and the PUPA (CA 2006: 37, 72).

The relationship of the local government with the civil society and the private sector is of great importance for the PUPA. The relationship with the private sector can be improved from isolation and consultation to partnerships and privatization of some of the public services. Cooperation with the private sector involving large firms and property developers can be arranged through Public Private Partnerships (PPP) and innovative financial local projects that benefit the community. The relationship with the civil society depends largely on how powerful its role in the city is and how this role is supported or challenged by the local government or other urban governance actors (CA 2006: 38, 73).

The local government defines usually the participants in the CDS process. It decides together with the leaders of the CDS on the partners in undertaking the task of maintaining the PUPA. Defining the participants and the ways to approach them is variable and depends on the relationship between the local government and the target groups of participants. Groups of city stakeholders from the urban poor should be targeted to be part in formulating the strategy and in its vision and themes for the future to ensure sustainable outcomes for all city stakeholders. In managing the participatory process of preparing and implementing plans on the local level, certain challenges need to be considered, like scarcity of local resources, lack of skilled staff, or clarity and applicability of the plan, which can affect the participatory process with the community (Hamdi and Goethert 1996).

Sustaining the participatory approach requires initiating new organizational forms or participatory bodies or institutions to facilitate the work of the actors and participants in the participatory activities and events, for, working groups or institutional structures that set up to drive the process whether at the city level or smaller levels (Pieterse 2000; Wampler and McNulty 2011) (see 2.2.3). These forms of organizational bodies will be examined in the framework of the case studies.

2.5.3. The Impact and Sustainability of the PUPA

The impact and sustainability of the PUPA can be examined through detecting the improvements in urban planning and governance as well as the effects on the community, for example, through achieved social empowerment and mobilization for urban change in these processes. The impact on urban planning and governance processes can be shown, for example, by institutionalizing the CDS as a planning instrument. This involves institutionalizing the organizational structures, participatory mechanisms, networks, and partnerships between the actors that constitute the basis to sustain the PUPA and allow its replication in other cities.

The impact on the community is central in the whole PUPA. Communities that are targeted in the process will be aware of their role in urban planning and governance and of being empowered and organized as essential condition to ensure the sustainability of the PUPA.

The impact of the PUPA in the CDS requires time, so the changes can be understood and accepted to facilitate replicating them. In this regard, institutionalizing the PUPA undertaken through the CDS is important in order to turn participation into a practice embedded in the institutional system and in the community. In many cases, although the participatory approaches have achieved success during the

project cycle, the reluctance to institutionalizing them, keeps them mere short-lived practices and without impact on the existing urban governance settings and behaviors (UN-Habitat 2001a: 98-101).

In sum, examining the impact and sustainability of the PUPA will focus on examining the institutionalization of the CDS and the participatory approach and its effect on the urban governance actors and the communities.

3. Participation in Urban Planning and Governance in the Arab Region, Egypt, and Syria

This chapter presents a background on the spatial trends, planning traditions, and urban and institutional challenges in the Arab region. Moreover, planning on the national level in Egypt and Syria will be explored and compared in addition to urban governance settings that underpin the PUPAs in the initiated CDS' stages on the local level. Eventually, the last section will provide the findings of the analysis and comparison.

3.1. General Introduction to Participation in Planning and Urban Governance in the Arab Region

In the following, the context of the Arab region will be introduced regarding its spatial and urban trends and challenges, in addition to urban governance and participatory planning approaches in some of Arab cities.

3.1.1. Defining the Context

The Arab world or the Arab region refers to a group of countries that are located in Africa and Asia, whose population speak the Arabic language and share, among others, a variety of historical, geographical and cultural characteristics.



Figure 7: The Map of the Arab World (ArabBay 2016).

The term Arab region involves a variety of characters and factors, which are considered differently in research and literature. Some of the main features are the level of development, geography, structures of economies, governance modes and institutional structures (Ali 2005: 11; Madbouly 2009: 18), in addition to different human development indices, political stability and historical conflicts, social cohesion, and modes of production (Madbouly 2009: 18). All these aspects influence the spatial planning system of these countries.

Focusing on the economic factors, the Economic Research Forum (ERF) 1998 has categorized the Arab countries into four categories³⁷; mixed oil economies, oil economies, diversified economies and primary export economies (Ali 2005: 11). The World Bank has provided other groupings based on the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita. According to this criterion, Arab countries are grouped in four groups³⁸: high-income, upper middle-income, lower middle-income and low-income groups (World Bank 2003: 234; Ali 2005: 11). In view of the human development index, most of the Arab countries have a low Human Development Index (HDI), taking into consideration the life expectancy, health and education, and per capita income indicators (UNDP 2014: 164) (see appendix 16: the ranking and values of the HDI for the Arab countries).

Most studies have pointed out to the Arab region' countries, as countries found in the Middle East and North Africa or the MENA region^{39,40}. This region includes 20 countries; 12 of them are mostly middle-income countries and eight high-income countries (Madbouly 2009: 6). The high-income countries are also the richest countries of oil reserves in the region that endows the region its strategic importance. Moreover, the Arab region is rich with its history, mainly in the successive ancient civilizations and religions (ibid). Further studies have identified more Commonalities among neighboring countries on the regional level. For example, the UN-Habitat has defined the Mashreq to include six countries; Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and Syria (UN-Habitat 2012: 33) and the Maghreb includes the countries Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, in addition to the disputed territories of Western Sahara. These groupings of the neighboring countries refer also to the shared historical and political changes that affect their development immensely.

Initiated endeavors to promote cooperation and development have tried to strengthen the cooperation between the Arab countries to provide reciprocal support for development. These endeavors are also promoted internationally. The Arab states have formed since 1945 the Arab League or the League of Arab States (LAS). It consists of 22 Arab countries that share a common national identity and seek to strengthen the collaboration between them in various developmental fields; like economy, culture and education, etc. (LAS 2018). In the international context and based on the common geographical features, Arab countries that are located along the Mediterranean have formed the SEMC, the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries together with Turkey (CMI 2011: 11-14). In concert with other countries from Europe, they have initiated networks and organizations, like the MedCities Network⁴¹ to strengthen cooperation and exchange. This Network is located in

³⁷ Mixed oil economies (MOE: Algeria, Iraq and Libya); Oil Economies (OE); the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE; diversified economies (DE: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia); and, primary export economies (PEE: Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen (Ali 2005: 11).

³⁸ The groups: "High-income group is that with GNI per capita of US\$9.2 thousand or more (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and UAE); upper middle-income group is that with GNI per capita range between about US\$3.0-US\$9.2 thousand (Lebanon, Libya, Oman, and Saudi Arabia); lower middle-income group is that with GNI per capita in the range US\$0.75-US\$ 3.0 thousand (Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen); and, low-income group is that with GNI per capita of about US\$0.75 thousand or less (Comoros, Mauritania, Somalia, and Sudan)." (cited from Ali 2005: 11 based on the World Bank 2003: 234).

³⁹ They include also Turkey and Iran, which are non-Arabic speaking countries.

⁴⁰ The MENA region was described as: "The MENA region includes 20 countries, 12 of which are active or potential borrowers of the World Bank (Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, West Bank and Gaza, Tunisia and Yemen). In addition, 8 relatively high-income countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Malta, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates), and while they are not active borrowers, but they rely on non-lending services." (Madbouly 2009: 6).

⁴¹ MedCities is a network of Mediterranean cities created in Barcelona in November 1991 (from the website).

Barcelona and it seeks to develop joint efforts to facilitate multi-disciplinary exchange and cooperation for development between the Mediterranean countries (MedCities 2018).

In its comparative approach, this research focuses on the cities Alexandria and Aleppo. It considers the national framework of PUPAs and hence the planning system and urban governance in Syria and Egypt. Both countries share a fair number of similarities but also differences in their spatial, political, institutional, economic and social components, which influence the PUPAs. These features will be explored closely in the case studies; Syria and Egypt in the next sections.

Egypt and Syria belong to the Mashreq countries together with Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). The Mashreq has a total population of 146 million people; Egypt alone has 83 million people. The urban growth in these countries had an average annual rate of 1-3 % until 2012, which is expected to decline slightly by 2030, but with high urbanization rates; 90 % for the population of Lebanon, 70 % for Iraq and 80 % for Jordan and the OPT (UN-Habitat 2012: 33-34). Uncontrolled urbanization and urban sprawl will continue to be a challenge in these countries, through lack of effective policies to stop the migration process and informal development (ibid). The largest cities in the region have registered high urban growth rates in their metropolitan areas, for example; Cairo, the largest Arab city, has an annual growth rate at less than 1% yearly since 1995. Amman with 1% annual growth from 1995-2005. Hamah in Syria was growing very fast in the last decade between 5-6.5 % annually (UN-Habitat 2012). Most Egyptian cities were growing slowly with 1-2 % annually, except Alexandria, Luxor, Qina and Al'Arish with more than 2 % annually. The government was taking actions to deal with urbanization on the agricultural land in the 2050 Cairo plan. It had planned housing projects in satellite towns in the dessert east and west of the Nile Valley (GOPP 2009; UN-Habitat 2012). The cities of Syria were mostly grown along the basin of the Euphrates River, the interior trade routes or in rain-fed agricultural areas. The largest cities Damascus and Aleppo had 20% of the total population and 37% of the urban population of the country (von Rabenau 2010). Cities, like Homs, Lattakia, and Hamah had around 300.00-1 million people and 14% of the total urban population. Other cities like Deir-ez-Zor, al Rakka, al-Hasakeh, Tartous (see figure 13) had 100,000-300, 000 people (UN-Habitat 2012: 33-34). The large cities in the Mashreq were also the centers of financial, economic activities and tourism. Policies have been developed to revitalize the economy and industry in the secondary cities through infrastructural projects, to make them attractive for domestic and foreign investment (UN-Habitat 2012: 38).

The urban structure of the Mashreq city was developing and growing in three successive stages in the history: the old city, the colonial city and the modern city. Some of the cities possess old and historic centers that are also registered on the UNESCO World Heritage list (UN-Habitat 2012: 48) for instance the old city of Damascus inscribed in 1979 and Aleppo in 1986 (UNESCO 2018). The old city is characterized by homogeneous organic fabric of low buildings with mixed of residential and commercial uses. In most of the cases, the Awqaf charitable and religious foundations own around 40% of the buildings (ibid). Old cities have such valuable cultural and historical importance, that the government invest a fair amount of resources in old cities' preservation projects. The second growth phase was recognized through the expansion intended at colonial times. The urban growth followed the Hausmannization style of European urban planning at that time. It characterized the construction of wide boulevards, big blocks, and multi-story buildings that have later been utilized as administrative buildings (Kiet 2011; UN-Habitat 2012). The modern tendency of growth after independence has resulted from the institutional reforms of the new governments, particularly land reforms, and

nationalizing some properties for public land use. The land regulations in the sixties and eighties, in addition to accelerated population rates, had resulted in rapid urbanization and informal development on the land. This has been exacerbated by the failure of the housing policies for accommodating the high land demands (Madbouly 2009; UN-Habitat 2012: 48).

3.1.1.1. *Spatial Trends in the Arab Region*

Spatial tendencies in the Arab region⁴² showed a high population growth from 100 million in 1950 to 380 million in 2000. Urban growth was expected to continue in the next decades, due to improved health services and education (Madbouly 2009: 6-7), from 385.6 in 2001 to 568.7 in 2025 and 719.4 in 2050⁴³ (Madbouly 2009: 7). Yet, a decline in these numbers is expected in the wake of the uprising and aftermath of wars in some of the Arab countries after 2011 through out-migration, in addition to the rising of environmental problems resulting from climate change.

The population growth has resulted in high population density in the region concentrated around the fertile land leading to imbalance in the spatial distribution of the population, especially in the coastal areas and along the main rivers. For example, the population in Algeria are concentrated on sixth of the whole area, and in Egypt, most of the population occupy the land along the Nile and the Mediterranean Sea, which constitute around 6% of the whole area of the country. Most Egyptian cities are established along the Nile River Valley or in the Delta Region (UN-Habitat 2012: 47). Urban growth in this form had led to forming development corridors between cities through transportation networks, for instance, Damascus-Homs corridor, which is different from those extended around mega cities in metropolitan regions, like Greater Cairo (UN-Habitat 2012: 21).

The high and imbalanced population growth and density posed a challenge for the planning system in the Arab countries leading to problems in their regions and cities (CMI 2011: 11-14). The severe environmental challenge in the region is the scarcity of water as an impact of climate change, which will affect its economic and physical development negatively: *"75% of MENA population is under water scarcity level. Over 2010 to 2030 period, Alexandria, Tunis and Casablanca will face individually potential cumulative economic losses of \$1billion from floods, coastal erosions, ground instability, marine inundation and water scarcity."* (Tebbal⁴⁴ 2011b: 8). The water scarcity in the MENA region lies below the international standard and 80% of the fresh water sources are concentrated in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey (Madbouly 2009: 11).

Moreover, there are increasing trends in the Arab region for rapid urbanization, which in the last decades have characterized the region of getting more urban than rural. Migration was the main reason for these trends, which had already started before the fifties, triggered by historical and political conditions and continued in the 1950's and 1960s in the region (Madbouly 2009). The migration of the refugees had flown from conflict areas in addition to the in- migration of marginalized rural population to the big urban centers and capitals. Only two Arab cities in 1950 had a population of more than one million. They increased in 2010 to 23 cities. The Arab region will host around 31 cities of more than one million inhabitants in 2025, which will be home of approximately 97 million

⁴² This research considers the Arab region/ or Arab cities, particularly low and middle-income countries, including the SEMC and the MENA countries. High-income countries like the Gulf countries are not included. This section tried to mention few examples, where not all cases or countries are covered in the discussion.

⁴³ This based on 2001 World Population Data Sheet; and UNICEF, The State of the World's Children 2001, Table, 2003 GRHS, Statistical Annex.

⁴⁴ This statement was cited from the director of CMI, Mourad Ezzine.

inhabitants. The largest Arab city in 2010 was Cairo (10 million) and it will remain the Megacity in the region, followed by Baghdad (8 million) and then Khartoum (5 million). The city of Sana'a in Yemen is the region's fastest growing city of 2.3 million inhabitants in 2010, it is expected to reach 4.2 million inhabitants by 2025 (UN-Habitat 2012: 14-15).

Yet, urbanization trends are changing while affected by variable factors in the Arab countries, like the natural resources, the history, the political stability, socio-economic factors and human development in addition to changes in the governance systems, modes of production and openness to the global market (Madbouly 2009: 18). Some countries have adopted market economies for example, GCC, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt. Until this point of time, Syria was still adopting a state guided economy. In addition, the political instability had a great impact on the spatial and urban development in these countries, for example in post-conflict countries (Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq) in addition to other countries that are still experiencing political transformation, like in Yemen, Libya and Syria in the aftermath of 2011 political conflicts and war. These regional variable features made it hard to examine urbanization trends equally without considering each country's based data. Therefore, any urban development process is affected directly by the specific country-based context (Tebbal 2012), e.g., stability and reconstruction in Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine, poverty issues, and urban governance in Yemen, Syria, Egypt, and Jordan and environmental risks in the GCC. (Madbouly 2009: 18). Urbanization rates were high in the last years and the urbanization process was accompanied by lack of infrastructure, services and housing, for example, Yemen had the lowest rates in 2004; just 67% of the country was provided with improved drinking water coverage and 43% with improved sanitation coverage (Madbouly 2009: 10 based on GHSR – Statistical Annex- 2005).

Further challenges for the spatial development in the Arab countries are the social and economic challenges facing the region. Some of the challenges are; poverty, unemployment and low education (Madbouly 2009; UN-HABITAT 2012). Poverty is one challenge for the population in the region despite the prevalent ranking as middle-income⁴⁵. Around 23.2% of MENA's population have lived on less than \$2 per day in 2011. This trend is aggravated with political instability, natural risks and rapid urbanization trends. Poverty and vulnerability are most likely evident in countries, like Morocco, Egypt, and Yemen (Madbouly 2009: 12-13). The gap of poverty rates between rural and urban areas is getting higher through urbanization processes. Arab countries were integrated in different development programs for poverty reduction in the framework of the former MDGs (2000-2015 by the UN) and in the framework on International Development Goals (IDGs) by the (OECD) (Ali 2005; Madbouly 2009: 12-13). Despite the international endeavors, poverty was getting higher especially in the rural areas but also in the cities; urban poverty was getting an urgent challenge for local and national authorities under the pressure of globalization and economic reforms.

High unemployment rates among the youth and economic stagnation are further challenges in the region. The unemployment rate was the highest between 1996 and 2010, e.g., "[...] 48% in Lebanon, 68% in Jordan, and 80% in Yemen over the last decade." (Madbouly 2009: 8). The region had the highest female unemployment rate, according to the ILO, and about three quarters of the unemployed are from the youth (15-29) (ibid). The youth, age group 15-29 years, constitutes about 30% of the population in the region (about 100 Million), which has a great untapped potential for development. However, the poor quality of education and the high unemployment rate (25-50 %) caused by the

⁴⁵ Yemen is ranked as low-income country.

economic crisis in the region, in addition to the lack of regional economic integration had led to depriving the youth from taking part in the development processes in their countries ((Tebbal 2011b: 7). Hence, revitalizing the economy in the face of globalization requires investment in the human resources focusing on improved education among the youth (Madbouly 2009: 9). This however is not a common case in all Arab countries, the imbalance economic development among the them is reinforced by the migration of the workers to the GCC, as labor receiving countries, has led to rapid economic growth and an intensive urban growth in these countries through urban development projects and infrastructure (UN-Habitat 2012: 16). Conversely, lower-income countries have to suffer of brain drain and economic stagnation. Furthermore, Arab countries have failed to realize solid economic policies and improve governance, which hindered establishing a strong private sector. The urgent need for institutional reform through decentralization, although is recognized, the reluctance of the governments to give financial and administrative autonomy to the local level, has posed a challenge for effective service delivery and funding of urban development projects (Madbouly 2009: 13; CMI 2011). Further institutional hindrances to economic growth in the region, is the lack of an effective land management system and secure property rights. This had led to the weaknesses in investment in real estate and housing mortgage markets, some examples for such constraints are mostly found in Egypt, Morocco, Yemen and Syria (Madbouly 2009: 13-14).

The spatial tendencies, including the increase in population and high urbanization rates have added more burdens on the governments in the Arab countries to provide services effectively, to reduce poverty, to raise environmental awareness and actions for water scarcity and to ensure the good living conditions that can hinder the ongoing brain drain in the region (Madbouly 2009: 7). Through the upheavals in the Arab countries in the last years, violence and instability had also posed more challenges that hit the cities and affected the social structure and economic development. In addition to its “spillover effect” on the neighboring countries, for instance, Syria’s conflicts had led to the migration and displacement of the people to Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey (CMI 2011; UN-Habitat 2012). Since these spatial and urban trends are expected for most of the cities to continue^{46,47}, each city is expected to develop differently depending on the regional, political and institutional factors, which affect its urban development prospects (CMI 2011: 11). Under these changing dynamics, it is expected that more differences in the development of these countries will emerge and should be considered in examining the spatial characteristics and tendencies in each country in the future.

3.1.1.2. Urban Challenges in the Arab Cities

The Arab region is rich with urban centers with valuable heritage and high potentials for development, like Aleppo, Damascus, Alexandria, Sfax, Baghdad, etc. (Tebbal 2011b; UN-Habitat 2012). These urban centers were experiencing high urban growth rates, from 48% in 1980 to 60% in 2000 (World Bank 2008 cited in Tebbal 2011b). The urban growth has caused pressure not just on the natural resources, but also on the municipal capacity for urban management of a city. This has resulted in the failure of the municipality to provide efficient public services especially in managing urban informality, which had led to uncontrolled urban sprawl on the agricultural land aggravating environmental challenges and the risks of climate change (ibid).

⁴⁶ These projections did not consider the dynamics of the followed social and political changes started in 2011, which affected the birth and urbanization rates in the region.

⁴⁷ It is expected that by 2020 more than the half of the population will reside in small, medium and large cities (according to UN estimates, cited in CMI 2011: 12).

The main urban challenge in the Arab cities is the challenge of urban informality⁴⁸. It affected the social, environmental and economic circumstances, especially for the urban poor. At least 20% of cities' population are living in informal settlements, for instance, people living in ISs⁴⁹ in Aleppo were about 50% of the city population in 2010 (CITY OF ALEPPO AND GTZ 2009). Growing of informal settlements was attributed to factors, like the outdated land management system, lack of affordable land for social housing and lack of services for the poor or financial policies to support their needs. In addition, the failure of the housing policies to regulate the real estate market, particularly in providing affordable housing for the poor who lack in these conditions the tenure security and basic services, had resulted in high demand for affordable land for development. Furthermore, dealing with informality issues is usually not included in the national policies, which are based on rigid regulations that follow a set of outdated planning laws, procedures and hierarchy (Madbouly 2009: 14; Tebbal 2011b: 4; CMI 2011: 12; UN-Habitat 2012). Informal settlements in the region were growing, particularly in Morocco, Algeria, and Jordan, despite the efforts to control this trend. Upgrading programs and policies have been applied in Jordan and Tunisia with some degree of success, which led after some years to undertake them by the local authorities without the international development assistance. In other cases, like in Morocco, Yemen and Egypt, the governments were putting much efforts in upgrading projects and programs to improve the living conditions in informal areas, which still need consistency and support to be successfully implemented (Madbouly 2009: 11).

In the cities of the Mashreq, the informal land development is expected to continue in the future despite the national and international efforts to deal with it in the past. The demand of new housing in the Arab cities in the region was growing. For example, the numbers for Egypt during the period 2007-2017 showed a need for 2.1 to 5.3 million units and in Syria during the period 2006-2010, a need for 687,000 units (UN-Habitat 2012: 48). The demand for housing was growing with the raising conflicts since 1948 and with the increase of the number of refugees moving from OPT and Iraq to neighboring countries mainly; Syria, Jordan and Lebanon (Madbouly 2009; UN-Habitat 2012: 48). This trend is changing today through the upheavals in some Arab countries since 2011, mainly the stream of refugees from Syria and the spillover to the neighboring countries, which is drastic and hard to predict in the long term.

The governments in the Mashreq have supported the construction of affordable housing in the past, under these conditions, an option that was challenging, while having no control over the formal land market. This had led to high prices of the real estate (30-50% of household's income invested in housing). The governments were not capable to develop effective policies to influence the informal urban land development, or for controlling the formal land market. The government had practiced its power through fiscal policies that regulate property taxes, in addition to funding infrastructure projects through subsidies (Eiwida 2000; Madbouly 2009; UN-Habitat 2012: 54). In addition, most of the development was concentrated on the public land in the peripheral areas around the big cities, where the governments had later intended to provide them with services and subsidize housing projects for low-income groups (UN-Habitat 2012: 54).

⁴⁸ Urban informality refers not only to ISs, but also to informal economy and informal ways of living.

⁴⁹ Informal settlements and informal housing refer to the building in non-compliance to the planning and construction regulations. Slums, refer mainly to the informal settlements with very poor living conditions and services, for instance, Slums are mostly found in Egypt comparing to other Arab countries (Madbouly 2009: 11).

Failing to provide adequate affordable housing for the newcomers of the poor, the formal housing market has managed to build housing for upper- income and upper middle-income households. Building affordable housing involves challenges for the private sector, mostly in providing the appropriate land for development and in providing the financial resources for buyers or for developers. These challenges are aggravated by the inefficient governmental policies if that by offering financial support through microfinance or mortgage markets, in services provision or by providing a clear-cut regulatory framework, particularly regarding the land management system (UN-Habitat 2012: 51).

Therefore, reforming the land management system was very necessary in the Mashreq countries which share, in addition to the geographical and political dynamics, a common history inherited from the Ottoman occupation era regarding “[...] *land tenure, titling laws and local institutions.*” under the *Islamic or Shari'a law*⁵⁰ (UN-Habitat 2012: 53). The emerged land registry system in the recent past is very complicated and can be found in different MENA countries. Yet, It involves laborious bureaucratic procedures and costs posing another challenge in managing urban informality “[...] *property registration takes on average six steps over 36 days, at a cost of 5.7 per cent of the property value – the second most expensive registration process in the world after sub-Saharan Africa [...]*” (UN-Habitat 2012: 53). Modernization of the land management system including renewal of the categorization of the land rights had lacked the institutional capacity to manage the modernization process and manage the change of the system, if that regarding the zoning or the registry system and procedures. This had led to increase of the unregistered properties in the Mashreq of about 90 % and 38 % of all properties in Egypt and Syria, respectively (UN-Habitat 2012: 53).

Further challenges imposed on the Arab cities are the environmental problems caused by rapid urban growth, like air and water pollution, water scarcity, and the loss of green spaces through urban sprawl. Urban sprawl has attributed in many countries to the loss of thousands of hectares of valuable agricultural land, like in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Syria in the time from 1975 to 1985. The failed urban management in dealing with urban informality is mostly the main reason for uncontrolled urban sprawl (UN-Habitat 2012: 16). Furthermore, the growing urban population has led to exhausting the fresh water resources that had dropped to the half between 1975 and 2001: “[...] *from 3,300 to 1,500 m³/person/year [...]*” (Madbouly 2009: 11). Water scarcity is a severe problem in the Arab region comparing to other regions in the world. It is considered a susceptible area for climate change risks in the future, and its water resources will be hard to manage for living and agricultural needs: “[...] *with an average of 2,000 cubic meters of renewable Freshwater water per capita [...]*” (UN-Habitat 2012: 18). It is also projected that this amount will be less and barely covering the need of fresh water to around 1,000 m³ per capita by 2025 (Madbouly 2009: 11). Through climate change, water scarcity is a great challenge for living and development in the region: “[...] *Around 8 to 10 per cent of water is used for domestic consumption, 5 to 7 per cent for industrial uses, and 85 per cent for agriculture [...]*” (UN-Habitat 2012: 18). Particularly for the urban poor, the accessibility to drinking water is a great challenge that need to be addressed by the governments (Madbouly 2009: 10; Tebbal 2011b: 4). Moreover, although the governments in the Arab countries are aware of the climate change and its effects, and despite adopting some measures to deal with it on the national level, this approach is rarely acknowledged by the authorities on the local level (Madbouly 2009: 10; Tebbal 2011b: 4).

⁵⁰ Accordingly: “*The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 established five categories of land tenure that still serves as the basis of modern land laws: privately owned land (mulk); religious endowments (waqf) that retain such designation in perpetuity; communal land and pasture (musha); state land (miri) and “dead” or uncultivated land (mewat).*” (UN-Habitat 2012: 53).

3.1.1.3. *The Political and Institutional Problems in the Arab Cities*

Notwithstanding the heterogeneous character⁵¹ of the cities in the Arab region, the urban problems including; urban informality, social and economic problems, environmental damages, the lack of efficient management of public services and infrastructure and the ineffective legal and institutional framework for planning, are common problems that proved to be challenging for any sustainable urban development process. Aggravating all of the above-mentioned problems in the city are the institutional and political conditions represented by the urban governance challenge; lack of effective urban management, centralization and the absence of solid legal framework and participation.

The prevailing historical and political conditions since the 1950's and 1960's in the region, have called for actions in the economic and social fields of development. These actions have led to marginalizing the rural population and triggered a large-scale in-migration from the poor rural areas to the urban centers and capitals, in addition to the migration of the refugees from conflict areas in the region, which started even before the fifties. The delay of adjusting the local and national governance⁵² systems to the new spatial dynamics and the failed traditional planning systems, have led to escalating the urban problems⁵³. The centralization and the lack of a strategic view and persistence in the state actions, led to ineffective measures for urban development, especially regarding developing new housing and master plans. The measures taken by the government to provide housing for the poor and to deal with unemployment were lacking consistency and were imposed in a top-down approach on a limited basis (Tebbal 2011b). Moreover, central decision-making that mark the planning and governance in the Arab countries had proved to be effective in carrying out mega projects regarding infrastructure development. Yet, the centralized planning and governance system had failed to respond in other development areas, like environmental management (Tebbal 2011b: 5) cited from UN-Habitat 2010 Beirut), which requires cooperation and participation from lower levels in the administration and from the citizens.

Furthermore, the challenge of the outdated planning systems is a common feature in the Arab countries, despite the national and international efforts for modernization. The planning traditions are still based on master planning that does not consider the national and regional needs in a strategic and comprehensive vision, in addition to following a hieratical technocratic approach. The failure of the adopted urban development tools to develop planning solutions and implementing urban projects, is attributed to the outdated legal framework and the lack of technical expertise on the national and local levels (CMI and MedCities 2011: 64). In addition, the central control of the financial resources had hindered the autonomy of local financial management for urban development through generating own income from taxes, mortgaging, etc. The limitation of the local financial management is inherited in the Mashreq for example from the Ottoman occupation and colonization times, where the devolution of administrative tasks did not include financial reforms (UN-Habitat 2012: 70).

Dealing with these deficiencies, intensifying efforts for modernization the planning systems in the last decades were not successfully tangible in practice. The need for essential institutional changes required to make urban planning and management instruments effectively work, were mostly

⁵¹ There are ancient cities like Damascus, Baghdad, Aleppo, Jerusalem or coastal cities like Alexandria and Sfax.

⁵² The research will focus on urban governance relating governance issues mainly to the city. Governance is however indicated in literature in general terms as local governance (including rural and urban areas).

⁵³ As it is mentioned above, Urban problems resulting from these conditions are manifested mostly in the lack of effective provision of public services, social exclusion, lack of the required infrastructure, economic weaknesses through high unemployment and environmental damages (Tebbal 2011b).

dismissed by the central states. These changes can be induced through measures, like thoroughly conducting “de-concentration”, and promoting “Contractualization” for providing public services. Deconcentrating of services in Morocco, for example, has allowed the local authorities to focus on strategic tasks through delegating managing the permits for constructions to lower levels in the administration (CMI and MedCities 2011: 64). Successful measures of decentralization are hard to be observe in other cities in the region, or just on a small-scale or as a pilot project.

The development interventions started in the nineties in some countries in the Arab region, had proposed inclusive strategies to alleviate urban poverty through improving urban governance. Urban governance is considered a method in managing the political and institutional challenges facing sustainable urban development in the Arab cities: *“If urban governance has become so important, it is because it is framed within a situation of excessive population concentration in large cities of these countries... “Urban governance” appeared in this context as the most appropriate urban management method to deal with urbanization challenges in DCs.”* (Tebbal 2011b). Achieving good urban governance in Arab cities requires developing participatory urban management instruments that are inclusive and accommodating to the institutional and cultural settings.

3.1.1.4. Urban Planning in the Arab Region: between Traditions and Modernization

Planning systems in the Arab countries are still based on the principles of the rational planning and producing master plans (Madbouly 2009: 23), which were developed in ICs at the mid of the 20th century (Pallagst 2007; Schönwandt 2008). The following development stages of spatial planning in ICs proved the ineffectiveness of the master planning in responding to the changes in the cities resembled by urban expansion, economic growth and motorization (ibid). The resulting planning forms led to adopting a collaborative mode of planning in managing the cities, where local governments and local actors take an active role in the planning process (Healey 2003; Madbouly 2009: 23) (see Chapter 2). The translation of the change in planning in ICs had focused in DCs on inserting the need to improve urban management in the cities. This approach was adopted by DAs in the last decades; mainly by the World Bank and the UN, and it was promoted in the development programs and projects (Madbouly 2009: 25). Recent Programs to improve urban management and urban governance in cities in DCs are mainly the UN Urban Management Program (Madbouly 2009: 27; UN-Habitat 2018). The program⁵⁴ aims at achieving sustainable urban development focusing on reducing poverty and working on inclusivity in the city (UN-Habitat 2005). Urban management proposed new concepts in planning that contradicted with the dominating state role in urban planning and development in the Arab countries (Madbouly 2009: 25).

The most recent transferred approaches of planning are those embedded in the strategic planning. Strategic planning had provided a new planning approach in ICs, despite the failure of its practices in Europe. It was criticized for attributing to socio-spatial exclusion in the cities and in most cases focusing merely on economic growth. Yet, strategic planning approaches were adopted in several DCs, like in Latin America and Asia (Madbouly 2009: 26) (see 2.3.2). They were proposed as alternative planning

⁵⁴ The program is one of the largest global urban programs: *“it was started in 1986 by the Urban Development Unit of the World Bank in partnership with UNCHS and funded by UNDP. It functioned as a tri-partite collaboration between UN-Habitat, UNDP and the World Bank. The program has been involved in 120 cities in 57 countries, with the overall mission of promoting socially and environmentally sustainable human settlements and adequate shelter for all, and the objective of reducing urban poverty and social exclusion. The Cities Alliance organization also emerged from this grouping. In 2006 UN-Habitat disengaged from the program and transferred the work to local anchor institutions”* (UN-Habitat 2005).

instruments to the outdated master planning in the Arab region, which proved to fail in responding to the emerged urban problems in the last decades. It was intended through these approaches to formulate a strategic vision of planning that is inclusive of the local actors and which involves long-term process that is supporting to a sustainable and inclusive city (Madbouly 2009: 26; CMI and MedCities 2011: 21). Nonetheless, most of the governments in the Arab countries view it as a tool for action planning of infrastructure projects or to integrate the technical and political dimensions in the planning process (CMI and MedCities 2011: 21), dismissing the participatory approach, the need for social change and inclusivity embedded in it.

Yet, urban planning systems in the Arab countries were influenced by the variable institutional, historical and cultural settings in these countries, which in turn, affected the land management system and urban governance. The historical development of planning had led to the fragmented urban fabric observed in the modern Arab city today. This fragmentation is a result of overlapping of different planning mindsets and values through the history; the Islamic City against an extended or imposed form of the colonial and post-colonial city plan. The planning of the Islamic City intends to bring culture and community together in the space, while the western planning follows rational ways for spatial development that is mainly functional (Kiet 2011: 41; UN-Habitat 2012: 10). Most of the Arab cities, despite periods of destruction of their physical structure, still possess valuable historical and cultural heritage for the collective memory of the citizens (UN-Habitat 2012: 10). Preserving the heritage of the Arab city is a main feature in the planning culture of the Arab city today that affects urban development agenda and governance. The fragmentation of the Arab city model today is also triggered by further changes in the last years that were induced by globalization. The fragmentation has resulted in fundamental alterations in urban planning and development in several Arab cities, and to a different extent in the region (ibid).

Urban planning, in its modern form, seeks to position the city and its image to raise its competitiveness in the global context (Madbouly 2009: 25). Most of the Arab countries, especially the GCC have adopted the shift to market economy through liberation of the economy and privatization of the services, which led to change in the role of the state in the economy (Madbouly 2009: 18-19; Hvidt 2012). This change has affected the governance settings and led in many cases to different forms of decentralization. In middle and low-income countries, like Yemen, Jordan, and Egypt, this was part of structural adjustment policies adopted since the mid-1990s (Madbouly 2009: 18-19).

Globalization has facilitated foreign investment in the Arab countries, especially in urban development projects. It has affected the urbanization process in the Arab countries in different ways. For example, the growing real-estate market for mega urban development projects has characterized the “global urbanity”, middle-income housing projects and programs, and growth of informal settlements. These three aspects were observed unequally in the region (Madbouly 2009). Initiating mega or monumental projects and new housing for middle-income groups of the migrants are mainly prevalent in the GCC. These two aspects in addition to the increase of informal settlements are to be seen in the GCC but especially in the Mashreq countries; in the desert and on the coastal areas. Supporting urban policies to integrate these projects was the new trend in the region to reshape the image of the city for the global market. These trends are seen to be promoted by the global capital provided by the GCC in addition to the supported neo-liberal economic policies (Madbouly 2009: 19; Hvidt 2012). Some examples of mega renewal projects are; in Jordan, the Abdali development in Amman; in Egypt, Uptown Cairo; in Lebanon, Solidere in the city center of Beirut. However, these projects have ignored

the social and environmental impacts on the city' living conditions and they seem to be entirely isolated from the city organic fabric leading to emerging a fragmented social and physical city structure. The resulting approaches of the new policies have dismissed all sustainable development principles, posing a great challenge for urban planning and management in the region (Madbouly 2009: 19-21).

3.1.2. Participation in Urban Planning and Development in the Arab Region

Participatory planning as a process and an approach, where the government, the planners, the private sector and the communities work together to guide urban development in the city is questionable in the planning practices in the Arab region. In the development field of planning today, the participatory approach is introduced in the strategic planning as a technical instrument to proceed different stages of the planning process until the implementation. In the participatory planning process, the aim of participation is for “[...] *Verification of objectives; Resource assessment; Formulation of programs and Monitoring and evaluation.*” The resulting plans and projects from the process, should be clear, accountable and realistic (Madbouly 2009: 35). Apart from this technocratic approach of participatory planning, the participatory approach aims at building consensus among the stakeholders, while forming networks, partnerships and communication forums, that should In the end lead to building a dynamic relationship between different city stakeholders (Hassan 2010: 3-4).

The PUPA is not a new approach in all the Arab countries. North African countries have adopted it in different development approaches since more than 30 years, while in countries, like Lebanon and Jordan, the approach was relatively new and centrally controlled. In the GCC, this approach was mostly translated in partnerships with the private sector and a leading role of a strong public sector which resulted in excluding the local communities (Madbouly 2009: 35; Hvidt 2012: 201). In urban development practices, participatory planning is recommended as a tool, for example to deal with urban sprawl. The land readjustment; agricultural to urban use, and land taxation instruments can be applied in a participatory process to control the land uses and land tenure. In one Egyptian example, elected leaders were involved in the detailed planning process to define the land boundaries and function for developing new local plans (Madbouly 2009: 36). Participatory planning in self-help projects and shelter upgrading in Egyptian rural and urban areas in the 1980s and 1990s have shown that integrating the local communities in these projects could unfold better and sustainable results (Soliman 2007). In urban renewal projects and programs, participatory approaches seem to stimulate innovation, particularly on the local scale of a neighborhood, like in projects of reuse of buildings in some neighborhoods or improving the function of the streets or extend parking lots. Such examples are seen in Beirut, Amman and Tunis (Madbouly 2009: 36). In these cases, financial and institutional support can be mobilized to achieve these projects through partnerships between public and private sectors. To scale-up such participatory planning practices to other areas, institutionalizing the process and engaging the local urban managers and planners in the process are very important (Madbouly 2009: 35; Tebbal 2011). A challenge in these approaches is ensuring inclusiveness, especially in approaching a diverse society in its ethnicity, religion, lifestyle, class, age and gender (Hassan 2010: 3). This issue poses a challenge for planners that requires creative skills and tailored tools adjusted to the context dealing with the diversity of the Arab societies in the targeted rural or urban communities and in preparing the appropriate strategies for possible interests' conflicts that can arise from these differences (Soliman 2007; Hassan 2010). In addition, in the participatory process, conciliating the

diversity of culture in the urban space with different economic interests and the environment is an urban governance challenge (Healey 2006).

Participation _its practices_ as one of the eight core principles of good urban governance developed by the UN⁵⁵ (UNESCAP: no year), is essential to achieve a sustainable urban management and development and for alleviating urban poverty (CMI 2011: 12). Urban governance in the Arab countries, especially in the Mashreq, is a product of national urban policies that are mainly developed on the national level excluding the local actors from the municipality and the communities. This trend has been changing with the pressure of urban growth to shift the focus to spatial and regional planning. Some Arab countries have started to initiate sub-national level institutions and build national- local collaboration to guide the planning and development to empower local authorities in urban and local planning processes (UN-Habitat 2012: 68). Decentralization of the central power to the local levels was adopted by the Mashreq countries in the eighties. This approach was not realized, where central governments kept holding their control of financial resources. Local governments were not allowed to generate their municipal revenues, either through borrowing or through collecting taxes. In addition, public services were provided by the line ministries or their delegated institutions on the sub-national or governorate level (Pieterse 2000; UN-Habitat 2012: 69), which resulted in a weak and ineffective municipal body on the local level. Despite the efforts to improve governance, most of the Arab cities were hardly making progress in reforming their local governance, especially with the absence of a consistent support from the center. Improving local governance was constrained by the limited efforts to implementing decentralization and delegation of the power and resources to the local level (Tebbal 2011b: 5). This resulted in emerging situations for enforced reform or conflicts in the face of the central control of the government. Within these conditions, the role of civil society and any participatory activities for urban development are hardly supported. Despite the growing number of CSOs in the last decade, it was hard to find an existing civil society, or an effective role of CSOs to support urban governance in the Arab cities.

In the development approaches, participation was applied as a tool to improve urban governance and management, particularly to improve urban management and governance. One of the first development programs which were initiated to improve urban management and urban governance in cities in DCs was mainly the UN Urban Management Program⁵⁶ (Madbouly 2009: 27; UN-Habitat 2018). In the framework of improving urban management, participatory planning was intended to promote different forms of public private partnerships in realizing a sustainable urban development; socially, economically and environmentally while fulfilling the needs of all social groups in the city of public services, if that for housing, infrastructure, health, education, etc. (Madbouly 2009: 36 based on UN-Habitat 1995; UN-Habitat 2012). The participatory approach in planning through forming partnerships for public service provision was realized in the example of the PPP in GCC countries in transportation projects. This approach has allowed to perform a participatory process through a strong media campaign that promoted the effective role of the PPP in urban development yet with a minimum level

⁵⁵ Participation, Rule of Law, Consensus Oriented, Equity and Inclusiveness, Effectiveness and Efficiency, Accountability, Transparency, and Responsiveness (UNESCAP: no year).

⁵⁶ The program is one of the largest global urban program initiated in 1986 by the Urban Development Unit of the World Bank in partnership with UNCHS and funded by UNDP and conducted in collaboration between UN-Habitat, UNDP and the World Bank. The program seeks to promote inclusive and sustainable urban upgrading of informal settlements aiming at poverty reduction. The Cities Alliance was the outcome of this collaboration, where UN-Habitat have left the program in 2006 to the local organizations (UN-Habitat 2005).

of public participation (Madbouly 2009: 36). Nevertheless, it is questionable if public private partnerships can lead to a sustainable urban development, while in most cases, these partnerships are usually formed without including the communities, and are mostly motivated by a neo-liberal agenda for pro-growth urban governance mode. This was reinforced by globalization which affected the GCC countries immensely. It has also affected the urban planning process in the GCC leading to the emergence of the urban trend of “monumental real-estate” that influenced directly the urban governance process. Therefore, the participatory approach focuses mainly on the role of the central and local governments in their partnerships with powerful partners from the private sector, predominantly through foreign real estate investments. In this regard, there is no inclusive role for the CSOs or the CBAs in such partnerships (Madbouly 2009: 39; UN-Habitat 2012), which in turn, undermines the participatory process.

Structural adjustment in the governance settings in the Arab region is needed to facilitate initiating participatory planning structures between modern government institutions and traditional ones on all levels. The challenges are mostly evident on the local level in small cities and towns, where the political system on the regional level disregard the local authorities or exclude them in the development process, viewing them as too traditional and outdated to operate in the given governance system. In big cities, the problem is seen in the power dynamics apparent in the informal governance settings in the poor areas that operate beyond the formal political system (Pieterse 2000: 4; Madbouly 2009: 39; Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Therefore, in adopting participatory planning in the Arab countries; informal structures formed by the urban poor should be included in the formed partnerships (Hassan 2010). In addition, to scale-up the participatory approach on the local level, municipal capacity building is essential, which requires both institutional and financial support that are missing in the Arab cities (Madbouly 2009: 39-40; Tebbal 2011). Finally, institutionalizing the PUPAis necessary to ensure the sustainable impact of participation on urban governance. The reluctance of the central and local authorities to legitimize and institutionalize the outcome of the participatory process indicates the importance of the impact of the participatory process and tools on the existing governance’ political and institutional settings.

3.1.2.1. Examples of Participatory Planning and Governance in Arab Countries

Participatory planning in the Arab region has started to take different forms in the framework of development projects and programs. The following are some examples from Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia.

Participatory planning approaches in Egypt are the oldest and they are dated to the seventies and eighties through development interventions and partners from the national government (ministries) on neighborhood level (Madbouly 2009; Soliman, Personal Communication: May 2014). The PUPA was applied in shelter upgrading and self-help projects, started by the support from UN-Habitat in Ismailia. This approach was extended later and funded by other partners in different places in Egypt, like the Nassriya project in Aswan and the SCP project in Ismailia. The participatory approach has included many institutions on the national level, for example, the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development, Ministry of Economic Planning and the Ministry of State for Local Development (Madbouly 2009: 37). Participatory planning approaches in Egypt started to be extended in the nineties, supported by many international partners, for instance, USAID, UNDP, UN-HABITAT and the GTZ (Eiwida 2000; Madbouly 2009). These practices were not limited to the local level, but were developed on the national level through the national program of participatory planning funded by the state and managed by the General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) that should be realized

for all Egyptian cities and villages. A similar program was started in 2007 prior to institutionalizing the participatory planning approach in the strategic planning process in the new planning law 119 in 2008. In this regard, the participatory process should be applied to all planning levels replacing the master planning practice with the top-down approach in the old law No. 12/1982 (Madbouly 2009: 37; GOPP 2010). In practice, the old traditions regarding implementing participation have hindered a transparent process of participation and led to holding the process on the tokenism level while lacking inclusion of the poor and real partnerships and with a strong and dominating role of the state in the process (Hassan 2010: 16; Kenawy, Taher and Alshamndy 2017: 3).

Further participatory planning practices in North Africa is PB in the town of El-Kasserine in Tunis. A long-term project (GESCOM) was initiated on the municipal level to shift to participatory decision-making in the time from 1995 to 2006. The local people were involved in a PB process through deliberations on resources allocation for the project at the beginning of each fiscal year. Some of the implemented projects through the participatory approach is slum upgrading. The communities in this area were allowed to take part in the decision-making process, which has resulted in gaining the cooperation of the communities and their willing to support the municipality financially through paying the taxes (Pieters 2000: 38; Madbouly 2009: 37). Another example of participatory planning approaches is a development program for building partnerships between the municipality of Tunis and the NGOs. The program aims at improving the coordination between the municipality and the NGOs and it intends to develop the capacity of community and to provide social services especially to the disadvantageous groups of the poor (Madbouly 2009: 37). Continuous efforts to scale-up the participatory approach in the Tunisian case required institutional improvements, like building the municipal capacity and providing training in addition to institutional and financial support. These conditions were developed and provided through the decentralization in planning and urban management to the municipalities. In addition, the new urban planning and land use code approved in 1994 and the followed Municipal Development Program (PDM), funded by the state together with the World bank, was sought to build the municipal capacity regarding financial management and for providing training for municipal workers (World Bank 2004; Madbouly 2009: 38).

The example of participatory governance in Jordan provided a case for conflict resolution over land management in the case of Petra in the 1995. The expansion of The B'doul tribe was hindered with the regional plan of the archeological site of Petra. The risen conflict between land use options tourism vs. residential needs was deliberately dealt with through a participatory process. Consultation meetings with the local leaders of the tribe were invited to discuss the possibilities and alternatives. Before adopting this approach, the tribe was excluded from any decision-making process, especially when they were relocated in the eighties. The participatory approach has allowed a wide range of inclusion, despite the absence of the voice of women and the youth (Pieterse 2000: 4; Madbouly 2009: 38). The approach was up-scaled in the national land management strategy and realized in Amman, Zarka, and Aqaba in the last two decades, presenting a positive example for institutional reform of the regulatory system in Jordan. The reform has focused on the inclusiveness of the poor in urban development endeavors, like the initiation of informal settlement upgrading projects and the new housing strategy (UN-Habitat 2008: 10; Madbouly 2009).

Jordan has scaled up the participatory governance approach through strategic planning instruments and participation. Adopting participation as a tool in development projects, programs, and strategies have been developed to improve urban governance. Some examples have shown positive urban

changes due to the institutional reforms undertaken on the national and local levels, like the Amman project in 2007. Strategic planning as an instrument to improve urban governance was adopted in Jordanian cities; Amman, Zarka and Aqaba, taking on participatory planning approach in the process. Amman has won the leadership prize in 2007 for the city of the year of the Middle East and Asia. The reforms of urban governance were implemented in the new master planning process, particularly in drawing an efficient transportation plan supported by solid local governance, land management, taxation system and generating jobs for the youth, which has helped the city to attract new investment. This approach is needed also to be scaled up in other development areas in the city, like slum upgrading and housing provision (UN-Habitat 2008: 10). Moreover, there is a need to look closely how the participatory approach is undertaken in this example and how it can be scaled up in the Arab region.

Participatory upgrading projects from the seventies and eighties were intended to improve the project effectiveness and reduce the costs without real community involvement. Participatory urban governance in some cases in the Arab region had some achievements in the field of housing upgrading and environmental upgrading (Pieterse 2000 39-42 based on papers by the UN-Habitat; Arendel 1999). Few examples have shown how city consultation processes succeeded to promote community participation in urban governance, for instance, the PB in in El-Kasserine, Tunisia (1995-6) led to increase the willingness of the communities to pay taxes, encouraged through their participation in planning of the budget of each fiscal year. According to the NGO-Municipality Partnership program of Tunis, the work of the NGOs in community development (youth, elderly, charity, shelter, etc.) and poverty alleviation was supported and coordinated among them (Pieterse 2000 based on the reports of the UN-Habitat through implementing UMP program). Another example from Egypt has revealed the benefit of the CBAs' and NGOs' cooperation and participation in urban planning. Promoting the role of local NGOs was evident in Hikr El-Sakakini, a slum area of Cairo with 12 thousand inhabitants, most of the poor. An NGO, the Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services, was active since 1986 to provide the lacking services, training for employment and credits for small businesses. Despite the restrictive regulations of the government to provide services illegally, the NGO formed a committee with the partnership with actors from the government and managed to connect the area to the city system (Pieterse 2000). Yet, the PUPA was criticized for not leading to institutionalize participation in the planning system, which led to the project ending. Weaknesses were recognized in the limited focus on the real local needs and the centralized (top-down) decision-making process where the power of the citizens and the community would totally be overridden.

Furthering strategic planning and participatory governance, the CDS approach in the last decade has been initiated in some of the Arab cities (see 3.1.3). It was intended to present an inclusive approach through mechanisms that involve the civil society and the private sector in urban development projects to collectively work with all society sections and groups in finding solutions for urban problems (Tebbal 2011b). Through the CDS and the consultation-based SWOT analysis tool, all the facets revealed through urbanization should be analyzed in the city, particularly the challenges, which need to be mitigated. The CDSs in the SEMC have shown that these challenges are magnified by the institutional limitations on the national and on the local levels. This has been shown through inefficient urban management that characterized the cities in the region. In view of all these context-related

considerations, there is a need for future, adjusted tools or strategies to meet these challenges⁵⁷ (Tebbal 2011b). Moreover, the lack of public participation has hindered initiating a comprehensive urban development approach, like the CDS (CMI 2011: 13), which is represented by the restricted participation of civil society and citizens from the poor in urban development especially women who are underrepresented in the urban development processes (Tebbal 2011b: 5; CMI 2011: 13).

The challenges for adopting PUPA and participatory urban governance approaches in the Arab region were mainly political and institutional (Eiwida 2000), mainly, the failure of the democratization process in the whole region. Democratization is essential for decentralization to empower the local government facing the problems arisen of rapid urbanization and globalization. Efforts for deconcentrating of powers resulted usually from fragmented actions and failure. The Arab governments intended to limit the local autonomy, as to avoid increasing the power of social and political movements that question their legitimacy. The unwillingness of the states to legitimize participatory approaches in addition to the lack of sense of citizenship, duty and responsibility among the citizens who mistrust the government, has led to demobilize citizenship. Citizens became reluctant to participate in political duties and development processes (Pieterse 2000; Eiwida 2000). In addition, the absence or weakness of CSOs has attributed in many PUPAs to the weak implementation of the development plans and projects. The lack of a stronger partner from the civil society posed a problem for the DAs involved as well as for the weak local governments in the Arab cities. The origins of CBAs are usually tribal or religious, that cannot be maintained in the face of urban growth challenges. The other emerging forms of CSOs apart from the former one are still not well developed to undertake their role in building the basis for participation. These weaknesses are recognized in their institutional organization. These organizations are usually led by the elites leaving out the grassroots. With their restrictive legislative frameworks, they grow strongly either on the religious basis of the majority, or because they are supported by the government and the political elites (Pieterse 2000), for example, the Governmental Non-Governmental Organizations (GO-NGOs) in Syria.

3.1.2.2. *The Role of the Civil Society and Local Planners in Participatory Urban Planning and Development*

The character of the CSOs in the Arab region was emerging and developing differently in the Arab countries, affected by different social, cultural and political factors. In general, CSOs have different functions in the Arab countries, and they have in common their non-influential role on the status quo of the political system and governance process. Some Arab countries have permitted the initiation and the work of civil society, e.g., Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, and Yemen. In other countries, like most of the GCC, civil society was strongly controlled, and its work was limited to particular fields of activities (Carothers 2003: 6).

The emerging role of the CSOs and lately local NGOs in urban and social development was attributed to the failure of the local governments in the Arab region to effectively deliver the basic services under the pressure of urban growth and lack of financial resources. The fields of activities were awareness-raising activities for environmental and social development issues, social services delivery, and in representing public interests, like that of women and youth (UN-Habitat 2012: 71). The most active form of the CSOs in the region is the charity-originated organizations, which is also the oldest form.

⁵⁷ The Guidebook prepared by Tebbal and Lehzam 2011, is a trial based. It provided an analysis of the situation in the SEMC and proposed this Guidebook to be a helpful tool for the local government for the future CDSs.

They are based on the Islamic values of “Zakat⁵⁸” and financed by the “Awqaf” ministry revenues generated from the Awqaf real estate (ibid).

Noticeably, the number of the CSOs was growing dramatically in the last decade. In Egypt, for example, there were around 16,000 active NGOs until 2005 (Baiair 2008: 1). In countries, like Jordan, supporting privatization in public services, the CSOs were active in fields of poverty alleviation, the empowerment of women, community development and youth services. About 36% from 3200 CSOs in Jordan were active in the charitable social field (Baiair 2008: 9; UN-Habitat 2012: 71). Egypt has also witnessed a growing number of CSOs from 7,600 organizations in 1985 to around 25,000 in 2008; this was supported by decentralization policy, which allowed CSOs to be active in public services in cooperation with urban governorates (ibid). The CSOs in Egypt have various challenges, like the strict regulations in registering at the Ministry of Social Affairs. They are also not allowed to get external funds (Baiair 2008; UN-Habitat 2012: 71). Similar impediments have the CSOs in Syria, whose work in urban development field of activities is, in addition to the former aspects, imposed by challenging conditions due to the rigid national, political and institutional settings (Stollies 2012). As opposing to these cases, the lack of reliable national government in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) has led to developing a strong role of the CSOs in providing social services (Baiair 2008: 13-15; UN-Habitat 2012: 71). The NGOs Law 1/2000 in the OPT represents the most liberal law to facilitate the work of the NGOs compared to NGOs Laws in other Arab countries. According to the Law, the NGOs are allowed to discuss public policies and modify them. In addition, they are allowed to get external funding for their work without approval from the Ministry of Interiors, and they are exempted from paying taxes and customs duties (Baiair 2008: 14-15).

The emerging role of the CSOs has witnessed a changing role of women in many Arab countries. The role of women is well-recognized in the Arab countries, especially in countries, like Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco who promoted women rights as one of the cosmetic actions towards democratization undertaken in the last two decades. These Arab countries were also the pioneers among the Arab countries to implement liberalizing reforms, which at the same time were reluctant to change their political systems (Carothers 2003: 11). Despite these efforts, statistics showed very low participation of women in the labor market. Women constituted around 16 to 25 % of the total workforce in the Mashreq (Madbouly 2009: 9; UN-Habitat 2012: 71). This was attributed to factors, for example, child care or prohibiting cultural values, like the dominating role of the male figure and patronage, very low wages and discrimination and lack of safety and transportation means (UN-Habitat 2012: 71). Women participation in governance and their contribution to the social and cultural life have emerged strongly anew with the growing of CSOs in Arab countries, especially for women development issues and their political rights and in administration; 45 % in Lebanon, 42 % in the OPT and 18 % in Egypt (ibid). For example, Lebanon was the first Arab country in 1952 to give women the right to vote and the right to become members of the parliament. In Jordan, the leading role of women in the local governance was planned to be realized, and since 2007, Jordan was seeking to increase the participation of women to around 20 % in the local councils. In this respect, one woman was elected as a mayor of the city of Hasa (UN-Habitat 2012: 71). However, in very traditional communities, approaching the vulnerable groups of women and youth pose a challenge. The traditional leaders should approve their

⁵⁸ Zakat is “[...] the root of religious endowments (*waqf*, plural *awqaf*) that dedicate the proceeds of real estate holdings to specific charitable purposes [...]” (UN-Habitat 2012: 71).

participation and for that purpose, separate consultation meetings should be designed to open channels of communication with them, for instance, the case of Petra in Jordan (Madbouly 2009: 38). Yet, discussing the emerging role of the CSOs is arguable in the Arab region, while accompanied the promotion of the neo-liberal policies in the region and at the same time a wider cooperation with DAs. In the framework of initiating development programs for improving governance, the cooption of the CSOs has led to maintaining neoliberal powers and a pseudo social empowerment that turns in reality to a social control “...the NGOs and other civil society organizations were co-opted to that purpose of “social control”, acting as a substitute for state welfare programs that were undermined by an externally-imposed austerity agenda.” (Hamouchene 2017: 128). Respectively, local communities tend to distrust the emerging CSOs and they question their fast growing role. This can be attributed to that some Arab states use the CSOs on their behalf, like the GO-NGOs in Syria (See 3.3.2.3), and in some countries, CSOs are supported by foreign funds, and by that they are considered agents to the west who seek changing the local cultural identity of the people (Sika 2012). Therefore, improving governance in the Arab countries is very essential to facilitate a transparent trusted and cooperative working environment for the CSOs, especially in the development efforts.

In the development endeavors, the government play the main role in urban planning and management, and the work of the CSOs is controlled and managed by the local governments. In Egypt, there are offices for the NGOs, who are working on service delivery in informal areas. These offices are working closely with the local councils in the local administrative units from the city to district level (Abou Omira, Personal Communication: May 2014). In urban development projects in the Arab countries, the role of the local government is present, but not necessarily as a decision maker. The centralized system in the Arab countries imposed different restrictions on the autonomy and freedom of decision on the local government. Even the local actors in the government, like that of the urban planners have limited role in the planning and development processes, although the practices of participatory planning have shown a vital role of urban planners and managers in urban development when they are given the freedom for innovation and creativity. An example is the role of the urban planners in developing the CDS in Aleppo and Tunis (CMI 2011) (see chapter 4.2).

Planners who are working in the local administration have untapped potential in modernization the planning cultures and practices and in developing the tailored tools to change local governance from below. The role of these local actors is very important to develop a planning culture of participation. Yet, there is a need to train them and give them the needed resources and autonomy to realize the changes. A critical look on the education and the traditional role of the local planners shed light on the identified weaknesses, for instance, the lack of skills and vision to implement modern planning methodologies. Planners in the Arab countries lack the skills and awareness to act as local actors in the participatory process, which is attributed to the planning cultures in the Arab countries that do not allow for a real collaboration between the planners and other local actors in the city. In participatory planning, the role of the planner is sought as a facilitator, through collecting and analyzing the data needed to develop the planning urban planning process in addition to presenting them clearly through the organized consultation and public meetings and reports. Planners in this role act as a coordinator and negotiator in case of interests’ conflicts. The planners should sometimes act as political actors, representing the interests of the public “advocate” and at the same time fulfill the bureaucratic role in the administrative system (Pallagst 2007; Schönwandt 2008; Madbouly 2009: 38-39). In reality, the planners in the Arab countries are usually employees at the local government who lack the skills to

play an active role in communication and coordination in managing the interests of different groups of city stakeholders (ibid). There are educated Planners who are working as professionals. They develop their technical skills needed for master planning while missing the vision for a comprehensive spatial planning system. Planners, who work together with the development agencies, benefit immensely through the training opportunities offered by these agencies, which, in turn, are conditioned by the project cycle and funding. Planners, who do not have the chance for training, lose the chance to develop their abilities, particularly with the limited resources allocated for training by the government. This poses a challenge for modernizing the planning instruments and practices in the city. Preparing and training planners that are able to work interdisciplinary in finding and implementing the solutions for urban challenges in the Arab countries, is therefore one of the challenges for developing the culture of participatory planning.

3.1.2.3. *Participation as an Instrument of Urban Planning and Governance in the Time of Change*

The erupted protests and social movements in 2011 have marked a time for the Arab awakening, which refers to taking meaningful actions for social and political change in many Arab countries. The social movements were emerged in big cities with the claims for ending poverty, inequalities, social exclusion and dysfunctional urban governance. The awakened civil activism through demonstrations in public spaces, which was strongly repressed in the Arab countries before, was just one indication to the need for political transformation to achieve more freedom, civil rights and participation.

Responding to these claims, some countries have chosen to improve local governance and adopt participation as main instruments on the local level in their cities to contain the protests. These actions can be detected in countries, e.g., Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria (Tebbal 2011b: 8-10), unlike other countries, like Egypt, Libya, or Syria, which adopted military repression' means to resist political and social reforms. Even if the changes in governance in these examples seemed not yet rigorously established and extensively adopted, these changes are sought to be fundamental for long-term urban development. Morocco has adopted proactive tools in supporting its cities to improve urban governance through institutionalizing the CDSs. Adopting PUPA through the CDS was realized in consultation and meetings with a wide range of city stakeholders in approaching urgent urban challenges (ibid). Hence, participation until this point was adopted as a tool to mobilize the actors to formulate the CDS. After the changes in 2011, participation was applied as a main proactive instrument for the fundamental reforms needed in the region, like in Morocco. In addition, the government has chosen to implement a series of cooperation programs which targeted city development through improving urban management and service delivery, particularly in dealing with urban informality and poverty, transportation, energy, waste management, etc. in cooperation with international partners, for example, the GTZ and other DAs⁵⁹ (Tebbal 2011b: 8-10; UN-Habitat 2012: 22). The outcome of the PUPA was very important for presenting a supporting image for improved urban governance in local and global media. Yet, developing a PUPA requires an elaborated examination of the urban governance settings to ensure effective outcome of the urban changes: "*Ongoing debates [...] do, however, herald a welcome healthy effort at initiating a participatory approach leading to a better understanding of the challenges and complexity of urban governance before embarking on shaping its future structure.*" (UN-Habitat 2012: 22).

⁵⁹ The CoMun program with GTZ and development strategies supported by Medcities (Tebbal 2011b: 8-10).

Participation was also highlighted in the reforms undertaken in Tunisia. Anchoring a new national instrument through the new constitution has offered the conditions to establish local democracy based on decentralization (1st article in the constitution). Accordingly, the participation of the youth should be ensured and the local authorities should have the freedom in managing the local resources. Focusing on the need for participation in the planning and implementation of development projects in one of the articles has allowed a wider citizen participation and for empowering the civil society to take a leading role in the process. *“Local authorities adopt the instruments of participative democracy and the principles of open governance to insure the widest participation of citizens and civil society in the preparation of development projects, town and country planning and the follow-up of their execution”* (Tebbal 2011b: 8-10).

The decision for decentralization in Algeria was directly affected by the oil market dynamics. Algeria had in the past the opportunity to reform its highly centralized system and develop its local governance in cities through cooperation programs. However, the state has first adopted decentralization when it was faced by the financial crisis caused by a drop of the oil market. This was a measure to face the shortages of the subsidies to the cities. In this respect, municipalities had gained more power and autonomy over financial allocation and the government demanded their support and mobilization to revitalize the local economy. Until this point, local governments have lacked financial support, suffered of corruption and strict bureaucratic procedures that hindered a sustainable urban development and efficient land management system. (Tebbal 2011b: 9-10). Moreover, in the institutional framework, PUPAs were adopted in urban governance through cooperation programs. The development partners (like GiZ and MedCities) together with the local governments have worked on establishing institutional bodies to monitor participatory activities and processes and ensure their sustainability: *“Local citizen’s offices [...], Municipal council of youth, Consultation process of citizen, Population participation in solid waste management, Revision of CDS on a more participatory base.”* (Tebbal 2011b: 8-10).

The uprising in the Arab region since 2011 marked a revelation of the need to balance the efforts for globalization and economic liberalization with the social needs and equity. Especially in capital and big cities where the population are concentrated, the events showed the failure of urban governance in responding to the urban challenges, like high unemployment rates among the youth, income disparities and ineffectiveness and corruption of the administrative system. In facing these governance challenges, there was an increasing awareness raised in the media to the need for PUPAs to improve urban governance in the future (Tebbal 2011b: 5; CMI 2011: 13; UN-Habitat 2012: 23-24).

3.1.3. PUPAs in Urban Development Strategies in the Arab Region

Sustainable urban development goals in the Arab cities were translated in improving urban management, particularly through measures to enhance financial, economic, social and physical conditions. Further actions to achieve these goals were targeting institutional improvements through decentralization, effective public sector and local economy, in addition to building efficient housing and land markets and developing proactive urban policies (Madbouly 2009: 14-17; CMI 2011; UN-Habitat 2012).

Development interventions undertaken in the last decade for sustainable urban development aimed to support these efforts in facing the challenges of increasing urbanization. In addition, they were intended to assist the governments in developing effective economic and financial policies as well as land and urban and housing policies to ensure the rights of the citizens (UN-Habitat 2012). Many development programs have targeted improving the institutional frameworks on the local and national

levels, especially in developing effective housing policies and improving the land registry systems and regulations. Besides, modernizing the regulatory framework for financial support and improving the land market are required to achieve sustainable urban development this through facilitating the access to mortgage finance and housing subsidies and enhancing the taxation system on the local level (Madbouly 2009: 14-17; UN-Habitat 2012).

The development interventions affected directly urban planning and governance in the Arab countries through inducing institutional change and modernization of the planning systems. The developed strategies aimed to revitalize the local economy by developing cooperation among city key stakeholders. Some of the strategies supported by the World Bank for poverty reduction and economic growth were, among others, Yemen Port Cities Development Program (PCDP) in 2003, which included formulating a CDS that aimed at integrating the private sector in the development process. Another example is Lebanon Municipal Infrastructure Project for municipal capacity building to improve service delivery and improve living conditions (Madbouly 2009: 14-17). A further example was the Tunisia Third Municipal Development Project, which focused on developing the funding capacity of the municipality to enable it to implement infrastructure projects and effectively deliver public services (World Bank 2004; Madbouly 2009: 14-17).

Some DAs were involved in supporting the governments in realizing their reform plans, among others, the World Bank, the UN-Habitat, Cities Alliances, MedCities, GTZ, etc. One of the interventions in the recent past that targeted sustainable urban development through strategic planning instruments through participation was the City Development Strategy (CDS) (see 2.3.2). The CDSs have been introduced in some of the Arab cities between 2000 and 2010. About 11% of the cities in the Middle East and North Africa were approved by the Cities Alliance to initiate the CDS (CMI and MedCities 2011: 8). International partners⁶⁰ and networks were backing the CDS, like the MedCities. The DAs have provided the financial and methodological means to initiate and develop the CDSs in some of the Arab Cities^{61,62} in the SEMC⁶³ and a number of these cities have renewed the CDS practice some years later⁶⁴ (CMI 2011: 13).

The CDSs were backed financially and institutionally differently in each of the phases. The first CDSs, Alexandria, Sfax I, Tetouan I, and Tunis, they had the financial resources from one or more DAs, still with weak participation on the local level and stronger representation from the governorate level. The second group of the CDSs, Sfax II, Al Fayhaa, Amman, Settata, El Jadida, and Ramallah, were characterized by relying on the local funds and limited international funding. Besides, there was more representation of the local actors and prioritizing of sustainable development projects. Further City Development Strategies were intended in Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, with the support of the

⁶⁰ In addition to the World Bank and Cities Alliance, the CDS was promoted by GIZ in the city of Aleppo and cities in Palestine, AFD in Al Fayhaa, Sfax, and Ramallah, and UNDP, which supported the Municipal Development Plans of cities in the Tangiers-Tetouan (CMI & MedCities et al. 2011a; 2011b).

⁶¹ Among others Tetouan (Morocco), Sfax (Tunisia), Alexandria (Egypt), Ramallah (Palestine), Amman (Jordan), Aleppo (Syria), Tripoli (Lebanon). First CDSs generation were initiated in Alexandria, Sfax I, Tetouan I and Tunis. Some cities have renewed CDSs like in Tetouan, Alexandria, and Sfax (Tebbal 2012: 2).

⁶² Morocco is one of the countries, which have developed the CDS by its own means.

⁶³ It is important to mention that this research focuses mainly on Arab cities in middle and low-income countries. Other SEMC' case studies include, for example, cities like Izmir (Turkey) and Tirana (Albania). These case studies were not considered in the examination of the CDSs' participatory approaches.

⁶⁴ Sfax II, Al Fayhaa, Amman, Settata, El Jadida and Ramallah.

central governments. They focus on involving the local actors and producing feasible action plans supported financially by donors (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011a; 2011b).

The outcomes of the strategies in the SEMC were unequal. Several economic, social, and institutional factors have affected the implementation of the CDSs and related action plans (Tebbal 2011b: 2). Still, there was a consensus among the involved local actors that the strategy was an essential practice of participatory planning, and it has the potential to further participatory urban planning and development approaches in their cities (Tebbal 2012: 1). Hence, the ineffective implementation⁶⁵(ibid) indicates that tools should be developed to overcome the constraints of adopting and implementing the CDS in the future in these cities.

Taking a closer look at the PUPAs, this section will focus on examining participation in developing and realizing the CDS and its participatory approach in some of the Arab cities in the SEMC.

3.1.3.1. Examining the PUPAs in Developing the CDSs in the SEMC

The adopted strategic planning in several urban development interventions was considered the main methodology to deal with urban challenges in Arab cities. Based on this methodology, action plans for urgent urban problems were set in the CDSs with realistic budgets and time plans (CMI and MedCities 2011: 21). Apart from the traditional planning systems in the region which proved to fail in responding to the urban problems (Madbouly 2009), adopting the strategic planning and the CDS in the Arab cities was intended to provide a solution for economic and urban problems. In many cases, governments have viewed the CDS as a tool for action planning in infrastructure projects or for integrating technical and political dimensions in the planning process (CMI and MedCities 2011). Further issues relating to social development and urban governance were disregarded in these views.

The participatory approach in urban planning and development as a main component in the strategic planning methodology, provides the opportunity to involve the city stakeholders including the poor in the planning decision-making process. Adopting the PUPA in the framework of the CDS in the cities of SEMC raise the question of how this approach has been understood, developed and managed through the CDS stages. Some of the responses in the first stages showed enthusiasm in adopting an inclusive approach of the citizens, especially the poor, in the process (CMI and MedCities 2011: 21 based on "Planning for a Better Future" by Paul Taylor 2004). In all the stages of the CDS, the participatory approach has been adopted, where people, the CSOs and local NGOs, the private sector and the local authorities were taking part in the process of formulating and implementing the CDS. This was reported based on a qualitative analysis of the CDSs in the SEMC that was done and published in a report by CMI and MedCities (2011). The evaluation framework in this study was based on the progress of each CDS and its stages (appendix 17) in the case studies and it followed the methodological guidelines set by the Cities Alliance and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (CMI and MedCities 2011: 21). Considering this study, examining the PUPA through the CDS stages in each of the case studies will help in understanding how participation is understood and carried out in the given urban planning and governance settings of the Arab cities, and how to improve participation as a tool in urban planning and development in the Arab region.

Looking at different stages and themes, the PUPA will be roughly examined while detecting the factors developed in the conceptual approach (see 2.5). In the table (appendix 17) is a detailed analysis of the

⁶⁵ One exception is Aleppo, it is however limited just to the old city as part of the strategy, which is already an ongoing project funded and supported partly by the state and partly by the GIZ (Tebbal 2011b).

participatory approach and activities according to the examined factors. Yet, for examining these factors, a limited spectrum of data was available. The data is based on the evaluation reports of the CDSs in some of the selected case studies in the Arab cities and the primary data sources gathered through the field research.

The **first CDS stage**, preparing the launching of the CDS, is the main stage to identify the actors and their planned roles in the CDS. This is also essential for implementing the PUPA through defining who is going to participate and who is going to manage the CDS and which participatory activities and communication strategies were developed in the process. In this regard, three main groups of actors and their roles were examined; the leader, the steering committee, and the external collaborates from the development agencies.

The CDS leader should be powerful and committed, but also should be aware of the power dynamics and how it should be distributed. It is however a delicate situation, if the leader is too domineering, and not delegating the powers to other local actors. Such situation was threatening for the CDS process, where the leader was replaced, affecting the motivation and the continuity of the CDS participatory process, like in Alexandria and Tetouan (CMI and MedCities 2011: 69). In the steering committee, partners from governmental institutions, academia, and the private sector were included. Conversely, representatives of the urban poor were not involved. This was common in most of the CDSs, e.g., Settat and El Jadida, and it posed a threat to the participatory approach and the whole CDS process (CMI and MedCities 2011: 69). The thematic working groups, who conduct the analytical studies, were supposed to be formed from different city stakeholders. To perform this task, most of the cities have hired local experts from the municipality, and occasionally together with external experts. Yet, Aleppo carried out the studies by engaging experts in pairs, one local and one external expert, which offered the chance for exchange of experience and knowledge (ibid). The international partners (mainly the GTZ and MedCities) who provided the technical and financial resources for the most CDSs in the SEMC were supposed to be engaged in different processes in the CDS stages, and in the participatory activities. However, in some cases, this approach was not favored, like in Ramallah, where the risk of dependency on the external expertise was seen as a threat to the sustainability of the process and to building the capacity of the local experts (ibid).

Communication strategies between the actors and the technical committee of the CDS affected the commitment and ownership of the actors to the CDS process. In the SEMC case studies, efforts to develop communication channels were variable; Aleppo and Ramallah provided good cases for well-developed tools for communication and reaching out from the first stages of the CDS (appendix 17). Other cities have initiated CDS websites and reduced the communication to organizing forums.

The **second stage** of the CDS, themes of the city, had mainly focused on identifying the themes of the strategy and the strategic goals. In this stage, it was not clear, if the PUPA was deliberately promoted as a planning tool for developing the strategy in this stage and until the implementation. However, the awareness to participation was raised, particularly as a component of the themes improved local governance and reduction of urban poverty. Although not explicitly highlighted, participation was discussed and brought up in the themes list of all the CDSs (appendix 18). Aleppo and Alexandria have focused on local economic development as a main theme, but also on poverty reduction in ISs. Aleppo' theme was inclusion of the youth, where Alexandria has given the theme participatory urban upgrading an urgency in dealing with the challenge of informality. Other cities have to deal with improving local governance and local management as priorities in the chosen themes, like in Sfax and

El Jadidah (CMI and MedCities 2011: 30-33). Yet, inclusiveness of marginalized groups, especially regarding the participation of women, was not well stated in most of the CDSs, despite the raised awareness to the need for the participatory approach not just from the private sector as a main actor but also from the civil society and the locals. In this regard, few cities have adopted the issues of inclusiveness as transversal issues, like in Tetouan 1 and 2 (ibid).

In the SWOT analysis phase, **stage three**, twofold issues were examined, conducting the participatory analysis, and addressing participation and inclusiveness issues in the findings of the CDS. This stage focused chiefly on identifying the actors who carried out the analysis and managed the participatory activities. There were some cities, which held workshops with various groups of city stakeholders to facilitate a thorough and participatory analysis. Other cities have adopted traditional methods relying mainly on their municipal staff. Yet, confusion in understanding the four categories of the SWOT analysis by the local actors was to be observed in the case studies, particularly regarding identifying the internal factors, strengths and weaknesses, and external factors, opportunities and threats (CMI and MedCities 2011: 34). Most of the cities have identified strengths in their physical potentials, and underlined the weaknesses in their local governance, high degree of centralization and the weak economic basis for development. In this respect, the detected strengths and weaknesses have shown a number of similarities in the case studies (appendix 19). The awareness to the importance of inclusiveness of the CDS and the PUPA was not raised in the analytical phase, except in the CDS of Ramallah compared to other CDSs. Ramallah' CDS had a remarkable feature in the raised awareness to participation especially among its municipal team. Including women in the labor market for example was an issue that was discussed in this stage in addition to the lack of awareness among the citizens for their rights and duties (CMI and MedCities 2011: 37).

Stage four comprised formulation of a collective and shared vision. The vision is *"A forward-looking ideal of where a community wants to be. It not only inspires and challenges but is meaningful enough to all residents, [...] because it captures their essential aspirations."* (ECON Analysis and CLG 2005: 41-42; CMI and MedCities 2011: 41). It was expected that participation of different actors and groups would be at its highest level at this stage. A wide range of stakeholders should be mobilized to express their vision of their city in the future whether, a leader, a renowned city' figure, or an ordinary citizen. This collective action should ensure a sense of ownership and commitment to the strategy from all the involved stakeholders that is essential for realizing the CDS and implementing its action plans in the next years. The main city actors, who have been mobilized in the first stage, and consulted and engaged in the stocktaking and analysis in the second and third stages, should also contribute to formulating the collective vision for their city. These measures should also extend the scope of participants in this stage.

Some cities have realized the need for the participatory approach in formulating the collective vision, e.g., Aleppo, Alexandria and Al Fayhaa, where others have confined the vision to practical goals decided on in a top-down process without endeavoring to formulate the vision, e.g., Tunis and Tetouan. Formulating the vision in the first cases was organized and sometimes disseminated in the media to larger groups of city stakeholders. The city of Aleppo, for example, has posed a question to about thirty representatives of city residents: *"Do you have a dream for Aleppo?"*. The answers on this question were included in pictures through a wide media campaign that opened the channel of communication with the public (CMI and MedCities 2011: 41). In the slogans of the vision statements, Aleppo raised economic development and inclusiveness of women in its approach. Further cities have

raised different visions and themes; Alexandria: socio-economic integration of the poor, Amman claimed the need to integrate citizens in the local governance. Ramallah has highlighted the need for public participation and inclusivity explicitly. Although Tunis has run a participatory process to formulate the vision, there was no consensus regarding the slogan (appendix 20) (CMI and MedCities 2011: 42).

Still, it is hard to verify if the efforts to initiate a participatory process in formulating the collective vision were transparent or the whole process was a pro forma to provide the image for the media and for the international partners. Such actions are usually viewed with skepticism from the local stakeholders or the excluded groups and are mostly aim to comply with the ToR of the donors to ensure the financial support, particularly while there are no particular evaluation tools for the participatory process. This calls for the need to develop adjusted participatory mechanisms to engage the local communities as main partners in the CDS process.

Stage five, formulation of the strategy was intended through translating the vision into concrete actions. The developed strategic thrusts in this phase should be concrete and measurable (CMI and MedCities 2011: 42). In supporting the participatory approach of the CDS, strategic thrusts should include actions that can help in sustaining different participatory components and adopting participation as a tool in action planning.

Not all cities were aware of PUPA as essential tool in the action planning. However, some cities have provided exceptional attention to some of the components that support participation in the following stages. For example, the communication strategy in Aleppo and acknowledging the need for inclusiveness in Tunis under the slogan: "*Tunis, a city for every man, woman and child where they will be guaranteed their rights as citizens,*" (CMI and MedCities 2011: 46). Ramallah has also raised the awareness to inclusiveness and the participatory approach, which was translated into actions regarding partnerships with community organizations, improving transparency in the relationship between the government and the citizens, and encourage voluntary cooperation with CSOs (CMI and MedCities 2011: 45). Other cities have stated very general statements in their strategic thrusts, which lack concretization of actions. For example, statements, like the need for social development, improve local governance or slum upgrading were raised without indicating the tools to further the participatory approach. Still, the challenge recognized in this stage for most of the cities was in ensuring the commitment of different actors to the PUPA in the CDS.

Ensuring the commitment to the PUPA is particularly essential in the **sixth stage**, i.e. preparation of action plans and estimated budgets. It was not clarified whether participation was going to be adopted as an instrument for action planning and implementation and whether the mobilized actors will still be involved and motivated to the process or more actors will be invited. For example, although PB was discussed in some cases for improving financial management, like in the CDS Alexandria, there was no clear commitment to applying this instrument in implementing the action plans. The same applies to the participatory slum upgrading projects. The "quick win projects" approach, which was adopted in some cities, for example, in the framework of the rehabilitation of the old city f Aleppo, it helped in legitimizing the PUPA of the CDS and in the trust building of the central government in the local authorities. Yet, these projects were conditioned by mobilizing adequate financial resources and were mainly based on the trust and the political commitment achieved through a long history of cooperation that unfolded tangible results in the past. (CMI and MedCities 2011: 71). In general, maintaining the

sense of ownership of and commitment to the CDS vision set in the early stages were great challenges in the CDSs to the actors from the public and private sectors and to the citizens.

For the **seventh stage**; implementation, institutionalization, monitoring and evaluation of the CDS, all cases were not able to reach this stage in developing and realizing the CDS, except Morocco. Particularly in terms of institutionalizing the CDS as a planning instrument, it was not obvious, if institutionalizing the CDS has considered adopting and committing to the PUPA in the proposed terms and plans. As a result, the whole CDS approach was not institutionalized in almost all the CDSs. However, certain actions in the CDSs were easier to realize, particularly those, which were already approved by the central government or those projects that support its ongoing projects. Still, the commitment and participation of the central government were very weak and sporadic, which has posed a threat for the funding and the institutionalizing of the CDS, as it was the case in Aleppo (CMI and MedCities 2011: 69). The government of Morocco was willing to institutionalize a strategic planning system that is similar to the CDS, where the cities should develop a Local Development Plan (LDP) for the next six years with an update period of three years (CMI and MedCities 2011: 54). In some cases, parts of the CDS were to be institutionalized, like the documented CDS cycle and the built partnerships and participatory structures of cooperation. This was even very essential to ensure the CDS sustainability and to preserve its components to initiate new participatory approaches through maintaining and consolidating the formed institutional structures. Few cities worked on this issue, for example, Aleppo and Alexandria, who maintained the steering team structure and the committed local experts to implement and monitor the process and to manage the communication and coordination among the central government, the local actors, the civil society and the locals. For example, Aleppo has initiated an agency for the old city. The agency was established at the beginning of the CDS and had a selected staff and a financial plan, which has operated throughout the CDS process. In Alexandria the establishment of the Alexandria Development Agency (ADA) was intended first to manage the Lake Marriout development, and later to monitor the CDS implementation process (CMI and MedCities 2011: 71). The ADA was resolved with closing of the CDS; however, a similar constellation of the mobilized actors and representatives was intended to continue working on urban development urgent issues in cooperation with the think tank group of the Bibliotheca Alexandria (Mehina, Personal Communication: May 2014).

3.1.3.2. Interim Findings: the Challenges and Success Factors of PUPAs in the Examined Cities

Based on the conceptual Approach, the success and challenging factors in the experience of the Arab cities in adopting PUPAs in the CDSs will be discussed to achieve an understanding of how participation is conceived and developed in the Arab region.

a. Urban Governance Framework Underpinning the PUPA

Through examining the political support and institutional structure to manage the PUPA and tools, the identified institutional challenges for the CDS has demonstrated the absence of supporting preconditions for adopting participation in the Arab cities.

The common institutional challenges faced the PUPAs in the CDSs in the SEMC have been identified on the local and national levels. The weak political support of the CDS to clearly promoting local democracy in integrating the marginalized groups of the society in the CDS stages. Reviewing the lists of attendants of the consultation and meetings, showed the need for transparency in the participants' selection process. A further challenge is the failure of the democratization process in the Arab region. Few countries started to democratize their systems, like Morocco and Jordan. Corruption and

manipulation of elections were threats for democracy and participation. The president of Egypt in 1999 was the only candidate and he became 99% of the votes (CMI and MedCities 2011; Tebbal 2012). This applies also to the local elections, which were manipulated and characterized by corruption and clientelism. Many institutional impediments were imposed by the centralization in the decision-making process (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b; Tebbal 2012: 4). Some Arab countries have adopted national reforms in the past to improve local governance. Institutional reforms through decentralization were translated in delegating more responsibilities to the lower levels without giving the needed powers for managing local resources or taking local decisions independently. The hierarchy in power left the local authorities powerless in the process (UN-Habitat 2012: 23-24). The governor⁶⁶, who is the most powerful actor on the local or municipal level, is usually the representative of the central authorities and responsible in front of the ministries. Despite his understanding of the local challenges, he is not entitled to make decisions without the approval from the central government (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 66).

On the local level, the lack of technical expertise of the local team has affected formulating a solid methodological framework in developing the CDS and its collaboration and coordination mechanisms. Moreover, Arab cities have certain financial constraints, besides being dependent on the national funding, the municipalities lack financial capacity, and their revenues are usually very scarce. The budget is distributed to employees' wages and short-term actions at the municipality. In addition, financial management is regulated top-down, where the municipalities are not allowed to get direct funds from a third party, like international or national organizations (CMI 2011: 59). Decisions regarding actions plans and projects for improving the public services and infrastructure should traditionally be approved by the state (Madbouly 2009). The high centralized planning system and controlling central powers have limited the efforts for de-concentration and financial decentralization on the local level. This was perpetuated by the lack of municipal capacity while lacking administrative and management skills to generate municipal resources in addition to the missing knowledge and expertise in the legal and fiscal frameworks needed for local financial management (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 67). Building partnerships between the private and the public sectors, although provides an alternative for funding the CDS' action plans, this option was limited by lacking the technical and legal skills on the local level to contracting and to structuring the PPPs. This had led in many cases to the withdrawal of the local authorities and to their reluctance to have an active role in the CDS process (ibid). Still, dealing with the financial constraints, institutionalizing the CDS on the national level can offer the framework to mobilize the required resources for institutional restructuring and decentralization that can enable managing the CDS process efficiently. In this regard, instruments as taxation needs to be included in the CDS main themes to increase the municipal revenues. In addition, there is a need to improve the communication between the national government and the international partners⁶⁷ (CMI 2011: 59) to achieve a coordinated financial management plan adapted to the CDS process cycle and the PUPA.

b. The Organization and Management of the PUPA in the CDS

Adopting the PUPA in developing and implementing the CDS implies besides mobilizing the city key stakeholders from all groups and sectors, promoting partnerships with actors from the local and

⁶⁶ In some Arab countries, this position is called differently like the "Wali" or the "Prefect" (CMI and MedCities 2011).

⁶⁷ The author has mentioned the United Nations, the World Bank and city networks like the MedCities, UCLG among others (CMI 2011: 59).

national levels and ensuring their commitment to implement the jointly produced action plans. In its collective form, the adopted PUPA in the CDSs was seen as an innovative approach in the Arab cities (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 55). With its novelty, the PUPA was perceived and translated differently in the urban practices in the case studies, which, in many cases, has promoted innovative forms for improving urban planning and governance. Examining these experiences, allow a great opportunity for learning and exchange across the CDSs. In the following the Methodology approach of the PUPA will be analyzed based on the reports by Tebbal 2011b; 2012, and CMI and MedCities 2011a; 2011b.

A common aspect in the case studies is the dominant representation of governmental institutions from national and local levels as the main involved actors in the PUPA. Disadvantageous or vulnerable groups were mostly underrepresented or excluded (CMI and MedCities 2011b). The lack of transparency regarding inclusiveness of the CDS process can be attributed to the need to holding the development of the CDS on the government level and to the absence of an active or empowered civil society. A situation that led to imbalance in the powers and to a top-down decision-making on priority development projects that do not serve the real needs of the citizens. In addition, the weak local governance through the adopted top-down approaches was manifested in the ineffective local financial management and the dependency on the national government. These challenges have hindered the efforts of the technical teams and the steering committees of applying the participatory mechanisms in realizing the CDS vision. For example, carrying out participatory budgeting, in many cases, was not possible due to the lack of political support, and the institutional and technical capacity on the local level. Still, the role of the steering committees and local planners was essential in cases, like Ramallah and Aleppo, which developed inclusive communication strategies, and participatory mechanisms to gain more participants in formulating the CDS vision. However, without in-depth information on the application of these strategies and mechanisms, it is hard to evaluate their effect on urban planning and governance.

Some cities have failed to reach out the proper stakeholders from the civil society and the urban poor, which made the vision incredible. Especially in the participatory analysis phase, it was based mainly on the data from governmental actors and experts from the DAs, where local knowledge was mostly not integrated or intended to be considered in the action-planning phase. This can be attributed to the lack of technical methods to timely defined data collection process from the locals that, in turn, resulted in rather theoretical analysis and unrealistic results.

Examining the communication strategies and participatory activities, most of the cities have developed websites for the CDS and organized and held workshops, consultation meetings, media campaigns, and partnerships. Yet, it is hard to examine the participatory processes implemented through these activities without documentation of the course of the meetings and discussions, scope and levels of participation, and accurate lists of the participants.

In few cases, consultation or public meetings have provided the chance for the local people and the private sector to discuss with the local authorities the emerging issues in the city. An occasion that enabled them to understand the prerogatives of the municipal actors and the institutional and legal constraints and the lack of autonomy in urban decision-making (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b).

The roles of the steering committees and local planners were highlighted through developing the communication strategies and participatory mechanisms for the CDS. The participating local actors

have brought forward creative ways to connect the city actors and bring new partners together. This was observed in some CDSs especially when it was politically supported. As a result, the cooperation among the local actors was promoted, and their self-initiative was encouraged: *“In general, it appears that steering teams understood the importance of the participatory approach and communication, and played a central role in the process. The technical team was given a free hand to design and carry out communication campaigns.”* (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 29).

Hence, the held participatory meetings and consultations have revealed different levels of participation. To examining the level⁶⁸ of participation in the CDSs, precise information and documentation regarding the number of participants, the scope of participation and the level of participation are required. Yet, due to the lack of these data, a qualitative criterion was adopted in the research to examine how the PUPA was integrated in the CDS process and if a wide participation of different social groups was taken into account in the meetings and events and in the available participants’ lists. Furthermore, the techniques, activities and arrangements of the participatory approach (ECON Analysis and CLG 2005: 38-41) were included, in addition to the ways for maintaining the participatory approach afterwards.

CDS Stages	Expected Levels of Participation in CDS Stages	Levels of Participation in the Case Studies
1) Preparing the launching of the CDS	<i>Partnership/Support</i> Initiating the participatory approach through mobilizing city stakeholders, forming partnerships and ensuring the commitment to the CDS process. Defining the actors, leaders and committees in institutional structure of the CDS.	<i>Diplomacy, informing/ Manipulation</i> Mostly partners from the governmental institutions and some partners from the private sector with limited representation of the citizens or local communities and CSOs (exclusion of the disadvantageous groups).
2) Stocktaking and participatory analysis	<i>Partnership/Support</i> Collecting data and analysis through a participatory process to raise the sense of ownership and commitment of the actors to the CDS.	<i>Diplomacy/Manipulation</i> The data collection was partly conducted through the fieldwork, using PRA methods to obtain the data from the local people, and through the local experts’ knowledge and their networks. The local actors from the municipality and the external experts were often responsible for carrying out the analysis. The reliability of the data is questioned, considering the lack of trust between the people and the government, which is seen as a hindrance to providing reliable data by the citizens in addition to the lack of technical methods to timely collect the needed data. In most cases, this resulted in unrealistic theoretical analysis.

⁶⁸ The levels of participation were projected based on the analysis and the assessment of the Authors in the reports and on the levels of participation developed by Choguill’s 1996.

3) Formulating the collective and shared vision	<i>Partnership/Support</i> For the participatory approach, the vision is very essential stage to bring the actors together and promote active citizenry, gain consensus, and promote common ground for communication among the city' key stakeholders.	<i>Informing/Manipulation</i> On the positive side, through the PUPA, the CDS has succeeded to bring many actors together for the first time, and few from representatives of the poor. It is however problematic in this stage, that consensus was hard to achieve; conflicted interests, besides unrealistic expectations have led to unrealistic vision. Some of the cities have failed to reach out the proper partners from the civil society and the poor, which made the vision not credible.
4) Formulating the strategy	<i>Conciliation/Support</i> Formulating the strategy should be done by the CDS committees and working groups, who document and summarize the agreed strategic thrusts/objectives.	<i>Informing/Manipulation</i> Participation was limited in this stage. Some of the arisen problems in this stage were lack of consensus and a coherent ground for identifying the projects. Lack of expertise regarding conflict management and local financial management and autonomy. The need for sustaining the PUPA to realize the vision was not addressed, like in participatory budgeting, in addition to the reluctance to involve social movements in reducing the centralized power in decision-making regarding local priority development projects. Lack of transparency in proceeding different CDS themes. Most of the times, the role of civil society was absent.
5) Preparing the action plan	<i>Conciliation/Support</i> The financial means and regulatory frameworks are essential in this stage. The PUPA can be organized through PB or active engagement of the target groups.	<i>Informing/Manipulation</i> This stage has been interrupted in almost all the case studies or ended because of the lack of resources and a supportive legal and regulatory framework, which led to not adopting the CDS as an institutional planning instrument or participatory practices.
6) Implementation, institutionalization, monitoring and evaluation	<i>Partnership to empowerment/Support</i> In the implementation, participation is expected to be adopted widely including the public and private sectors and civil society, depending on the prepared action plans and projects.	<i>(No participation)</i> In the SEMC, this CDS has not reached this stage, despite developing the CDS vision and strategic thrusts.

Table 18: The level of participation interpreted as expected in the CDS stages and identified in the SEMC case studies, based on the Guidebook CMI 2011 and qualitatively assessed in reference to Choguill's (1996) model of the ladder of community participation in DCs.

The level of participation observed in the CDSs ranged from manipulation including diplomacy and informing to no participation (according to the model of the ladder of community participation in DCs (Choguill 1996). The CDS was developed in a top-down process. The PUPA although sought to ensure including a large group of participants, it resulted in the participation of limited number of actors. In addition, the themes and projects were dependent on the governmental development agenda and funding, regardless the real needs of the city stakeholders. Developing the CDS through the PUPA was managed in one-way informing through a limited number of public consultation sessions. Applying diplomacy in the second stage was intended to gain the cooperation of the CSOs in undertaking the

initiative projects through the CDS (Choguill 1996). Yet, by their lack of autonomy, the CSOs had rather the role of an advocate to the government's policies, but not as a partner in sharing the planning decision-making process and implementation. Despite ending the whole CDS process in all the cities before the implementation, the PUPA has achieved a favorable environment for collaboration between the stakeholders in the planning stage, particularly in the early three stages. Yet, the challenge of maintain and furthering participation has posed a challenge to effectively follow through with the PUPA. Accordingly, the CDS process as whole despite the early accomplishments was considered non-participatory (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 77).

On the positive side, the PUPA has succeeded to bring different actors together for the first time, including representatives of the government and the private sector, and in a few cases, representatives of the civil society or local leaders from the society. In this respect, the PUPA was a unique experience, yet, it involved some risks related to the arisen conflicting interests and power dynamics that were hardly addressed in the process. The lack of consensus and absence of a coherent ground for implementation of the projects were exacerbated by the lack of the expertise regarding conflict management. Particularly in the third CDS stage, formulating the strategic thrusts, the consensus was hard to achieve, besides conflicted interests and unrealistic expectations have led to unrealistic vision (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b). Participation and the CDS were not realized in the last phases despite developing the CDS vision and strategic thrusts. This stage has been interrupted or closed due to the lack of resources, political support and facilitating legal and regulatory frameworks. The reluctance to adopt the CDS as an influential institutional planning instrument in the case studies was also applied to adopting the PUPA in the CDS process.

It was expected through the PUPA to achieve inclusiveness of the urban poor in the CDS, raise a sense of ownership of the vision among the stakeholders, and ensure their commitment to the end stages of the CDS as essential for the sustainability of the PUPA and the CDS. Few cities have achieved a clear understanding of these aims and the PUPA' long-term contribution to the city development and its citizens. The case study of Ramallah has shown a raised awareness and recognition of the PUPA in the CDS vision and statement (appendix 20) where the city of Alexandria worked on participatory slum upgrading as a top-down approach without promoting real participatory practices. In the absence of inclusion and participation as a cultural practice, raising the sense of ownership tend to be directed to the media in advertising to the new city image without a meaningful reaching out strategy that is adjusted to the local conditions. Yet, the PUPA and involved communication strategy in the CDS of Aleppo led to launching an effective media campaign to promote the CDS vision. Still, the absence of democracy and lack of trust between the government and the citizens have led to observing these campaigns as manipulative and cosmetic, leading to undermining the real purpose of participation.

c. The Impact and Sustainability of the PUPA

Examining the impact and sustainability of the PUPA is connected to the tangible outcomes of the CDS on the institutional as well as societal level. The impact can be observed through the institutional improvements besides adopting or institutionalizing the CDS and scaling it up. Considering that, the CDS was mostly interrupted or closed before the implementation stage. One of the identified threats was the change of the leaders after the expiration of their terms of office. This was a threat for some of the CDSs and had affected the motivation, commitment and the continuity of the CDS process (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 26). Moreover, the lack of an Institutional structure or an organizational entity to ensure the sustainability of the PUPA posed another threat to sustain the momentum of

cooperation. Such arrangements or participatory institutions were supposed to ensure implementing the action plans and sustaining the pillars of the PUPA, like the formed partnerships and promoting their sense of ownership and commitment to the CDS. In some cases, such entities were established later in the process and stopped afterwards (Tebbal 2011b). Through the CDS, the cities have planned large-scale projects for urban development, for example, rehabilitation of the Lake Marriout Area in Alexandria. For urban projects of this type, the national government formed partnerships with the private sector and DAs, and made the land and financial resources available while excluding the local stakeholders in the city from the urban decision-making process. The local actors, in the administration in addition to the local planners, find themselves excluded especially while lacking the needed funding, autonomy and technical skills to take part in the projects even to learn from the projects. The imposed tasks from the center lead to limiting their role to performers and in most of the times override their capacity for urban management *“from a political point of view, local authorities will take over and manage projects that were designed without any democratic consultations or controls”* (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 63-64). To avoid such risk, the CDS projects should offer the chance for the city and the local actors to be involved and for building their capacity for the future projects, where political, financial and institutional support are ensured.

Still, despite the short cycle of the steered CDS stages, some impacts were recognized in some of the cases, particularly demonstrating the willingness of the governments for institutional change and improvement (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 60), that has been shown through institutionalizing of the CDS, promoting strategic approach in the planning, or scaling up the CDS to other cities. Institutionalizing the CDS was a problem in a number of the cities, whose governments were not willing to adopt the CDS as a planning instrument for guiding urban development. Some of the governments intended to scale-up the CDS and promote the PUPA, particularly regarding forming partnerships between different institutions and the private sector. Still, this was considered in most of the future plans in the case studies, which proved invalid with the falling out of the CDS. Morocco was an exceptional case, where the government has adopted the strategic approach in modernizing the planning system upon which the CDS process was developed (Tebbal 2012: 3-4). In Morocco, institutionalization of the CDS was intended through a developed plan that aimed at reducing urban and rural poverty (National Human Development Initiative) giving the power to the local authorities with the participation of the elected officials and the civil society. Another tool was the Local Development Plan (LDP) (6 years) which was initiated and legalized. The need for the participatory approach was indicated in the plan, to ensure the involvement of women and CSOs in the planning process. The plan considered that all stakeholders including the local people should participate in defining the priorities for action planning. The needed resources should also be available for implementation in the first years. The plan was organized through adopting participatory analysis, forming a collective vision and through acquiring the financial backing from the government: *“The LDP is structured on three pillars: a participatory analysis, the future vision and the financial and institutional provisions for its implementation”* (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 58). This plan including the institutional reforms were supposed to be implemented in different municipalities in the framework of the planned strategies (ibid).

In Jordan, the implemented CDS in Amman in 2004 has resulted in adopting a sustainable development approach in the city, including the PUPA. Moreover, the positive outcomes of the whole approach in different development fields, like poverty reduction, led to scaling up the PUPA in more Jordanian

cities with high poverty rates (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 60). While In Syria, despite the success of the CDS in Aleppo, it had a weaker impact on the institutional reforms. Due to the rigid institutional framework of planning and centralization, the national government did not scale up the CDS process: “[...] Apart from the nearly completed CDS of Aleppo, Syria has not engaged actions to scale-up the CDS approach to other cities or to institutionalize the CDS process. However, the work in progress confirms the government’s decision to carry out reforms that will put an end to centralized planning and engage a decentralization process devolving powers to local authorities. [...]” (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 60). Yet, the CDS in Aleppo has provided the platform to exchange the experience and knowledge between the cities through the participation of other Syrian cities in the forums in each of the CDS stages. Interventions to improve local governance have been taken with the assistance of DAs in the Syrian cities, e.g., the MAM program⁶⁹ and the new local administration law to support urban projects and regional planning. One of the interventions in 2008 has focused on decentralization to regional and local levels regarding the political, administrative and fiscal tasks: “A growing, yet sporadic, interest in City Development Strategies in the region: Countries like Syria where there has been long-standing resistance to decentralization of powers to local levels are gradually becoming more receptive to local democracy.” (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 61). In addition, the following Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) has considered promoting the involvement of all sectors as well as the civil society in urban development projects. Yet, promoting a participatory approach in the future of Syrian cities was sought on the local administrative level between the mayors of cities for the purpose of learning and exchange among them (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 60). In this regard, the experience of the CDS in Aleppo has shown that the institutional change can be achieved in Syria, in gradual and deliberate steps, which is conditioned by the political support from the central government.

Further impacts of the PUPA have revealed its effectiveness in improving urban planning and management in some of the Arab cities. Modernizing urban planning tools through the planning of the CDS and through carrying out the initiative projects was one of the impact, where the planning systems have hitherto provided only traditional and ineffective urban planning tools. The knowledge and experience were acquired through developing the urban projects innovatively in addition to evaluating the challenges in the existed urban planning and utilizing the international support for implementing planning strategies on the national, regional and local levels (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 63). This holistic approach was missing in the traditional planning systems in most of the CDSs. Despite these efforts, realizing new planning tools while adopting the PUPA for the long run was hindered by the lack of resources, lack of technical expertise and the need for institutional reforms and continuous political support.

Triggering improvements in urban governance is one of the good impacts through the CDS and the PUPA. The changes on the local level can lead to sustainable changes in urban planning and governance processes in practice if embraced from the bottom and were influential to the upper levels, like developing the LDP in Morocco to face the national institutional challenges on the CDS. Moreover, from the experience of Spain, the success of the CDS to make a sustainable impact demanded to apply the right methodology until the final stage, adopting it as a spatial planning tool or a complimentary planning tool, implementing it in one or more projects, and supporting it by an effective urban governance system (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 62-63) (see appendix 21: factors to be considered for a successful CDS). These facilitating premises were not existent in the SEMC. Developing the CDS in

⁶⁹ MAM national program of Municipal Administration Modernization in Syria (2005-2008).

the SEMC without considering the national constraints led to an ineffective strategy. Only when the local authorities possess the power for decision-making, the CDS and the PUPA can have a positive impact on urban planning and governance (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 62-63).

Further success factors achieved through the CDS process and the involved PUPA, were that developing the CDS as a global approach had helped to build channels and networks for learning and exchange with other national and international actors. Building these networks had helped to extend the collaboration vertically and horizontally, especially among the local leaders and the elected officials (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 68) and joint their efforts. Municipal capacity building for the local actors, elected officials and the technical team was an essential contribution of the CDS. Additionally, the analysis and the produced projects were important products of the CDS to guide the following development interventions, e.g., in Alexandria, Aleppo, Al Fayhaa, and Sfax, especially for local authorities and the funding collaborates (ibid). The produced action plans, even if not institutionalized can be considered as priority projects for funding by the national or international partners. Moreover, best practices of the CDSs resemble good examples to learn from and to share with other local governments in the region (Tebbal 2012: 4).

Finally, the impact and sustainability of the PUPA in the CDS were hard to be deliberately examined, for conducting interviews with all the involved actors was not possible. The CDS' reports have evaluated the CDS process and its outcome and roughly mentioned participation across them while looking at participatory mechanisms from the perspective of the steering committee at the municipality. The views of further actors in the process were rarely examined which demonstrate the need of the DAs and the steering committee to develop a set of criteria to examine and evaluate participation in the CDS separately and deliberately from different actors' perspectives ,including the private sector, the CSOs and the involved local stakeholders. Achieving this aspect is important to develop a CDS as a methodological approach that is adjusted to the urban planning and development in the Arab cities, as well as examining the perception of participation as a tool and as an objective for social development. In the reports, there was insufficient information about how participation was methodologically applied. The reports have merely explained the organization of the PUPA in the first stage. Participation in this stage was an essential approach to bringing the actors together, where in the following stages, there was no reporting, but a remark that the PUPA was weaker and hard to sustain. In most of the report sections, it was not clear, if the PUPA was inclusive of the key actors in the city or not. There was a confirmation of including representatives of the civil society that contradicts with the results of the reports that pointed out to the absence of the civil society. Hence, the used methodologies need to be clarified in a separate document that focuses on evaluating the PUPA to enable developing an effective PUPA in the future.

3.1.3.3. *The Main Findings and Recommendations*

Adopting PUPAs in development in the Arab cities has revealed several challenges and successes. Although the PUPAs were adopted in the seventies and eighties in many Arab cities, until today, the challenge of centralization in the planning system and urban decision-making is hindering an effective PUPA. Excluding the marginalized groups in the planning process was observed in the CDSs against promoting the interests of the economic and political elites. Yet, PUPAs in development projects and programs had revealed some achievements in gaining the cooperation of the communities and changes in urban governance, although limited to some cases, for example, through the adopted UMP and participatory urban governance in Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt (see 3.1.2). Later, the

PUPAs in the CDSs in the SEMC were characterized as novel, but not enduring to the further CDS stages, while leading to exclusive and pro forma participatory processes. Representatives of the civil society and disadvantaged groups were rarely involved in the planning process, only a few were included in the early stages. Still, it was obvious that despite the similarities in dealing with the PUPA, some cities proved to adopt a different view and understanding of the PUPA. Acknowledging the role and the potentials of the local actors in the PUPA was missing due to the lack of time and adhering to a prescribed project agenda and resources (based on the reports by, among others, CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b).

The main challenges for achieving PUPAs in the Arab cities were of political and institutional nature, in addition to the lack of civil activism among the citizens and local communities. The failure of the democratization process and lack of decentralization led to the weak role of local governments and lack of sense of citizenship among the citizens. This was reinforced by the absence of an effective role of CSOs, who lack structure and funding to support in improving urban governance. Strengthening CSOs is one of the keys to improve PUPAs and participatory planning practices in the Arab region. There is a need to invest in the social capital, especially in women and youth for developing the local economy and put efforts to preserving community cohesion as a basis for building a strong civil society. In addition, utilizing the potential of the informal forms of urban governance requires reforming the legislative and institutional system to respond to the needs of the urban poor and the citizens. In addition, the role of the media should be supported throughout the participatory processes. The media should be actively engaged to raise the awareness of the public and ensure the quality and transparency of public consultations and the participatory processes. Through its role, participants can be motivated to their responsibility as citizens and can contribute with their knowledge constructively. In this regard, consultation processes applied in the region through the UMP or for developing CDSs are encouraged to involve the media to maintain the dialogue and sustain a positive impact of the PUPA even after the city consultation or the workshops. For this purpose, the political commitment of the national and local actors to the outcome and the continuity of the PUPA is essential.

Considering the novelty of the PUPA in the CDS, improving PUPAs in future CDSs in the Arab cities requires:

- Introducing participation while considering building up a culture of formal and institutionalized participation on the governmental and on community level. This should be prepared from the outset to the follow up stages.
- Evaluation of the PUPA should be performed apart from the CDS, in addition to developing more participatory tools to complement the PUPA prescribed in the CDS. This can take a form of selecting a core group of local actors who supervise the participatory processes and who have the power to adjust the participatory planning instruments to the local needs, and document the participatory processes, and replicate them in other cities regardless of the outcome of the CDS.
- Institutionalizing the PUPA, and adopting participatory planning as a legal instrument that includes clear guidelines for its application.
- Replicating the participatory processes and the cycle of the CDS to ensure better outcomes on the participating institutions, the citizens, and the planning process, while considering the setbacks of the prior CDS applications.

- Incremental and deliberate participatory approaches in developing the CDS are recommended, supported by an educational and cultural awareness of the stakeholders to participate in the urban development process.
- Action planning with community participation should be organized parallel to the CDS' formal consultation meetings and partnerships and time and resources should be available for that. Considering the weak municipalities in the Arab cities, sometimes a tradeoff between these approaches, on the local and governmental level, is necessary or as parallel, or alternately.

Moreover, there is a need for inclusiveness in the CDS process through stronger representation of city stakeholders from the marginalized groups, especially by organizing regular participatory planning processes with them to support building a culture of participation. Lessons learned from the prior CDSs are the basis in underlining the gaps and potentials, like maintaining the political support and mobilizing the management teams at the municipality. In general, more efforts should be put to manage the PUPA effectively in all the CDS stages. A recommended CDS cycle was proposed by planners to promote cooperation and participation along the six CDS stages, which consider "sequential activities" in each of the stages, in addition to the three "transversal activities" across the whole CDS process. These activities have highlighted the PUPA as a main instrument for managing the CDS stages (based on a guidebook⁷⁰ recommendations for future CDS in the SEMC⁷¹ and on CMI 2011: 9) (see appendix 21). The raised awareness for strengthening participation as an effective instrument in urban development in the example of the CDS is one of the crucial deducted outcomes that need to be respected not just by the local governments but also by DAs.

3.1.3.4. *The Influence of the Political and Institutional Transformation on the Future PUPAs in the Arab Region*

The end of the 2010 has marked unprecedented revolutionary events of the Arab spring^{72,73}, in the region (340 million people in Arab region) were considered in different researches the most important since the end of Communism in 1989 (Sakbani 2011). The vented events were attributed to, among others, economic, social, and institutional factors, and especially, political factors, including authoritarianism⁷⁴, despotism, and rights deprivation (ibid). Urban changes were manifested in the turmoil resulted from rising criminality, particularly of land and properties, and the increase in informality on agricultural land that has almost occurred everywhere. In cities, the concentration of urban communities along ethnic and religious cleavages became a trend that created conflicts among them and determined fragmented spatial patterns in the cities (UN-Habitat 2012: 23-24).

Notably, the political and social instability had marked the failure of economic and institutional reforms undertaken in the last few decades. The liberalization of the economy has benefited the elites and led to widening the gap between the rich and the poor, unemployment, increase of imports of the basic

⁷⁰ A guidebook has been prepared by experts from DAs who were partners in the CDSs in 11 cities from the SEMC. The author, Tebbal, in collaboration with Abdallah Lehzam have developed "*City Development Strategies Guidelines for South and East Mediterranean Cities*".

⁷¹ SEMC stands for Southern And Eastern Mediterranean Countries; Albania, Algeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey (CMI and Medcities 2011: 17). MENA region stands for Middle East and North Africa, while the Arab region is used here to indicate the countries, which are in history officially, speak the Arab language and share the Arab culture.

⁷² The changes undertaken at the time of the Arab Spring will not be regarded for this research.

⁷³ The "Arab Spring" or "Arab Uprising" refers to the peaceful protests started in many Arab countries during the end of 2010 and early 2011, which were induced by political, social, and economic imbalances.

⁷⁴ See Schlumberger 2007 and Heydemann 2004 regarding Arab authoritarianism and the acquisition of power.

commodities, in addition to social inequity, corruption and bad governance (UN-Habitat 2012: 23-24). The erupted demonstrations in the big cities were led by the youth especially from the marginalized groups who claimed their basic social rights and needs for employment, food, equity, and most importantly for empowerment and inclusive governance and fair political, institutional and legal and planning systems (UN-Habitat 2012: 23-24).

Considering the differences and similarities in the historical and political backgrounds of the Arab countries, it is questionable in which form the change will be molded, taking into account the variable regional and international factors, which play a critical role in this change (Sakbani 2011). It can also be shown in the way each state has responded to the claims of the people. There were two forms of reactions from the governments in the Arab region. Governments who started to change and reform, like Tunisia and Egypt, and governments, which were keen to maintain the status quo by reacting with the military apparatus, sinking the country with chaos and war, like in Yemen, Libya, and Syria. Some governments were ready to undertake the necessary reforms for more political freedom of expression, respect of human rights, multi-party system, less executive power and for negotiation and dialogue to reach a consensus with the ruling political party. The claims for decentralization and autonomy on the local level were raised to gain power and resources to improve urban governance, eradicate corruption through fair elections of governors, mayors, and local representatives. Especially in systems where economic and political power is concentrated in one party or elite, e.g., in Egypt and Syria the elected bodies have lacked the legitimacy and trust from the public (UN-Habitat 2012: 23-24).

The need for political reform and improving governance on the national and local levels was recognized in urban development projects in the Arab countries a few decades before. The issues of urban governance and local democracy in most of the development interventions, like that the CDS, were not openly discussed before 2010, they were even evaded. Besides, the necessity for social change in the region dives for the need to improve urban governance in cities as essential for a sustainable development process (Tebbal 2012: 3). The areas of interventions of improving the political system and urban governance will change also the urban planning and management for more effective and accountable especially through PUPAs. There are many discussions in the media on the need for participatory approaches, which should be considered in the post upheavals or post war phase in order to understand the existed urban governance settings in the Arab countries: *"Ongoing debates in the media reflect a mix of idealism and pragmatism with a dose of opportunistic posturing. They do, however, herald a welcome healthy effort at initiating a participatory approach leading to a better understanding of the challenges and complexity of urban governance before embarking on shaping its future structure."* (UN-Habitat 2012: 23-24).

A good urban governance is based on a solid legal and regulatory framework, as well a sound planning system with its participatory approach. The concerting efforts of the key city actors in the decision-making to achieve development is indispensable for sustainability of development interventions. In this process, local governments, the private sector and the citizens including the urban poor need to take part in the improvement of their own city. *"It is quite likely that the changes occurring in the region and the calls for greater democratization of public life, as well as the need to grant more decision-making power to the levels directly concerned (subsidiarity) will lend additional legitimacy to local authorities, which will make CDS a central, essential tool in their development policies."* (Tebbal 2011b: 4). In the end the breakthrough in the Arab countries was seen as "urban manifestation" while emerged from large cities, initiated by young people and women participation not just from the poor

but also from well-educated and from cultural figures and institutions (UN-Habitat 2012: 23-24). This raises the urgent need for empowerment and for participation of all the citizens regardless their gender, age, educational or socio economic backgrounds in the urban development process. Inclusiveness became in this sense a necessity to counterpart the failure of urban governance in the Arab cities.

For the future of the Arab cities, urban development programs and many projects initiated from the bottom will be encouraged in addition to actions for restructuring and rebuilding. Especially partnerships should be formed between the public and private sectors and civil society. These partnerships are the key for improving urban governance on the local and national levels. Improving urban governance constitutes the millstone to achieve effective urban planning and management in Arab cities for better living conditions of the urban poor as priority and for sustainable urban development (CMI 2011: 14; Tebbal 2011; UN-Habitat 2012: 23-24). Hence, at the time of transformation, the future CDSs need to consider participation for the future of the cities in the Arab region and to adopt PUPAs more firmly and deliberately while adjusting them to the local settings. Participation should not be attended as a mere methodological tool for planning, but also as an aim for social change in the Arab region. The need for inclusiveness in the process for different groups and for more participation in the planning process, the achieved political support and the municipal mobilization of the management teams should be maintained.

Learning from the practices^{75,76} of the CDS in the Arab cities, some of the factors that support the success and completion of the CDS in the future are for example the ownership of the CDS by the local actors through the participatory processes and partnerships. Ownership is essential for the sustainability of the CDS process and for implementing the PUPA. One of the positive examples that have represented a strong sense of ownership and commitment by the local actors is the approach of the CDS in Sfax⁷⁷. Ownership was necessary to maintain the motivation of local actors and to ensure the continuity of the efforts of the steering committee, particularly for applying for the funding to implement the strategy (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 55-57). seeking a strategic and democratic planning process, planners and urban managers should be trained and empowered to be able to fulfil their leading role in the CDS and urban development process in their cities (CMI 2011: 15) not as technocrats, but as communicators and agents for innovation in developing and managing the PUPA.

It has been recognized that the CDS character in the region has been in transformation before and after the Arab uprising. Before the uprising, PUPA was used as a tool to mobilize stakeholders who need to formulate the CDS. After 2011, for example in Morocco, the PUPA in the CDS was used as a proactive instrument to practice participation in urban development and to contain the social instability through more inclusion in the CDS process. For furthering the development and the transformation of urban centers and big cities, adopting PUPAs emerges as a positive approach to ensure the commitment to an effective reform in urban governance towards democratic and participatory planning practices.

⁷⁵ Lessons learned of CDS practices and comparisons in similar contexts, particularly in the context of the SEMC case studies, of the CDS conducted from 2000 to 2010.

⁷⁶ For example in Alexandria, Aleppo, Amman, Al Fayhaa, El Jadida, Settat, Tétouan, Ramallah, Sfax, and Tunis.

⁷⁷ Tunis has hosted the first CDS in 2000.

3.2. The Case Study of Egypt: Urban Planning and Governance Settings Underpinning the PUPAs

The aim of this section is to examine the conditions in which the PUPAs have been initiated⁷⁸ in the national planning of Egypt. For this purpose, the planning system, the planning process, and the existing urban governance settings and actors will be explored. Moreover, to facilitate a better understanding of the PUPAs in Egypt, important practices of PUPAs will be presented and their potentials and challenges will be identified.

3.2.1. Egypt: Background on the Country and the Planning System

The Arab Republic of Egypt is a Mediterranean country and a transcontinental country between Africa and Asia. More than 90 % is desert and 3.5 % agricultural land based (FAO 2011). The Nile River represents the backbone of the inhabitancy in the country with high population density.



Figure 8: Egypt (The World Factbook 2019).



Figure 9: Egypt borders (Google maps no year).

The populated area form around 6% of the country area (GOPP 2014: 9). Egypt has the largest population in the Arab world with 91.508 Million in 2015 (UNDESA 2015). The urbanization trends in Egypt have shown an increasing of the urban population in the main urban centers of about 43% in 2014, which expected to reach 57% in 2050 (UNDESA 2014: 21). The majority of the urban population resided in the densely populated centers of Greater Cairo, Giza and Alexandria and other major cities in the Nile Delta. Cairo city has alone 10 million inhabitants (UNDESA 2014: 26) and 15 million in its metropolitan area or the Greater Cairo Region, which accommodates around 40% of the country's urban population (UN-Habitat 2013).

The poverty rate was increasing between 2000 and 2010, it was in 2000 about 16.7% and increased to 25.2% in 2011 (Tsuchiya 2016). It was highest in 2009, which was attributed to the global financial crisis which affected the economic growth in the country (Bargawi and McKinley 2011; Tsuchiya 2016). Poverty rate was higher in Upper Egypt regions in both urban and rural areas, like in Asyut and Aswan than in Lower Egypt regions, for example, in Cairo and Alexandria (Tsuchiya 2016). The unemployment

⁷⁸ The study focuses on the time between 2003 and 2010, considering the conditions in which the CDS of Alexandria has been initiated.

rates were between 9-11 % in the 2000s especially among women and the rate of labor force engaged in informal economic activities were consistently rising (ibid).

Egypt has a developed services sector which constituted about 49 % of the GDP (2009), followed by agriculture with around 38%. The largest urban regions of Cairo and Alexandria are the centers for economic growth of the country, especially Greater Cairo, the host of 57 % of manufacturing activities, foreign investments and the hub for transport and communication (UN-Habitat 2012: 41-44). Therefore, Cairo as the mega city in the Arab region have many urban challenges, including transportation problems and environmental degradation through congestion and air and water pollution (ibid).

3.2.1.1. The Development of the Planning System in Egypt

The planning system and related decisions are centralized in Egypt. They are managed on the national level from the political and administrative center of Cairo. The physical Planning process and urban development had undergone many changes after 2008. Before that, they were part of the national planning system as they were regulated in the framework of the “National Development Plan (Five-Year Development Plan)” and followed by development plans for the lower levels. Each administrative unit should prepare its own development plans, projects and programs, which must comply with the objectives of the National Development Plan (Salheen and El Khateeb 2010).

The Five-Year Development Plans⁷⁹ are prepared on the national level. They define among others the objectives, the plans and programs that aim to be achieved for urban planning and development (Rayser and Franchini 2008, 2015). This form of plans had started in 1957 for the first time, formulated by the National Planning Committee under the rule of President Nasser. With the rising of the Arab Nationalism in 1962, the centralized planning and state-based decisions were seen as a necessity for the reform at that time. The development plan in the seventies, tried to focus on strengthening the private sector and encourage private investment. At the beginning of the eighties under Mubarak’s rule, the plans and related policies were growth oriented focusing on opening the economy to the global market while ignoring the long-term effect on the local economy, which later led to the rise of corruption and social and economic inequalities (Sakamoto 2013). These inequalities were mainly attributed to the unavailing planning mechanisms dealing with urban growth and informality in addition to ineffective political and administrative decisions.

The physical planning system in Egypt has been developing incrementally in the country’s modern history. It consisted of fragmented planning regulatory actions and improvement interventions before independence in 1952 (Elkhishin 1997; Sakamoto 2013). After that, the spatial planning had a developmental approach through the comprehensive Planning Law No. 3/1982. The planning had mainly a top-down approach, where decisions were taken mainly on the national level. Yet, it had a new perspective with the transition from the comprehensive to strategic planning through stipulating the new planning law “The Unified Construction Law” No. 119/2008. The new law focuses on strategic planning and participatory planning approaches (based on MCHLR 1982; GOPP 2010).

⁷⁹ The Five-Years Development Plan is a national strategic plan formulated to put a strategy for 5 years implementation time span, it includes development guidelines in different areas, economic, social and spatial, where urgent development needs within the indicated time are defined. Financial means are allocated according to these priorities in these plans, prepared by the ministry of planning.

Before the revolution in 1952, the planning was limited to interventions regarding repairing roads and beautifying the cities following the British laws and regulations in planning and urban design, in addition to regulating building and subdivisions without considering the master plans approved on the local and national levels. The responsible planning authority was called at that time the “*Tanzim*” which represented the planning and building Bureau (Elkhishin 1997). After the independence, between 1960 and 1982, new laws, decrees and regulations⁸⁰ have been stipulated and many have been amended or replaced again. However, the new planning laws and regulations did not present a responding framework to the needs of planning. This was escalated by the discriminating decisions of planners, decision makers, in addition to unjust regulations and penalties, leading to massive building violations. As a result, the planning system was unable to keep pace with the violations in the times after 1956, which led to accepting the illegal constructions as a reality and later on to formalize them (ibid). Furthermore, formal land registration was a very tedious process and had led to many land tenure problems in Egypt. The land registration process has to go through around 71 bureaucratic procedures in around 31 different offices, which may take more than six months to be fulfilled (UN-Habitat 2012: 53).

The stipulation of a comprehensive Planning Law No. 3/1982, offered a solid structure to the planning through organizing the preceding fragmented planning laws, decrees and regulations. This law came to organize the planning process focusing on the physical, administrative and financial aspects⁸¹. The law had emphasized the need to formulate and implement the local plans for subdivisions according to the approved master plans on the local and national levels. Therefore, the national and local planning authorities including the General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) and the governorate should formulate and approve the local plans of the subdivisions (MCHLR 1982; Elkhishin 1997 cited from GOPP and GTZ 1985). The plan for the subdivision should proceed in different phases; certification by an architect then by the Local Planning Department for technical review, and in the end it should be approved by the Urban Planning Committee⁸² led by the governor (Elkhishin 1997 cited from Elkhishin 1990; Madbouly 2009). The law had its virtues in offering a space for negotiations and development rather than just regulatory implications (MCHLR 1982; Elkhishin 1997). The weaknesses of the law lie in its institutional gaps and in excluding the planners in the decision-making process regarding urban development, particularly those projects that targeted informal areas. Moreover, the law implied many controlling regulations, which made the planning process in many cases ineffective. For example, acquiring construction permission was intended to mobilize the needed financial means for services supply. Avoiding the formal procedures for getting a permission had led to increasing informal land development where the developers were unable to fulfill all the formal requirements (Elkhishin 1997).

The new Planning Law “The Unified Construction Law” No.119/2008 focuses on strategic planning and participatory planning approaches. The law was adopted in responding to the emerging urban problems in the last decades and the pressure on the resources through population growth⁸³. These

⁸⁰ The law No. 52/ 1940 (Elkhishin 1997).

⁸¹ This includes: population densities, land use budgets, building regulations, administrative where developers should show the plan and report to the local council the management framework for cooperatives regulations for delegating powers to the local government, and in funding of low income housing projects (Elkhishin 1997: 62 cited from GOPP and GTZ 1985)

⁸² The members of this committee are representatives from the utilities companies, multi-disciplinary professionals and observers from the Local Popular Council (Elkhishin 1997 cited from Elkhishin 1990) the local council can put rules for lot coverage for example according to the law 3/1982.

⁸³ Population growth is expected to increase from 73 in 2006 to 110 in 2032 (GOPP 2010: 2).

urban problems have posed also threats for the future of the country represented by urban sprawl, uncontrolled urbanization and informality, poor service provision, pervasion of poverty, inequality, weak economy and unemployment in addition to deterioration of historical sites. This was accompanied with informal expansion on the agricultural land in the largest where developed land in cities and villages were hardly inhabited leading to economic, social, environmental and institutional challenges on different levels of planning (GOPP 2010: 2). Hence, the strategic plans indicated in the law should provide a framework for setting the priorities for planning and development in the country to deal with these challenges through sustainable participatory approaches of planning and development for the future visions (ibid).

The Unified Construction Law has been issued in 2008 and put into action in 2009. According to this law (Article 2) the levels of the planning system in Egypt have been identified in four levels; national, regional, governorate and local (city or village). On each of these levels, goals, policies and programs have been accordingly defined. Additionally, participation is a main component in the planning process and the detailed procedures of this process have been elaborately explained for each phase of the local planning on the city or village, district or neighborhood level (according to the Unified Law 2009) (GOPP 2010; Ghattas 2016). Yet, within the short time of implementing the new law, the practice of the participatory approach on the national and regional level was not realized and planning remained centralized. In addition, most of the priority or development projects on the local level although agreed on in public meetings; they cannot be proceeded to the implementation without the approval of the national level, where the related political and financial decisions are taken (Ghattas 2016).

3.2.1.2. An Overview on the Administrative System and Spatial Planning Levels

The administrative system for spatial divisions, especially for the towns and villages, started to take shape with issuing the Law No. 145/1944. Each town or village with 3000-15.000 inhabitants should have a local council, which is responsible for health, sanitation, and management sectors, e.g., hospitals, roads, pedestrians, waste, etc. Yet, this law has merely focused on the urban and population factors, therefore, the Law No. 66/1955 was issued to unify the regulations regarding the administrative organization of the local councils, except those, which were established according to special laws, like in Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said. The local councils until this point were organized in two categories; one administered by the Ministry of the Interior and the other; the municipal council, is administered by the Ministry of Municipal and Provincial Affairs which was also responsible for planning (Allam and Qashwa 1995: 12-14). In 1960, the laws for local or municipal councils were abolished and replaced by the Local Administration Act. According to this Act, the administrative divisions have been determined and differentiated between governorate, city and village, etc., in addition to defining the difference in respect to the dynamics of urbanization, urban growth and population, between rural and urban. For example, Cairo and Alexandria are urban governorates, considering the level of urbanization, urban density and population. Each level should be administered by a council and should be headed by an appointed chairman and other members are partly appointed by the central government and partly elected (ibid).

The Law No. 75/1971 replaced the Local Administration Act with the Local Government. On each administrative local level; governorate, city, districts and villages (figure 10), there should be two councils; one executive council and one popular council (members elected and nationally appointed). This law was put in force until the Law No. 43/1979 for Local Administration Act has been issued, which is still in force. According to the Act, the local councils are differentiated between executive and

popular councils; the members in the first are appointed centrally and in the second are elected (Allam and Qashwa 1995: 12-14; El Sawi 2002; World Bank 2006). This administrative Act has been amended many times but it is still for the most part in force, unlike the planning law, which has been changing over the time. Based on the administrative divisions, the planning system was structured along the administrative system to national, regional and local levels.




Figure 10: Local Administration Structure in Egypt (El Sawi 2002; World Bank 2006: 14).

i. The National Level

The planning process on the national level is represented by drawing the national plan, the general policy for spatial planning and urban policies. The national plan is developed by the GOPP⁸⁴. Egypt planning policies in the recent past were characterized by concentrating on planning new areas, cities and towns rather than controlling urban growth in the existed areas, in addition to focusing on individual and urgent urban problems which lack a comprehensive vision and consistency (Worldbank 2008: 11-14). Some of these spatial policies was for example the “*Tahzim*” initiative to control urban expansion on private agricultural land (World Bank 2008: 107). One of the new spatial policies and strategies was the “*New Communities’ Strategy*” which has demonstrated in its pilot projects different successes and challenges. In terms of housing policies, the historical background of these policies was linked to the socio-economic fragmentation of the Egyptian urban development today, referring to the housing policies and the laws for public housing in the socialist state between 1952 and 1970 (Badawy, et al. 2015: 1228).

⁸⁴ The General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) is “*The official organization responsible for drawing strategies, policies, plans, programs and projects for human settlement development, together with provision of housing, utilities and social services, as well as monitoring and follow-up on implementing these schemes. The capacities of GOPP to coordinate between development partners and concerned bodies at both central and local levels. The abilities of GOPP and affiliated regional planning centers that geographically cover Egypt to monitor, analyze and follow-up on the conditions of human settlements in Egypt. GOPP offers technical assistance to local administration units, and build their capacities in the area of human settlement development and management*” (GOPP 2014).

ii. The Regional Level: Planning Regions

Egypt is divided into seven⁸⁵ “Planning Regions⁸⁶”, which also represent the economic regions established based on the presidential decree 475/1977 (Mustafa 2015: 74-76). Each of the regions has two or more governorates, each led by a governor. According to the decree each region has its own “Regional Planning Authority” supervised by the Ministry of Planning (decree 475/1977, Article 2), which are connected to the central authority in Cairo. Each region has a capital (Law 43/1979, Article 7). Each region has also a GOPP regional office, which is managed with the Regional Planning Authority by a “Supreme Committee for Regional planning⁸⁷” in each of the regions (according to the Law No. 43/1979, Article 8) (Ryser and Franchini 2008, 2015; Mustafa 2015: 74-76).



Figure 11: Egypt Planning Regions (GOPP 2016).

Researchers and technical experts in the regional planning authorities⁸⁸ work on analyzing the economic and social needs of each region to define the development priorities, and propose future plans and projects (Zakaria, Personal Communication: May 2014; Mustafa 2015: 75-76). The “Supreme Committee for Regional Planning” decides on the priorities and criteria for the plans, coordinates the plans of the governorates with the regional plans and supervises the implementation process. The committee is chaired by a governor⁸⁹, and its members include the governor or governors, the heads of local popular councils, and the chairman of the regional planning authority, as well as the general

⁸⁵ They became 28 in 2008 according to Presidential Decrees 114 and 124 of 2008.

⁸⁶ The proposal for the planning regions was accepted by the committee of local development on the national level (ministry level) in 1974. Another specialists committee studied the proposal considering in the divisions specific criteria, among others; proportional population densities in the regions and geographical characteristics (Mustafa 2015).

⁸⁷ Subordinated by the Minister of Local Development (presidential decree 475/1977, Article 2).

⁸⁸ Managed by the Ministry of Planning and the National Center for Planning State Land-uses.

⁸⁹ The governor will be changed every year.

secretary of the committee of the region, and representatives of the competent ministries (Mustafa 2015: 75-76).

The Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development (MHUUD) works on studying and preparing the regional plans⁹⁰ and projects for the regions considering the priorities decided on the national level (by the SCPUD/Cabinet) which should also approve the regional plans (see previous section). The GOPP regional offices or the “Regional Centers for Urban Planning and Development (RCUPD)” in each of the regions prepare mainly the strategic plans for the villages and cities in each of the regions, under the supervision of the MHUUD (Mustafa 2015; GOPP 2016; Ghattas 2016) (see appendix 22: the structure of the GOPP).

The GOPP has its planning offices⁹¹ distributed in the capitals of the planning regions. They were established in 1986 to decentralize the tasks for urban planning in the regions (GOPP 2015), in addition to regional branches responsible for environmental planning and protection. The assigned GOPP “Regional Centers for Urban Planning and Development” should, according to the Article 7 of Law No. 119/2008, provide the technical expertise in preparing the strategic plans⁹² for villages and cities with a request from the governor (Mustafa 2015; Ghattas 2015; GOPP 2016). The centers should cooperate and coordinate with the “General Administration for Planning and Development” at the governorates in the regions under the governor’s supervision (Law No. 119/2008, Articles 7 and 8, to find in pages 10-11). The “General Administration for Planning and Development” is responsible for receiving the comments from citizens and stakeholders for further modifications in the plans and mediating them with the regional centers. The decision regarding the plans must be taken in coordination with the governors and the local popular councils whose approval is essential to implement the plan (as stated in the Article 18 of Law No. 119/2008) (Mustafa 2015: 25; Ghattas 2016).

iii. The Local Level and the Planning Process

The planning on the local level proceeds through the governorate, city, district, and sections levels to the lower administrative levels or smaller administrative units. To examine how a PUPA is developed and implemented in practice on the local level, there is a need to understand the phases of the planning process and the roles of the involved actors who affect urban planning and governance.

Planning Phases	Planning Law 3/1982	Planning Law 119/2008 Steps for preparing strategic master plans for cities for the year 2032	
Preliminary phase	Collecting data.	Preliminary phase	Collecting proposals, reports and information or database.
Phase 1	Prepare master plans in the planning department by the planning commission, consulting the LPC then approve the plans.	Phase 1	Prepare the plans involving stakeholders and define the priority projects then approve the plans.

⁹⁰ According to the Egyptian Construction Law No. 119/2008, in adopting the strategic planning: the Regional Strategic Plan is the plan that sets out the development goals, policies and programs for each economic region and develops the regional projects for implementation and its mechanisms and phases. In addition to defining the role of both the public and private sectors in the implementation (Mustafa 2015: 17).

⁹¹ The GOPP offices were established in 1986 in the regions centers; Greater Cairo, Delta, Asyut, South and North-Upper Egypt regions, and the Suez Canal (GOPP 2015).

⁹² The GOPP subcontracts with private engineering consulting offices to work on the plans’ proposal under its supervision and revision (Ghattas 2016).

phase 2	Prepare the detailed plans in the local units.	phase 2	Prepare the detailed plans for implementation, feasibility studies for the projects (4-5 projects; for example, urban upgrading projects, urban expansion, sub-divisions, etc.) in addition to prepare the time plan and bid terms and conditions.
Phase 3	Implementation.	Phase 3	Implementation, follow-up and evaluation (done through subcontracts with consulting companies).

Table 19: The phases of physical planning and development on the local level according to Law 3/1982 and the Law 119/2008 (The MCHLR 1982; GOPP 2010: 5; Abou Omira⁹³, Personal Communication: May 2014).

The planning process was undertaken by the attentive planning authorities in the local administrative units on each of the local levels, Governorate, *Markaz*, and City/Village. In the following, the administrative actors, who are involved in producing and approving the plans, and those who manage the planning process, are going to be explained (see figure 12).

On the Governorate level, Egypt is divided into 27 governorates, which either are “Urban” or compounded of “Urban” and “Rural” areas. The levels of local administration are the governorate as the highest level in the local administrative system. It is followed by the “*Markaz*”^{94 95} mainly in the mixed type of governorates, then City/Village, City District, city district’s sections or *Qism* and *Shiyakhat* the smallest urban units (according to the Local Administration Law 43/1979 and its executive regulations and amendments) (World Bank 2006: 14; Ghattas 2015; Okabe 2016: 193).

Each governorate is chaired by a governor. Each level of the local administration is governed by two councils system⁹⁶, the Local Popular Council (LPC) and the Executive Council (EC); one council on each of the levels; the governorate, the *Markaz*, City/Village, and district levels (El Sawi 2002; UCLG 2007: 2). The hierarchy applies also to the decision-making and monitoring processes, where local and executive councils on lower levels are subordinated by those of the higher levels (El Sawi 2002: 7; World Bank 2006: 17). The aim of the dual system in the local administrative structure is to allow for more autonomy and flexibility on the local level, particularly by benefiting the local community through the role of its active members in governance. However, where the law states that the executive council is responsible under the supervision of the local council, in reality, the executive council is the main actor in approving the plans and the central governmental policies. The comments of the local council are mostly ignored especially when they conflict with the plans and policies of the central government (World Bank 2006).

Governorates get their funds from taxes and subsidies, where the funds from non-governmental actors should be approved from the prime minister. The governorates have special funds⁹⁷ based on the local administration laws and ministerial decrees, for example, the special fund for Housing, Agricultural and Reclaimed Lands and for Local Services and Development (Social Development Funds (SDF))

⁹³ The director of urban planning department in Alexandria city administration.

⁹⁴ Urban governorates have no *Markaz* but directly a City, e.g., Alexandria, Cairo, Port Said and Suez urban governorates (Worldbank 2006: 2).

⁹⁵ The “*Markaz*” has usually one to two main cities besides several villages (Ghattas 2015).

⁹⁶ The Law 43/1979 assigns to the national actors the task of monitoring the Executive Councils and LPCs. The national actors are represented by “The president, the prime minister, the Council of Ministers, the Parliament, the Supreme Committee of Local Administration, the Minister of Local Development, and other central institutions such as the Central Authority for Organization and Administration and the Central Agency for Audits” (World Bank 2006: 17).

⁹⁷ Governorate’s Popular Council should approve grants whether governmental or non-governmental.

according to the Law No. 43/1979 (Article 36), as amended by the Law No. 145/1988. The financial resources for the SDF are governed by the MOLA, such as charges and fees for services, rental income of housing units and profits from funded projects through the SDF (El Sawi 2002: 17).

On the Markaz, City and districts levels, the Markaz follows the governorate (the mixed type) in the local administrative structure. It has a capital city and several cities and villages. The city in the urban governorate is the capital city and cities are followed by districts. The districts are divided into sections and sections into Shyakhat. Each Markaz has a chief and own LPC and EC (World Bank 2006: 14; Mustafa 2015: 73-74).

3.2.1.3. Institutions and Key Actors Involved in Producing and Approving the Physical Plans

The local governance in Egypt is strongly affected by the political legislative and administrative system. In the constitution, People's Assembly has the legislative power. In practice, there are hierarchical distribution of powers. The president has constitutional powers and he directly appoints actors on the national and local level, e.g., vice presidents, prime ministers, the Council of Ministers in addition to senior civil servants, heads of autonomous agencies, governors and judges. The prime minister ensures the control on the bureaucracy in front of the president and he has therefore lots of power in the Council of Ministers or on any level when his intervention is needed. He leads the economy regarding the budget and public expenditures. The Governorate Council operates on the local level led by the prime minister and decides regarding legislative matters on the local level. The mayors operate as council managers and they are appointed by the prime minister. They issue decrees, which are supportive action in the decentralization process (Eiweida 2000: 113-114).

The actors who approve the plans decide on how the inputs of the participatory actors will be included in the plans for implementation. The participatory process in planning as a method in preparing the physical plans is developed and managed by the actors who are usually producing the plans; collecting required data, observing, or consulting. In the hierarchical administrative structure, there are actors and institutions who are responsible for the physical planning in Egypt. The GOPP is responsible for producing the plans and prepares them for all the planning levels. The prepared plans should be approved by the central government. In the following figure, the tentative institutions who are responsible for managing the participatory process in urban planning and governance will be introduced. These actors do influence the PUPA and its impact and sustainability directly and indirectly.




Figure 12: Key institutions and actors involved in the planning process and their roles on different levels (based on Ghattas 2015 cited from Nada 2011; Mustafa 2015: 118 cited from UN-Habitat).

The physical planning process, on the national, regional, and local levels, is carried out by the "General Organization for Physical Planning" (GOPP⁹⁸). The GOPP follows the MHUUD directly, and it is together with the MHUUD and MOLD responsible for preparing the plans on different levels. The Supreme Council for Planning and Physical Development (SCPUD) headed by the prime minister and the Housing and Physical Development Ministry (MHUUD) supervises the work of the GOPP in preparing and implementing the strategic plans on different planning levels (GOPP, Law 119/2008⁹⁹).

Since it is a centralized planning system, governors, and mayors are appointed by the national government. The master plans prepared on the local level must also be approved on the national

⁹⁸ The General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) has been established in 1973. It is the responsible organization for the physical planning process in Egypt, and has seven "regional planning offices" related to it, as Egypt is divided into seven "planning regions" each region contains two or more "governorates" (GOPP 2016).

⁹⁹ Article 10 of Law 119/2008, page 11.

level¹⁰⁰. The plans contain details regarding land use, urban densities, infrastructure, transportation, economic activities and building regulations. In addition, in the implementation process, participatory planning processes are implied¹⁰¹ (Ryser and Franchini 2008: 12).

The actors affecting urban planning and development: The planning process of Egypt on the local level is proceeded through different actors, from national to the local level (see appendix 23). These actors affect also the participatory process in the planning, if that directly or indirectly.

- On the national level, the higher council for planning and physical development represented by the GOPP and the “Hayz committee”, the MHUUD and the Ministry of Defense.
- On the regional level, the administration of regional planning at the GOPP and the regional planning office of the GOPP. The governor has the main role in decision-making regarding the planning on both the regional and governorate levels.
- On the governorate level, the administration for planning and physical development in the governorate and the LPC of the governorate.
- On the *Markaz* level, the head of the *Markaz* and the local public council of the *Markaz*. The same applies for the city or village level, the head of the city or the village and the LPC of the city or village. The cooperation of further actors including the private sector and the civil society and NGOs should be initiated first on the governorate level and downwards (Nada 2011 cited in Ghattas 2015).

The responsible planning authority or institution, today called today General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) was developing in different phases. The first phase was from 1965 to 1973 initiated through Planning of Greater Cairo where a Supreme Committee for the planning of Greater Cairo was established (with the Presidential Decree No. 2102/1965) in addition to an executive body to organize the planning tasks. From 1973-1981, the Public Authority for Urban Planning was formed to set the general policy for urban planning, and to put the rules for urban development and preparing master plans for cities and villages. It has also the task in coordination with other bodies to develop comprehensive regional plans based on the priorities of each region (GOPP 2016). The GOPP is the main actor for producing the plans. This body, according to the planning law is in charge of drawing the general policies for sustainable urban planning and development. It is responsible for preparing plans and programs for spatial and urban development at the national, regional and local/governorate level. This includes reviewing and approving the urban plans at the local level within the framework of the national, regional and local goals and policies for sustainable urban planning and development. The involved departments in the GOPP are specialized in different disciplines, like regional and urban planning, infrastructure planning, social and economic science, etc. The decentralized regional offices undertake the tasks of the GOPP in the seven economic regions (GOPP 2016, see appendix 22). The table in appendix 24 shows the key institutions, responsible for producing and implementing the plans and those responsible for approving the plans, who are also responsible for drawing up urban policies, and manage urban programs and projects.

There are other authorities affecting the planning process. For example, the responsible institutions for land management, who provide the basis for implementing the planning process, for example, the

¹⁰⁰ First by the MHUUD then mainly by the SPUD and MODMP, in addition to the approval from attentive ministries.

¹⁰¹ Although this is according to the former Planning Law 3/1982, but it is still in force in the current law and its implications.

National Center for Planning State Land Uses (NCPSLU) and the New Urban Communities Authority, in addition to institutions who provide the basis for implementing the plans, like the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Investment (Mustafa 2015).

a. Key Actors in the Planning Process on the Local Level

The key actors in the planning process on the local level are primarily, the governor, the planning commission in the governorate and the Local Popular Council (LPC) and the Local Executive Council (LEC). They are involved intensively in producing approving and implementing the plans. Further actors, who are responsible for approving the plans on the national level, are the MOL and the MOD (appendix 24). Both affect strongly the local planning decisions, which is common in the centralized planning systems. Actors, like CSOs, who had a less active role in the past that was vaguely referred to in Law No. 3/1982 by that of the LPC, they were getting more representation with the issuance of the new Planning Law No. 119/ 2008 (based on MCHLR 1982; GOPP 2010).

The actors on the local level are involved in the participatory process and in the local planning and governance in the governorate, *Markaz*, and city/village levels. The governorate coordinates between the planning bodies, gets approval of the LPC and the governor proceeds the plan to the national level represented by the related ministries (El Sawi 2002: 10; Mustafa 2015).

b. The Governor

The governor is appointed by a presidential decree and the prerogatives and executive powers in his governorate are conferred to him from the national level (Article 25, Local Administration Law No.43/1979¹⁰²). He belongs usually to the political elite, mostly chosen from the military¹⁰³ (Pieterse 2000: 36; World Bank 2006: 17). The governor is given the legitimate power to regulate the expenditure through SDFs on the local level starting with the governorate level (as it is stated in the Prime Minister's decree No. 578/1986). He is also authorized to allocate timely-limited funds “sub-accounts” from the SDFs to financing projects undertaken through community participation and funds for districts projects (El Sawi 2002: 14).

Besides his responsibility as representative for the national executive power in the governorate, according to the Law 43/1979, Article 26¹⁰⁴, the governor supervises implementing the state general policy in service provision and production in the governorate. He supervises not only the national but also the local utilities in the governorate, and leads the governmental bodies including the branches¹⁰⁵ of ministries at the governorate. The governor should submit periodical reports to the Minister of Local Administration¹⁰⁶, summarizing the progress and results of the works undertaken in the governorate (Mustafa 2015: 77). The governor sends his reports to the prime minister, who organizes meetings for policymaking between governors and ministers (Ben Nefissa 2009: 181).

In his political role, the governor_ always male_ is appointed directly by the president and his task is to ensure putting the state policies into action on the governorate level (Pieterse 2000: 35; Ben Nefissa 2009: 181). The mayor on the other hand is responsible on the municipal level (Pieterse 2000: 35). The governor assures his loyalty to the central government in promoting more capital for economic growth

¹⁰² Article 25 of law 43/1979 was substituted by law No. 26/1982 official journal – issue No. 15 on 15 April 1982.

¹⁰³ Almost 70 % of the governors are former military or police (World Bank 2006: 17).

¹⁰⁴ The first paragraph was substituted by 145/1988.

¹⁰⁵ Except the judicial authorities (Article 27 Law 43/1979) (Mustafa 2015: 77).

¹⁰⁶ Minister of local administration, submits to the prime minister periodical reports on work results in different governorates after studying them (Article 29, Law 43/1979) (Mustafa 2015: 77).

and ensuring political control and stability (Pieterse 2000: 36). These conditions considering the background and the mission of the governor create an atmosphere for patronage and favoritism. The interests of the employees on the governorate level including the governor is in preserving their power and position through their loyalty to the central government. This, however, does not ensure a committed role to sustainable urban development and PUPAs.

c. The Planning Commission

In each city or town/village, there should be a planning commission in the governorate (Article 1, Law 3/1982), responsible for producing the general plans for the city or village. With a decision from the governor, the commission will be formed. The members are experts from planners and specialists from different disciplines, e.g., social, economy, tourism, industry, etc. in addition to individuals, who are concerned about planning, for example, stakeholders, and some of the members of the LPC in the attentive governorate, city, or village, which should be planned for, and representatives of Agriculture and Defense Ministries. Further members are administrative actors for managing the activities of the commission. The preparation of the plans for cities or villages should consider the regional needs (social economic or environmental) whenever is required. The commission subcontracts with consulting planning agencies or assign the planning team in the local unit to work on the plans. The planning commission branches out in consulting committees or sub-commissions, which are responsible for the preparation studies for the plans, e.g., regarding housing, transportation, public services, etc. according to the Law 3/1982 (Allam and Qashwa 1995: 27).

In the new Planning Law 119/ 2008, the General Administration for Planning and Urban Development in the governorates identifies the needs and priorities of urban development at the local level within the framework of the local and regional goals and policies. It proposes the necessary projects and work plans, according to the criteria of the urban plans prepared by it and in cooperation with the competent local unit, LPCs, competent executive bodies and representatives of the civil society (Mustafa 2015: 21).

d. The Local Popular Council (LPC)

The LPC in each of the administrative levels has the tasks of proposing, deciding on and approving the plans in their administrative unit. The members of the local councils are elected directly from the people as it is stated in the constitution¹⁰⁷ (World Bank 2006: 14; Ghattas 2015; Mustafa 2015). Citizens elected in the LPC represent the interests of the community in the planning process and has a political and cultural role through its representation of the local interests. The representatives could be workers or farmers (around 50%) women should be also represented in the LPC. However, this seat is lately has been given, by the Law 145/1988, to independent candidates (El Sawi 2002: 7). The LPC on the governorate level takes the decision, according to the law, regarding initiating, approving, implementing and monitoring development plans and projects and decide on the annual budget of the governorate. It works on a public participation plan regarding local projects, as stated in the new planning law. It supervises the works of the LPCs on lower levels besides approving their plans. In addition, it undertakes controlling the activities, decisions and decision makers on the governorate level according to the Law 43/1979 (Article 10 and 19) (Mustafa 2015: 78). However, in practice, the Executive Council (EC) decides and takes the responsibility to implement the policies where the local

¹⁰⁷ The Constitution 1971 and its amendment in 1980.

council contributions are usually not considered (Allam 1995: 43; Zakaria, Personal Communication: May 2014).

e. The Executive Council (EC)

The members of the Executive Council are appointed from the national level (WorldBank 2006: 6). Therefore, it represents the central government and ensures, while considering the LPC recommendations in the action plans, their compatibility with the public policies. The members are the governor and his deputies, Secretary General of the governorate (also secretary of the council, Article 32 Law 43/1979), governmental institutions or ministry directorates, chiefs of *Markazes*, cities and districts (appointed by the prime minister); and chiefs of villages (appointed by the governor) (El Sawi 2002: 7; World Bank 2006: 1).

The tasks of the Executive Council in the governorate is to provide consultancy to the LPC and the governor regarding technical, administrative, financial and legal issues, in addition to supervising and following up the tasks of other executive bodies in the governorate. It sets also the rules for land management, planning and housing projects as well as the financial plans for investment in the governorate (Mustafa 2015: 79).

The executive council is given the political power over the LPC who has very limited power despite its given legal functions. For example, the LPC is not included in the budget planning and it is not allowed to question the role of the EC. Despite the legal role given to the LPC by the Law 43/1979, it demands indirectly that the LPC follows up and be totally supervised by the EC rather than being responsible for producing plans, expect some tasks, like allocating funds for some activities regarding housing or land management (World Bank 2006: 1).

3.2.2. The Main Challenges for Urban Planning and Development in Egypt

Egypt' population is increasing and it is expected to reach 117 million by 2050. Urban growth is high mostly in Greater Cairo Region (GCR) and Alexandria, both host 56% of the country' urban population (UN-Habitat 2012). Urbanization rate in Upper Egypt cities is much lower, and rural population accounts for 75%. The poverty rate is high and affecting 60% of the population who lack adequate education, employment and health care (World Bank 2012). Different reforms have been undertaken in the last decades in the country, particularly through adopting structural reform and new political and economic policies resulting in raising new challenges for urban development and governance processes in the Egyptian cities.

Centralized spatial planning decisions regarding building new cities are political and administrative decisions in Egypt as well as the states' regulations that are taken usually on the Cabinet level. In responding to the challenges of urban growth, urban policies have been developed to control urban growth on the Nile Delta and Valley. Accordingly, construction projects had been initiated to deal with urban growth and to provide housing for low-income groups (Eiweida 2000: 107). New cities have been planned in addition to satellite cities and mega projects, such as the Toshka New Valley, South-west Egypt, and the El-Salaam Canal from the River Nile to Sinai. Focusing on particular regions and actions had led to excluding many other areas where the poor population resides from urban development while depleting the scarce resources of the country to realize these mega projects (ibid).

The growing informal settlements was the biggest urban challenge in Egypt since the seventies, particularly for the scarce agricultural land in the country. Urban policies to control growing of informal settlements have witnessed variable approaches since the seventies in Egypt. Before the nineties, they

were confronted with negligence, which led to rapid increase of these settlements. The first urban upgrading projects have started in the end of the seventies followed by “New Town Policy” in the eighties (Khalifa 2015). With the privatization policy, the state has built partnerships with the private sector, and sold land in the desert to large real estate associations to build new settlements along with tourism projects on the sea for high-income groups. The government has planned to displace the urban poor from their informal settlements and has offered new housing in the desert. The intended housing projects for low-income groups were initiated since the sixties but with slower pace than the rapidly growing urban population. The state had to deal with shortages of capacity to implement these projects without relying on the private sector who targeted projects that maximize its profits (Eiweida 2000: 107-108). As a result, the demand of the poor for housing was not fulfilled leading to increasing of informal settlements to reach 84% in the eighties, mostly leading to expansive loss of the agricultural land (ibid: 108-109). The failed planning and regularization led to the increase of informal areas while the lack of basic services has imposed pressure on the cities and the national government capability for service provision. However, this has started to change since the nineties, where the state offered a National Fund for urban upgrading and through initiating programs¹⁰⁸ for development of informal settlements (1994-2004) and programs for belting the informal areas to control their growth (2004-2008). Since 2009, Informal Settlement Development Facility (ISDF) has been established, according to which the settlements have been categorized according to the urgency of intervention in these settlements (Khalifa 2015).

The national Five-Year Plan (FYP) (2002-2007) has focused on regional planning and development. It mainly worked on monitoring the development plans of the desert and supported modernization of the cities in addition to the development of new settlements to release the population pressure on the Nile-Delta. In the detailed master plans of big cities, the elements indicated in the FYP were integrated. The master plans have focused mainly on the current problems in the urban context and the development of vacant land and infrastructure (Ryser and Franchini 2008: 10).

The offered programs and initiatives to contain the problems caused by urban informality have been faced with many hindrances, like the absence of adequate formal housing and rapid urban growth rates in addition to many institutional deficiencies, such as the lack of coordination between different sectors. Furthermore, the lack of a comprehensive planning for urban areas for dealing with the core problems of urban poverty, the contradictions between the policies and implementation, particularly in participatory programs and the absence of cooperation between the local government and civil society have led to the failure of such planning instruments. Finally, the failure of these efforts was undermined by the main conditions of the lack of funds and political will (Khalifa 2015). Urban problems were therefore rooted in political settings, lack of control over policy implementation on the national level, and lack of decentralization to facilitate local decisions and implementation of urban regulations and projects (Eiweida 2000: 109), particularly regarding the financial planning of urban development plans and projects (Ghattas, Personal Communication: April 2016).

Further institutional development actions and structural reforms had led in the past to further challenges to urban governance and development. The political changes have affected the urban policies in Egypt, particularly through the regional political instability. This has influenced and disrupted urban development programs of upgrading or in overregulating and displacement. Land reform

¹⁰⁸ A parallel initiative for upgrading was the Participatory Development Program in Urban Areas (PDP) (Khalifa 2015).

policies have been developed through the nationalization undertaken by the socialist system (Eiweida 2000: 102-109). The adopted Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) since the nineties had influenced strongly the economic development and society in Egypt. The reforms, including privatization and financial liberalization, should revitalize the economy and qualify Egypt to compete in the global market. The ERSAP has succeeded in reducing the fiscal deficit, trade deregulation, and investment policies, but led to cutting off public subsidies which, in turn, had led to rising poverty and unemployment rates (Eiweida 2000: 103-105). Statistics in 1999 showed that 3% of the population has lived below one dollar/day, where over half of the population lived with less than two dollars/day. One fifth of all households in Egypt lived in chronic poverty¹⁰⁹, and 48% of households were always poor (CPRC 2005: 67). Urban Poverty was experienced even more negatively than the rural poverty (two dollars/day) (CPRC 2005: 37), particularly at the beginning of the nineties through urban growth caused by rural-urban migration (Eiweida 2000: 104). In the following years, there was improvement in the urban areas, but an increased rural poverty. The increase of poverty in 2009 can be attributed to the global market crisis. However, Egypt had the highest rural poverty rates (28.9%) among the Arab countries in 2008 (Bargawi and McKinley 2011: 4).

Region	1990	1995	2000	2005	2009
Urban	20.3	22.5	9.3	10.1	11.0
Rural	28.6	23.3	22.1	26.8	28.9
Total	25.0	22.9	16.7	19.6	21.6

Table 20: Poverty headcount ratio using national poverty line, 1990-2009 Region (CAPMAS and the World Bank cited in Bargawi and McKinley 2011).

Regional disparities were detected between governorates, and within the governorates between urban and rural areas. Development efforts tend to be more effective in Lower Egypt rather than Upper Egypt, not just because of the concentration of wealth and natural resources in Lower Egypt¹¹⁰, but also because of the way social and public services are distributed (Eiweida 2000: 104). Most researchers on poverty issues in Egypt argue that poverty is concentrated in rural areas, especially in Upper Egypt (Bargawi and McKinley 2011: 4).

year	All Egypt	Metropolitan	Lower Egypt urban	Lower Egypt rural	Upper Egypt urban	Upper Egypt rural
1996	19	13	8	22	11	29
2000	17	5	6	12	19	34
2005	20	9	9	21	26	44
2008	22	8	5	15	15	40

Table 21: Urban and rural poverty in Egypt (percentage below the national poverty line), 1996-2008 (Mohieddin 2010 cited in Bargawi and McKinley 2011).

The emerged urban challenges in Egypt were represented mainly in internal and external institutional deficiencies mentioned above in addition to the urban growth dynamics (Eiweida 2000: 134; Madbouly 2009). The examined political and legal framework showed that Egypt has predominantly centralized governance settings in addition to adopting bureaucratic and corporatist traditions that led to weak urban management powers of the local government who is dependent on the national level in its decisions for urban development and management. These governance weaknesses are reinforced by the absence of the role of the civil society in urban management that led to weak performance of the

¹⁰⁹ Chronic poverty refers here to multidimensional deprivation, hunger, and undernutrition, and polluted drinking water, illiteracy, having no access to health services, social isolation and exploitation (CPRC 2005).

¹¹⁰ Lower Egypt is the northern region along the sea and the Nile delta, where Upper Egypt is the region along the lower part of the Nile which is mostly bordered with the desert.

local governments (Eiweida 2000: 133). Hence, these urban challenges were dealt with through adopting reforms in the planning system. In the framework of the undertaken changes, PUPAs were adopted, yet, in practice with weak impact and sustainability. In this regard, PUPAs need a close examination in the practice considering different urban governance challenges (see 3.2.4).

3.2.3. Participatory Planning Approaches in Urban Development Practices in Egypt

Participatory planning is not new in Egypt, which can be traced back to the development approaches for shelter upgrading and self-help projects in the seventies and eighties (Ahmad Soliman, Personal Communication: May 2014). Multi and bilateral International development agencies for urban development in Egypt started after the revolution in 1952 to support modernization processes in economic approaches, national administration, land and housing management. There were more than fifteen DAs involved in the process including, in order of magnitude, the USA, the African Development Bank, Germany, the Islamic Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, France, Japan, Denmark and the UK. In addition to the funds from the IMF, the World Bank and the European Union (EU), to support structural reforms (Eiweida 2000: 110).

Some of the pilot projects, where participation in planning was introduced, were small-scale settlement upgrading projects developed by the World Bank in 1970s in rural and urban areas. For example, a development project was initiated by the World Bank in the eighties in a small village named *Alhekr*. This initiative was supported by political actors and international funding that were essential for the positive outcome of this pilot project (Soliman, Personal Communication: May 2014).

Many projects and examples of participatory planning approaches were adopted on a small scale, which was considered the main factor for the efficient outcomes of these projects and the conducted participatory planning processes (Hassan 2010; Soliman, Personal Communication: May 2014). Earlier participatory planning processes in Egypt carried out on the local scale, which targeted both rural and urban communities, were successful mostly in the rural areas (Soliman, Personal Communication: May 2014). In this regard, self-help projects in small communities had more chances to succeed comparing with that on the city level. Local communities in the rural areas do share similar historical background, social strata and problems. Participatory self-help projects seem to tap into these qualities and to build upon the solidarity and social ties that are not easy to define in the diverse urban societies in the big cities (Abers 1998: 41). Most of these self-help projects were part of the informal management system of the rural and small urban communities. Yet, through urbanization and growing urban informality, participation was gaining more importance as a tool to gain cooperation and support of the local communities in the development process (Soliman, Personal Communication: May 2014).

Participatory planning practices in international development in Egypt were extended accompanied with the institutional reforms undertaken for improving governance. Especially in underdeveloped rural areas as well as in new urbanized areas that are in urgent need for intervention in dealing with urban growth and increasing informality. Participatory planning approaches in the last decade became a development trend in Egypt (Soliman, Personal Communication: May 2014), especially with the issuance of the new Strategic Planning Law 119/2008 (Zakaria, Personal Communication: May 2014; Ghattas, Personal Communication: April 2016). Participation in urban development was seen as a strategic option, according to the law, to bring the actors from the public, private and CSOs together and gain their collaboration. This trend presented for researchers and planners an emerging area for examining the principles, methodologies and potentials and challenges of participatory planning, especially in the framework of development projects and programs.

Two of the participatory planning methodologies were identified in the Egyptian cities since 2002, one through the methodologies of Strategic Urban Planning (SUP) with the technical cooperation of the Sweden international Development Agency (SIDA) and the second is the methodologies of Strategic Urban Planning for the Small Cities (SUPSC), with the cooperation of UN-Habitat. In these examples¹¹¹, community participation is meant to be the main tool to develop and implement the participatory planning process (Hassan et al. 2011: 203). Based on the following parameters (appendix 25), the efficiency of participation was examined, while comparing these two approaches in the Egyptian cities (ibid: 206).

One of the most important parameters for the efficiency of the participatory process was building trust to enable a transparent communication and cooperation among the stakeholders and to gain the support of the citizens for the development projects (Hassan et al. 2011: 208). Comparing the parameters in both methodologies, the author could identify that both had favored multiple participatory activities to bring the stakeholders together; either by focus groups meetings, or by workshops. In addition, many factors have played the role in establishing and sustaining a culture of participatory planning. Primarily, trust and reliability were very essential to maintain the engagement of the participants. The SUP method showed less effective results regarding participation. This was attributed to adopting unreliable methods to involve the community in all the planned phases, particularly due to using ineffective communication strategies compared to the SUPSC tools (Hassan et al. 2011: 211).

On the example “Strategic Urban Planning of Qwesna City¹¹²”, the participatory method SUPSC was applied. In this example, community participation was proceeded through consultation, workshops and surveys. Urban governance issues raised in this example were the main challenges, particularly in developing a partnership and a legal framework to implement the financial plan of the decided priority projects. PB as a model approach has lacked the legal framework and institutional support despite its potential in realizing the urgent projects to achieve sustainable development in small cities (Hassan 2010). Yet, the participatory approach in this example has shown better results, particularly by considering the cultural and historical character of the community and its diversity. Therefore, the diversity of urban communities proved to be a crucial aspect of future PUPAs. Besides, comparing further examples of PUPAs has the potential of providing additional results, which can help to understand the local context in which the PUPA is implemented.

3.2.3.1. Critique on PUPAs in Development Interventions

Development planning interventions with their PUPA by DAs were criticized for their failure to achieve a real social empowerment for urban communities. Studies¹¹³ about the influence of the development interventions in the urban sector showed that development efforts have failed to achieve sustainable

¹¹¹ The case studies considered by the source are “Strategic Urban Planning (SUP) applied in Zefta city, which is located in the Delta (agriculture context). The second was the first phase of Strategic Urban Planning for Small Cities (SUPSC) applied in Delta cities also. The two cases are similar from context and communities point of view. Both cases are managed by the General Organization of Physical Planning (GOPP) with assistance of an international agency.” (Hassan et al. 2011: 204).

¹¹² Developing the urban strategic plan for small cities indicated in law 119/2008 was intended to be performed in a participatory approach of the community who should, together with other city stakeholders, set the priorities for urban development in attaining sustainable urban development goals.

¹¹³ The studies are based on reevaluation conducted by Zetter and Hamza (1997) of three urban upgrading case studies: the Helwan Project, Cairo (USAID funded), the Garbage Collectors Settlement, the Zabaleen, also in Cairo (World Bank, Oxfam and Ford Foundation funded), and the Nasriya Project, Aswan (GTZ funded). (Zetter and Hamza 1997; Eiweida 2000: 110).

urban development and poverty reduction through community participation. Evidence was presented from projects undertaken in the seventies and the eighties (Zetter and Hamza 1997; Eiweida 2000: 110). The challenges were identified in the work of the international development agencies (operational), the governmental (political and institutional) and the community (societal and cultural).

Types of Challenges	Aspects
international development agencies (operational)	Limited time and resources for project implementation (results-oriented and given set of criteria), lack of adjusted participatory models to the local context, managerial approach that uses centralized organizations in participation, western criteria without considering the local place and local values.
governmental (political and institutional)	Political acceptance for participation, lack of institutional awareness/conceptualization of participation and participatory methods.
community (cultural)	Patronage of community leaders, reinforcing existing inequality.

Table 22: Identified challenges for the participatory approaches in international interventions in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (summarized, based on the study by Zetter and Hamza 1997 and the reflection by Eiweida 2000: 110-111).

Limited time- resources: The performance of the DAs was criticized for focusing on the results within limited time and resources frame adopting the centralized managerialism approach of the government, which reinforces the states’ centralization and political agenda. This approach does not support a structural reform in planning in practice or an effective urban policy, despite emphasizing these reform needs in the program (Zetter and Hamza 1997: 164; Eiweida 2000: 110-111).

Imposing democratization through participatory approaches: Development approaches, for instance, by UNDP 1993 for governments intended to achieve democratization, decentralization and strengthening civil society, NGOs and GROs. These approaches lacked the consideration of the cultural features and governance settings, which are specific in each country (Eiweida 2000: 111). They can be attended in the long term, but in the short term, they will cause many disruptions politically, economically, and socially. An abrupt transition in powers in an authoritarian system can lead to emerging opposing forces, resulting in disorder and conflicts in the political, social, and economic structures (Linz 1978; Baloyra 1987 cited in Eiweida 2000: 111). Therefore, democratization processes in Egypt were recommended to involve gradual process of concession from the national level for more civil and political freedom and from the local level through pluralism and strengthen the role of popular councils. These processes should be undertaken without threatening the regime in power (Eiweida 2000: 111).

Dependency on DAs tools in implementing development projects: The purposes of development interventions for sustainable development and alleviate poverty in DCs have shifted the focus on the main development problems, like inefficient service delivery to creating dependency tools on the international assistance. This was achieved through convincing the government of their need to import technical and administrative expertise to solve development problems. Some examples are the projects initiated by IMF and the USAID in Egypt as the largest multi-and-bilateral DAs contributing to the Egyptian economy every year. The imposed development policies by these DAs led to cease price subsidies, increased unemployment, economic recession, and inequality (Mitchell 1991; Mitchell 1995: 133 cited in Eiweida 2000: 112).

In sum, the interventions in the seventies and eighties that adopted Participatory approaches on the local level were top-down approaches focusing on the managerialist approach of the government and the dependency on the international donors and experts. The new participatory approaches since the nineties have shown some successful cases, although similarly criticized for reinforcing dependency

and disregarding the cultural and social local context (Piffero 2009a; 2009b; El-Shahat and El Khateeb 2012). The contribution of the GTZ in 1998 is seen as a new approach when it started to develop bottom-up strategies through its development programs and through implementing participatory upgrading mechanisms (El-Shahat and El Khateeb 2012). The GTZ through the PDP¹¹⁴ presented a triangle model to include different actors in the planning, the public and private sectors and NGOs. The Egyptian government has adopted this model later (Zakaria, Personal Communication: May 2014). Yet, it had raised the question about the role and the agenda of the NGOs in Egypt and their capacity to act as a strong actor in the development process. The role of the international partner as a facilitator to gain governmental support for the participatory process is indispensable for implementing the project. Yet, this role was seen as undermining establishing sustainable development process on the local level. Besides, participation is viewed as a western transferred model that triggers unfavorable conditions of dependency on the facilitating role of the development partner while lacking the local expertise and power to sustain the participatory approach (El-Shahat and El Khateeb 2012).

3.2.4. Examining Urban Governance Settings Underpinning the PUPAs in Egypt

In this section, examining urban governance settings and actors, including the institutional and political frameworks of planning that underpin the PUPAs will provide a better understanding of different affecting factors on the PUPAs, which will be explored in the case study of Alexandria.

3.2.4.1. *The Institutional and Political Frameworks of Participatory Planning Approaches in Egypt*

The constitution is the fundamental legal framework from which the participatory approaches and practices gain their legitimacy, particularly through ensuring civil rights and political freedom. The constitution¹¹⁵ of the Arab republic of Egypt from 1971 was amended in some parts in 1980¹¹⁶, 2005 and in 2007 to facilitate political and economic improvement towards the liberalization of the market and dissolving socialism (Ryser and Franchini 2008; IDEA 2016). People assembly and the president have the right to make amendments in the constitution, according to Article 189 and the Islamic Law “*Sharia*” which is the principal source of legislation (Article 2) (IDEA 2016).

The discourse on citizenship has dominated the later amendments of the constitution reconciling with the modernization in political, economic and social policies. Egypt is, according to the constitution¹¹⁷, a democratic and a socialist state¹¹⁸ (amended to: based on citizenship in 2007) (Article 1) and “*Sovereignty is for the people alone; they are the source of authority.*” in Article 3 (IDEA 2016). Furthermore, the constitution includes articles on people rights and freedoms, for example, Article 45 states that the law protects the private lives of the citizens. In Article 47: “*Freedom of opinion is guaranteed*”, whereas Article 48 indicates the freedom of the press and media except situations of emergency. The individual freedom and believes, right for expression, art and research are specified in Article 49, the right to peaceful assembly without prior notice in Article 54. In Article 55, the right of

¹¹⁴ The Participatory Development Program In Urban Areas (PDP): “*is an Egyptian-German development measure implemented by the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities (MoHUUC) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). It started in 2004 and the actual phase (until 2018), beside the core-financing by BMZ, is funded by the European Union (EU) and by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) with a total amount of EUR 49 million.*” (MoHUUC and GIZ 2017).

¹¹⁵ The Constitution 1971 and its amendment in 1980 “*refers to local administration as the third branch of the executive authority of the government, after the president of the state and the government*” (World Bank 2006: 14).

¹¹⁶ The Islamic law “*Sharia*” is the legislative reference regarding among others inheritance and marriage.

¹¹⁷ The constitution of Egypt 1971 and its amendments in 2007.

¹¹⁸ Amended in 2007 to “*The Arab Republic of Egypt is a democratic state based on citizenship*”.

people to establish civil associations is indicated in the law, however, formed associations for military purposes, clandestine or those which don't serve the society are prohibited (Article 55) (IDEA 2016).

The amendments introduced in 2007 have called for more democratization in the political processes. However, political activities based on religion are forbidden, in an attempt to control the rising influence of the Muslim brotherhood. The political activities even by secular movements were opposed with more restrictions by the legislative powers and repressed by security forces (Brown et al. 2007). This authoritarian led to political apathy among the Egyptians, in addition to the distrust in the state governance. The regime used its legislative powers to control the political activities and repressed them with military and security forces. In reality, there was no real change, regarding political freedoms, even the "Emergency Law" has been amended at that time, ostensibly, by replacing it with a new law for "Combating Terrorism" (Brown et al. 2007).

The last version of the new constitution after the revolution in 2011 is the constitution of 2014. It is based on the constitution of 1971. It intends to limit the powers and ruling the time of the president. It emphasizes essential amendments in underlining the political and social rights and freedoms (Chapter 3 in the new constitution), in addition to citizen participation in the public life (Article 87) (IDEA 2016).

Public participation in its political context in the history of Egypt was emerged in connection to the national liberty during the 1950s through the evacuation of the British from the country (Abdel Halim 2005). The hindrance of participation practices in Egypt was attributed to socioeconomic, political, cultural and historical factors. The political support for participation depends to a large extent on the political system and the political actors. The political system in Egypt is a multiparty¹¹⁹ system (Article five of the constitution), and the political parties are regulated by the law (IDEA 2016). In practice, the political system supports a military dictatorship form of government and the political regime is described as an authoritarian regime, while the central rule is in the hand of the president as a main power of decision for the country¹²⁰ (IDEA 2016). The National Democratic Party, who has been in power since the revolution in 1952, had dominated the political system in Egypt as well as the legislative, administrative and planning decisions (ibid).

The adopted liberal economic development and modernization in the nineties imposed threats on the government and its authoritarian regime in promoting a modern society and in allowing a democratic political life and pluralism. The challenge was to achieve the balance between building a modern society and maintaining the traditional values as an Islamic state. In other words, how to build an effective civil society and face the risk of rising fundamentalist religious movements of the poor, especially the rural poor in Upper Egypt, who are suppressed through the new economic policies (Eiweida 2000: 106).

Improving governance and promoting democratization provide the basis for initiating any participatory approach. Good governance and democratization have been on the reform agenda of the country since the eighties and the objectives of different programs and projects initiated by international actors that had hardly any tangible outcomes (Mehina; Zakaria, Personal Communication: May 2014). Good

¹¹⁹ Article 5 in the constitution 1971/2007: "The citizens have the right to establish political parties according to the law. It is prohibited, however, to exercise any political activity or to found any political party based on religious considerations or on discrimination on grounds of gender or race." (IDEA 2016).

¹²⁰ Stated in Article one in the constitution.

governance indicators^{121,122} (1996-2014) for Egypt have shown an incremental decline from 24 to 14 in Voice and Accountability. In Political Stability and Absence of Violence, until 2011, it had a better ranking of 44.7 (2000) and after that between 22 and 28. Government Effectiveness, before 2011, between 40- 49, Regulatory Quality between 27- 49, the Rule of Law 50-56 and Control of Corruption 26-46 (World Bank 2014).

Among these indicators, corruption has posed a great challenge in achieving good governance, particularly regarding the lack of transparency in attaining public funds, pervasive bribes and tax fraud, and favoritism, especially in appointing government leaders and officials. In addition, centralization of the bureaucratic government has led to rigidity in taking actions for reforms. Moreover, the relationship to the public was unreliable, while the lack of transparency hindered their accessibility to government information, and the activities of CSOs in politics and development were mostly limited to charity activities (Gebriel 2004: 3). Hence, to widen participation in the Egyptian society, improvements in the legal framework, media, education, economy and governance need to be undertaken, in addition to building the needed trust between the government and different actors from the society (Abdel Halim 2005).

3.2.4.2. Centralization of the Planning System and the Role of the Governance Actors

The competent institutions on the national level, like the GOPP and the Ministries of Finance and Planning, usually take the decisions over urban planning and development. Local actors and CSOs are excluded in the process. These institutions exercise their formal and functional responsibilities in implementing urban policies according to the national agenda which seldom take into consideration the local needs (Eiweida 2000: 133; Zakaria, Personal Communication: May 2014; Ghattas, Personal Communication: April 2016).

In dealing with the high centralization, the state has established partnerships with actors from the private sector and civil society and mediated between different interest groups. However, such measures result usually in more restrictions on the activities of the civil society, where the government has the determining role in the decision-making process. The local administration of urban management, while controlled by one-party corporatist system, makes it hard for groups from other sectors, particularly from the civil society, to take part or negotiate effectively in urban governance (Eiweida 2000: 133-134). The centralization is affecting also the planning decisions, which implies a great challenge for any participatory approach on the local level. The political elite including the president, the cabinet and the Ministry of Defense, have to approve the plans according to the law (Ghattas, Personal Communication: April 2016). Planning institutions and planners who are merely responsible for producing the plans, they do not have the power to influence the planning decisions.

Centralization in decision-making process regarding urban development has imposed inflexible structure where the local demands are inconsequential to be considered in the national policies. Moreover, the political and governmental actors were reluctant to take the initiative for positive change and to improve governmental performance. Consequently, the centralized political and administrative systems have resulted in an inactive political citizenry and impinged any possible participatory form in public life (Eiweida 2000: 116). In Egyptian cities, maintaining an undemocratic atmosphere for urban governance has also led to ineffective and unaccountable local government

¹²¹ The estimates consider the time before the Uprising in 2011.

¹²² Percentile rank among all countries ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) (World Bank 2014).

(CMI 2011; UN-Habitat 2012). Therefore, most of the social groups remained politically repressed and inactive, particularly in poor urban areas. Most commonly, the social and interest groups and movements; Islamists, secularists, feminists or human rights activists, can get politically boldly active in situations where urban development intervened to defend their interests, especially where power dynamics are played out in such projects (Eiweida 2000: 134-135).

The international pressure for economic reform in the past decades had contributed often to urban poverty, unemployment, and informality, which is mainly attributed to the fact that the actors who take hold of power remained the same. These actors are the main partners in the reforms supported by DAs. Besides, the development approaches usually lack consideration of the cultural aspects of the country, which defines the needed measures of each donor receiver while imposing an obstinate development programs (Eiweida 2000: 134-135; Hassan et al. 2011). These approaches provide the conditions to spend the money within the country employing their firms and sectors, while the funds mostly end within the state elites who guide all development decisions (Eiweida 2000).

Dealing with poverty and unemployment: The government has dealt with unemployment through privatization and supporting competition in the market without allowing complete liberalization. The emerged forms of state corporatism have in turn, led to limiting civil participation (Eiweida 2000: 103-105). In the following years, Egypt has taken measures to decentralize its system and integrate this approach in its FYP (2002-2007) where participatory local development in poor urban areas is addressed in a policy draft for action (GTZ 2004). Yet, the gap between policymaking, planning and implementation is considerably wide in the Egyptian system. The Five-Year Plans as well as many developed strategies would for the most part be unrealizable. This can be attributed to the lack of institutional and management capacity for establishing a qualified implementation body, in addition to the lack of coordination and dialogue between cross-scales actors and institutions, which leads to ambiguity regarding who from these actors are responsible for implementing the plans (Sakamoto 2013: 15).

In general, there are three challenging factors in local planning in Egypt; the reliability of the information needed for the planning process, acquiring the needed resources for implementing the planning projects, and the institutional capacity to carry out the planning process (El Sawi 2002: 8). Primarily, realizing the plans is constrained by the centralized financial plans and policies not just on the national level, but also on the local level. The central government and line ministries are the main actors in the financial planning. The national annual budget, prepared by the Ministry of Financial Planning, should be approved first from the cabinet and the parliament and after that it will be distributed by the Ministry of Finance to the competent bodies. In the annual financial plan, the proposed plans, programs and projects that should be implemented in the next budget, would be considered and classified according to their priority and urgency. This criterion is decided on by the national level. Subsequently, the budget will be distributed in their attentive institutions in the governorates, who prepare the financial plans regarding the local programs and projects on the lower local levels (El Sawi 2002; Ghattas 2015: 184-8).

The centralized management of the financial plans in addition to the lack of decentralization are two main challenges for planning and PUPAs on the local level. Only the governor and the financial directorate in the governorate are the influencing actors in the decision-making regarding the spending for implementing the projects and organizing the related time plan (El Sawi 2002: 15). In this sense, participatory approaches regarding budgeting is mostly dependent on the central apparatus decisions

and the interests of the main actors, the governor and his advisers. Adopting a participatory approach requires that the governor motivates the LPC to raise local funds through community participation, and coordinates between different local institutions. Yet, without decentralization, such approach is not feasible also for the governor, who has mostly to approve his decision from the central government (Pieterse 2000; El Sawi 2002: 15). However, the deconcentrated power from the national level given to the governor on the local level can be positively considered as a step towards decentralization (Eiweida 2000). Some adopted measures for de-concentration in the last years were limited to delegating the personnel to the local level, while keeping the process of making legislative and financial decisions on the national level, particularly by the Ministry of Fiscal Planning, which decides how the resources will be reallocated to other ministries and local bodies (governorates and downwards) (Eiweida 2000: 109; Sawi 2002; Ghattas 2015).

The need for decentralization in the administrative and planning decisions was indicated in the 2007 amendments to the 1971 constitution. This issue although widely debated in the reform approaches, was a far-reaching goal in practice (Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev: 2008 cited in Ryser and Franchini 2008: 2). After the 2011 uprising, decentralization has been included in Article 176¹²³ in the constitution of 2014 as an urgent action including the need to strengthen the local governments (IDEA 2016).

Partnerships were usually formed between the public and the private sector, while ignoring the civil sector. The initiated reforms between 2004 and 2011 were intended to promote partnerships between public and private sectors. However, this form of partnership is usually based on corruption and collusive relationships, while lacking an institutional arrangement for coordination and communication between the sectors, which can benefit some companies and lead to excluding other actors from the private sector and the CSOs (Sakamoto 2013: 11).

3.2.4.3. The Role of the Urban Governance Actors in the Practices of Participatory Planning in Egypt

The role of the local government in the city administration is limited in the urban decision-making process, which is primarily taken on the national level by the ministries and the cabinet. Its role is secondary in relation to that of the governor and his office who have more power in the process (Tebbal 2011; Ghattas, Personal Communication: April 2016). Centralization in financial planning and urban management combined by the lack of municipal capacity and skills to manage participatory planning tools and mechanisms limit its function and influence on urban development. The taken measures to decentralize the administrative system in Egypt have mostly resulted in deconcentrating of some of the responsibilities to the lower levels without real change in the power relations.

Despite these constraints, the local government, with its functional prerogatives, has usually the main role in managing urban development and the PUPA on the local level. Beside the local government, the emerging role of the private sector in developing the local economy was strongly emphasized in different development projects in Egyptian cities, especially after the economic reforms. This role, however, is linked to their influence as adherents of the political actors. Therefore, supporting the PUPAs should be first profitable for the private sector and the political elite, whose support is essential for promoting the PUPA. For example, at the beginning of the eighties under Mubarak's rule, the plans

¹²³ Article No. 176: "Empowerment of administrative units. The state ensures support for administrative, financial, and economic decentralization. The law organizes empowering administrative units in providing, improving, and managing public utilities well, and defines the timeline for transferring powers and budgets to the local administration units." (IDEA 2016).

and related policies were growth-oriented and focusing on opening the economy to the global market while ignoring the long-term effect on the local economy, which later led to rising corruption and social and economic inequalities (Sakamoto 2013).

Targeting and mobilizing influential governance actors in urban development was also the main objective of the CDS and its PUPA in revitalizing and strengthening the local economy and the role of the private sector in Alexandria's urban development. With this approach, the CDS targeted quick successes and tangible outcomes through focusing on the efforts of the influential city stakeholders. Conversely, the role of the civil society remained in the background in its supportive role. Despite being a weakness in the CDS, it helped to identify the need for an inclusive PUPA of all city stakeholders.

Another emerging role in the PUPAs is the role of the planners. The PUPAs although getting widespread in the Egyptian cities and in the formal instruments for urban development, they were not included in the educational curricula, since the education of the planners in Egypt is based on the curricula of the architectural and engineering schools (Madbouly 2009; Zakaria, Personal Communication: May 2014; Ghattas, Personal Communication: April 2016). Planning teaching was limited to the master planning through survey and analysis. Lately, since 2001, there was a new approach to teaching the levels of planning (Madbouly 2009), an approach that supports the modernization steps that have been done in this field by the government, through the changes in the planning law since enacting Law 119/2008 for strategic planning. This law has started to be taught in the Egyptian universities for the undergraduates, for example, in *EinShams* and *AlAzhar* universities, where more universities are considering integrating it to their curriculum. In addition, more fields of study were started to be offered in relation to the planning, like the environmental planning and urban economy and sociology (Madbouly 2009). Prior to that, just master planning was the dominating model for teaching, while there was an urgent need to deepen the planners understanding of the dynamics of urbanization in the country and their role of change. Planners should be aware of topics related to the process of urbanization, including financial management and land investment market, the informal sector and its contribution to development, community participation and that of the NGOs and CSOs, transforming governance and sustainable development of the city in its different dynamics in economic social and environment (Madbouly 2009; Bayad, Personal Communication: May 2014).

The planning education being centered around the technocratic approach for producing the plans and urban design for a long time, served the top-down approach adopted by the government within its planning offices (Madbouly 2009, Zakaria, Personal Communication: May 2014). Hence, the generation of planners was the perfect agent in the top-down restrictive planning and governance system developed in Egypt, particularly with the dominating master planning also in developing the new communities and in integrating new plans to the old ones. This planning model was adopted not just in the planning institutions on the national and local levels but also in the planning firms and private planning bureaus (Madbouly 2009). Directed by university professors, who are usually the main contractors of the government for planning proposals and detailed plans, this trend has turned planning, even outside of the governmental offices, to an outdated process that lacked innovation and flexibility.

Hence, the role of the planners should be more empowered in the PUPAs. In Egypt, there is a need to connect the educational topics with the new planning methods and tools, while bridging the gap between planning theory and practice. It is mainly recommended to focus on the main areas of debate in the planning, like developing the knowledge in areas of environment and its practices, to link to the

technological systems, transportation and to market dynamics locally and globally. It is also recommended to expand the knowledge regarding planning tools and tailoring them to the MENA region, especially evaluation and monitoring techniques of projects, participatory forums to discuss new ideas and ways of implementation, methods to conduct environmental, social, economic and political surveys, and training programs to master new technical tools of planning. Moreover, awareness-raising is crucial for furthering community development and integrating the political aspects into planning education, for without understanding power dynamics, planning remains a technocratic process separated from society (Madbouly 2009: 103-107; Bayad, Personal Communication: May 2014).

3.2.4.4. *Adopting Participation as a Planning Instrument*

The planning law in Egypt has been modernized in the last decades, in responding to the development needs and reforms in the country. The successive planning laws in the last three decades showed a raise of awareness to institutionalize participation and provide the legal framework to apply it as a planning instrument. In particular through the recent approach of the new planning law 119/2008 in Egypt. The law has integrated public participation in its articles and executive regulations. The planning process should proceed strategically¹²⁴ according law, on all the levels; national, regional and local, while adopting the participatory planning approach (GOPP 2010). Conversely, the former Planning Law 3/1982 has focused on a comprehensive vision, a technocratic and top-down approach, trying to combine different, social, economic, and environmental approaches of development from national to local levels (MCHLR 1982 and GOPP No year).

The planning process in the comprehensive Planning Law No.3/1982 has predominantly followed a top-down approach, while giving the power of decision-making to the institutions as the main planning actors. This law has come to serve the aim of producing plans in the fastest and efficient way to deal with the urgent and rapid urbanization challenges replacing the prior fragmented and reactive plans. It intended to consider the specific and long-term development needs of each city or development area in the spatial and urban planning, like providing services and infrastructure (Allam and Qashwa 1995: 25; GOPP No year). This law didn't focus on participation explicitly, it focused on planning as a technocratic process in addition to the importance of the institutions as the main responsible bodies on the local and national levels in producing and approving the plans for cities and towns (ibid: 26).

Participatory planning process referred to by "*Mosharakah Sha'biyya*" is defined extensively in Law 119/2008 and its regulations and must be carried out according to the law in preparing the physical plans (Abou Omira, Personal Communication: May 2014) (see capital two of the TOR of Law 119/2008). Although participation is not explicitly indicated in the former law, like that in Law 119/2008, Law 3/1982¹²⁵ has stated the need for some level of participation from the public in producing and approving the plans (Article 4/Chapter one: the general planning¹²⁶). Particularly in the local planning, involving the citizens and the LPC represented an essential step, which precedes approving the plan on the national level. Approving the master plan by the LPC in order to be legitimated is mentioned in

¹²⁴ Strategic plans should according to the law consider all planning levels; national, regional, and local, in identifying the goals, policies, socio-economic and environmental development required to realize sustainable development and future needs. It implies the need to realize development priorities and programs, and employ the resources to implement the plans (Article 2, Law 119/2008).

¹²⁵ The procedures in formulating and approving a master plan for a city or a village according to the law 3/1982 are explained in appendix 26.

¹²⁶ In Part two "city and town planning" of the executive regulations of the Law 3/1982.

Article 14 of the law. These Participatory activities lie in the Tokenism level (referring to the ladder of participation by Arnstein 1969): informing through official media and public hearings or to manipulation through informing (indicated by Choguill 1996). The planners on this level obtain information from the people without engaging them in further phases of planning which results in one-sided exchange or non-reciprocal interaction with the planning' development partners.

Article No.	Participatory technique and purpose	Actors and interest groups	scope of reaching out	Level of Participation
Art. No.13	Informing: publishing the master plan and the date of the public hearing session. Mainly through the official newspaper.	The administration in the local unit/citizens and local stakeholders.	Limited: Interested citizens, investors, planners, institutions, stakeholders from education sector.	Non- participation /Informing/tokenism (Arnstein 1969), or manipulation/ informing (Choguill 1996).
Art. No.14	Public hearing: Inviting local popular councils and the public.	The administration manages the meetings. Attendants include the LPCs and the locals of interested citizens, main stakeholders and NGOs.	Limited: Officially, the attentive LPCs are invited.	Consultation/tokenism (Arnstein 1969), or manipulation/ diplomacy (Choguill 1996).
	Consultation meeting: Inviting the LPCs members To discuss the comments on the plan.	Mainly the LPCs members as the representatives of the public.	Very limited: experts and the LPCs.	Placation/tokenism (Arnstein 1969), or manipulation/ diplomacy (Choguill 1996).

Table 23: Articles in the planning law 3/1982 where participatory activities and actors were indicated (based on the Law 3/1982 in Allam and Qashwa 1995) and on the levels of participation by Arnstein 1969 and Choguill 1996.

The new Planning and Building Law No. 119/2008 focuses on formulating strategic urban plans for Egyptian cities that corresponds with sustainable aims of planning and development of cities (GOPP 2008a). The law has introduced participatory planning as an essential component. It defined the key stakeholders who need to take part in determining the urban development needs on the local level. The actors in the government are represented by the local unit with the governorate's Regional Planning Office¹²⁷, in addition to the LPCs, Executive Councils or bodies and representatives of civil and local society¹²⁸ (Article 11¹²⁹, Law 119/2008: 11). The planners in the GOPP on the sub-national level are responsible for managing the participatory process (see appendix 27: the role of planners, consultants, and the social groups in the planning process, based on TOR 119/2008: 6).

In a critical view on participation in practice, referring to the Planning Laws 3/1982 and Law 119/2008, the role of the LPC in the planning process, is one basic role that is acknowledged in proceeding the participatory planning to a more inclusive and participatory process. However, in planning practices, the power given to the LPC is questioned. The LPC is requested to approve, sometimes to sign the plan without having a real influence on the final decision which usually taken by the LEC and the governor on the governorate level. The role of the LPCs from the lower to the higher level in the local

¹²⁷ It is the authority of physical planning administration who represents the General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) in the governorate.

¹²⁸ Local society is understood as NGOs and civil society and the LPC. There is in the document of the law or in the regulations no clear definition of what civil and local society are.

¹²⁹ This law has set the terms and planning regulations for preparation and implementation of strategic plans of Egyptian cities.

administration, although highlighted in the law as an essential to legitimate a plan, the elections and the function of the local councils in practice are biased and lack transparency (Allam 1995; Zakaria, Personal Communication: May 2014).

The traditional role of the LPC continues to be disregarded in practice under the new law. Since including participation in the regulatory framework of Law 119/2008, approving strategic plans proceeded through collecting signatures from the stakeholders “Development Partners¹³⁰” (TOR 119/2008: Annex one) (GOPP 2010). This process is a mandatory step for the plan to be approved. Without the approval of the development partners, the plan will not proceed to the final ratification from the national level. This measure, although supportive of PUPAs, it implies a compulsory aspect that leads mostly to a pro forma participatory process in practice. However, despite of being supported by the new law, the practices of participatory planning in Egypt are still graded between non-participation and tokenism levels in the ladder of participation by Arnstein 1969 or non-participation to manipulation by Choguill 1996. Particularly manipulation in the level “non-participation” is seen in the planning practices in the new Planning Law 119/2008. Collecting signatures from the development partners turned to be a routine process, which is not necessarily an outcome of a participatory process. The list of participants, who must sign the plan, is already prescribed by the administrative local unit indiscriminately and without much input (Ghattas, Personal Communication: April 2016). In order to improve the quality of the participatory process, there is a need to improve the relationship between the stakeholders and the government (Hamdi and Goethert 1997) to raise the transparency and trust.

Further participatory planning practices in Law 119/2008 lie in the rungs three and four of tokenism, informing and consultation, or manipulation through diplomacy. These practices are mostly observed in big cities, like Alexandria. Such practices seek primarily to contribute to promoting the image of the city in the media and in gaining support from the donors for further funding of development projects. On the contrary, planning decisions on the local level on small local units, for instance, *Mashayka* or neighborhood level, are usually top-down decisions with no participation (Zakaria, Personal Communication: May 2014). The rung five; placation in the ladder or diplomacy in the levels of participation by Choguill 1996, is hardly observed, due to cultural and political reasons. It is common that the stakeholders show reluctance to participate while convinced that their views will not be seriously considered in the end. Being aware that the final decision will be taken by the central government regardless their claims, they therefore tend to relinquish their contribution to the decision-making process to the governor in a consultation session on the local level (ibid).

The plans should be approved first by the GOPP and then by the prime minister. Finally, when the Ministry of Defense approves the plan, it is not allowed to be amended, since changing a resolution taken by the Ministry of Defense is considered an issue that affects the national security¹³¹ of the country (Soliman 2013).

¹³⁰ Referring to the list of stakeholders as development partners is to be found in the terms of reference (annex 1) of the law 119/2008.

¹³¹ According to Soliman :“ *The General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) is the planning organization in Egypt responsible for establishing and approving planning projects for both urban and rural areas. There is a committee within the GOPP for reviewing and approving the submitted planning projects, after which the GOPP has to send the approved plans to the Ministry of Defense to get the final approval. Nobody in Egypt can discuss or review the decision of the Ministry of Defense, as its decision concerns the National Security of the country.*” (Soliman 2013).

3.2.4.5. *The Emerging Role of the Civil Society in Planning and Urban Development in Egypt*

The role of the CSOs in the history of Egypt was well known in the form of religious organizations supporting the government in providing social services for the poor. After adopting the economic liberalization policies in the nineties, the World Bank and IMF have provided aid for structural development projects while advocating increasing the role of the CSOs in the development process (Sika 2012). The majority of civil society contributions recognized in urban development efforts are in supporting the initiatives in dealing with poor informal areas. They usually cooperate with the Informal Settlement Development Facility (ISDF), who follows the Urban Renewal and Informal Settlements Ministry (Abou Omira, Personal Communication: May 2014). Today it is hard to deal with informal areas without the role of the NGOs who are the main mediators between the urban poor and the government and the DAs (ibid).

Yet, the role of the CSOs in Egypt was developing gradually in history. After holding the International Conference on Population and Development¹³², the number and scope of CSOs have increased from nearly 600 organizations in 1985 (UN-Habitat 2012: 71), to 10,000 in 1998 and 25,000-30,000 by 2008 (UNDP 2008; Sika 2012; UN-Habitat 2012: 71). This was supported by the decentralization policy, which allowed these organizations to be active in public services in cooperation with urban governorates (UN-Habitat 2012: 71). About half of these organizations are development and religious associations while the other half is active organizations in sports, youth or social clubs, trade and industry chambers, in addition to professional syndicates and trade and workers unions (Hassan 2011: 7; Sika 2012). At this time, different institutions offered support for CSOs, e.g., the Ministries of Health, Youth, Education, and cooperated with NGOs in topics, like youth and gender (Sika 2012).

Still, while the CSOs by definition are usually independent bodies that represent the collective interests of the society, the popular form in Egypt is represented by governmental professional unions and syndicates, which have neither autonomy in their action nor credibility from the society. Some of these organizations are teachers and commerce groups who advocate the state's policies (UNDP 2008; Sika 2012). Some of the semi-independent are the Bar association, the journalists, the medical doctors, and engineers associations (Sika 2012).

Targeting community development, the feminist movements and NGOs were active in cities. They initiate small development projects in urban and rural areas to increase social awareness and eliminate Islamic misconceptions about population policies. Some of the topics were eradicating illiteracy, family planning, women's rights and childcare. Although about 15% of the total 15,000 registered CSOs who were working in Egypt at that time were devoted exclusively to carrying out gender related projects. Still, women movements faced many challenges mainly regarding lack of financial support and human resources, which made it difficult to establish an effective and autonomous civil society in Egypt (Eiweida 2000: 105). Women in Egypt still have difficulties in financial and social autonomy, despite the improved civil role of women in the Egyptian society in the last decade. Women, compared to men, have difficulties in decision-making in their households in addition to discriminating job market (ibid).

With the controlling role of the regime in the nineties, the state intended to promote different economic and social development activities of the CSOs, while turning down any democratization activities (Sika 2012). The transition of the state's function from service provision to planning and

¹³² The International Conference on Population and Development was held in 1994 in Egypt and was a milestone for the promotion of CSOs as partners in the new economic liberalization process (Sika 2012).

monitoring production, was expected to open up multiple opportunities for participation of the civil society and more democracy and effectiveness (Eiweida 2000: 129). However, the state intended to lay legal hindrances for democratic forms of activities and limiting political participation, through which it legitimized and controlled their actions while maintaining its power through provision of goods and services as well as monitoring production and distribution to the mass consumers. Through these limitations on political participation, the government had promoted a participating society in consuming rather than in politics (Singerman 1997: 245 cited in Eiweida 2000: 129). The state tried in its legislative framework to limit the influence of the Islamist party on the syndicates by enacting Law 100/1993. At the time, it has tolerated business associations and chambers of commerce who supported the state liberalization economic policies. These forms of associations turned to act as instruments for the state rather than representatives for the interests of the society (Sika 2012). This political exclusion as a result of the government's policies, has led to maintaining the state role as provider while keeping the population occupied with consumption rather than political and democratic activities (Eiweida 2000: 129). As a result, the society has developed a passive attitude toward cooperative ventures with the government that are required to initiate and develop participatory approaches.

Hence, the role of the civil society in Egypt in democratizing life and promoting participation is influenced by political, institutional and cultural factors. The choice for fostering the democratization process provides two approaches; either through building the capacity of the CSOs or that of the state institutions to act according to democratic values (Abdallah 2008: 2). While the state can benefit immensely from an active civil society in its missions to the society, the Egyptian government tried, in its bureaucratic role and through imposing strict rules, to alienate its citizens. This attitude resulted in making the people reluctant not only to participate politically but also to participate in group activities out of fear of arresting, e.g., vote cards, regulating unions, meetings of any kind, voluntary associations, demonstrations, media, including books, newspaper, radio, or television (Eiweida 2000: 129).

i. The Legal Framework and Governance of the CSOs and the NGOs in Egypt

The legal framework of the CSOs was set according to Law 32/1964 until 2000 and was characterized of being restrictive of the type and scope of their activities. The number and scope of CSOs have increased in the nineties in order to promote economic and social development under the auspices of the state, without supporting their role in democratization. The Civil Society Law No. 32/1964 was active until this time. Yet, the following Law No. 153/1999 had brought some improvements and more freedom for action, but the law was not approved and instead it replaced later with the Law 84/2002. The later had entailed even more restrictions that hindered them from getting external funding, initiating political activities outside of the frameworks of the legitimated political parties or from practicing activities that disrupt the public order or revoke the legitimacy of the state (MISA 2002; USAID 2003: 4; Sika 2012) (see appendix 28).

The Law 84/2002 defined two main forms of non-profit organizations (NGOs): associations "*Jam`iyyat*" and civic foundations "*Mu'assassat Ahliyya*". The most common forms promoted by the state legislation were the syndicates, unions, business associations and service-based organizations (Sika 2012). These forms of CSOs were led by the elite, who possess the central power of decision and guide development and economic reform in the country. Meanwhile, the state counted on a neutralized role of the people, particularly the poor. Yet, the CSOs tend sometimes to provide the needed service, which the government failed to fulfill (Eiweida 2000: 133).

All non-profit groups of ten members or more working in social development activities must register with the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs (MISA¹³³) (HRW 2005: 8). The groups who work in areas such as development, education, human rights, and social services have to face challenges caused by the law, like intervention by the security forces, restrictions laid out in Article 11 of Law 84/2002 regarding banned political or trade union activities, and the bureaucratic obstacles inherent in the registration process (HRW 2005: 17; Sika 2012).

Law 84/2002, although accompanied liberalization state policies for effective development, it has imposed many restrictions on the work of the NGOs. For instance, the organizations must be registered at the Ministry of Social Solidarity, and their activities and cooperation with foreign organizations and funding should be permitted and approved by the Ministry, they would otherwise be punished (Transparency International 2010; Sika 2012). The law would also be used by the state as an instrument to restrict the freedom of NGOs using defamatory campaigns in the state media as being receiving foreign aid without permission, to prevent any democratic movements that serve freedom of action, particularly against human rights defenders or movements of democratic political parties (Sika 2012). The state intended to repress political voices and spread fear, but this does not apply to all Egyptian cities. Based on one of studies by Singerman 1997, in some quarters of the city of Cairo, urban poor tended to engage in activities with political content to defend their interests, likewise in cities, like Ismailia and Aswan (Eiweida 2000: 130). These informal forms of social activism are usually deterred by the government, because of their lack of legitimacy according to the state's political and legal system, although they are collaborative and powerful in their urban spheres.

Restrictions on the NGOs autonomy in taking action and activism are imposed by their performance, accountability and activities, particularly in the field of community development. They usually lack managerial and planning skills, in addition to their dependency on financial aid (UNICEF 1994 cited in Eiweida 2000: 131). The active NGOs in the country have mostly fragmented efforts and wasted potentials that has cultural roots. The secular NGOs lack a wide social base and limited external financial aid and their efforts are usually ineffective. Conversely, the Islamists NGOs have wider social support, without external funds and effective efforts in the society. Therefore, it is hard for these NGOs to cooperate for democratization or to get external funds for any form of cooperation with other NGOs for civil activism (Abdallah 2008: 2).

In Sum, like many NGOs in the country, Egyptian private voluntary organizations had faced four categories of the constraints; financial, managerial, institutional and cultural obstacles (listed by Eiweida 2000: 131-132 based on a UNICEF survey¹³⁴) (see appendix 29). Some of these constraints were the lack of autonomy from the government, particularly in its legal and regulatory framework (mentioned above). The state did not allow the NGOs to receive financial aid without its permission, and it did not support such forms of aid. One example is the initiative by the USAID in 2001 to financially support civil society in Egypt in the framework of promoting democratic change. This approach has hardly been realized due to the limitations imposed by the state. In addition, the managerial weaknesses were represented by the lack of structure from within, and _with that_ the capacity to collaborate with other NGOs in addition to the weakness in its governance capacity due to the lack of transparency and democracy. Most of the CSOs were questioned for their activities, which seemed to

¹³³ The governmental body responsible for registering and enforcing compliance of most Egyptian NGOs.

¹³⁴ The survey was conducted in 1993 with private voluntary organizations in the Governorates of Cairo, Alexandria and Asyut (UNICEF 1994 cited in Eiweida 2000: 131-132).

rather support the authoritarian state rather than the social change (Eiweida 2000; Abdallah 2008: 2). Finally, dealing with these obstacles, measures should be taken concerning the capacity building of the CSOs in Egypt by offering training programs and technical aid by the DAs. Yet, this approach was criticized in Egypt for being theoretical, and that the used materials were not adjusted to the local context regarding the real needs of the trainees, in addition to overlooking cultural aspects, like gender issues. Training programs lacked follow-up measures and targeted improving the skills of the individuals but not the performance of the organizations as a whole, including the local government (Eiweida 2000: 132).

3.3. The Case Study of Syria: Urban Planning and Governance Settings Underpinning the PUPAs

The aim of this part is to examine and understand the conditions in which the PUPAs have been initiated¹³⁵ in the Syrian national framework. For this purpose, a background on the country and its planning system will be presented. In addition, urban governance settings and actors that affect the planning process and the PUPAs will be examined.

3.3.1. Syria: Background on the Country and the Planning System

Syria is located in the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea on the borders of Turkey to the north, Iraq to the east, Jordan to the south, Palestine to the southwest and Lebanon and the sea to the west. Because of its strategic location between three continents, Syria had an important role in the trade in the history and was a disputed area for different regional and international political powers (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 1).

Syria is divided into 14 governorates¹³⁶ (provinces). Each governorate has its own ecological characteristics that determine the population distribution, density and economic activities (Hasan 2012: 44; Ryser and Franchini 2015). The coastal area contains the major commercial seaports and shores that extend on around 183 km. The main coastal cities and ports are *Latakia*, *Tartous* and *Banias*, the latter two are oil terminals. The main mountains region in Syria is located parallel to the coast. The valleys region where the fertile plains are located is spread in different regions from the north to the south: in the plains of Aleppo, *Al Ghab* valley, the fertile Euphrates valleys, which forms *Al Jazeereh Assouriyah* area, Damascus and *Hawran* Plateau. These regions are highly inhabited, particularly those areas by the coast and by the rivers; The Euphrates, the *Tigres*, *Barada*, Orontes (*Alasi*), *Banias*, *Alawaj*, *Quweiq*, etc, where the Syrian Desert, *Al Badiyah*¹³⁷, in the south and the east of the country has very low urban density (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 1).

¹³⁵ The study focuses on the time between 2004 and 2010, considering the conditions for adopting structural changes in Syria; in which the CDS in the case study of Aleppo has been initiated.

¹³⁶ Al-Hasakah Governorate, Deir ez-Zor Governorate, Hama Governorate, Aleppo Governorate, Daraa Governorate, Homs Governorate, Idlib Governorate, Latakia Governorate, Quneitra Governorate, Ar-Raqqah Governorate, Rif Dimashq Governorate, As-Suwayda Governorate, Tartus Governorate.

¹³⁷ On the borders with Jordan and Iraq, and Palmyra is the main city.



Figure 13: Syria and neighboring countries (DGMQ, CDC 2009).



Figure 14: Syria's governorates (Britannica.com 2009, by courtesy of Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., copyright 2009; used with permission).

Syria's population in 2005 was around 18.941 million. The population growth rate (2000-2005) was 2.45% (according to the Syrian Bureau for Statistics (CBS) 2006 cited in Asfour 2007: 45). In 2008, the total population of Syria was 22,331 million (based on CBS 2008 Statistical Yearbook cited in Von Rabenau 2010: 101). The distribution of the population varies between the rural and urban regions. Damascus, the capital city, had around 1.6 million inhabitants in 2004 and twice of this number in its metropolitan area including parts of rural Damascus (SPC 2006; Hasan 2012: 44). Even though Aleppo city hosted more population than the city of Damascus, the centrality of the services and administration of Damascus still made it the main center of the country, while Aleppo had represented the industrial center, mainly for textiles and chemicals (UN-Habitat 2012: 69-70). The main sectors in the country were agriculture and trade. The service sector was primarily active in the big urban centers of Damascus and Aleppo and contributed around 55.2 % of the GDP followed by industry and agriculture. Syria was well known for its cultural and historical heritage, which had attracted many tourists in the past years (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 1). The tourism sector was growing gradually mainly in the big cities of Damascus and Aleppo until 2004, there it witnessed a slight decline in the following years. This can be attributed to the slow development of this sector due to the restrictive legal framework for touristic investment (ibid).

The administrative structure is based on the divisions represented by the 14 governorates, each is divided into regions (*Mantika*), which are divided into districts (*Nahiya*) each with more than 25.000 inhabitants (UNPAN (no year); Ryser and Franchini 2015). The governorate encompasses several cities (more than 50.000 inhabitants), towns (*Baldah*¹³⁸), smaller towns (*Baladiyah*¹³⁹), villages and farms. The cities, towns and smaller towns, each is divided into neighborhoods (*Ahyaa*¹⁴⁰) (Ryser and Franchini 2015). Each governorate has a central city, which functions as a capital city and administrative center of the governorate. The governorate is headed by a Governor, who is nominated by the Interior Minister and approved by the cabinet according to an executive decree (Hasan 2012: 76). Each governorate has two administrative bodies; an elected Governorate Council¹⁴¹ (GC) branches in

¹³⁸ It includes the centers of Nahiyahs and any urban settlement with 10.001- 50.000 inhabitants (Ryser and Franchini 2015).

¹³⁹ Urban settlements with 5.001- 10.000 inhabitants (ibid).

¹⁴⁰ With 10.000 inhabitants in the cities, 5.000 inhabitants in the *Baldahs* and 4.000 inhabitants in the *Baladiyahs* (ibid).

¹⁴¹ The majority of the members are elected, and the rest is appointed by the central government (UNPAN (no year)). The elections take place every four years (Hasan 2012; Ryser and Franchini 2015).

Regional Executive Committee (REC) and Executive Bureau¹⁴² (EB). The members of the EB are partly from the GC, who are chosen and appointed by the central government. Each of the members has specific responsibilities (UNPAN (no year); Hasan 2012: 74; Ryser and Franchini 2015). The Executive Bureau is responsible for the local affairs in the governorate and works together with the directorates¹⁴³ (Hasan 2012: 74). The administrative bodies and personnel in the lower local administrative units following the governorate¹⁴⁴ are usually nominated by the Governor and approved by the Interior Ministry. Part of the members is elected and part is appointed directly. They are headed by a mayor who is appointed by the governor and represents the governorate on the attentive level (UNPAN (no year)).

3.3.1.1. *The Planning System, Process and Actors*

Syria does not have a clear-cut spatial planning system¹⁴⁵ that encompasses social, economic and physical development on different planning levels. The recent system has evolved through the history influenced by the inherited colonial planning procedures and planning' actions on urgent development demands. Yet, the planning system is highly centralized and guided by the national FYPs. Centralization applies also to the governance process on different planning levels.

The states' FYPs usually guide the planning process, which follows the given administrative procedures for preparation and approval according to the local administration law. The planning process and strategies are mainly based on the master plans for cities prepared in addition to the governorate plans by the Ministry of Local Administration (MoLA) (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 7). The planning on the regional level was carried until 2010 on a limited scale by the Ministry of Housing and Construction. Regional planning¹⁴⁶ was introduced in 2010, officially, through the Regional Planning Law, followed by establishing a Regional Planning Commission that defines the National framework in developing the regions (ibid).

The Five-Year Plan (FYP) presents the state's guiding national strategy of development and related policies. The 10th FYP (2006-2010), that set the vision of the development until 2025, had introduced in the last decade a paradigm shift for the country's national policy focusing on opening the economy to the global market, initiating public- private partnerships, adopting participatory approaches and supporting mechanisms to support the activities of the civil society in development fields (SPC 2006). The plan emphasized the need for decentralization and legal and institutional reforms, including more transparent and participatory accounting mechanisms (Rahimeh 2007: 10). The 10th FYP as well as the 11th FYP have underlined the growing role of the private sector in the economy especially in urban development and management: service delivery, waste management, construction, telecommunication and finances (SPC 2006; Ryser and Franchini 2015). The legal and administrative frameworks were adjusted to support public- private partnerships. The Local Administration Law has been modernized to enable cooperative work between local institutions and the private sector (Ryser and Franchini 2015). Sustainable development goals have been put in the national agenda since 2007

¹⁴² It consists of 10 members from the GC appointed by the central government from the council's elected members (Hasan 2012: 79).

¹⁴³ The directorates are the delegates of the ministries in the governorates, each operates according to its competencies and coordinates between the governorate and the ministry, e.g., the Directorate of Tourism in Aleppo represents the Ministry of Tourism, Directorate of Culture represents the Ministry of Culture, etc.

¹⁴⁴ Districts, towns and smaller towns.

¹⁴⁵ This analysis considers the phase until 2010 before the political and structural changes undertaken after 2011.

¹⁴⁶ Before 2010, there was a program focusing on regional planning. The Municipal Administration Modernization Program (MAM) until 2008 by the EU commission, provided support with establishing a strategic regional plan for the Eastern Region.

when the Environmental Council issued the National Framework Strategy for sustainable development after examining the environmental, ecological and health conditions. It intended to develop the appropriate legal and institutional frameworks to implement environmental programs (Hasan 2012; Ryser and Franchini 2015). Sustainable development principles have also been adopted in the urban development program of Syrian cities in 2007 in cooperation with the international cooperation partners GTZ or the GIZ and UNDP (GTZ 2007).

a. The Legal Framework of Planning

There was no unified law of spatial and urban planning and development in Syria. A set of planning laws, legislative decrees and policies has regulated urban planning and development and has been issued and later amended several times. The planning process and actors are affected by those planning laws, decrees and policies. The main legal instruments, which had particular influence on urban development in the last decades,¹⁴⁷ were:

Legal Instruments of Urban Planning	Purpose
Urban Expansion in Cities and Towns	
Decree 5/1982 ¹⁴⁸	defines the procedures for preparing general master plans and detailed plans amended by Law 41/2002
Decree 20/1983	permits municipalities/administrative units to acquire land for public projects (amended by Decree 437/1983 for planning standards (Hasan 2012: 89)
Law 9/1974	defines the methods for organizing urbanization of cities through land subdivision (amended by Law 46/2004)
Law 60/1979 ¹⁴⁹	permits central cities to acquire land to implement their master plans (amended by Law 26/2000), before it was Land Evacuation Law 232/1956 (Hasan 2012: 89)
Law 14/1974	applies to three cities of Homs, Aleppo and Damascus to expedite land development
New urban planning legislation (2007)	Decision 16 of 2007 complements the Decree 5 of 1982, it permits erecting New Urban Development Societies on both public and private lands by both public and private organizations also by external actors from Arab or foreign countries. According to the Law 2007, Article 1, for establishing Comprehensive Development Areas on public land for investment or development, a decision by the Prime Minister's Cabinet should be obtained (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 9-10)
The New Foundations and Standards of Urban Planning 2008 ¹⁵⁰	define the conditions for the new urban areas (MLAE, 2008, 9; Ryser and Franchini 2015: 9) Planning guides in the study of land uses aims at protecting the environment and healthy living conditions (Article. 3) (MLAE 2008: 16-20)
Urban Informality	
Law 26/2000	modified Law No.60 preventing illegal land sales to avoid land acquisition at arbitrarily low prices evaluated by the Government
Law 44/1960	regulates illegal housing

¹⁴⁷ The time referred to here is the period between 2000 and 2010 with reference to the time-frame of the case study.

¹⁴⁸ Decree No. 5/1982 "sets the basic principle for urban development and planning and aims at regulating urban development, expansion and land uses with related infrastructure, public spaces and services. The law defines the content and tools of urban planning, stipulating that urban master plans should comprise urban settlements for a period of 20 years. Subsequent laws and regulations supply Decree 5, including those regulating urban settlements and building" (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 9).

¹⁴⁹ Law No. 60/1979 focuses on Expansion Areas; it defined the main principles for the expansion of urban areas that are identified in the existing master plans according to Decree 5, or within the ratified Master Plans (ibid).

¹⁵⁰ They "set up guidelines for the creation of new residential neighborhoods and master urban plans based on new standards and planning methods including analyses, priority settings and arguments for implementation possibilities." (Ryser and Franchini 2015). The planning process should consider the balance between the number of inhabitants and services, with consideration of the land uses zones (ibid).

Law 1/2003	modified Law No.44 establishing criteria for demolition of illegal buildings in view of the Building Code, further laws: Illegal Buildings Law 59/2008, Property Regulation Law 33/2008 and Property Development Law 15/2008 (Hasan 2012: 89)
Local administration and Finance	
Law 15/1971	Local Administration Law defines the actors in preparing and approving the plans (Amended by Decree 61/1974). Local Administration Law, Executive Bylaw, Decree 2297/1971 (Hasan 2012: 89).
Law 1/1994	Local Administration Financial Law. To finance non-built plots fees, Decree 39/1966.
Environment and Infrastructure	
Law 50/2002	Environment Protection Law.
Law 125/1959	Infrastructure Wastewater connections.
Law 49/2004	Solid waste collection, disposal, and waters pollution.

Table 24: The main legal instruments influencing urban planning and development in Syria (based on JICA 2007: chapter 1, part 6 of sector report; Hasan 2012: 89; Ryser and Franchini 2015: 12).

Controlling the development activities and construction is emphasized in the regional, master and detailed plans, in addition to the laws, regulations and codes, particularly in relation to protection and prevention laws. For example, activities, like the construction on agricultural land in the land use plan, or subdivision activities of the land, should be undertaken in compliance with the master plan and detailed plans and regulations (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 13). The local council in the municipality is authorized to stop or demolish the violations and to put the law in force or impose penalties and fines in case of construction without permits or violation of the environmental law (ibid).

b. Planning Instruments

On the national level, the 10th FYP (2006-2010) was a planning instrument that provided the framework for modernization in the legal framework of planning and guided future planning and development in compliance with the national aims for economic growth and sustainability. On the regional level, the regional plans should comply with the national plan (SPC 2006). The national and regional plans guide the local plans and any development process in urban or in rural areas.

On the local level, the main planning instruments that serve achieving the national goals are the General Master Plan and the Detailed Plans. The General Master Plan defines the future vision for the urban settlement for the coming 20 years and includes proposals for its administrative boundaries, expansion, future land uses, transportation network, and building regulations. Preparing the master plan should follow the procedures instructed in the Law 5/1982 and amendments in the Law 41/2002. Preparing of the plans should be preceded by a thorough socio-economic analysis of the area and a SWOT analysis to define the goals and priorities of the plan as for strategic planning, according to the new Syrian Foundations and Standards for Urban Planning of 2008. The General Master Plan and its building regulations are binding in further planning practices, for example, regulating parking lots, the length and heights of buildings and facades, and parcels size (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 12). The Detailed Plans define all the details, which are related to the main and secondary road networks, pedestrian areas, open spaces, and built areas, according to the proposed future land uses and stated in the General Master Plan (Decree 5/1982 MLAE 2004; Ayad 2011: 414; Ryser and Franchini 2015: 11).

c. The Planning Process and Related Actors

The planning process in Syria is based on the General Master Plans drawn up by the REC in the governorate in accordance with criteria and regulations set by the central government or regulations put by the ministries. The Preparation of master plans and detailed plans are performed in the attentive local administration units. Governorates play the key role in preparing and approving plans for its local administrative units regardless of the administrative hierarchy. However, the planning

process can take several years until getting the master plan approved and issued for implementation (Ayad 2011; Hasan 2012).

The Legislative Decree No. 5/1982 is the main regulatory instrument for the stages of preparing general urban plans and regulations and amendments. According to the decree, the master plans should be approved by the Minister of Housing and Construction based on the proposal of the Executive Bureau of the governorate's council, while the detailed master plans of the city should be approved by the governorate's council based on the proposal of the Bureau (MELA 2004; Asfour 2007: 47).

The steps of the planning process of preparing and approving general master plans or detailed plans based on the Decree No. 5/1982¹⁵¹ are explained below (MLAE 2004; Asfour 2007: 47-49; Ayad 2011: 415; Hasan 2012: 91; Ryser and Franchini 2015: 14; MHC 2017).

- The governorate receives a planning program¹⁵² of the plan¹⁵³ from the attentive municipality or local administrative unit¹⁵⁴. The program should be approved or returned for amendments from the national level (the Ministry of Housing and Construction (MHC))¹⁵⁵.
- The plan will be prepared by the directorate of technical services¹⁵⁶ who works on it jointly with the GEB. The directorate of technical services submits the general master plan proposal with its building regulations to the local council for approval and adoption in the first council meeting (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 14).
- The council might request amendments to the plan. The directorate of technical services forwards the plan proposal with the suggested amendments to the Regional Executive Committee¹⁵⁷ in the governorate, which assesses and approves the amendments and returns the plan to the directorate of technical services in order to include the amendments in the plan (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 14).
- When the plan is approved by the local council and the governorates' council, a public hearing will be arranged in the administrative unit hall for public comments and complaints for 30 days. The plan will be also announced for comments or complaints in two local newspapers and other local and popular Media in the country, and to the stakeholders (Decree 5/1982 (MLAE 2004)).
- The comments and complaints will be revised by the REC in the governorate, who invites the stakeholders to a meeting. The Committee sends the plan with the amendments back to the directorate of technical services to incorporate them in the master plan¹⁵⁸ within a maximum period of five months.

¹⁵¹ There is vagueness regarding the Decree 5/1982 (six pages); it mentions the process very roughly with focus on the role of the governorate where the role of the local units and the follow up process are not explicitly explained.

¹⁵² The planning program defines the present and future needs of a residential area or agglomeration, based on planning principles while considering the factual situation of the area. The program includes population, density and the required services and buildings (based on the Decree 5/1982 (MLAE 2004)).

¹⁵³ If that a general master plan or detailed plan.

¹⁵⁴ If it is a municipality of a city, town or a small town down in the administrative structure.

¹⁵⁵ The Ministry can add amendment during a maximum period of 20 days, which should be considered in the master plan by the local administration (Ayad 2011: 415; Ryser and Franchini 2015: 14).

¹⁵⁶ The local council of the municipality of the local unite can commission the MHC to prepare the general and detailed master plans and related technical books and regulations (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 14).

¹⁵⁷ The governorate could commission a private planning office through a contract for preparing the master plan.

¹⁵⁸ The Directorate in the Ministry achieves amendments for the center cities.

- After evaluating the complaints and undertaking the required modifications, the plan will be approved and adopted by the local councils¹⁵⁹ and then by the governorate council. In the case of governorate's central cities, the MHC should approve and issue the plan for implementation after being approved and issued by the Executive Bureau of the Governorate's Council (Decree 5/1982) (MLAE 2004; Ryser and Franchini 2015: 14).
- The plan and related regulations should be monitored after one year of issuance and afterwards on three-year intervals during its implementation. Each time the plans would be reviewed for amendments, a public hearing should be organized for further complaints and comments regarding the new amendments.

The planning process proceeds from the local to the national level; the national authorities must approve the plan before it is being implemented. Formulating national plans should be done on the national level, where local plans are produced on the local level and approved first by the governorate and finally approved by the national level. The institutions and key governmental actors involved in the planning process are responsible for preparing and approving the plans (Hasan 2012; Ryser and Franchini 2015). Any planning or urban development process in cooperation with international or external development partners should be agreed on and led by the national level (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 16).

Different national and local actors are usually involved in the planning process, whether that in preparing or approving the plans. On the national level, the government formulates the national plan, goals, and policies regarding planning and development; particularly the cabinet and the associated councils are responsible for this task, while the decisions should be approved by the president. The cabinet, together with the attentive ministries, supervises the implementation that will be managed by the ministries' representatives in the directorates on the local level (Asfour 2007; Hasan 2012; Ryser and Franchini 2015). There are several founded high-level councils in Syria, who are supervised directly by the cabinet and mainly responsible for formulating national strategies. The key councils are the State Planning Commission (SPC), the Higher Council for Regional Planning established in 2010, the Environmental Council and The Higher Council of Tourism (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 4-5). These institutions are the main actors who affect planning decisions, particularly regarding land-use planning and urban development:

- The SPC analyzes the economic, social and environmental issues and formulates the FYPs. It initiates with the attentive ministries sectoral development programs and coordinates international and regional development cooperation (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 5).
- The Environmental Council sets up the national environmental strategy and approves environmental programs.
- The Ministry of Housing and Construction¹⁶⁰ (MHC) is responsible for urban planning and policymaking in addition to approving Master Plans for the governorates and preparing a national map of ISs. The ministry commissions its General Company for Engineering Studies

¹⁵⁹ The master plans for governorates' center cities should be approved by the councils and issued by the ministry of MHC, For Damascus by the MLAE/MoLA.

¹⁶⁰ Since 2012, named Ministry of Housing and Urban Development by a legislative Decree No. 45. It takes on the responsibilities of the MoHC in addition to further responsibilities from the MoLA regarding implementing urban plans (Ryser and Franchini 2015).

and Consulting (GCESC), to study, develop and supervise planning projects on the national, regional and local levels. The company offers consultation to the local governments on developing land-use plans (Hasan 2012: 74; Ryser and Franchini 2015). In each governorate, there are representative directorates¹⁶¹ and commissions¹⁶² of the MHC (Ryser and Franchini 2015).

- The Ministry of Local Administration and Environment (MLAE), is responsible for implementing plans and the governorates for preparing master plans. With the Legislative Decree 64/2004, the MLAE has undertaken the tasks of planning from the MHC (Hasan 2012: 74).

There is a group of institutions, which usually do not take part in producing the plans, but it should, in legislative terms, approve the plans and further spatial development activities, particularly regarding land ownership. They should also supervise the attentive projects and programs. Some of these institutions are; the Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs (MSEA), the Ministry of Tourism (MT), the Ministry of Culture (MC), the Ministry of Religious Endowments (MRE) (Hasan 2012: 74).

On the regional level, Syria did not consider the regional planning level before 2010. Activities regarding regional planning and development were taken by the SPC and the GCESC to tackle particular management issues between regions, like the river Barada basin and the Ma'aloula area.

The Higher Council for Regional Planning was first established in 2010. It approves the National Framework of Regional Planning and adopts regional planning priorities and programs after consulting the Regional Planning Commission¹⁶³ (RPC). Regional planning initiatives have been supported by the international program MAM for preparing regional plans for some regions (Ryser and Franchini 2015, 5). Regional plans were usually prepared for each governorate on the governorate level by the department of regional planning at the technical services directorate of the governorate (info derived from Ayad 2011: 417). Formally, the planning on the regional level has first been established in 2010 according to Law No. 26 on Spatial Planning and Regional Development. The law defined the goals, and actors of regional planning and their responsibilities and the relation with planning activities on the national and local levels. According to the law, the Higher Council of Regional Planning has been established under the supervision of Council of Ministers and the Regional Planning Commission. The law defines two main tools of regional planning; the "National Framework for Regional Planning" (every 15 years) and the "Regional Plan" which defines the policies and strategies and guidelines for developing a Syrian region considering its potentials (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 9-11).

On the governorate level, the GC is according to Law 15/1971 the decision maker in the planning and development processes on the local level¹⁶⁴. The GC fulfills its competencies through its Governorate's Executive Bureau (EB) and the REC. The GEB works together with the directorates in the governorate to prepare local structural and master plans, public construction works and services. Each of the

¹⁶¹ These are: the Directorates of Urban Planning, Urban Development, and the Implementation of Planning, the latter monitors the implementation of master plans and reviews planning studies (ibid).

¹⁶² The General Commission for Investment and Estate Development and the General Establishment of Housing (ibid).

¹⁶³ The Regional Planning Commission (RPC) was established in 2010 and it follows the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development according to the Legislative Decree of 2012. It is responsible for comprehensive regional planning that guides and implements economic and social policies and cultural and tourism policies based on regional and national studies. It also supports the local councils in identifying spatial planning challenges and the areas that require environmental protection and historical preservation as well as forest areas. It coordinates development programs at the national, regional and local levels (Ryser and Franchini 2015).

¹⁶⁴ Following the local Administration Law No. 15 of 1971.

directorates works, according to its specialization, in coordination with the attentive ministries. The Governorate Executive Bureau (GEB) has ten members from the council's elected members who are appointed by the central government (Hasan 2012: 75, 79). The REC is the main body to approve the plans. It decides over the development plans and should approve the plans before they get the final approval from the Ministry of Local Administration (MoLA), in addition to its legislative planning competences, like granting permissions of planning (Hasan 2012: 79).

The governor is the key actor in appointing the members of the REC. The members include a member from the GEB, the executive services director, the monuments director in the related governorate, the principal of urban planning in the technical services directorate, two planners and one expert in planning legislation, the head of the related municipality, a representative of the related ministry (allocated), a member from the related association or union (elected), and the principal of the executive affairs in the related municipality (does not vote) (Asfour 2007; Hasan 2012).

The GC approves the plans, which are prepared by the technical planning office, and supervises the implementation through the Executive Bureau after being approved on the national level, by the MoLA /MLAE. The GC approves the governorate financial plans and investment in addition to further social and economic plans. The GC cooperates with other sectors and other governorates councils and coordinates with the central institutions in preparing the plans. It also supports local councils in the governorate. The GC implements and monitors the plans in addition to implementing the laws and policies on the local level, which are agreed on by the ministries (Hasan 2012: 79; Ryser and Franchini 2015: 6).

On the city level, town and small town levels, the planning competencies are mainly the preparation of the master and detailed plans and the works for service delivery in the city or the smaller local units. The actors involved in this process are mainly the City Council, the *Baldah* Council and the *Baladiyah* Council in coordination with the relevant governorate council and other higher level planning authorities (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 12). On each of these levels, the technical department should prepare the plan in cooperation with the planning authorities on higher levels and on the governorate level. The local councils for each of these levels have the same task regarding approving the plans, like the GC, although the plans must be approved according to the hierarchy by the attentive GC. An Executive office on each of the levels should supervise the implementation of the plans and policies (Hasan 2012; Ryser and Franchini 2015: 6).




Figure 15: The planning process and the main actors involved in producing and approving urban plans in Syria (based on Asfour 2007; Hasan 2012: 48).

3.3.1.2. The Main Challenges for Urban Planning and Development

Urban planning and development processes in Syria faced many challenges in the last few decades that were caused mainly by the weaknesses in the institutional framework of urban planning and governance. This had resulted in social, environmental, economic and spatial problems, particularly in the big cities, in which the majority of the population of the country has been accumulated. Cities had to deal with severe urban challenges, e.g., environmental degradation, urban health risks, economic stagnation, and deterioration of the historical centers in addition to social and spatial fragmentation, transportation problems and urban poverty. These aspects were discernible in all Syrian cities, but especially in the big cities of Aleppo and Damascus where about 50% of their urban population were living in informal settlements (Von Rabenau 2010). Urban informality was considered an urgent urban and political challenge in these cities (each had between 5-6 million inhabitants in 2006). The uncontrolled and informal urban growth in the last decades has resulted, *inter alia*, in the emergence of informal housing, illegal industrial areas and loss of green spaces and conflicted land uses and ownerships (World Bank and UNDP 2003: 29; GTZ 2007: 9; Mr. Alhaj, Personal Communication: September 2008).

The problem of informal settlements returns to the second half of the 20th century, where waves of migrants from neighboring countries and the rural areas came and settled in the peripheries of the big cities fleeing from the wars in the region (in the seventies) or rural poverty. The wave of migrants from the rural areas was intended to support the Baath regime later on. This group of migrants served in the public sector, especially in the political center of Damascus (Hinnebusch 1993: 246). The migration to the urban areas had led to a real estate crisis, where the government was unable to provide formal housing in affordable prices for the newcomers. Hence, the lack of housing for low-income groups led to the occupation of vacant land or developing land informally, and to the development of ISs, mainly in the peripheries and suburbs. Urban informality includes the informal settlements and the informal businesses established outside of the formal economic system. Informal settlements were those built in a way incompatible with the land use plan, or contradicts with building regulations. Some have even some level of tenure security¹⁶⁵. The informal sector is usually illegally developed in the peripheral or industrial areas nearby the city (Bitar 2012). The resulting urban housing crisis in the seventies and eighties was caused by increasing the demands for housing and real estate in the peri-urban areas of the big cities, started with the increased migrants. The failure of the state to provide affordable houses for the new urban middle class led to developing informal areas around the cities. In addition, the outdated land tenure and registry system and the poor management of modernization the registry system by the state; have led to escalating the problems leading, in turn, to land disputes and difficulties to own a land or a house. This consequently has also contributed to the uncontrolled informal urban growth. To deal with the problems of the outdated and bureaucratic cadastral system¹⁶⁶, temporary records in 1974 have been established which lack accuracy comparing to the situation on the ground (Hallaj 2017: 1-2).

The state intended to manage urban land development and its regulations differently in the country, guided by the need for political security, for example in the northern borders with Turkey on the Kurdish resided areas. The new laws¹⁶⁷ to regulate land speculation led to that most of the urban development land was controlled by the public sector, and poorly compensated expropriation processes led to distrust in the state by the people. Most of the land has been built in favor of particular groups that were politically supported (Hallaj 2017: 1-2). Hence, despite the availability of 700,000 vacant houses, due to unfair regulations for compensation, this resulted in the lack of housing for low income groups who took hold of the options of informal housing (GTZ 2007: 9¹⁶⁸). All of that had led to developing of informal settlements rapidly in the major urban centers of the country. By 2011, around half of the major cities population lived in ISs. Dealing with these challenges by the local governments ranged between upgrading approaches to demolition, or non-action. However, informal real estate market had strongly developed and played an influential role in the housing market, which affected the social and economic structures of the cities (Hallaj 2017: 1-2).

Dealing with the challenge of informality was hindered by the delays in updating the master plans and in developing timely financial plans. Depending mainly on the topographic plans in the preparation phase of the master plan without regarding the real estate maps led mostly to conflicts between the

¹⁶⁵ For example agreements concerning usufruct rights.

¹⁶⁶ This system is inherited from the French colonial time (French mandate of 1920–1946.), who intended to set a legal framework for property and land titles. They have also developed a bureaucratic procedures “[...] to delineate rights, demarcate physical property, register titles, cross-reference registers, and adjudicate disputes [...]” (Hallaj 2017: 1).

¹⁶⁷ Specially the Decree 20/1983 (see Table 24).

¹⁶⁸ A statement by Hon. Dr. Nabil Achraf.

land ownership and the planned land uses. These conflicts emerged usually when the plan was in the implementation phase (Ayad 2011: 414). An issue that undermined the efforts and the time put for the preparation on the master plan, which sometimes takes about eight to ten years. Hence, the ineffectiveness and unaccountability of the planning system, the actors and the participatory process have raised the need to address the barriers detected in the centralization of urban decision-making. Further institutional barriers were the weak legal framework of planning, the lack of vertical and horizontal coordination between the attentive institutions, lack of competent staff and the technical expertise and tools, and lack of transparency and participation in all stages of planning process. In addition, the common problems in the public sector were its obsolescence and lack of technical know-how, the lack of comprehensive information system and expertise due to the lack of training in administration which has led to very low efficiency in the municipal performance especially in local administrative units (REF 2005: 122; Asfour 2007: 46; Ayad 2011).

Different measures to deal with the housing demand and to counterpart urban informality were taken. Since the issuance of the 10th FYP and adopting free market policies, the state intended to empower new actors and partners in the planning and development processes, particularly as an engine for economic growth. In 2007, facilitating the investment in the big cities have invited regional and national investors to initiate big urban projects, leading to a construction boom in the cities' centers. Yet, the new policies have benefited only particular groups from the political and business elites, which resulted in increasing of urban poverty rates, inequality and informality while dismissing sustainable urban development goals in dealing with urgent urban challenges (Valérie Clerc 2011: 1-2). Moreover, the last changes in the economic policies, although brought a boom in urban planning and development, had affected the social development negatively and imposed challenges on urban development and real estate market.

Syria had adopted in the past a planned socialist economy that, according to the constitution, considers public, collective, and private ownership¹⁶⁹. Yet, all forms of private ownership served the national economy and public interests were prioritized against fair compensation (ERF 2005: 116; Article 13-15 of the constitution in ICL 2010: 3). With the shift toward market economy since the eighties, the state was taking small actions to facilitate the role of the private sector through the issuance of the Investment Law 10/1991. This law had succeeded in attracting few local and foreign investments; however, due to the administrative delays and bureaucracy, just few projects have been licensed for implementation. In 2005, the Baath Party declared adopting a "Social Market Economy" (ERF 2005: 128-129). The taxation system has been modernized in compliance with Article 19¹⁷⁰ of the constitution. Even before issuing the new law, the prior laws which were issued since 2003 led to reducing the tax rates from 60% to 35%-25%, in addition to combating tax evasion according to the Law 25 for 2003. Legislative actions which affected the economy positively were the Legislative Decree 61 for imposing sales or consumption tax on commodities, and Law 60/2004 for lowering tax rates for joint stock companies and calculating a percentage of revenues for contractors dealing with the public

¹⁶⁹ The types of ownership regulated by the constitution are: (a) Public ownership including natural resources, public utilities, and nationalized installations and establishments, which the state supervise its management in a "*way that serve the interests of the people, whose duty is to protect this property*", (b) Collective ownership, encompass the property owned by popular and professional organizations and by production units, cooperatives, and other social establishments, and (c) Individual ownership includes property that belong to individuals which may be expropriated for public interest against a fair compensation in accordance with the law (ERF 2005: 128-129).

¹⁷⁰ Taxes: "*[...] are imposed on an equitable and progressive basis which achieves the principles of equality and social justice [...]*" (REF 2005: 129).

sector or foreign companies (REF 2005: 129). The negative effects of the state's efforts to liberalize its economy were in adopting a neoliberal agenda for controlling the economy, which had only served the political elite and created wide wealth disparities between the rural and urban regions. Liberating the national economy and promoting privatization measures had affected the real estate market, property prices, and laws, for example, the issuance of the Real Estate Development Law 15/2008. Although these measures have led to propelling urban development projects through attracting foreign investment, they resulted in gentrification and urban poverty, like in the case of the old city of Damascus, where urban development projects were undertaken by upper-class societies, who were the main beneficiaries of these projects (Sudermann 2014: 103).

The boom of mega urban development projects and programs in the big cities of Damascus and Aleppo have put pressure on the local actors in the municipality to follow a neo liberal agenda through advertising to their cities. Building an attractive city image for the global market and for investments, intended to mask aspects of urban informality and poverty. This has led to the shift of the role of the local actors, especially of urban planners and managers from bureaucrats to entrepreneurs without dealing with the institutional weaknesses. In this respect, the development approaches seem to prioritize growth-based options while subordinating social development needs required for achieving sustainable urban development goals. Pursuing or opposing these approaches, the roles of the DAs, political and national government and local actors are questioned and need to be closely examined.

3.3.1.3. Urban Development Projects and Participatory Planning Approaches

Since the issuance of the 10th FYP, the state has allowed initiating more cooperation projects and programs with international development partners to realize the objectives of the plan, particularly in relation to achieving sustainable urban development. Multi and bilateral co-operations and partnerships have been formed in undertaking planning development projects in rural and urban areas. The international partners usually work with the central government represented by the Syrian Planning Commission to formulate the programs and projects, which comply with the aims of the FYP. The most related topics to urban development highlighted in the 10th FYP were improving the management of the resources and urban governance through decentralization, sustainable development, supporting the civil society, promoting participation of the youth, combat poverty in rural areas and preservation of old city centers (SPC 2006). Yet, it was not clear how these approaches and objectives were going to be realized, and there was even no clear agenda to elaborately plan the related actions since the new approaches represented a new perspective into urban planning and development in the country. Accordingly, between 2005 and 2010, there were many international programs and projects, which were initiated for improving the planning system and for urban development, particularly in the big urban centers, like Damascus and Aleppo. Some of the key programs and projects are listed in the next table.

International Partner	Program and Duration
GTZ/GIZ (BMZ)	initiated the program for sustainable urban development in Syria UDP 2007-2010
EU	MAM Program 2005-2008
UNDP	2010- 2011 supports regional planning
JICA	DMA Damascus 2006 Project for Urban Development and Planning in Damascus Metropolitan Area (DMA-UPD)
the Cities Alliances	The CDS in Aleppo 2008-2010

Table 25: International partners and the main programs and projects in relation to urban development between 2004 and 2010 (UNDP 2005; GTZ 2007; Hasan 2012).

These interventions have set objectives that comply with the 10th FYP and targeted urgent issues, like improving local governance and building municipal capacity, decentralization in planning in addition to adopting PUPAs in urban development projects. For example, some had included participatory approaches in preparing the urban plans in pilot urban development projects. The initiated projects by the JICA, GTZ, the UN and EC in the framework of the reform had adopted the PUPAs and tried to implement them with the support of the central government. Improving local governance was mostly emphasized in the national program of Municipal Administration Modernization (MAM) (2005-2008) which was sponsored by the European Commission. It ran a capacity-building program on the municipal level in many Syrian cities, for example, Damascus and Aleppo and called for engaging the civil society in the local governance. Some of the focus areas were also institutional improvements in urban upgrading and formalization of the informal settlements (Clerc 2011). The Sustainable Urban Development Program (2007-2010), was managed by the governorates in cooperation with the GTZ/GIZ. The Governorates of Aleppo and Damascus have started with projects for the rehabilitation of the old cities, and upgrading of the informal settlement areas, for instance, in Aleppo, the first surveys conducted by the GTZ and the municipality, partly with the locals, were intended to form the basis for the later upgrading works (City of Aleppo and GTZ 2009). A further example is holding participatory meetings with the local stakeholders groups in the framework of UNRWA projects in 2005 for education and poverty reduction. The successful participatory approaches were planned to be replicated in other areas and in different development projects (Al Shoura, Personal Communication: April 2017).

However, in the reports published on the projects that have adopted participatory approaches, there was a cursory and cautious referencing to the undertaken participation processes. Besides, they have hardly explained the course of the participatory processes and the role of different stakeholders or addressed the influence of the political powers on them. The inadequacy of the provided information has created a gap in understanding the participatory approaches that were developed and adopted in Syria, on both levels, the institutional and community level (based on the examined JICA, GTZ and the EC reports).

Upon the overview on the participatory approaches in development projects in Syria between 2005 and 2010, the next chapter will focus on examining the PUPA carried out in the CDS in Aleppo. For this purpose, the next section will provide an understanding of how the urban governance settings and the institutional framework of planning do support initiating and implementing PUPAs.

3.3.2. Examining the Urban Governance Settings in Syria Underpinning PUPAs

In the following section, urban governance settings and actors will be examined, particularly the institutional and political framework of planning that underpins the PUPAs. The examination will provide a better understanding of the factors affecting the PUPAs in the national planning context of Syria.

3.3.2.1. *The Institutional and Political Frameworks of Urban Governance in Syria*

The institutional development and urban governance settings in Syria revealed many contrasts in the practices of participation in planning and development. The assumed citizens' rights for participation are indicated in the constitution, yet in practice, citizens' participation is hardly permitted and CSOs are owned by the government and have mostly ineffective role in urban governance.

According to the constitution¹⁷¹ 1973 (of society and state “Article VIII”), Syria is a “*democratic, popular, socialist, and sovereign state and the people are the ultimate source of national sovereignty*” (ERF 2005: 115; ICL 2010: 1). The content of the constitution has indicated principles that support the integrity of the citizens in articles that ensure equality regarding the rights of the individual for participation in elections, rights for education, job opportunities and litigation, and emphasize the role of women in the society and the need to facilitate their participation. Amending the constitution, however, can only be introduced by the president or by one third of the people’s assembly, and must be approved by the president and three fourths of the people’s assembly (ERF 2005: 116). Further articles regarding the social freedom of expression, are shown in the right of citizens to meet and demonstrate peacefully within the principles of the constitution (Article 39). In Articles 9 and 10 of the constitution, the institutional organization of the people is the form where people’s issues can be managed in the relation between the state and the society (ERF 2005: 116; ICL 2010). This refers mainly to organizational forms, like cooperative associations and people’s councils as formal institutions through which the citizens have the right to participate in the administration and the society (ERF 2005: 116). In addition, freedom of press and freedom of the individual is protected according to the law including those related to religious or ethnic believes (ERF 2005: 116; ICL 2010: 3).

The power, according to the constitution is divided into the executive, legislative, and judicial powers. All three branches and powers of the state are guided by the views of the Baath Party, whose primacy in state institutions is assured by the constitution (Hasan 2012; ERF 2005: 117-122). The executive power including the president, the Cabinet (Council of Ministries), State Planning Commission, Central Body for Financial Control and Central Body for Control and Inspection. The Central Body for Control and Inspection has a representative institution in the ministries and own directorates on lower local levels. Inspecting public institutions has created an atmosphere of distrust and fear among public officials, who were reluctant to assume the responsibility of taking planning decisions to avoid being questioned or accused by the Inspection, which was one of the constraints imposed on the administrative processes leading to procrastinations in many executive decisions of urban planning (ERF 2005: 121). This also applies to decisions regarding the processes of planning and development. Hence, the dominating top- down political power affects any possible participatory approach and citizen activism that can influence urban governance.

Moreover, with the one ruling political party “*The Baath Party*”¹⁷² since the seventies, Syria was known as a centralized authoritarian- populist state (Hinnebusch 1993: 246). The former president *Hafeth Al Asad* and his successor; his son *Bashar Al Asad*, with their approach in military control and inherited outdated socialism’ ideologies, have supported an oligarchy dictatorship state and the law of emergency. The state has used its political and military power in resisting political transition that threaten its power, suppressing the opposing powers and every form of civil activism and free actions. The Baath Party was the main party and its principles guided the state institutions and the three branches as it is stated in the Syrian constitution. The party's slogan was “*Unity, freedom, and socialism.*” (ERF 2005: 128). There were seven smaller political parties, who were dominated by the Baath Party. All the parties form the National Progressive Front (NPF). The NPF formed the only

¹⁷¹ The constitution of Syrian Arab Republic has been issued in 1973, after *Hafeth Al Asad* came into power with the ruling party “The Baath Party”.

¹⁷² Article 8 in the Constitution: the Arab Baath Socialist Party is the leading party in the state and society and heads the National Progressive Front (The Economic Research Forum (ERF) 2005, 116).

framework for political participation for the citizens and served the image of the multi-party state. Yet, these parties exist only in name. The President was the Chairman of the NPF and the Secretary General of the Baath Party. The Baath Party had an executive body branches from regional to local levels; each provincial district or quarter of a city had a party organization and on smaller levels circles or cells and several divisions, which form a section and each section represented a village or neighborhood (ibid). Hence, the political freedom was very limited, and indicated political participation in the constitution was performed on pro forma basis. Based upon this fact, people were reluctant to take part in the elections. They distrusted the corrupted system and they were aware of that their votes are going to be tempered with for the interests of the political elites, particularly for people who work in the public sector including teachers, doctors, and academics, etc. These groups were forced to take part in the national and local elections and in formal occasions. The intelligence apparatus has usually censored their participation and the retarded would be punished accordingly. In view of that, this form of relationship between the society and the state can also be observed in each of the state’s interventions, which applies to development projects, where people can be forced to participate or can be alienated. Syria’s indicators for good governance showed low scores compared to other Arab countries in the region (Kaufmann et al. 2005; ERF 2005: 114).




Figure 16: Governance Indicators of Syria in 2004 (Kaufmann et al. 2005; ERF 2005: 115).

Weaknesses were identified in the institutional structure of governance, particularly in the regulatory framework, voice and accountability, and corruption, in addition to the lack of “societal governance institutions” (ERF 2005: 114). The low scores in responsiveness and transparency were attributed to the procrastinations in decision-making processes and lack of transparency between the governmental institutions, officials and the citizens, who have no access to the information system and governmental data (ERF 2005: 114). Corruption was the main challenge in the institutional development in Syria, especially upon the fact that the public sector, centralized in Damascus, was ruled by small political elite, which was established through the history based on sectarianism and oligarchy (Hinnebusch 1993). Corruption is contagious in Syria that affected not just the administration, but also the economy and the society. Different types of corruption can be observed, like bribery, abuse of power, and

embezzlement of public funds. The resultant effects of corruption were, for example, undermined legitimacy of the political system, weakening the capacity of the government and economic inefficiency. Furthermore, the absence of social accountability in addition to the apathy and passivity among the citizens, who mostly lost the sense of duty through observing social injustice, had widened the gaps among social classes and led to marginalizing the poor and disadvantageous groups from women and the youth (Al-Sheikh and Hamadah (no year)). In addition, the lack of voice¹⁷³ and accountability was mostly attributed to the absence of a reliable civil society for the citizens, which can play an effective role as an accountable partner in the urban governance process.

3.3.2.2. *Centralization and the Weak Role of the Local Actors*

Centralization in decision-making regarding urban planning and governance in Syria posed a great challenge for initiating or implementing participatory approaches, in addition to the limited role of the local government and the civil society.

The planning system was highly centralized and the planning process has traditionally been guided by central planning and administrative authorities reinforcing hierarchical procedures for reporting and approval for projects, as indicated in the framework of the Local Administration Law¹⁷⁴ No. 15 dated 11/5/1971 (SPC 2006) (see 4.1.1.1). Despite the existence of local governments at the governorate and municipal levels, the decision-making process was taken merely by central ministries and national political apparatus, and the local institutions were just extensions to the central ones (ERF 2005: 121).

The lack of decentralization in the planning process had negatively influenced the urban development process in the Syrian cities, causing delays in the updating of master and detailed plans and approving the financial plans for urban development projects. The appointed governors reported directly to the president, and the local councils cannot take any decision without the approval of the governors. In addition, local governments were dependent in their expenditures on the national funds (from one national budget) and the excess of revenues on the local level should be returned to the central government. Moreover, the lack of training in local administration and the lack of the required expertise of the employees on the local level, where most of the officials in higher positions were appointed based on personal connections and affiliations (REF 2005: 121; Asfour 2007; Sudermann 2014).

The state started to take cautious steps to implement decentralization in planning through moving from centralized planning to indicative planning, giving more power to the governors and improve the legal framework to empower the elected local councils, in addition to drafting a new administration law that delegates more powers to the local level (REF 2005: 122). Another action for decentralization started in 2004, supported by the EU, to modernize the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment and the empowerment of six municipalities. The developed program has focused on improving urban management in the cities, and on supporting the municipalities in developing sustainable urban plans and improving financial management (REF 2005: 122, Clerc 2011). Under the MAM national program of Municipal Administration Modernization in Syria (MAM 2005-2008),

¹⁷³ It is defined by the World Bank: “Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.”(World Bank 2019).

¹⁷⁴ The Law 15 on Local Administration of 1971 was in action until 2010, until the government has adopted a new local administration law based on decentralization in 2011 (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 3).

decentralization in local administration, planning decisions and service provision, was a main target set to improve local governance and the capacity of the local institutions (UNDP 2005). Training was provided for the employees on national and local levels and citizens were intended to be included in decision-making process in pilot projects and actions. Moreover, the program intended to develop local legislation, improve financial resources management, like taxes, and enhance the municipal capacity for urban planning, for instance, providing information, developing detailed plans, and making recommendations to amend the urban planning law (REF 2005: 122-123; UNDP 2005). Further improvements were planned in land provision and management for housing to increase the revenues for the cities in addition to upgrading the legal framework (building licensing) and facilitating procedures for that through digitalization of registry system. Environmental sustainability was adopted in many initiatives through raising the awareness in the public and private sectors especially in the private investment. Further related topics were addressed, for instance, optimizing the solid waste management and developing traffic planning and public transportation (REF 2005: 122-123; UNDP 2005). Finally, encouraging the cooperation between the local government and the civil society and citizens was highlighted in the form of working together with local NGOs or neighborhood committees (REF 2005: 122-123). From these planned measures and actions, few were taken, particularly in the big urban centers in Syria under the MAM program, yet without a real decentralization of power.

Since participatory approaches on the local level depend upon the support of the central government, the lack of this support, in addition to the weak municipal capacity, represents the main hindrances for implementing PUPAs effectively. The need for participation in improving urban planning and governance was raised by DAs, and some planners in the administration and in academia recognized existing opportunities for democratic actions and participation. Yet, utilizing these potentials by local governments is impaired by the lack of the expertise in this area “[...] *decentralized democracy down to the community level does exist in Syria but the problem is that many in the administration, particularly at the local level do not know how to access it and use it.*” (Hon. Dr. Nabil Achraf in GTZ 2007: 9). The role of academia was limited at this point to consultancy in development projects and cooperation, where the need to integrate new planning concepts and participatory planning in the planning education, although recognized, should be politically approved from the central government. Planning theories taught at the universities were very limited in the teaching programs and curricula. The discussed issues remained in the theory field without connecting them to the practices of planning or to governance issues, mainly in relation to urban politics. The educational system in this regard was based on the technocratic approach of planning implied in the master planning principles. The taught topics were divorced from the reality and the need for effective urban management and skills for putting sustainable development approaches in urban planning into practice. Sustainable urban development, particularly environmental planning, was later one of the topics incorporated in postgraduate study programs; yet, there is a need to furthering environmental and governance issues in the curricula for undergraduates.

3.3.2.3. *The Emerging Role of CSOs in Urban Planning and Development in Syria*

There is no clear legal and organizational framework for the civil society and its activities in Syria, in addition to non-existence of a civil society as organized societal forms (Al-Om 2011) that work together to achieve the common good. Yet, the Syrian constitution had referred to the role of the popular organizations, cooperative associations, and people’s and local councils. Through these institutions, the citizens are supposed to exercise their rights in governance and leading the society (ICL 2010). Yet,

the governmental organizations after the seventies have partly re-emerged in new forms under the governmental umbrella as GO-NGOs (Stollies 2012) especially after the issuance of the 10th FYP in 2006. Under the political development of the country (the Baath Party) and the corporatist strategies since the seventies, certain forms of CSOs have been established: popular organizations (*Munazzamat Sha'biyya*) and professional associations, syndicates or unions (*Niqabat Mihaniyya*). These organizations have integrated peasants, youth, and women and were the main actors in the leadership of the trade unions. However, the corporatist state had little autonomy under the one political party and by that a restricted societal freedom (Hinnebusch 1993: 247). Therefore, the related governmental organizations were lacking the needed autonomy and had followed a top-down structure imposed by the state, in addition to the absence of structure and power to challenge the state decisions. Hence, the relationship between these organizations and the state was mainly based on shared mutual interests and benefits (Hinnebusch 1993; AL-Om 2011; Sotllies 2012). An example is the peasants' syndicates, who, through approving the state strategies for land reform and marketing for the products, could gain political and institutional benefits in return (Hinnebusch 1993).

Civil society in Syria had two main features in its history, traditional society and class society. Both society groups were affected by the state strategies of redistribution and modernization. Resistance movements, mainly from the religious and economic based movements (who had formed the political Islam), were repressed in the eighties and only few religious civil associations were active and the old ones were replaced or institutionalized as syndicates under the regime's control (Hinnebusch 1993). The state instruments in diminishing and controlling the civil society by reducing the power of classes had created clientelism. International and regional conflicts were used in the past by the regime to legitimize building the security and military apparatus to limit the freedom of the civil society, which resulted in limiting its activities (Hinnebusch 1993: 256).

At the beginning of the last decade, since Bashar al-Assad has undertaken the presidency of the country, the political agenda has considered promoting a new image of the state through embracing modernity and democracy in society and development approaches. This was voiced through economic transition, technological thrive and promoting CSOs and their role in development, which was emphasized in the 10th and 11th Syrian FYs. Yet, these aims reflected conflicting issues, where the state tried to create democratic image of a thriving civil society, it intended, at the same time, to keep its control on the emerging organizations with legal and organizational instruments and consequently keep the political status quo (Stollies 2012).

Besides the traditional form of the governmental organizations, discussing the need for active NGOs has been in the debate in Syria that started later. The term NGOs was understood as charitable associations in the Syrian society. The non-governmental form of organization was unknown until the time of the "*Damascus Spring*" after Bashar al-Assad took over the power in 2000. That time had witnessed the rise of political and social movements, which started to discuss the emergence of a non-governmental form of CSOs, opposing to the state supported forms of associations and which advocating political freedom that is conditioned with the abolition of the emergency law (Stollies 2012; Suderman 2014: 122). These liberal movements were active for no more than few months and ended by arrest of the activists and intellectuals who led the forums of Damascus Spring and were accused by opposing the state interests and integrity (Stollies 2012). As a result, many organizations which termed by civil organizations, intended to work for social and environmental development rather than for political purposes (ibid). These organizations had to follow very strict regulations regarding establishing

an association. In addition, permitting membership and the type of activities should not come upon political or religious issues. Therefore, they should strictly be controlled by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, and were not allowed to accept funding from international donors without an approval from the national level (MLSA 2008; Stollies 2012).

The First Lady Asmaa al-Assad had launched a network of organizations in 2001 for social development which merged in 2007 under "*The Syria Trust for Development*"^{175,176}. The Syria Trust for Development organized an international conference in 2010 in Damascus on "*Emerging Role of Civil Society in Development*". The organizations sponsored by Asmaa al-Assad presented themselves as the actual representatives of the Syrian civil society (Al-Om 2011; Stollies 2012). The promoted slogans to strengthen civil society were raising the need to support participation in democratic process and improve the relationship between civil society actors and the state. They worked mainly in the fields of rural development, culture, youth, disabled and orphans. These elite organizations described as "*Governmental Non-Governmental Organizations (GO-NGOs)*" (Stollies 2012; Ryser and Franchini 2015), unlike other organizations, were not obliged to fulfill the strict legal regulations of the ministry and have received plenty of funding from international donors. Despite the weaknesses and lack of experience in the working team at the organizations, the advantages from the state have been utilized in partnerships to realize development projects, which otherwise would not be implemented under the formal restrictive institutional procedures and bureaucracy. Meanwhile, these projects were propagated widely in the media while attributing their representative outcomes to the sponsorship of the first lady and the political elite. Emerging as a strong, exclusive, and organized NGO in the country, the UNDP has supported the Syria Trust for Development to provide an NGO platform to network and coordinate with other associations. This has led to growing numbers of registered unions and associations until 2010 to reach 1240 registered associations, mostly charitable, and some were cultural and environmental and others were youth and women associations (Stollies 2012). The Syria Trust for Development functions as a representative for CSOs, and as a mediator between them and DAs, who support in their development work the engagement of civil society. Yet, the civil society in this form remained weak, unstructured, overregulated and lacked legitimacy and transparency, which also affected its capacity for effective participation in the development process (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 7-8).

i. Participation of Civil Society in Urban Planning and Development

Participation as an institutionalized planning instrument does not exist in the planning culture in Syria. Yet, participation forms of the society in planning activities were either self-help initiatives (voluntary works) or formal civil organizational contributions through international projects prompted by donors' terms of cooperation and were urged by the desire of the state for reform through rapid tangible outcomes.

Participation in the formal planning process was just allowed in raising objections before the final decision and the approval of the plan (see 3.3.1.1). The main aim of this procedure is for informing (ranked in the level of tokenism, based on the ladder of participation by Arnstein 1969). Even in urban

¹⁷⁵ The Syria Trust for Development is defined as: "*a Non-Governmental, Non-profit Organization was established in 2001. Its focus is primarily on development and cultural aspects, through its faith in enabling communities and working with the communities in its projects*" (Syria Trust for Development 2017).

¹⁷⁶ Before the political upheavals in Syria, Syria Trust for Development was leading GO-NGO for activating the role of the civil society. Their contribution was in involving NGOs in the pilot projects of the CDS of Aleppo and in a national level pilot project in 2011 for the development of informal settlement areas (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 7-8).

policymaking, due to lack of political freedom, citizens are neither allowed to discuss the existing policies or to participate in developing new ones nor to take part in the planning process. Participation was, hitherto, intended to be practiced in pilot urban development projects, yet, without institutionalizing these participatory approaches in the planning process and laws. Few limited improvements have been observed since the issuance of the new Law on Local Administration of 2011. According to this law, more representatives of the local people were allowed to be elected and included in the local councils (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 7-8). Still, there is no information on how the views and contributions of these actors are integrated in the planning process, or if this action was just a pro forma procedure for collecting signatures or as a maneuver to prove the intention of the state for democratization after the uprising in 2011.

The role of the civil society had many challenges in urban planning and development, having an unorganized and underdeveloped civil society in Syria (FRF 2005: 129; Ryser and Franchini 2015: 7-8) the participation of the NGOs in urban planning and sustainable urban development had many restrictions legally and politically, except the charity NGOs and CBOs. The work of the charity organizations was historically tolerated by the government as it supported the societal values and did not pose any threat to the legitimacy of the state. Yet, being controlled and regulated by the state has made the CSOs and their activities in Syria unreliable development partners or trusted representatives of the people in urban planning and governance processes. With the restricted conditions for their participation, their contributions in participatory urban planning and development was a prescribed or pro forma and thereby unsustainable.

Apart from the formal role of CSOs, the Syrian society has managed to organize itself informally and to interfere in the governance process. Cooperative and participatory, organized or spontaneous forms of self-help activities had traditionally and historically developed in the Syrian society. These forms have contributed to improving the social and physical environment and infrastructure when institutions failed to fulfill their functions. These forms were more common and effective in rural than in urban areas. Self-help interventions were observed, for example, on a scale of small irrigation projects among peasants in rural areas or improving green areas on the neighborhood level in cities, or in ISs, connecting the canalization or water pipes illegally to the city networks (examples from Aleppo¹⁷⁷ in Bitar 2012: 82). The state, as based on corporatism-populism, as well as sectarianism and kinship, did tolerate forms of societal popular self-help activities, where family, religious and neighborhood solidarity serve for societal integrity (Hinnebusch 1993: 248). However, self-help cooperative interventions were rarely documented, acknowledged, or utilized by the institutions for cooperative development projects. These conditions were also reinforced by restrictions in action by the local authorities and the lack of institutional expertise and awareness of the importance of social mobilization and partnership, in addition to the lack of political support, while any form of democratization was seen as a threat for the state's legitimacy.

On the other hand, development interventions by DAs had an important role in introducing and implementing participation in the initiated urban development (pilot) projects in a structured and prescribed mode, still with a close supervision from the state. The partial legitimization of participatory approaches in development was done through adopting participation in planning and development

¹⁷⁷ In some of the settlements like Ashrafiya, Hydareyeh and Shaikh Maqsd in Aleppo, a voluntary community action and participatory processes were conducted that proved how some of informal settlements in Aleppo do have the respective competences and existing organizational and technical skills for participation (Bitar 2012: 82).

that has been introduced officially in the 10th FYP. The plan has acknowledged the important role of different society segments and sectors in the sustainable development process. It focused on strengthening the role of CSOs and supporting their participation to achieve good governance (10th FYP, Chapter 6) (SPC 2006). However, there were no further terms of the form and the scope of the arranged participatory activities. Hence, the role of the DAs was viewed mainly in providing the funding and expertise in developing, managing, and scaling the participatory process up to supporting institutionalizing participation, if allowed, in consensus with the national government and in cooperation with the local governments.

Development pilot projects where participation has been applied as a planning tool for decision-making process varied between upgrading projects of informal settlements and projects on the city level. Some of the projects on the city level were the pilot project of Metro Damascus in 2008 and the initiative projects undertaken between 2008 and 2010 in the framework of the CDS of Aleppo. Differentiating the participatory approaches adopted in the upgrading projects as bottom-up approaches from those in the projects on the city level, which were top-down approaches (Hasan 2012), development projects with participatory approaches have always to be approved from the central government. The pilot project of Damascus Metro in 2007 was initiated in partnership between the governorate, the MLAE and the international actors¹⁷⁸. Further projects where participatory process was carried out in land-use decision-making were observed in the city of Damascus. The participatory process was managed by DAs¹⁷⁹, who provided the expertise and financial aid in managing and implementing the projects¹⁸⁰ (Hasan 2012: 141). Upgrading projects initiated for example in Aleppo and Damascus were in partnership between the GTZ, UNDP and the governorates on behalf of the state. Participatory approaches in the city of Aleppo initiated by the GTZ since 1999 were the basis for many cooperative development projects later on (Nebel, Personal Communication: September 2013). However, participation was taking the form of informing through public hearing except the organized meetings and workshops with key stakeholders in the framework of planning for small-scale projects, which targeted collecting data from the local stakeholders. Practicing participation in urban planning and development in their pilot forms and within limited time and resources, was one of the hindrances for addressing issues of inclusiveness of the vulnerable groups from women or youth in the debate on participation (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Particularly since the participatory approach was hardly accepted and integrated formally by the government as well as by the local people who distrust their government and its actions. Moreover, despite the positive outcomes of some of these participatory approaches, there was no intention from the government to institutionalize the participatory approach or to include it in the legal framework of the planning process, like the PUPA in the CDS of Aleppo (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b).

One of the development areas, where participatory approaches were adopted was environmental education. There were highly promoted actions since the issuance of the Environmental Law 50/2002

¹⁷⁸ SYSTRA + Khatib and Alami (Khatib and Alami (no Year)).

¹⁷⁹ German International Cooperation (GIZ), The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), The Municipal Modernisation Programme Team (MAM) and The French-Lebanese joint venture SYSTRA + Khatib and Alami (Khatib and Alami (no Year)) (Hasan2012: 141).

¹⁸⁰ Participation was conducted in six pilot projects within the city of Damascus between 2006-2008. Those were in Al-Qanawat South and Al-Ghota as part of the Project for Urban Planning and Development in Damascus Metropolitan Area DMA-UPD run by JICA; Street 30 West and Qassyoon informal settlement, both run by MAM; Damascus metro (the Green Line) by SYSTRA + Kanda; and Old Damascus reservation and environmental awareness as part of the Program for Sustainable Urban Development (UDP) run by GIZ (Hasan2012: 143).

and the commitment of the government to Agenda 21. The state has supported local actors, mainly the NGOs and organized voluntary activities for raising environmental awareness in society. These activities were organized, especially in big cities, in the form of cleaning campaigns in historical centers, riverbanks, or seashores. In this field of action, there was a great potential to mobilize more civil activism from women, youth, and different societal segments regardless of class or ethnicity. Moreover, the potential role of the media and academia in the above-mentioned participatory approaches, although timid, they remained untapped in planning practices in Syria. The media was strengthened in the last decades, by highlighting the pitfalls of the performance of the local governments and the development needs in poor areas. Yet, their capacity was limited, and its role was highly controlled and censored by the government, which made it ineffective and unreliable for the public (Ryser and Franchini 2015: 7-8). Academia on the other hand, although possesses the tools to influence the development process, was lacking the freedom and political support to influence the educational process. As a result, there was a wide gap between practicing participation in development and in introducing it in the planning curriculum in Syria. Participatory processes are not new in the history of the Syrian society, albeit its newness in their formal forms in the development practices. To help the new educated generation of planners to understand and utilize the potentials of the PUPAs, there is a need to discuss the political role of the state and its influence not only on the planning education in Syria but also on the practices participatory planning in each case study.

3.4. Interim Conclusions: Comparing Urban Governance Settings Underpinning the PUPAs on the National Level in Egypt and Syria

Through examining the main elements in urban governance settings underpinning the PUPAs on the national level in Egypt and Syria, common and different potentials and challenges in comparison have been identified. These elements are the planning system, the planning process and the political and institutional frameworks of planning in both national contexts, in addition to the role of the local government, the private sector and the civil society in the planning and the DAs. The table below encompasses the main elements and the challenges and potentials in comparison.

The main elements in urban governance underpinning the PUPAs on the national level	Syria	Egypt
The planning system	Centralized planning system based on master planning.	Centralized based on master planning 1982_ centralized based on strategic planning since 2008
The planning process	Top-down process. The urban plan will be published in the city hall for the public for objections in the last stage before the approval (tokenism level of participation).	Top-down, feedback on the plan in the last stage before approval (Law No. 3/1982) (tokenism level of participation). The planning process in the strategic planning adopts the participatory approach as pro forma through collecting signatures from the stakeholders or development partners.
The political framework (based on the constitution)	No participation. Freedom and civil rights were supported in the constitution but not in practice where emergency law and	No to limited participation. Amendments in the constitution in 2007 led to addressing citizenship and allowing more freedom for the media and CSOs, yet, religious as well as liberal

	<p>military force interfere in civil activism.</p> <p>Apathy and distrust in the state's governance led to a passive role of the citizens in politics and development.</p>	<p>movements were repressed in practice leading to many restrictions on participation.</p> <p>Apathy and distrust in the state's governance led to a passive role of the citizens in politics.</p> <p>Still, an emerging and active role of CBAs in development was witnessed in the last decade.</p>
Supporting PUPAs in the national policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supporting PUPAs in the FYPs but with limiting legal frameworks. - Economic reforms resulted in facilitating the role of the private sector and foreign investment in mega projects in big urban centers, depriving the urban poor from their rights for sustainable urban development. - NGOs Law and activities presenting a façade of liberal society and masking an excluding NGOs legal framework through governmental control. - Accordingly, permitted participatory forms in practice were through charity work and voluntary actions for environmental awareness raising (after issuing the Environmental Law). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supporting legal framework of PUPAs in the planning Law, also in the FYPs, yet, this contradicts with the practices of PUPAs. - Economic reform resulted in emerging the role of the private sector in mega projects and tourism in addition to privatization and foreign investment. This was followed by amending the constitution and the party system in 2007. - As a result, the reforms led to seeking modern society image strengthened by an active civil society and the role of the women, yet with spatial exclusion of the poor from the Muslim Brotherhood from the economic benefits. - Restrictive legal framework for CSOs in terms of funding and political activism.
Legislative framework of planning (planning laws)	<p>Outdated planning laws and instruments embedded in Planning law 1982 (amendments added in 2002) and master planning. No comprehensive reforms, only contingent plans and cumbersome decision-making over urban policies.</p>	<p>Awareness for planning reforms</p> <p>Planning laws: Comprehensive Planning Law No. 3/1982 followed by the Strategic planning Law No.119/2008, which adopted participatory planning as a main instrument.</p>
Urban Governance Settings and Actors		
The institutional and political framework on the local level	<p>Restrictive of participation through centralized and hierarchal planning system under the appointed leader.</p>	<p>The same.</p>
Participatory processes in planning	<p>Participatory processes are controlled and limited to pilot projects and development practices.</p>	<p>Participation in planning Institutionalized in 2008 in the planning law, yet, participatory processes are undertaken on a pro forma basis. Local scale projects showed more effective PUPAs through collaboration of local actors, mainly, the municipality and the CBAs.</p>
The role of the local government and the local councils	<p>Restricted to their administrative role and dependent on the central role of the state in urban and financial planning, and its representatives on the local level.</p> <p>The role of the local councils is restricted and controlled.</p>	<p>The same.</p>

The role of the civil society	Restricted by the Law Limited to charity or few regulated activities and controlled by the state.	Restricted by the Law Emerging role of CDAs in the poor rural areas and in informal areas in big cities in cooperation with the local government and DAs.
The role of the private sector	Restricted politically (the elites as main beneficiaries) Economic reforms promoted foreign investment in mega urban projects for the global image, while putting off sustainable urban development plans.	Promoted politically (the elites as main beneficiaries) Reforms in economic policies led to an emerging role of the new rich and widening the gap between the rich and the poor.
The role of the local planners	Mostly as bureaucrats and varies between bureaucrats to entrepreneurs in pilot urban development projects.	Mostly as bureaucrats and varies between bureaucrats to entrepreneurs and mediators.
The role of academia	Consultancy with limited political power in urban decision-making. Participation is limited in theory and practice of planning. Limited elaborated research on PUPAs.	Consultancy with limited political power in urban decision-making. Participation is discussed in theory and limited in practice of planning. Increased research on PUPAs.
The role of the media	Unreliable and limited role to the official media. Limited accessibility to and cautious growth of digital media regarding planning and PUPAs.	Unreliable and limited role to the official media. Accelerated growth of digital media regarding planning issues, PUPAs and laws.
The role of DAs	Limited cooperation partners and overlapping development interventions to duplication. Support with funding and expertise in developing the PUPAs. Reforms demands for improving governance, democratization and adopting neo liberalistic policies.	Variable cooperation partners and overlapping projects. Support with funding and expertise in developing the PUPAs. Reforms demands for improving governance, democratization and adopting neo liberalistic policies.

Table 26: Comparing urban governance settings underpinning the PUPAs on the national level between Syria and Egypt.

The planning system and the planning process have many similarities in both countries. They were based on master planning as the main planning model while adopting a top-down approach in the planning process. Accordingly, the decisions on urban planning and development were mainly taken in a top-down process, and hence, participation in planning was not promoted. Particularly in reference to the Planning Law 3/1983 in Egypt and Decree 5/1982 in Syria, the participation of the citizens in the planning process is limited to informing and receiving comments before the final approval, which results in a pro forma participatory process. The practices of participation in planning in both countries lie between non- participation and tokenism levels in the ladder of participation by Arnstein 1969 and manipulation according to the levels identified by Choguill 1996. In the framework of urban development projects, public consultation organized by DAs had mostly led to carrying out participation on the level of “non-participation” to manipulation (based on Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 68). The leader, who is appointed and legitimized from the national level, was formally the decision-maker in public consultation and in organizing and managing participatory processes on the local level. The indicators of good governance have shown some similarities in the weaknesses chiefly regarding the “Control of Corruption” in the public sector and “Political Stability”. In both countries, the lack of

trust between the society and the state and in the corrupted regime, led to the reluctance of the people to participate in political or development processes. Moreover, the restrictions on the political freedom and the measures taken under the emergency law in both countries have strengthened the security apparatus in its repression of social activism. These were the main threats for PUPAs that kept them until this point on the governmental level, based on top-down, exclusive and pro forma participatory processes.

Other indicators have shown a better ranking in Egypt than in Syria, still with a low score under 50. An example is a score for "Voice and Accountability", which was six in Syria in 2004, while 24-14 in Egypt for 1996-2014. In the "Rule of Law" and "Regulatory Quality", Egypt had slightly better scores than Syria as well as in "Government Effectiveness". Egypt had achieved better governance in the same period than in Syria. This can be attributed to the bundle of reforms that Egypt has taken since the eighties. Egypt had adopted more reforms than Syria in its economy and governance, which affected also the planning system and urban governance. Participatory approaches were affected by these changes through institutionalizing participation in the planning law 119/ 2008. Syria was very cautious in integrating reforms in its urban governance and planning system. It intended to integrate reforms in very small steps and in a controlled manner than ensures the status quo regarding the political stability and control. This was observed in the economic policies, which were adopted much later than in Egypt and in very cautious steps through a series of policies to open up to the global market and facilitate private investments. The construction boom in Syria was first started in 2006 while in Egypt urban development was affected by many dynamics through the economic and administrative reforms or structural change through liberalization in the nineties, leading to a boom in the tourism and planning for large-scale projects, like the new towns and cities around Cairo.

PUPAs were adopted and documented in development projects in Egypt. PUPAs was mostly effective in rural areas supported by the government politically and financially. The later developed PUPAs in urban areas have shown the need to consider factors, like building trust between the society and the government, and to consider the diversity of urban communities in developing the PUPA. In Syria, despite having projects initiated with similar development components, participatory approaches were discussed apart from the related local governance discourses. The topic of participation was later addressed in the planning research and practice in Egypt compared to Syria, as an emerging field of study and practice of civil activism. The emerging interest in PUPAs had a role in integrating the participatory process as a planning instrument later in the strategic planning Law 119/2008. In Syria, participation remained a part of the development interventions and pilot projects that ended with the duration of the project without reflection or consideration in the planning research or by local institutions for furthering these practices. The awareness and discussion of participation were gradually rising in the Syrian planning context. Since 2010, the contribution of PUPAs to the social development was recognized regardless the political effects (reflecting on the papers by Ramadan 2010 and Bitar 2012¹⁸¹). Yet, the political apparatus in Syria was far more restrictive regarding the discussion of the topic of participation in research and in relation to civil activism and political freedom. In Egypt, even though the freedom of critical research was promoted as a part of the democratization process and the image for the donors, in practice, strict measures would be taken to retain the political stability and control.

¹⁸¹ Both were involved in participatory approaches in the city of Aleppo as local urban managers and worked together with the GIZ.

The urban governance settings showed restrictions in the role of the local government, local councils, the CSOs, and the private sector. The leading urban governance actors of PUPAs in both countries although vary in their competencies, they fulfill the same representative role of the national government on the local level. In Egypt, the governor has much power on the local level where in Syria he deals with regional and less with local issues and the mayor is the leading local actor of the PUPA. Yet, in both systems, PUPAs were adopted as technocratic tools, due to the limited and technocratic role of the local planners in conducting master planning, and their lack of skills to manage participatory planning processes.

Moreover, in academia, theories of planning were limited in the teaching programs and curricula and were not connected to governance issues, especially regarding urban politics and the links between the theory and practice of planning. However, Egypt has started to insert learning materials on the planning system and levels, later in its universities curricula, while in Syria, these topics were excluded in the education of planning. The educational systems in both countries need to shift from technocratic-based planning teaching to practical approaches in relation to urban management and sustainable urban development and related projects. These topics were first highlighted in higher educational research while there were limited discussions in the classrooms. Moreover, observing the change of the role of planners from technocrats to mediators and agents of urban transformation is one of the issues to be considered in education along with learning materials and practices of participatory planning. The main role of planners in Egypt and in Syria remained limited to their administrative role. Yet, in Egypt, this role has transformed through education and through practice. Many Egyptian planners discuss PUPAs and methods in planning practices in the country in research and in planning forums, which indicated a shift in the role of the local planner through its experiences in managing PUPAs and mediating in the participatory planning process. In Syria, the correlation of participation to the political freedom and the right of voice hindered discussing PUPAs openly in educational forums and among planners.

Nonexistence of an active civil society posed a challenge for the PUPAs in both countries. While there was no to limited role of civil society in Syria, there was a strong emerging body of civil society in urban development and urban activism in Egypt, particularly in addressing urban poverty issues and informality. Still, the role of the CSOs was limited by the law in both countries especially regarding supporting their activities through external funding and in their practice of civil activism in urban politics. An active civil society was seen as a threat for the state stability. Therefore, in the legal framework for the work of CSOs, bureaucratic restrictions were imposed in the registration process for any organization or NGO. Furthermore, internal constraints and weaknesses were also imposed on the NGOs in both countries through their lack of autonomy from the government and their weakness in their management and structure due to lack of the skills and mechanisms that enable them to cooperate with other institutions and actors in urban development projects. Further hindrances for the work of the CSOs are their lack of transparency in their governance, e.g., Trust Syria GO_NGO, and most importantly lacking the legitimization from the society, which distrusts their activities that seem to serve the agenda of the authoritarian state, rather than fostering sustainable development.

The emerging role of the CSOs in Egypt was more prominent in urban development projects in urban poor areas in big cities where urban growth is very high. Urban growth in Egypt was much higher and faster than in Syria, with rising urban challenges through urban informality that affected about 70% of Egyptian biggest cities and 50% in the biggest Syrian cities. Economic liberalization policies undertaken

gradually in Syria have less subtle effects on governance and on urban poverty than those in Egypt, which resulted in poverty gap, which was much wider between the classes in Egypt than in Syria. The high urban informality rate in Egypt led to overstraining the municipal capacity for providing public services and to the emerging role of the local associations in supporting the municipality. The state and the local government have acknowledged this role and they have managed to address formal forms of collaboration with CDAs to provide the needed services and integrate them in the administrative structures through initiating offices for them at the city administration to facilitate the cooperation with them. In Syria, although there was an increasing number of local associations working in the development field in the last decade, a formal collaboration with the local governments was limited politically.

To effectively develop and manage PUPAs in planning in both countries, there is a need to explore the character of the urban communities in the targeted cities. This approach is underrepresented in development, particularly in considering it in urban planning cultures and traditions. Analyzing different cases in Egypt had helped to present a wealth of knowledge on the features of the society and the required tools for approaching its diverse segments in the participatory planning process (Hassan et al. 2011). Therefore, there is a need to understand the cultural and local context, particularly in defining the vulnerable groups and their needs from the planning process. In the past, the role of the vulnerable groups in urban development and planning was hardly emphasized, despite being a crucial component in any participatory process. This role was also differently addressed in both governance settings in Egypt and Syria. For instance, there was a tendency in the Egyptian society to subordinate the role of women through education and employment despite acknowledging their role in the development of the society in the constitution. The cultural representation of women remained embedded in its role in the traditional society. Considering the fact, that poverty and lack of education are the main indicators of the limited role of the marginalized groups in the society. In Syria, the role of women was presented in the public sector and through civil engagement, however, with tendency to subordinating her role culturally especially among the urban poor. The role of women was more apparent in the urban than rural societies and in higher income groups than in poorer communities in both countries. Therefore, widening the gap between the rich and the poor in Egypt indicates a retreat of the role of the marginalized groups, including women and youth, who with the poverty spiral, get limited access to education and job opportunities.

The role of the DAs in affecting urban governance settings of planning in promoting PUPAs is in their initiating and managing of the participatory processes in development projects as it prescribed in their development agendas for improving governance, democratization and supporting sustainable development processes. The agreements between the national government and the DAs in acquiring funding for development projects imply the need of the government to adopt PUPAs involved in the project design given for each DA. Yet, realizing PUPAs was mostly a pro forma and the DAs had weak influence on the process in practice, especially within the timely limited cooperation contracts, and where the prescribed PUPAs were applied without adjustment to the given local contexts. The cooperation relationship between the government and the DAs involve providing the expertise through training programs and offering technical aid. This approach was criticized in Egypt of being theoretical and ignorant of the local needs in the host country in the provided content of the assistance for the trainees. Cultural aspects, like gender, were usually overlooked, while having a limited project time cycle; these offers have hardly a sustainable impact and are normally limited to improving the

skills of some individuals from the national or municipal employees but not the performance of the institutions as a whole, including local governments. The local level was usually divorced from taking part in coordinating and allocating the resources and technical assistance where it is needed in development projects. Centralized governance decisions hindered a real transfer of lessons and experiences from DAs to the local level, if that regarding decentralization or further instruments, like participatory planning. In addition, the lack of local expertise leads normally to dependency on the external experts in developing and implementing PUPAs in development projects. Lacking the power and skills on the local level posed a challenge for effective management of the PUPAs that can influence governance in conditions where real decentralization and autonomy in financial planning for urban development are absent. Moreover, in both countries, it was observed that the work of the DAs was duplicated and focused on specific areas for interventions that served the funding plan according to a particular agenda without considering the real urban development needs in the country. For example, many projects have targeted the rehabilitation of historical centers, regardless of the urgent needs of development in the peripheral areas where urban poverty is concentrated. DAs tend to introduce PUPA in a very limited time and resources frame, as supposed to be results-oriented under a given set of criteria that is counterproductive for establishing a culture of participatory planning. In addition, their PUPAs lack adjusted and flexible participatory models and tools to the local context and the given local governance settings of the country.

Considering the identified challenges and potentials of adopting and implementing PUPAs in the selected Arab cities and the differences and similarities both countries, Syria and Egypt, have in their planning system and urban governance settings, the next chapter, will provide an in-depth examination of the PUPAs in Aleppo and Alexandria. Analyzing and comparing the PUPAs in the CDS in the two cities will help to understand the governance and planning settings underpinning the PUPAs and the arrangements and tools used in realizing the participatory approaches in urban planning and development. Besides, detecting the challenging and success factors of the PUPAs in each of these cities will provide valuable lessons for cross-national learning and exchange.

4. Exploring the Participatory Urban Planning Approaches (PUPAs) in the CDSs of Alexandria and Aleppo (2003-2010)

This chapter provides an examination of PUPAs in the CDSs in Alexandria and Aleppo. It is based on the factors developed in section 2.5 for identifying the successes and challenges in developing and implementing PUPAs.

4.1. Exploring the PUPA in the City Development Strategy (CDS) of Alexandria

This section provides a background on the urban development and governance of the city and focuses on identifying the main urban challenges and the adopted urban development approaches to deal with these challenges. It also presents an analysis of the PUPA in the CDS of Alexandria and the success and challenging factors in implementing it.

4.1.1. Background: Urban Characteristics and Challenges of the City of Alexandria

Alexandria is the capital city of Alexandria urban region. The city and the urban Governorate of Alexandria are merged under the rule of the assigned governor (Zakaria, Personal Communication: May 2014). It is the second-largest city in Egypt, and it accommodates more than four million inhabitants since 2010. It is expected to reach 5.6 million by 2025 and become the fifth largest Arab city (UN-Habitat 2012: 14). As the major seaport in the country, it contributes to about 40% of the national industrial output. Alexandria region is also an important region for domestic tourism and investment. Alexandria city extends linearly along the seaside and the land while separating the sea from the Lake Marriout (Whyte 2016: 5) (see Figure 17). It had an area of 2,300 square kilometers, and the population density was about 1,739 per square kilometer (CA 2007: 51).




Figure 17: The location of Alexandria (Worldatlas 2018).




Figure 18: Alexandria Corniche (Whyte 2016).




Figure 19: Alexandria in its administrative boundaries (1997), source Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development, and the GOPP 2008.

The city assets are in being the economic center for imports and exports and a host of many industries and manufactures, e.g., textiles, petrochemicals, food processing, oil refineries, steel, and iron. The city provided employment opportunities for about 30% of the countries labor force. Its potential for tourism is untapped, which was limited to local tourism and just around 3% for international tourists (World Bank 2006). Alexandria has a unique cultural heritage and historic fabric. Its urban and architectural history is influenced by many inter-regional cultures. Many of its Roman buildings and monuments in the old town are listed on the world heritage list. Alexandria's urban pattern originates from 323 BC when Alexander the Great had built its port as a powerful and strategic commercial center in the Hellenistic times. It has a grid pattern that is well known in many Mediterranean coastal cities in the history of the Middle East (UN-Habitat 2012: 10). The city had its importance in Greco-Roman history. Many old buildings from that period were found underwater. The most significant building was the ancient library of Alexandria, which was an influential cultural Hellenistic institution. It was demolished between 270 and 250 A.D. In 2002, a new cultural center of Bibliotheca Alexandrina was inaugurated on the site of the old one, under the auspices of the UNESCO to represent a memorial of the ancient library. Bibliotheca Alexandrina contains new buildings for cultural and scientific exchange and valuable ancient volumes (UNESCO 2003).

The spatial characteristics of the city, being a coastal city on the Mediterranean Sea and having the Lake Marriout and Al-Mahmoudiyah channel¹⁸², provided it with natural urban growth tendencies to the east through continuous population growth and migration. While the possibility for urban growth to the western side is limited, the expansion to the eastern side along Mustafa Kamel Road and the surrounding area can be more beneficial in accommodating urban growth needs, facilitated by the transportation system developed on this route (GOPP 2008b). The growing urban population in the 1970s was contained by erecting the new city of Borj El Arab, which is located 60 km from Alexandria. The construction of the building started in 1979 to provide housing for around 750.000 of the city population and migrants, yet only 5% of the city population lives in Borj El Arab, which constitute around 150.000 inhabitants (NUCA 2018) and 95% in Alexandria city (World Bank 2006). The lack of a reliable transportation system was one of the challenges to attract more population to the satellite city (GOPP 2008).

Despite the strengths of the city of Alexandria, there are high demands for investment to provide job opportunities for the young population, constituting about 51% of the city population, and to respond to the pressure of the rapid population growth. The unemployment rate in Alexandria was about 7.1% in 2004.

Informal settlements have increased in the city to reach 30. They hosted around the third of the city population. Most of the residents were vulnerable to health problems due to the air and water pollution in these areas, and they lacked access to public services. The most challenging aspect of the urban growth of Alexandria is the mismanagement of the lake Marriout, which turned out to be a polluted space through untreated sewage and industrial waste (World Bank 2006). In addition, the development of informal settlements in the southern and western side of the city and the risk of continuous illegal land development have posed a challenge to the natural resources, especially for the lake and the green fields on the southern side. Air and water pollution caused by the mixed industrial and residential uses in these parts of the city presented an urgent problem for the environment and

¹⁸² Al-Mahmoudiyah channel is a subterranean waterway from the Nile crosses the city of Alexandria and ends in the Mediterranean Sea.

urban health. These problems were exacerbated by the lack of an updated master plan to limit illegal urban growth and to regulate different land uses. Besides, there was a need to develop a reliable transportation system that serves the new residential areas, like the city of Borj El Arab to the west and the informal settlements (GOPP 2008b; As&P 2010). Furthermore, climate change is one of the problems that would face the city until 2030 through risks, such as higher marine submersion, coastal erosion, and water scarcity that will affect urban health immensely (World Bank et al. 2011).

Urban challenges caused by rapid population growth are rooted in the weak institutional framework of urban planning and governance. The local government lacked the capacity for effective service delivery and infrastructure, having limited powers for financial management and decision-making regarding urban planning and development and lacking the needed expertise to carrying out a participatory strategic planning process in dealing with these problems. Further institutional challenges were weak partnerships between the private and the public sector, in addition to the ineffectiveness of the land policies, the regulatory framework for public land development, and the registry system to manage the real estates. The resulting high demand for affordable housing, accompanied by a weak public supply of housing that covered just about 30%, led to an increase in the number of informal settlements in the past (World Bank 2006). The delay in taking actions to deal with urban informality and the lack of resources and transparency in the decision-making process (Eiweida 2007: 9) were the most apparent problems for growing informal settlements in the city. As a result, these challenges have raised the need for modernizing the master plan of the city of Alexandria while considering different aspects of urban informality in the urban planning scenarios. Therefore, a sustainable urban development that can safeguard the natural resources in the southern part of the city should be ensured (Zahran, Personal Communication: May 2014).

4.1.1.1. Urban Development Approaches and Participation

The city of Alexandria put efforts and took actions in the past to modernize the master plan and develop strategies and policies to deal with the posed urban challenges sustainably. Yet, the proposals for modernizing the master plan of Alexandria, which have taken a long time to be prepared, from seven to ten years, were not realized, due to their outdated data and further institutional constraints (Zahran; Zakaria, Personal Communication: May 2014).

In the 1980s, the master plan was developed to guide urban growth and to draw up strict planning regulations to limit the conditions of informal development while adopting a comprehensive model of planning. This planning approach considered the sustainable expansion of the city by protecting the green areas in the southeast and directing the growth to the western line coast of the city, the vacant arable land. Not implementing the plan was attributed to different financial, institutional, and political restrictions (Zahran, Personal Communication: May 2014). Likewise, the proposed master plan¹⁸³ in the 1990s was not realized (ibid), in addition to later proposals to develop strategic urban plans for the city, like the proposal for the year 2022 and 2027, which were not realized for the same reasons (based on Ayad and Zahran, Personal Communication: May 2014). The master plans proposed in the 1980s and the 1990s were outdated and disregarded the emerging urban problems resulted from the absence of affordable housing for low and middle-income groups, and the lack of coordination regarding land management that aggravated informal land development on agricultural land and illegal land uses (GoA

¹⁸³ The prepared plan in 1985 gave a vision to the city growth until 2005 by the Comprehensive Planning Authority, was not enacted, where the followed plan prepared in 1997 by the GOPP has derived many elements from the former one, although enacted but was not realized (GoA et al. 2007: 43).

et al. 2007: 43). Until this time, the planning process had adopted a top-down and technocratic approach, depended on the institutional and technical capacity of the planning authorities. Thereby, the planning efforts in practice have mainly taken the form of action development plans, where urgent interventions are required. Besides, the existing institutional framework and restrictive urban governance have hindered the timely updating of the successive master plans (ibid).

The attempts at the beginning of the 21st century to modernize the master plan and to guide the city growth have focused on the participatory approach called upon in the development practice. An example in this regard is the approach in the Alexandria Development Project (ADP) in the CDS in 2004, which invited an inclusive and participatory planning approach. The following phase has witnessed the modernization of the planning law by issuing the planning law 119/2008 while adopting strategic planning and participation as the main instrument of planning for Egyptian cities and towns (GOPP 2009). The issuance of law 119 and its regulations in 2008 has led to institutionalizing public participation (*Mosharakah Shaabyeah*) in planning and implementing it more extensively (Abou Omira, Personal Communication: May 2014). In the law 119/2008, the need for participation is one of the pillars for sustainable development of the city, where stakeholders are involved in setting the priorities and in implementing urban planning and development projects (GOPP 2009: 2). According to the law, the planning authority should ensure that stakeholders agree on the proposed plan, their agreement should be obtained by letter, and if the stakeholders do not agree, the plan will not be approved for implementation (Abou Omira, Personal Communication: May 2014).

However, since the law's implementation in 2009, the government has made many efforts to enforce its participatory approach that participation became, according to the interviewed planners, a top-down obligatory and a pro forma procedure that led to preserving the status quo of the traditional centralized planning system (Zakaria; Mohsen; Hassan, Personal Communication: May 2014). Moreover, the central and local authorities have to face contradictions between the interpretation, definition and practicing of participation. Besides, the lack of decentralization and autonomy on the lower administrative levels resulted in the dependence of the staff in the sub-national planning authorities on the instructions from the central authorities for implementing the participatory process. Thereby, implementing participation was limited to getting local plans signed from the stakeholders and holding pro forma public meetings with them without considering the real purpose of this process and the value of inclusive and participatory planning. The staff mostly lacked the skills and expertise, and the governor takes the final decision before it was finally approved by the central government (Ghattas, Personal Communication: April 2016). The participatory approach was adopted in the new strategic plan of Alexandria started in 2013. However, evaluating the participatory processes requires considering the final phases of the project (see appendix 30: a brief summary of the state of the project from May 2014).

PUPAs in Alexandria were adopted mostly in the framework of programs for sustainable urban development and poverty alleviation in informal areas. Pilot projects in the framework of the development program "Participatory Development Program in Urban Areas (PDP)" have focused on the development of five informal areas, two in Greater Cairo and three in Alexandria. The participatory mechanisms and policies were intended to be institutionalized. The partners in the participatory processes were mainly the GTZ and KFW, and institutions from the national level, e.g., Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of Planning and Local Development, Social Development Fund, and Cairo and Alexandria Governorates. On the local level, representatives of the local districts and few

NGOs contributed to the implementation. This program targeted community capacity development, including trust-building, improving communication, and information sharing that can affect urban governance and the life of the poor in informal settlements (Abdrabo 2008). The pilot projects were also included in the CDS, which was developed between 2004 and 2008 and supported implementing participatory approaches and mechanisms in its working themes.

i. Alexandria' City Development Strategy (CDS) 2004-2008

The Alexandria City Development Strategy (CDS), being one of the first developed CDSs in the Arab cities in the MENA region, was considered a model project. Adopting a CDS for Alexandria was an important option to face the constraining urban governance settings; like fragmented efforts for service delivery and limited decentralization. Since 1990, several urban development initiatives were undertaken in the city. Yet, the formulation of the CDS in 2004 was preceded by an initiative by the World Bank and the Arab Urban Development Institute (AUDI), in 2003, to initiate a long-term strategy together with political, administrative, and academic figures of the city. The city received a grant from the Cities Alliance (CA) to formulate the CDS through a broad-based participatory process. With this grant, the governorate was supposed to integrate the CDS into its plans (World Bank 2008: 5, 15) and adopt it as an institutional tool for guiding urban planning until 2017. Hence, the CDS was supported and sponsored by the Cities Alliance, AUDI, and the World Bank. The defined aim of the CDS was to set long-term goals for sustainable urban development, focusing on three main objectives: local economic development, participatory urban upgrading of ISs, and environmental rehabilitation of the lake *Marriout zone* (World Bank 2008: 15). This, in turn, implied tackling problems in urban management and governance, like facilitating investment and ensuring the inclusion of the urban poor by improving services and infrastructure (Eiweida 2007: 4). To achieve these objectives and following sustainable strategic planning and economic development, two principals were adopted in the CDS. First, forming a partnerships' forum that ensures the commitment of the key stakeholders in the city from different sectors including the civil society through regular consultative meetings for developing and formulating the CDS. Second, promoting engagement and investment in the CDS frameworks to ensure further financial support from the donors. The city put efforts to provide the proper conditions for developing the strategy by building up public-private partnerships, which aimed to plan, implement and follow-up the development projects for infrastructure and public services through the ADP and further investment plans (Eiweida 2007: 7-9). The ADP was part of the developed strategic plans for Alexandria city in tackling urban problems, like environmental problems, weak local economy, social development, uncontrolled informal urban growth, and sprawl on agricultural land (World Bank 2007).

Forming public-private partnerships (PPP) through the CDS was a remarkable feature, even though such initiatives were not successful in the past due to the lack of the governorate's capacity to form PPP and the absence of accountability and transparency to execute the process effectively. (Eiweida 2007: 8-9). The partnerships with the private sector in the CDS added more credibility to the process, particularly in dealing with urban informality. Forming these partnerships was essential for implementing socio-economic development measures that targeted low-income groups, like creating job opportunities for them. Moreover, understanding the social and economic needs through a PRA of 20 informal settlements in the framework of the ADP helped to change the ways of managing urban challenges throughout the strategy (ibid). In this regard, working on improving urban governance was accompanied by a strong executive leadership that supported sustainable participatory strategic planning through promoting the PPP and furthering the cooperation with local NGOs in ISs. The

qualities of the CDS' participatory approach in the processes of vision formulation and the decision on the action plan, represented by the ADP, were evident in the raised sense of local ownership and political commitment from the beginning (World Bank 2006; 2007: 3-4). These assets on the local level had ensured the funding from partners and sponsors of the CDS Alexandria, mainly the CA, World Bank, GTZ, UN-Habitat, AUDI, GOPP, CIDA, and IFC (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 24). The CDS of Alexandria was developed in two phases. The first phase was dedicated to the formulation of the CDS' vision and bringing the city stakeholders together into this process. In the second phase, parts of the action plans were implemented, e.g., forming the management agency of the lake, local participatory planning of investment and urban development plans, and developing land-use plans for the three pilot informal areas (ibid: 52). Although the action plans of the CDS were prepared (appendix 6: stages and developed themes of the CDS) and a bundle of projects were planned to be implemented, the plans and the projects were stopped in 2008, due to different reasons¹⁸⁴, addressed by the local planners interviewed in May 2014:

- a) Running out of financial resources needed for implementation (Ayad, Personal Communication: May 2014).
- b) Conflicts over the proposed solutions with the funding institutions, like the World Bank (Mehina, Personal Communication: May 2014).
- c) Lack of transparency of the institutions and the governorate's actors, in addition to rampant corruption, where an ambiguity surrounds suspending the big project of the CDS (engineers in the governorate and the regional authorities, Personal Communication: May 2014).
- d) The accelerated urban change and the unpredictable trends of urban growth led to the invalidity of the plans and the projects produced in the first stages of the CDS (Ayad, Personal Communication: May 2014).

4.1.2. Analyzing the PUPA in the CDS in Alexandria (2004-2008)

The PUPA in the CDS Alexandria was planned in both CDS phases II and I (2005-2017). The PUPA was developed in two ways: through building partnerships with key stakeholders in the first stage and conducting PRA techniques in the pilot projects in the later stage. Participation in decision-making and management in the CDS and the ADP was applied mainly as a tool to improve urban governance and management in the city of Alexandria. The aim of conducting PRA techniques in the implementation was for collecting the data as part of the upgrading project of the three pilot ISs. Adopting these participatory techniques reveals the willingness of the government to set a CDS that is inclusive of the urban poor in the planning process. Further arrangements to manage the PUPA in the CDS of Alexandria have been examined in the following section, based on the aspects discussed in the conceptual approach (see 2.5).

4.1.2.1. *Urban Governance Framework of the PUPA in the CDS of Alexandria*

In this part, the political support of the PUPA in the CDS will be examined¹⁸⁵, in addition to the institutional framework and the actors involved in the CDS process.

¹⁸⁴ These issues were not new in the framework of development projects cycles in DCs, which should be analyzed in further studies to examine the effectiveness of the working methods and sustainability of development projects regarding the variability of national and local contexts.

¹⁸⁵ The analysis is based on the available data in the published reports by the Cities Alliance and the World Bank as well as the conducted personal communications with the planning actors in Alexandria in May 2014.

a. The Institutional Framework of the PUPA

The national government has put efforts to implement measures for improving the institutional framework for urban planning and development in the country in dealing with urban challenges, including supporting participation in local planning (see 3.2). The framework for these measures was the national FYP, which focused on developing regional and urban development plans that provide solutions for urban problems in major Egyptian cities. Some of the focal issues indicated in the FYP were monitoring the development plans of the desert and supporting the modernization of cities, in addition to developing new settlements to reduce the population pressure on the Nile-Delta. These issues were also integrated in the detailed master plans of the big cities, which addressed the current urban problems including vacant land and infrastructure (Ryser and Franchini 2008: 10).

The Egyptian National policy to deal with urban challenges of squatter settlements was adopted in 1993 as a response to the increasing pressure on the land through urban informality and resulting socio-economic problems (GoA et al. 2007: 11). The policy aimed to upgrade a large number of around 1221 squatter settlements through improving their physical infrastructure and services, from which the government has managed to upgrade 895. The action plans for implementing the policy has shown the raised governmental awareness of urban problems, especially regarding the rise of urban poverty. Yet, the policy' setbacks were identified in its focus on physical improvement without considering issues, like the need for employment among the youth, schools and social improvement. Particularly, community participation was an absent component in addition to the lack of an active role of the local NGOs, CDAs and the private sector (ibid).

The analysis phase of the CDS in Alexandria has focused on identifying the weaknesses of the legal and institutional framework and areas of improvement that can affect the participatory processes directly. The lack of capacity of the local government for urban management and service delivery was mainly attributed to the centralization of the planning decision-making and budget allocation, particularly for participatory strategic planning (Eiweida 2007: 3). Decentralization was an issue that started to be practiced in local budgeting in the governorates Alexandria and Qina, which were financing their urban development projects from their local resources through collecting fees from the citizens (UN-Habitat 2012: 3). Yet, the lack of PPP arrangements to undertake urban management tasks and lack of competition were attributed to the centralization of the state, leading to ineffective urban management and planning (Eiweida 2007: 3).

Hence, supporting participatory approaches in the local planning was limited before the issuance of the Planning Law 119/2008. The planning process was implemented according to Law 3/1982 in a top-down manner. Examining the articles of Law 3/1982 and the practices of the planning process in preparing and approving the master plan (2006-2009), participation was permitted in limited forms in later phases of the planning process through the involvement of the LPC (see 3.2.1.3) (GOPP no year). The LPC was the main actor that represents the citizens in the administrative unit. It was involved in the local planning and governance processes (see 3.2.4.4), still with very limited power compared to the appointed Executive Council. This has posed a challenge for the CDS and the PUPA.

To support the management of the PUPA in the CDS, as derived from the reports, measures for strengthening the institutional framework in Alexandria were undertaken, backed by international, regional, national, and local partners. Some of these measures were proposed to ensure the political commitment of the governor and to establish new institutions and flexible institutional forms in managing the PUPA on the local level. To manage and follow up the CDS process, maintaining the PPPs

and communication among the local stakeholders was organized through group meetings, conducting PRA techniques in informal areas, and forming participatory arrangements and building partnerships for technical support in the implementation (Eiweida 2007).

In practice, the given legal and institutional framework contradicted with the course of actions taken through the planning process of the CDS and related participatory arrangements, especially since these actions required the approval of the central government to be implemented on the local level. Moreover, the planning decision-making was taken by the state's reliable actors, mainly the national government, the regional office of the GOPP, and the governor, who is the representative of the local level, hence an influential actor in the planning process (Zakaria, Personal Communication: May 2014). These actors were the main partners to the international donors and development partners in the decision-making process regarding formulating and implementing the CDS and the PUPA in Alexandria, who ensured the political support for whole CDS process.

b. The Political Commitment as a Key for Institutional and Political Support of the PUPA

The local government, represented by the Governorate of Alexandria, took over leadership of the CDS process. Mainly the governor, his staff and the General Secretariat of the Governorate of Alexandria were the main decision makers regarding the PUPA, including the participants' lists and the key actors who should be included in the participatory processes. Their political support of the PUPA on the local level was essential to its continuity. The Governor of Alexandria, who represents the de-concentrated state administration, took the initiative for the CDS and ensured proceeding of its phases (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 26). Yet, a consensus between the two structures, the deconcentrated administration and the elected officials, was essential for initiating the CDS and in supporting the PUPA. Eventually, the flow of the process of the CDS was not possible without the support of the governor, as this was acknowledged as a main success factor of the CDS in the reports: *"Given the broad-based stakeholder participation since the early stages of the CDS, the project enjoys from the onset a great deal of local ownership and political commitment."* (Eiweida 2007: 4). The governor has ensured the involvement of the city key stakeholders to gain their cooperation, commitment and consensus regarding the strategy and the financial support. Acquiring the political support of the governor was very important for the PUPA, which was affected by the change of the governors in 2006 as well as the change of other supporting actors, like the Secretary General (head of the CDS team) and the director of the planning department. This change posed a challenge for carrying out the CDS process, especially since the new actors have extensively revised the action plans¹⁸⁶ (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b). As a result, the donors, for example the World Bank, had to convince the new governor to support the CDS and its outcome (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 26). This adjustment in the local administrative structure led to many delays in the CDS advanced stages and in carrying out the PUPA, particularly in raising the awareness to the CDS through the dissemination of the first outcomes to the public and to the media (ibid).

The role of the governor in the CDS, as in any endeavor for participatory urban planning and development, is highly questionable. The governor's role in supporting the CDS is derived from the mission, authorized to him by the central government (see 3.2.1.3). The governor's support of participation in the CDS depends on enabling key local actors from civil society and the private sector and empowering the local community and the marginalized to take part in the decision-making

¹⁸⁶ According to the report by CMI & MedCities et al. 2011b, it happened in the CDS I and most part of the CDS II.

process. In practice, the participatory process in planning the CDS was interpreted in a number of city consultation sessions headed and managed by the governor, who had the last word in the decision-making process. Accordingly, it is not usual for other representatives from the participants to express their views in these meetings (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 26). The strong leadership has benefited the CDS process, but without sharing the leadership with other local actors, it endangers its completion. (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b). If the leader is not guided by a sense of ownership for the CDS, the CDS and its PUPA are means to assert the existing political power as the main power, regardless of the interests and needs of the people. In rare cases, the ownership and commitment sense of the governor leads to promoting democratic conditions and inclusiveness (ibid), leading to sustainable outcomes and impact that can benefit future projects.

Therefore, there is a need to examine the power dynamics and the consensus and conflict situations in practice. The commitment of the governor to the CDS does not mean his commitment to implement the PUPA. Besides, the outcome of his decisions for physical improvement can lead to acquiring the people's support for his agenda and his next elections, which does not necessarily mean his commitment to an inclusive PUPA. In this regard, practicing participation, as a tool for assuring political power versus targeting community development, empowerment and inclusiveness, are two facets for the PUPA that need to be examined deliberately.

c. Participatory Arrangements and Partnerships

The PUPA was developed through planning consultation meetings and initiating partnerships on the governorate level, which brought actors and stakeholders together for the first time to formulate the strategy and to cooperate in the established forums (Tebbal 2011). The PUPA on the governorate level was managed through establishing a consultation forum or "Partnership Forum". Besides, new partnerships and synergies have been established to support local actions dealing with informality; for example, the Social Fund for Development (SFD¹⁸⁷) Besides, new partnerships and synergies have been established to support local actions dealing with informality; for example, the Social Fund for Development (CA et al. 2008).

On the local level, local councils were established in the attentive districts to manage the upgrading plan through managing participatory processes that include the locals from informal areas (details on the applied methodologies in 4.1.2.2). Partnerships were formed that involved international partners¹⁸⁸ to support the local capacity building needed for the implementation (Eiweida 2007: 7). They aimed to improve urban governance and support the management and implementation processes of the CDS. New bodies and arrangements have been established, mainly within the Alexandria governmental institutions, where mainly governmental employees and experts were involved, in addition to contractors from academia and DAs. The purpose of these arrangements and

¹⁸⁷ The SFD has assisted the Governorate of Alexandria in preparing the studied for the upgrading project of ISs. This had included household survey, participatory identification and validation of community needs and priorities, preparation of feasibility and design studies and tender documents (World Bank 2007b: 52).

¹⁸⁸ The international partners who cooperated in developing the ADP were "The Cities Alliance Program, the International Finance Corporation (IFC)'s Private Enterprise Program for the Middle East and North Africa (PEP-MENA) and Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) programs, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Government of Japan, the German Cooperation (GTZ and KfW), the Canadian CIDA, the Swiss Fund, the Danish Government (CTF), USAID (Technical Assistance for Policy Reform- TAPRII), UNICEF, UNHabitat, the Social Fund for Development, the Arab Urban Development Institute (AUDI), and Bibliotheca Alexandrina." These partnerships offered also technical assistance and expertise in capacity building and infrastructure development (Eiweida 2007: 7).

bodies was to manage the action plans of the CDS and to guide the implementation and the follow-up phases. The established leading bodies were:

Alexandria Development Agency (ADA) was established and counted as one of the important steps for institutional development through throughout planning the CDS and the ADP (CDS' sub-component 4.2). The ADA was considered an important pillar in building the capacity of the governorate and improving urban management (Eiweida 2007: 4). The tasks entailed not just managing the CDS' urban development projects on the governorate level but also building the basis for communication with and mobilization of the local community (see appendix 31: the structure and organization of the ADA). The ADA was responsible for the implementation of the CDS strategic plan and for the follow up of the action plans in the ADP, which required a certain amount of financial autonomy (GoA et al. 2007: 31). The lack of financial autonomy was identified as an institutional challenge that hindered sustaining the ADA constellation, although the institutional framework was arranged through a MoU between Bibliotheca Alexandrina and the General Organization of Physical Planning (GOPP) that provided the technical assistance for the ADA and the Governorate of Alexandria (Eiweida 2007: 8). A bundle of coordination mechanisms was developed within the structure of the ADA, while the policymaking remained on the national level (appendix 31). Besides, a partnership forum was proposed, where actors from the national and local level meet and discuss the ADP and the implementation steps (ibid). The actors included in this structure were mainly from governmental institutions and local experts.

The PUPA was an essential component that was planned throughout the activities of the ADA. The technical committee required the sub-specialist committees to promote the involvement of business and civil society actors through public consultation meetings. In addition, civil society mobilization and inclusion of representatives from the local economy and business sector should be promoted in policy and planning development, although there were no clear mechanisms or techniques to put this approach into practice (Mehina, Personal Communication: May 2014). This ambitious arrangement for capacity building of a city think-tank as a negotiation, coordination and implementation team was foreseen for the future urban development projects, as reliable and effective structure. Yet, this approach remained a proposal that lacked financial and political support. Only parts of it lasted until the finalizing steps of the project, which were financially supported (appendix 31).

The Project Management Unit (PMU) was initiated for the execution phase of the ADP, when four units have been established (see the illustration in appendix 31). The PMU¹⁸⁹ was one of the units involved in the implementation process, supporting technical and administrative tasks. The experts in the PMU were hired by the Governorate of Alexandria and were assisted by consultants employed in the Supporting Technical Evaluation Committee of the PMU (Eiweida 2007: 7).

4.1.2.2. *The Organization and Management of the PUPA: Mechanisms and Actors*

The PUPA aimed to raise awareness and ownership, and to build consensus among the key stakeholders over the CDS, in addition to empowering the locals and the civil society to take part in the CDS process to ensure its sustainability. In the long term, the PUPA should be scaled-up and institutionalized to be adopted in further CDS stages and future development projects. In the same vein, the aim of the CDS process was to formulate a shared vision that is agreeable to the city key stakeholders. To achieve this aim, sharing the knowledge between the technical actors and the city stakeholders was very important, as it was stated by the Secretary General of the Governorate of

¹⁸⁹ Established according to Alexandria Governor Decree No. 671 in August 2005.

Alexandria “[...] to build consensus among the city main stakeholders to come up with a shared vision of the city development through two-way information sharing between the technical experts and city stakeholders [...]” (World Bank¹⁹⁰ 2007: 9). Accordingly, participation was applied as a tool to build consensus among different city stakeholders on the future CDS. Thereby, participatory decision-making was essential in this process. Yet, participation should also be more than a process to exchange information. Through the PUPA, it was expected that the CDS team prudently identify the stakeholders, bring them together, and enable the building of a culture of participation in the processes of urban planning, governance, and development and the revitalization of the local economy (Eiweida 2007).

The first arrangements in putting the PUPA into practice were to organize a “Partnership Forum” that includes key stakeholders from the public and the private sectors as well as the civil society, who meet regularly for consultation throughout the CDS stages. On the governorate level, the partnership forum was led and managed by political, governmental actors and academics, who formed the core group in the CDS initiating stage. In addition, strengthening the cooperation with donors in the CDS framework was important to ensure the funding (Eiweida 2007: 7). This organizational step, forming the Partnership Forum and strengthening the cooperation with the donor, was essential to ensure the sustainability of the strategic planning and the local economic development processes intended in the CDS. Moreover, managing and sustaining the PUPA through the CDS and through the ADP planning and implementation, depended largely on the core group actors and their roles in maintaining communication, coordination and inclusiveness. In addition, they were the main actors in the decision-making process regarding the selection of key stakeholders in the CDS team, intended to be involved in the CDS’ action plans (World Bank 2007).

The key stakeholders were identified from national, governorate and district levels, and from DAs, businesses, and local communities (GoA et al. 2007: 8, 161) (see appendix 32: stakeholders, who are directly or indirectly involved in the ADP). The CDS team was established including a wide range of stakeholders from senior local officials and directors of line ministries, university professors, NGO representatives, prominent businesspersons, the advisory committees on LED, Urban Upgrading, Environment and Cultural Heritage and members of the Partnership Forum (GoA et al. 2007: 27). The arrangements for managing the CDS and the ADP’s operational plan were performed on two levels: on the governorate and the local level.

On the governorate level, three advisory committees were established by a governor decree, whose members were partly members of the Partnership Forum. The committees have undertaken the works on three pillars of the CDS regarding analytical studies and reports (GoA et al. 2007). The PMU has been established under the supervision of the Governor of Alexandria, who commissioned the Secretary General of the Governorate to provide an oversight on the PMU. The PMU director and five specialists¹⁹¹ and their staff led the implementation of some small-scale projects. In addition, a Technical Support Unit was dedicated to assist with its technical expertise. The experts in this unit can be hired (ibid: 99). Finally, the ADA was one of the main objectives of the CDS. The function of the ADA should be sustaining the PUPA along the CDS and monitoring the implementation of the plans. This body should be funded from the CDS budget. The ADA was technically supported by the national level;

¹⁹⁰ Assessment report.

¹⁹¹ Financial Manager, Procurement Specialist, Infrastructure Engineer, Economist and Executive secretariat (World Bank 2007: 99).

the GOPP and Bibliotheca Alexandrina (ibid: 44). On the local level, a Management Unit¹⁹² for Urban Upgrading and three local offices were initiated. The local offices were installed in local NGOs' rooms. The function of these management bodies was to ensure communication among the local communities in three pilot areas and the Governorate (CA et al. 2008: 43).

Bringing these bodies and actors' together, participatory activities and mechanisms have been developed and implemented in the CDS' stages. Stakeholders were expected to be involved from the first stage in formulating the CDS to the follow-up stage (as it stated in the CDS' terms CA 2006). The PUPA in the city of Alexandria has been undertaken on two parallel levels:

- *On the governorate or city level*, where the strategic decisions were taken with limited or none local participation, like developing the CDS has been taken mainly by the GoA and the CA. On this level, partnerships were built with key stakeholders mainly from governmental institutions, academia, businesses and international consultants. Workshops for consultation have been held to get feedback on the results of the analytical and assessment studies and the reports produced by the consultants.
- *On the district level*, a participatory action planning has been planned with involving representatives of the local councils in three pilot informal areas. In this planning process, PRA techniques have been conducted to prepare surveys and analyze the social, economic and environmental problems in the informal areas. This was followed by preparing proposals of detailed upgrading plans for these areas with their budget plans (GoA et al. 2007).

i. Participatory Activities and Mechanisms on the City Level

Participatory activities and mechanisms on the city level were represented by organizing partnerships, consultations, workshops and public meetings, which will be analyzed regarding¹⁹³ their purpose or the themes open for participation, participants' representation in the meetings¹⁹⁴, level of participation and the location of the participatory meetings (see table 30). The participatory activities on the city level were mainly planned and carried out in the following forms:

- I. Establishing a **Partnership Forum**, with scheduled meetings and workshops among the stakeholders; twice a year,
- II. **Key Stakeholders consultation**, for discussing interim analytical studies, mainly for Integrated Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (IESIA),
- III. **Public consultation/Discloser session**, to inform the public about the outcomes of the analysis (IESIA) to raise their awareness and gain public support to the CDS, and
- IV. **Sporadic Workshops** on specific measures and projects with key stakeholders, for example, a workshop was organized to discuss the underwater museum, with the participation of the UNESCO and the Ministry of Culture (CA et al. 2008: 71). Another workshop was held in 2006 for discussing Lake Marryot' land-use plan with the participation of the key stakeholders, e.g., the prime minister, the inter-ministerial committee, and the Governorate of Alexandria. A stakeholders' workshop was set up in January 2007 in cooperation with the governorate and

¹⁹² The unit served as the Governor's advisory unit and assisted in the coordination of ministries, donors and NGOs involved in upgrading squatter areas in Alexandria, in addition to the coordination with ministries, with SFD, with donors and with NGOs in their interventions in the three informal areas (CA et al. 2008: 43).

¹⁹³ There are more criteria to be considered in the analysis, yet, these will be examined based on the available data in the CDS reports and on the collected data through the Personal Communications conducted with key actors in 2014.

¹⁹⁴ According to the social assessment report 2007: 97, meetings have been documented (minutes reports), these reports are not available online, at the GOPP or the GoA.

in collaboration with the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) and the General Authority of Investment and Free Trade Zones (GAFI) to discuss its findings. (CA et al. 2008: 47).

The following participatory activities represent the milestones in developing the PUPA of the CDS in Alexandria. Their outcomes indicate the impact and sustainability of the PUPA:

The Initial workshop was held in 2003 to discuss the process of initiating and developing the CDS. The participants in the workshop from the city key stakeholders showed different reactions from cooperative to opposing that hindered reaching a consensus among them at the beginning. Most of the institutional weaknesses encountered on local level were the lack of trust and governmental accountability experienced in the past projects and plans. As a result, the key stakeholders have agreed on formulating a new, comprehensive, and strategic development plan of their city, an outcome that proved the effective communication that was arranged between the participants. To improve the communication and transparency between the stakeholders, further participatory meetings have been scheduled, which were intended to be more inclusive (CA et al. 2008: 15). Yet, there was no information on the selection process of the attendees, the topics, the course of the discussions or the outcomes of the workshop.

The Partnership Forum was established in the framework of the CDS and in the context of the ADP. It comprised key stakeholders from the governorate and of the city including representatives of the local economy and NGOs. The Forum identified priority interventions areas for economic development and physical development through urban upgrading and solving tenure issues (GoA et al. 2007: 120; CA et al. 2008: 16). The forum met twice a year to decide on key issues, mainly, economic issues to develop a medium to long-term economic development strategy, a sustainable participatory urban upgrading strategy for the informal areas, and a land-use plan of Lake Marriout area (CA et al. 2008: 16). The key stakeholders in the “Partnership Forum” were listed in the following table (in reference to “Annex 2” in the report published by CA et al. 2008: 81-82). The table has shown an absence of civil society and representation of the locals, despite confirming their participation in the reports:

The Type and Number of the Key Stakeholders involved in the “Partnership Forum”
Governmental institutions: (8) from governorate and the GOPP, and (3) from Bibliotheca Alexandrina
DAs (6)
Regional Organizations (2)
European City Representatives (7)
Academia (7)
Businesses (16): (3) from ADA
Media (1)

Table 27: Stakeholders involved the “Partnership Forum” as they listed in “Annex 2” in report published by the Cities Alliance (CA et al. 2008: 81-82).

Stakeholder’s consultation sessions, public hearing and disclosure: in the framework of Alexandria Development Project (ADP) in the CDS, public consultations¹⁹⁵ and disclosure of information on the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) have been undertaken. These events were intended to inform the affected stakeholders about it and to get their feedback on possible social and environmental effects on their lives. The target groups were mainly the locals, project beneficiaries and local NGOs. The consultation run by IESIA local stakeholders was also meant to raise the public awareness to the

¹⁹⁵ The program of public consultation was prepared according to the policy of the World Bank and the CDS in Alexandria: “World Bank policy, GP 14.70 Involving Non-governmental Organizations in Bank-Supported Activities and the framework of Alexandria City Development Strategy (CDS), a public consultation program should be prepared” (GoA et al. 2007: 105).

project and to gain its support. “The objectives of consultation and disclosure are to ensure that all stakeholders and interested parties are fully informed of the proposed project, and have the opportunity to express their views and opinions regarding the potential impacts that might affect their livelihood.” (GoA et al. 2007: 105). Alexandria Governorate has led the public consultation sessions with the technical support of the Project team¹⁹⁶. The sessions were held in two stages:

The 1 st Stage during the Scoping (Activities, Location and Roles)	The 2 nd Stage in the Preparation of the Assessment Draft (Activities, Location And Roles)
<p>Activities prior to the consultation session:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - initial identification of key stakeholders and interested parties - kick-off meeting (in April 2006) at the PMU with most relevant stakeholders for discussing the scoping results <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - in-depth interviews with the most pertinent local stakeholders through site visits <p>The consultation session (in May 2006)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - it was held at the Governorate of Alexandria - key stakeholders have discussed the reviews of the assessment reports - participants were from the civil society, governmental institutions and technical firms (From Annex 9¹⁹⁷ in the report (GoA et al. 2007), there was no documentation of civil society representatives) - the moderator of the session was the PMU manager (GoA et al. 2007: 106) 	<p>Public hearing session¹⁹⁸:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - it aims at receiving feedback from the public on the ADP impacts on the social and environment living conditions - open to a wide range of the public - Announcement by GoA and ADP, which was published in the official media - summaries¹⁹⁹ in the handouts and the presentation were in Arabic - disclosure of the final report was done locally and in the World Bank Info shop - comments and questions raised by the participants were documented and discussed internally - the location of the event was in a four stars hotel located in a high-income neighborhood <p>Issues raised by the participants regarding their contribution through the participatory process and those in the future:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - if the contributions of the participants will be taken into consideration in the following stages - the need to promote community engagement and their natural leaders in the project - public disclosure: handouts and information were available at the GoA, Bibliotheca Alexandria and World Bank Info shop
<p>Key Persons interviewed during the First Consultation Stage</p>	<p>Participants in the Public Hearing</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Alexandria Governorate (5) mainly the secretary general who was the project manager - ADP/PMU consultants (6): two from the GTZ, three from academia and one urban planner - Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (4) - other Government Organizations (1), for example, responsible for investment - governmental institutions (11) from different fields, like slum-upgrading, environment, economic development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Government (24) - academia (9) - business (19) - consultants (1) - NGOs (3), business NGO (1) - media (3) - DAs (5) <p>(the participant name/ affiliation was listed of about 64 attendants in the Annex 9 in GoA et al. 2007: 170-171)</p>

¹⁹⁶ The IESIA team supported in in coordinating the IESIA with the relevant stakeholders “local population, governmental and non-governmental organizations, academia and other relevant groups”. The team was supposed to conduct an effective identification and consultation with the related groups (GoA et al. 2007: 106).

¹⁹⁷ The Annex 9 includes lists of the participants in the public consultation sessions.

¹⁹⁸ The public hearing session was announced in the official newspaper one week before it was conducted “The consultation was held on August 1, 2006 while the announcement was published on July 25, 2006. An announcement was made on the most widely spread national newspaper (Al-Ahram) one week prior to the consultation date.” (GoA et al. 2007: 108).

¹⁹⁹ Getting the Summaries was possible after the announcement at the Public Relations office in the Governorate (GoA et al. 2007: 108).

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - civil society (1) a member of Alexandria Business Association' Board (this Association was mentioned in another list as a representative of the businesses in Alexandria) - DAs (6), four from The World Bank and two from the GTZ - technical consultants (8), mainly engineers active in the industry (GoA et al. 2007: 169) 	
The Outcome	The Outcome
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The awareness was raised among the participants - locals and institutional figures as well as businesses welcomed the ADP and were well informed (GoA et al. 2007: 107) - positive feedback through the willingness of the residents to pay for the improved services intended in the ADP (ibid) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Consultants have raised awareness of the exclusion risks in the urban governance - raised awareness by the participants to the need to include the local community in the implementation of the project, in order to ensure the social impact of the project and the improvement in the socio-economic conditions (GoA al el. 2007: 111)

Table 28: The examined consultation sessions and public hearing (GoA et al. 2007: 105-130).

Hence, the following table summarizes the examined participatory activities and mechanisms:

Participatory activities and mechanisms	Initial workshop in 2003	Partnership Forum' consultation and workshops	Public hearing session
Purpose of participation	Initiation the CDS	Identify priority intervention areas	Disseminate the results of the analysis and raise the awareness to the CDS processes and feedback is desirable
No. of Meetings and location	Once, at the GoA	Semi-annual (2 times a year)/ at Bibliotheca Alexandrina	once, at a prestigious hotel
Participants	The Secretary General of the governorate co-chaired the first workshop with the chairman of the Alexandria' LPC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Officials and Administration (8) from the governorate and GOPP - DAs (6) - regional Organizations (2) - European City Representatives (7) - Bibliotheca Alexandrina (3) - academia (7) - business (16), 3 from ADA, 1 from the media) (CA et al. 2008: 81-82)	Key stakeholders and representatives of the local communities
Level of participation	Consultative	Consultative With the key stakeholders Mostly Pro forma participation to ensure the approval. A high number of participants (49 participants), inputs were not effectively received	Non-participation pro forma approach, with limited input from the participants
Outcome	Consensus and integrated feedback in the future plans	Built partnership and gained commitment	Information disseminated, awareness was raised among the participants

Comments	There was no stakeholders' list of participants, no clear mechanism of participation documented	There was no representation from the CSOs in the participants in the partnership Forum and no available minutes of the meetings to evaluate the participatory processes	Public hearing was organized to inform the public on the project, there was no details on the meetings, the duration or the number of participants
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Table 29: The examined participatory activities and mechanisms on the city level.

In sum, examining the PUPA in the CDS stage I and stage II on the city level has shown that various forms of participatory activities were fulfilled in the CDS stages. The main purpose of these activities was to gain consensus, commitment, and cooperation, and to raise awareness of the city key stakeholders to the CDS themes and processes. Besides, public hearing, which targeted a wider range of stakeholders, was intended to inform them of the results of the assessment studies.

The level of participation²⁰⁰ in the consultation sessions of the “Partnership Forum” can be identified within the level of “Support” varying between “partnership” and “conciliation”, according to Choguill 1996, and as consultative, according to Hamdi and Goethert 1997 (see 2.3.1.1). At the beginning, partnerships were formed for sharing the responsibilities and for reaching a consensus among the key stakeholders. Yet, the governor and the national government took the final decision, regarding the plans. In the end, the stakeholders have to agree on these plans. In the consultation session, the consultants played the role of mediators among different stakeholder groups. Key stakeholders, who were invited and included in the consultation, were dominated by governmental and academic actors and lacked the representation of civil society.

The participation of the local stakeholders in the pilot areas was intended on the level of local planning, adopting for this approach PRA techniques in preparing for the upgrading projects of the pilot informal areas. In the CDS stage II, a public hearing session was held in a pro forma process, without reaching out to the local community. The announcement was only published in the official newspaper, and the location of the public hearing was a prestigious hotel in the city center. Thus, a lack of inclusiveness was identified as a weakness of the PUPA on the city level. This issue was debated in some of the consultation meetings, and raised for consideration in further CDS and project stages (based on the reports).

ii. Participatory Activities and Mechanisms on the district Level

Occasional meetings with local stakeholders were arranged, and PRA techniques were conducted. The participatory processes on the local level were carried out in the framework of urban upgrading of three pilot areas²⁰¹ El Amrawy, El Hadara Al Gadida and Naga Al Arab, out of 20²⁰² of the surveyed informal areas in the city. The pilot projects were selected²⁰³ by the governorate in 2004 and the work started in 2006 by the GTZ team in cooperation with SFD for implementation. The aim of the urban

²⁰⁰ The author considered in examining the level of participation in the case studies, the levels of participation defined by Hamdi and Goethert 1997 for technical approaches and by Choguill 1996.

²⁰¹ “El Amrawy (population of 365,000), El Hadara Al Gadida (population of 134,000) and Naga Al Arab (population of 29,000). Together they account for 15% of Alexandria Governorate population, only during Phase I, which is a significant proportion.” (World Bank 2007b: 16).

²⁰² The number in the World Bank Report is 20 informal areas, while the governorate had declared 30.

²⁰³ The criteria of the Governorate’s selection of the first pilot upgrading areas were:” (1) *having areas which represented the main typologies of the informal settlement phenomenon in Alexandria and (2) having each area in a different urban district (Hay).*” (GoA 2008).

upgrading was to improve the basic services, mainly in infrastructure and social services (World Bank 2007b: 16). The following figure shows the location of these areas:




Figure 20: The three pilot areas included in the PDP program by the GTZ and as a focus theme of the CDS of Alexandria (Abdrabo 2008: 5).

Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA) techniques were applied for gathering information. A survey²⁰⁴ was conducted in the informal areas in the CDS I, where the local community was involved in the process through providing the needed information. The purpose of the appraisal was to classify 20 informal settlements according to their demands of services and to develop upgrading plans to be implemented in the CDS II (World Bank 2008). The PRA surveys and the analysis of the data were followed by the preparation of a preliminary citywide urban upgrading strategy for Alexandria Governorate. The strategy set short, medium and long-term action plans in the 20 settlements while considering existing and planned government interventions in these areas, like the PDP program. Most of the residents in the three areas depend in service provision on the interventions of the Community Development Associations²⁰⁵ (CDAs), which do not exist in all areas and therefore the demand for services is very high, especially regarding education, schools and literacy (from the SPAAC consultancy report 2006 cited in; CA et al. 2008). The strategy aimed to improve the urban, environmental, local economic and institutional conditions, in addition to solving land tenure security issues (World Bank 2008; CA et al. 2008: 40).

The Participatory Local Development Program of the GTZ²⁰⁶ in these areas was intended to establish stakeholders' councils and project liaison offices in each of the pilot areas and to arrange the tenure regularization issues (SFD 2006: 3). The World Bank and the Governorate of Alexandria commissioned the GTZ to manage the development process. In the framework of the program, meetings were held

²⁰⁴ A consultancy body SPAAC has undertaken the survey and set the survey reports. It was commissioned by the SFD.

²⁰⁵ According to the NGO Law 84/2002, there are two main types of NGOs: Community Development Associations (CDAs) and Civic Foundations (CFs).

²⁰⁶ No reports were available or accessible from the GTZ.

in each area to bring the local stakeholder councils from the three pilot areas together and to train them to take the responsibility in the implementation and maintenance phases of the upgrading projects. The participants included, among others, representatives of the NGOs and the private sector, selected natural leaders (from elders, women and youth), executives of the district administration, representatives of the LPCs of the districts, the Parliament, and the Shuraa Council (CA et al. 2008: 40; World Bank 2008). Within the framework of the GTZ' program, participatory forms of budgeting and coordination were held between the funders, including the World Bank and the SFD, representatives of the governorate and the chiefs of the three informal areas. Community participation in the upgrading projects' implementation and monitoring in the three areas was represented by the involvement of the local stakeholders' councils. These councils were representatives of community groups in the districts as well as the poor and disadvantaged groups (youth, women and elderly, see appendix 33: upgrading of three slum areas in Alexandria). This approach was planned to continue in the following CDS stages and phases, which was not realized due to ending the CDS process before its completion.

Participatory activities and mechanisms	Purpose of/ or issues open for participation	No. of meetings and location	Participants	Level of participation	Outcome	Comments
PRA techniques By SPAAC consultancy (2006) commissioned by the SFD ²⁰⁷	To gather information from the 20 informal areas and to run surveys in the three pilot areas to define upgrading priorities	Consultants visits in the field and interviews with households from the locals	Consultants run the surveys with representatives of the local stakeholders and the CDAs	None participation to indirect level of participation (Hamdi and Goethert 1997)	Reports provided the results of the surveys upon which Urban upgrading plans were developed in the pilot areas	It is not clear how and who from the households have been reached out in the surveys
Focus group discussions in addition to 43 in-depth-interviews with community members of the three pilot areas	To gather information for social assessment that can help in understanding the urgent problems faced by the local stakeholders, esp. land tenure issues	Meetings were taken place seven times at the CDA offices and five focus group discussions in the three areas	Mainly with local stakeholders from the three informal areas; fishermen communities at Maawa El Sayadeen	None to indirect level of participation	Data was used for the social assessment report	No details on the selected groups of interviewees and the issues raised, in addition, the impact on the local stakeholders was not identified in the reports
Participatory Meetings	Initiating local councils to support and implement small-scale community projects for development in form of youth center, or in an organizational form through PB plan within the pilot areas	Not available	Representatives of the NGOs and CDAs, local administration, local councils, Shurra council, executive councils and the private sector	It cannot be defined due to the lack of information on the meetings	Local stakeholders councils have been established and trained	Lack of information on the meetings on the local level, the applied techniques, the managers and the participants

²⁰⁷ The Social Fund for Development (SFD) was commissioned to conduct the surveys under a collaboration agreement with the Alexandria Governorate (GoA et al. 2007: 120).

Participatory Budgeting plan 2006/2007	Plenary meeting was held to define the status of available budgets as well as discussions for coordination regarding the time plan of implementing and monitoring the budget plan 2006/2007 for each project in each area and for Preparing the draft of 2007-2012 plan.	Not available	With representatives from the three informal areas, and the team with the Executive Board, the Local Council, and the Heads of the three districts concerned, In addition to the chairmen of the facilities and services institutions in the Governorate, the World Bank and the SFD	It cannot be defined due to the lack of data	Outcome: Budget plans prepared	
Community Participation in preparing the Budget plan 2007-2012	To prepare the plan 2007-2012 for the upgrading projects in the areas that were proposed to be included In the FYP (2007-2012 ²⁰⁸)	Not available	Representatives of the local community in coordination with the Ministry of Local Administration and the Ministry of Economic Development	It cannot be defined, due to the lack of data	The plan 2007-2012 was prepared	It is not clear who from the local community has participated in the community participatory meetings (if it was limited to the participation of the local stakeholders councils or more from the locals
Participatory local action planning (started in each area with a large public meeting)	Involving the local community in implementing the small-scale projects	Not available	Meetings within the local stakeholders' councils and the locals, organized and coordinated with the support of the GTZ	Consultative level to shared control, still more data is needed to define the level of participation	In some pilot areas, small-scale projects were implemented, like the social center in one of the areas	No precise details on the techniques and the participants' list

Table 30: The examined participatory activities and mechanisms on the local level (The information in the table were summarized from the reports: CA et al. 2008 based on SPAAC survey reports 2006).

²⁰⁸ The plan (2007-2012) was prepared with community participation and in coordination with the Ministry of Local Administration and the Ministry of Economic Development (World Bank 2008: 40). There is, however, no further details how the participatory process was organized and the roles of different local actors.

Examining the PUPA on the local level has demonstrated that new forms of community participation' activities and mechanisms have been organized through preparing and implementing the CDS action plans and the small-scale projects. The participatory mechanisms were mainly PB and the PRA techniques, which later focused on conducting a detailed baseline survey in the targeted pilot settlements and establishing a stakeholder's council for each of the three areas (Eiweida 2007: 9). Still, evaluating these processes and identifying the level of participation require detailed information and minutes of the meetings with the stakeholders, which were not available or accessible.

Community participation from the urban poor was planned and organized after the strategic planning decisions have been taken on the city level (Eiweida 2007: 9). This top-down approach was traditionally committed in the planning process for producing master plans according to the Egyptian Planning Law No. 3/1982. Accordingly, the role of the public is limited in the planning process to their feedback on the plan in the dissemination phase within a definite timeframe.

The last decades have witnessed an increasing role of the CDAs and local NGOs in developing detailed plans or in the process of local planning (Zakaria, Personal Communication: May 2014). In the framework of the CDS, local associations or CDAs, which represent the interests of the locals, and their natural leaders were involved in the three pilot projects in the informal areas and collaborated with the actors from the government and the consultants. Still, it is not clear how these associations represent the interests of the local community and which role they play in mediating between the local communities and the local government. The registered CDAs and NGOs were the main representatives of the civil society in Alexandria according to the Law²⁰⁹ No. 84/2002. The associations formally involved in the activities of city development were mainly charity and religious-based local associations. The local associations are mainly active on the district and neighborhood level to support the poor, women, elderly, disabled and youth especially in the informal settlements (Abou Omira, Personal Communication: May 2014). Their activities are controlled by the government and should normally be approved and coordinated by the local government in any development project. These terms are especially strict when the associations cooperate with DAs, which are formally not allowed to support them financially or to collaborate with them without the permission of the national government, particularly the approval of the Ministry of Social Affairs (according to the law). Yet, the role of the local associations has been emerging and extending to further development areas in the last years, like environmental awareness or in the mediation between the local communities and the local government to settle land tenure issues in informal areas (Soliman, Personal Communication: May 2014).

In many city consultation sessions and during the preparation of the CDS and its development project ADP²¹⁰ between 2004 and 2007, the participation of the citizens was not documented. There was no information on the participants from the CDAs or the local stakeholders. The involvement of the CDAs or local NGOs was limited and hence criticized in the reports. In the participants' list, three participants from the local NGOs were listed. However, it is not clear how they were informed and which role and interests they represented in the CDS process. For example, the list of participants in the consultative session shows ABA as the only actor declared under the participating CSOs (GoA et al. 2007: 179). The

²⁰⁹ Law 48/2002 for Associations, where the former law 153/1999 was abolished.

²¹⁰ There was another project, which has started in 2010 and should be implemented in two phases; phase I until 2012 and phase II until 2014. This case is not considered in this research, due to its irrelevance regarding the defined timeframe.

ABA defines itself as a non- governmental and non-profit organization²¹¹ (ABA 2017). ABA enjoys political and governmental support, and in comparison to other local CDAs and state wages, its employees earn high salaries. (Zakaria, Personal Communication: May 2014). This observation corroborates the need for further examination of the criteria for selecting the stakeholders and their role in the CDS, which were not clear in Alexandria's CDS. Particularly, the main actors in the decision-making process regarding the PUPA need to be examined regarding their influence on the outcome of participation in planning.

4.1.3. Discussing the Success and Challenging Factors in the Case Study of Alexandria

To understand the PUPA in the CDS of Alexandria, success and challenging factors of the PUPA are going to be discussed considering the developed key analyzing and comparing factors (see 2.5).

4.1.3.1. Urban Governance Framework of the PUPA in the Alexandria's CDS

Through the PUPA in the CDS, institutional improvements have been achieved that affected the urban governance process. New structures have been established, represented by participatory management bodies, such as ADA on the governorate level, and the local units on the district level. The actors in the established local units were assigned to carry out the urban upgrading works. For this purpose, they have been trained through capacity building programs regarding participatory upgrading, land regularization and Geographic Information System (CA et al. 2008: 44). Preparing the local actors at the governorate and local units was necessary for developing the detailed participatory urban upgrading plans in the three pilot informal areas and for implementing the participatory upgrading projects (ibid).

The political support of the governor and his office was essential for the CDS process and the PUPA. The steering committee was established by the GoA to steer the PUPA by coordinating the partnerships with different administrative levels. The steering committee should include members from national and governorate levels in addition to the prominent and active NGOs in the local economy, like the ABA. The partnerships were formed between actors from the public and private sector, and academia, to develop the CDS and monitor its implementation. For maintaining these partnerships, a permanent body or structure of the ADA was established. The ADA was responsible for managing the PUPA throughout the implementation of the action plans and for planning new ones. The ADA was supposed to coordinate the CDS processes institutionally and work on the final stages. This body should work closely with the Comprehensive Planning Agency, in coordination with the steering committee on the national level, inter-ministerial, which can help to facilitate urban decisions (CA et al. 2008: 45). The ADA and the local units, although they were essential for the sustainability of the PUPA along with the implementation of the action plans of the CDS, were dissolved after closing the CDS (Mehina, Personal Communication: May 2014).

Still, the awareness of the national government was raised through the CDS, and meetings were held with the stakeholders and development partners to accelerate the changes in urban planning policy, for instance, by convincing the central government to provide the funding for immediate pollution abatement measures in Lake Marriout (CA et al. 2008: 68). In addition, in collaboration with AUDI and UNICEF, the government had supported measures for the development of the youth and the

²¹¹ The Alexandria Business Association (ABA) "*is a non-governmental, non-for-profit organization based in Alexandria, Egypt, aiming at Economic Development and improving the Business climate through research, advocacy and raising the efficiency of Human Resources. ABA is also an active contributor to community development and manages one of the most successful micro-finance projects.*" (ABA 2017).

protection of children at risk in informal settlements (ibid). In this regard, the PUPA led to a shift in urban policy and revealed the potential of promoting dialogue and collaboration in supporting inclusiveness of the urban poor and addressing their needs and roles in the planning process. Yet, this was seen as a threat to many political actors in the government, who were dominating the urban decision-making process: “[...] at the national level, there is a lot of support in Egypt for a participatory and more inclusive approach to planning. It is clear that the current political and economic situation in Egypt has created a great deal of interest in planning that reflects the needs of the average Egyptian to a greater extent than was necessary in the past. On the other hand, there are some departments, agencies and individuals whose power and influence may be affected by any proposed change in how policy is developed and implemented [...]” (CA et al. 2008: 76).

The institutional challenges for the PUPA in the CDS were represented by the state’s high level of centralization in proceeding the planning process. The Egyptian Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development controls the planning process if that for master planning or local planning in cities and villages. Likewise, the national government and the governor have taken strategic decisions regarding the CDS process. The governor is the representative of the central government, and the main decision-maker on the local level. Therefore, developing a master plan or implementing urban projects would be affected by the change of governors or any other political or administrative changes, imposed from the central government (Zahran, Personal Communication: May 2014). The governor affected the PUPA. He defined the meeting place for the consultation meetings, led the participatory processes, and influenced the views expressed by the participants, which represented mostly the views of the political leader or the governor (Ayad, Personal Communication: May 2014).

As a result, the CDS was performed as a technocratic top-down process that led to the production of unrealistic plans without considering the urgent local needs. This approach was reinforced by the limited role of the planners in this process, who were obligated to follow up on the centralized decisions. (CA et al. 2008: 75). The experience of the PUPA in the CDS was therefore a top-down approach interpreted in city consultation sessions for discussing the strategic development plans of the city of Alexandria (Soliman, Personal Communication: May 2014). Traditionally, any form of consultation or participation with city stakeholders must be institutionalized and approved by the state according to the law and the contribution of the citizens to urban policy or in the process of bypassing new urban laws was usually not considered (CA et al. 2008: 75). For example, the update of the master plan was merely done on the governmental level and with the GOPP without getting inputs from the local stakeholders or the NGOs. Moreover, implementing participatory planning processes on the scale of a big city, like Alexandria, was not possible, considering the required time and costs for public involvement, which was beyond the foreseen budget and the limited capacity of the governorate (Soliman; Mohsen; Zakaria, Personal Communication: May 2014). Besides, the absence of traditional citizens participation meant that mobilizing the citizens was not possible, which led to excluding essential local partners from the CDS planning process.

Conversely, in many cases, top-down planning approaches were considered an effective option when urgency for action is required, and the institutional capacity to manage the participation process is lacking. Yet, the high degree of centralization in urban policymaking had led to procrastinating the reforms in the local administration. Hindering a real decentralization or adopting participatory approaches in governance and planning led to delays in taking action on urgent urban problems. With the absence of a functional role of the institutional apparatus in responding to the citizens’ needs and services, participatory efforts emerge in informal forms, like the self-help or “Al-majhud Al-dhati”, that

supports the role of the NGOs in undertaking a great part of the tasks of the state informally (Ben Nefissa 2009: 179). Formalizing these informal forms of participation through institutionalizing participation requires an organizational form, a participatory institution or a team on the local level, where planning activities can be shared with the national level or with the GOPP. For that purpose, decentralization in the urban planning, governance and management processes is still a prerequisite for adopting PUPAs.

Another institutional challenge was the lack of governorate capacity to manage strategic participatory planning that affected the urban management process of public services and addressing related administrative limitations. The weak capacity of the local government and the absence of cooperation with the citizens and local communities have led to a limited influence on the urban decision-making process and the financial management of urban development projects (World Bank 2007: 1). An additional weakness on the local level is the lack of expertise to undertake participatory planning processes, in addition to the lack of power given to the urban managers and local planners for managing PUPAs (Zakaria, Personal Communication: May 2014). Moreover, planners and urban managers need to utilize the cultural assets of their city in developing adjusted participatory mechanisms and communication tools that consider diverse social groups, including the poor communities. In this regard, PUPAs are challenged by social fragmentation on the neighborhood level, the absence of local leaders, and the lack of local awareness for participation (Mostafa, Personal Communication: May 2014). Therefore, adopting PUPAs in development and planning should be accommodated to the existing cultural context of the city, including urban planners, government employees, academia, the media, and local NGOs and CDAs. The absence of a well-educated and organized civil society led to raising the role of academia as an advocate of civic engagement, which was attributed to the increased role of the knowledge (idealist views), not because of the experience on the ground, a gap that needs to be addressed more effectively in the future. Finally, the need for trained staff to develop and implement participation can be met in capacity building of the HR in the governorate, allocating the necessary resources and ensuring the political will to adopt PUPAs (Bayad; Zakaria, Personal Communication: May 2014). In order to ensure the participation of the citizens, especially the poor local communities, community development and political empowerment are the basis to motivate them into the participatory process (Abbott 1996: 8).

4.1.3.2. *The Organization and Management of the PUPA: Mechanisms and Actors*

The whole PUPA of the CDS was a novel approach on the city level, bringing actors and stakeholders together for the first time and providing the basis for collaboration and partnerships.

a. The Actors and Participants: Leadership, Stakeholders and Inclusiveness

The political leadership was represented by the role of the governor in supporting the participatory approach on the governmental level and the formed partnerships with key stakeholders from the private sector, academia and other governmental actors. The role of the governor in the CDS (2004-2007) was important for enabling the private sector to participate in the service delivery and housing supply (World Bank 2007: 3). The governor had an essential role in affecting the actors involved, their cooperation, and consensus as well as ensuring the approval from the state for funding the CDS. The strong leadership of the governor in supporting the PUPA has resulted in building the “Partnership Forum” and leading further participatory meetings through the CDS stages that their outcomes were beneficial to the planning process. Yet, the political support of the governor as a precondition for the realization of the PUPA in the CDS without sharing the leadership with other local actors posed a threat to the sustainability of the PUPA and the CDS process. If the leader is not guided by a sense of

ownership for the CDS, then the CDS will be applied as means for furthering his political power and control, and the participatory processes will be performed on a pro forma basis only. In this regard, the participatory processes led by the Governorate of Alexandria were managed on a pro forma basis. Hence, this posed a challenge for the PUPA and the CDS process in Alexandria, especially by limiting the freedom of the participants from the lower local levels to express their views in the consultation meetings supervised by the governor (model pro forma by Hamdi and Goethert 1997) (see 2.3.1.1). Moreover, the role of the governor in the CDS Alexandria was determining for undertaking two stages of the CDS, yet proceeding with the next stage was a challenge after a change in governors and their staffs. The new government has extensively revised the action plans, due to the lack of trust in the former government (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b).

Considering the achievement of the PUPA in bringing the key stakeholders together from the outset of the CDS process, still, city stakeholders from CDAs and the urban poor were underrepresented. Representatives of the marginalized groups from the city stakeholders were not invited to the activities and workshops announced and organized by the governorate throughout the CDS. Mainly institutions and businesses, academia, in addition to prominent NGOs, mostly from elite organizations, were invited for participating in the CDS process (CA et al. 2008: 75). Furthermore, deciding the terms for selecting the participants in the workshops remained unclear. Development cooperative partners addressed the underrepresentation of the urban poor in the planning decision-making process as an institutional challenge for the CDS. Their participation was very important in discussing land tenure issues, resettlement and terms of compensation raised in ISs. This was also identified as a source of conflict between the Egyptian laws and the World Bank' policies (World Bank 2007b: 110). Decisions regarding resettlement in informal areas were usually taken by the central government and people although informed about it were excluded in deciding on their options and alternatives (ibid). Even though the consultation and participatory events have focused on informing the stakeholders on the resettlement procedures, from planning to monitoring, the government did not consider the feedback from the stakeholders in the informal settlements (ibid). The resulting participatory process and events in these cases underline the top-down approach in the planning process and the "manipulation" level of participation in the practices of urban planning (see 2.3.1.1 and table 9: levels of participation by Choguill 1996). Furthermore, the participation of CSOs in the meetings and workshops was intended to be limited, which is reflected in the organized participatory processes, their location, the character and number of the anticipated participants, especially in the second stage of the CDS, which was intended for public hearing or public consultation. The representation of the key stakeholders included the NGOs, locals, academia, media and representatives of national and local institutions, for example, the EEAA was confirmed (World Bank 2007b: 20). Yet, there was no documentation of the representatives from the local communities and their contribution through the course of the performed participatory processes.

Developing and implementing the PUPAs while dealing with inclusiveness issues revealed the need for skilled actors who can develop the participatory tools and manage the participatory planning processes effectively. The lack of the capacity of the governorate has created difficulties for developing adjusted participatory mechanisms to promote inclusiveness within the framework of the CDS and the limited time frame and resources. Supporting the CDS in Egypt as it is experienced in Alexandria required more time to ensure an effective PUPA, inclusiveness of the poor, and raising funding for the costs of establishing new-trained institutional bodies, like the ADA, in addition to developing adjusted tools. Primarily, promoting the PUPA required sustainable stakeholders' communication strategies that

ensure a meaningful outreach to diverse stakeholders' groups (CA et al. 2008: 76). Moreover, it requires trust among different city stakeholders and the local government. The lack of trust is traditionally rooted between the citizens and the local governmental. Lack of trust combined with the given centralization in decision-making on the local level have led to an overlooked role of the municipal actors and from the citizens in the participatory decision-making, compared to the role of the governor. This can be attributed to the history of governmental corruption and clientalism, which resulted in weakening the sense of citizenship and responsibility. Besides, viewing the role of the government in its administrative role hindered to mobilize active citizenship politically as well as motivating them to participate in urban development. In this regard, the state legitimacy is questioned, as well as its actors in the given governance settings, and their exercise of power on the local level (Pieterse 2000: 39).

To meet the challenge of lacking the governorate's capacity, the role of academia and the new-educated generation of local planners in supporting the PUPA in the CDS was strongly emphasized in Alexandria. Academia was a traditional local partner in the urban development endeavors in Alexandria. Represented by the professors and professionals, academics played an important role in supporting the local government as consultants or subcontractors. They were close partners and key stakeholders in guiding the planning decision-making process regardless the outcomes, which have little or no influence on the political decision-making process. The challenge of the role of academia was the weak political power they have been given to influence urban policies, regardless their views and visions of PUPAs (Zakaria; Mustafa, Personal Communication: May 2014). Despite the abovementioned challenges, academia played an important role, and it still has the potential as an influential agent of change of planning practices. In this regard, the relationship between the local consultants from academia and the local government is very important to build the culture of participation, if the academic actors would politically acquire more power to raise the issues of inclusiveness in planning. Moreover, in the last decade, the role of academia has found a new emerging role through the new-educated generation of local planners. Young planners in high governmental positions, who have acquired post-graduate degrees from Egyptian or western universities, e.g., in the UK, USA, France or Germany, facilitate the work with international partners and with new planning concepts, which is needed to modernize the traditional planning system. This approach, in turn, helps to save the costs of outsourcing to external experts and consultants. Planners as young professionals play a different role from the traditional planners' role in the planning institutions or as planners in private planning bureaus. Engaging in the public sector, planners are willing to contribute with their knowledge in practice, yet their efforts are usually confronted by institutional and cultural challenges (Zakaria; Mustafa, Personal Communication: May 2014). Dealing with these challenges requires a deep understanding of the local context to develop adaptable tools in beneficially dealing with institutional constraints instead of working against them. For local planners, understanding the cultural setting can help in managing PUPAs and shift their role to communicators and mediators between the citizens, the poor, and the government.

Finally, the PUPA in the CDS would not be realized without the financial support of DAs (mainly by the World Bank) and technical support (from the GTZ) in capacity building and in conducting the PRA techniques in the upgrading projects and in building partnerships throughout the CDS process. Yet, the limited resources and the time cycle of the project have resulted in difficulties regarding the impact and the sustainability of the PUPA and led to the dependency on the contributions and support of the DAs until the closure of the CDS.

b. Participatory Mechanisms and Communication Strategies

The PUPA was organized on two levels; on the governorate level and the community level in the three pilot areas. While bringing the actors from both levels together in the participatory process as desired, this division has shown a communication gap between the community and the decision-makers in the governorate. Furthermore, the communication strategies and participatory mechanisms were applied separately and on each of these levels differently, which is seen as a strength and a weakness at the same time. From the local government's perspective, considering the challenge of reaching out to a wide variety of city stakeholders, narrowing down the issues for participatory planning has helped to develop the CDS within the limited period and allocate resources effectively. On the contrary, actors from the DAs have seen this approach as contradicting the purpose of the PUPA for including the poor in the decision-making process on the first stages of the CDS.

In the first consultation stage (scoping): in-depth interviews with community members were carried out, still lacking clear terms of interviewees' selection²¹² and reaching out strategies. In addition, involving the local stakeholders and CDAs²¹³ in the CDS through conducting PRA techniques was organized by the governorate, the GTZ and the SFD. This was followed by the establishment of a "Stakeholders Council" in each of the informal areas, represented by natural and proactive leaders (CA et al. 2008: 75). The aim of applying the PRA techniques was to collect the data from the local stakeholders from the urban poor, without a direct involvement in the planning process. However, identifying the natural leaders and local councils was one basis to further the PUPA in the later stages. At this point, the CDS vision has been formulated and the objectives have been set in a top-down approach. The PUPA described above that was undertaken in the informal areas by the GTZ and the SFD, was the only bottom-up approach for complementing the CDS vision with the views of the stakeholders from the poor (CA et al. 2008: 76).

In the second CDS stage, which was intended for the second public hearing or public consultation, many city stakeholders have participated, including the NGOs, the locals, academia, the media and representatives of national and local institutions, like the EEAA. The governorate has promulgated for participation in this event (World Bank 2007b: 20) mainly in newspapers and through direct invitations (ibid). Yet, there was no clear information on the reach out of a strategy to different city stakeholder groups and their contribution to the session.

In sum, considering the limited data regarding communication strategies, tools, and participatory mechanisms, the main participatory events were limited to the workshops, two public consultations, and the interviews in the framework of data collection through PRA in the later phase of the CDS. Through the reports, the city stakeholders who attended the formal meetings were the same actors across the CDS process, exposing an underrepresentation of the urban poor.

c. The Outcome of the PUPA in the Alexandria's CDS

The outcome of the PUPA was its novelty in bringing city key stakeholders together for the first time, compared to the traditional top-down approach in development and planning. It was represented by the established platforms for participation, for example, the consultation, the workshops, the media platforms, and dissemination (CA et al. 2008: 44). Moreover, synergies with national and development partners in the framework of the CDS were built, and commitment for the follow-up phase, particularly from the local partners and the governor, was ensured. The local partners from the public and private

²¹² Based on the stakeholders' list, available in annex (7) in the IESIA report by GoA et al. 2007.

²¹³ PRAs, followed by in-depth base line survey.

sectors have supported the CDS with their investments in the action plans and projects (CA et al. 2008: 67). This commitment was evident in the first stage of the CDS. In the second stage, political, technical, and financial challenges have faced the CDS and the PUPA, leading to the abandonment of and closing the CDS process.

Yet, training for participatory budgeting in one of the three pilot districts was provided in the framework of implementing the PUPA in the CDS and promoting related partnerships and cooperation on the local level. Besides, based on the cooperation between DAs and the local councils on the district level, a community center was established, which was funded through the Local Area Initiative Program, initiated by the GTZ/KfW. A further outcome of the development cooperation and the partnerships between GTZ/KfW, SFD, and ABA was the provision of micro-credits to the local businesses in the pilot areas (CA et al. 2008: 74). As a result, partnerships and trust among the stakeholders were built, and as a tangible success, health care in the target areas was improved. This achievement has led to furthering cooperation with more international and regional partners in the project, like the UNICEF and AUDI (ibid: 68).

The establishment of the ADA, although was not realized later, was a great culmination of the adopted PUPA throughout the CDS. The undertaken local projects in the pilot informal areas were also an outcome of the PUPA based on the cooperation between the local government, the CDAs and local leaders, the SFD and the GTZ. Further outcomes can be seen in the raised awareness among the local actors who were involved for the first time in the CDS process, and their contribution to future discourses in developing the PUPA in the cultural context and in planning practices (Mehina; Bayad, Personal Communication: May 2014).

4.1.3.3. *The Impact and Sustainability of the PUPA in the Alexandria' CDS*

Acknowledging the PUPA in the CDS as an innovative approach was one of the positive impacts of the participatory approach. Moreover, Alexandria's CDS in its urban reform approach and the held partnerships and cooperation was seen as a guiding model for other cities, nationally and regionally. The CDS process was intended to be scaled-up nationally and locally, on the city level through "A Citywide Slum Upgrading Program" and on the national level through „A National Program of CDS“(CA et al. 2008: 74). Particularly through adopting the PUPA in approaching slum upgrading, the CDS was seen as a model for urban planning reforms, dealing with informality to other Arab cities (ibid). Further identified outcomes to scale-up were the forms of partnerships and synergies among the city key stakeholders that had a positive impact on the lives of the poor communities in informal settlements, for instance, through implementing some of the pilot projects and initiatives. These partnerships had also contributed to strengthening the cooperation with DAs and forming new partnerships for future plans and projects.

However, the scale-up of successful small-scale projects need to consider the constraints in the design of the projects, especially lack of inclusiveness and the challenge in the applicability of the PUPA to the existing local setting. Moreover, to implement projects where large groups of people are involved, mechanisms should be developed where they can be reached out, listened to, heard, and acted upon (UNDP/CSOPP 1997: 29).

Examining the PUPA through the field research, in comparison with the documentation of the CDS process in the reports, has demonstrated many contradictions. In practice, it was hard to acknowledge the positive impacts of the PUPA (based on Personal Communications with the local development experts as well as the local team in the governorate and academia: May 2014). General statements

have confirmed the contribution of the CDS process and the PUPA to raise a sense of ownership, which led to a fruitful collaboration in realizing the projects: “[...] non-participatory nature in planning, decision-making and implementation. Instead, the Alexandria CDS and ADP rely on a bottom-up approach where ownership rests with local authorities/stakeholders with emphasis on broad-based participation in formulating the long-term vision and identifying development programs [...]” (World Bank 2007: 5; CA et al. 2008: 74). Yet, it was hard to examine different components of the PUPAs due to the lack of documentation of the performed participatory processes, especially regarding the level of participation and the contribution of the engaged participants (passively or actively).

Moreover, participatory activities were organized after the central government has taken the key planning decisions. Although the participatory process was described as an inclusive and “a multi-stakeholders” process, in the reports, it was hard to detect a balanced representation of the city stakeholders in the lists of attendants. In most of the sessions, meetings and workshops, there was a minimum or absence of civil society representation. Considering the number and the character of these actors, just temporal benefits and limited impact seem to target selected groups of stakeholders for a short period of time (Mustafa, Personal Communication: May 2014). The partnerships and meetings with the governmental actors, elite academics, and experts were routine procedures that are usually planned and carried out in each development project (Abo Al-kheer; Ayad; Mustafa; Mehina, Personal Communication: May 2014).

Accordingly, the CDS, similar to many of the development interventions, was seen as a cosmetic development project with limited impact in practice. Yet, it was acknowledged that the collected data in the reports were essential to the continuity of funding for the CDS from the donors and for ensuring the political support from the national government (Mustafa; Zakaria, Personal Communication: May 2014). For the DAs, the character of the development approach in the CDS involved a large-scale capital infrastructure and investment that is conditioned by the support of the state, which is not necessarily favorable for the PUPA and community development through participation. PUPA on smaller scale, e.g., community-based management projects concerning health care or environmental development, have more chances to succeed since there is a higher degree of flexibility in planning and the possibility to involve local actors aside from national governmental actors (UNDP 1997: 29).

Ensuring the sustainability of the PUPA was challenged by the time limitation and the institutional constraints through the lack of capacity of the local government and the political support. The CDS program was not realized until the end and the CDS and the PUPA were not institutionalized or sustained. Still, the institutionalization of participation as an instrument in the new Planning Law in 2008 is an indication of the institutional awareness, which raised over time for the need to improve urban governance and planning practices through PUPAs.

Hence, successes and challenges of the PUPA are summarized in the following table:

Key Factors	Successes	Challenges
U. Governance framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political support to initiating the CDS and the PUPA - cooperation across the planning levels - initiating institutional participatory bodies, like the ADA and the local unites - gaining cooperative partners from DAs and ensuring further funding for the action plans 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The PUPA was a top-down approach - fragmented planning approaches top-down (urban decision-making) vs. bottom up (participatory local projects with CDAs) - the challenges for a bottom-up PUPA has mainly two sides; one was the centralized planning system and the other was the lack of community development approach

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inserting changes in urban policy regarding urgent urban problems, like land tenure issues - undertaking improvements in urban governance through establishing bodies for coordination and through initiating further PUPAs on lower local levels - raising the municipal awareness and the supporting role of the CDAs and local NGOs in urban upgrading projects - a supporting role of academia and think tanks for public participation, despite their lacking political power to influence urban decision-making and the resulting gap between theory and practice 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Centralization in the decision-making regarding the participatory structures, actors and activities, like funding and lack of inclusiveness and transparency - the main power in the planning decision-making and throughout the participatory processes and public meetings was given to the governor - lack of inclusiveness: only influential actors from the economy and the government were involved in the CDS process, with underrepresentation of the marginalized groups in the city - lack of municipal capacity to develop and manage the PUPA due to the lack of know-how on PUPAs and related toolkits in addition to limited time and resources to manage the PUPA - the municipal actors lacked the autonomy and flexibility in developing the PUPA especially regarding participatory mechanisms and dissemination platforms, in addition to the need for these arrangements to be approved by the central government - lack of adjusted PUPA to the cultural context of the city, considering social challenges, for example, fragmented social structure, low education level among the poor, income disparities and cultural diversity
<p>The organization and management of the PUPA</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political support and leadership of the governor - forming synergies and partnerships between academia, private sector, public sector and DAs to formulate and implement the CDS - the novelty of the approach on the city level though bringing actors and stakeholders for the first time together - the emerging role of academia and the new local planners in building a culture of participatory planning in theory and practice esp. as main actors in the ADA - establishment of participatory bodies, like the “Stakeholders Council” in each of the informal areas to coordinate and implement participatory processes with the local stakeholders, conducting PRA techniques and in-depth interviews with them 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dominating role of the governor as threat to the CDS process and the PUPA - lack of freedom of expression in the city consultation sessions led to limited inputs from the participants - traditional roles and limited political and administrative powers given to the local planners and academia, despite the raised awareness to the PUPA - collecting the data and running the projects in the pilot informal areas were done after a top-down approach on the governorate level - excluding the urban poor from the main consultation meetings and decision-making processes - the main participatory events were limited to the workshops, two public consultations, and the PRA interviews in the later phase of the CDS - the city stakeholders attended the formal meetings were the same actors across the CDS process, with underrepresentation of the urban poor and the marginalized

Impact and sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishment of the ADA as a participatory and coordinating institutional body - institutional awareness for the PUPA by the government, the involved planners and municipal workers - motivated CDAs to support participatory urban projects with the poor 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lack of continuity and effective tools for implementation - abandonment of the CDS process - failing of the scaling-up of the PUPA - impact and sustainability were conditional by the political support, which was not maintained to the later stages of the CDS
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Table 31: An overview on the success and challenging factors of the PUPA In the CDS Alexandria.

4.2. Exploring the PUPA in the City Development Strategy (CDS) of Aleppo

This section aims to develop an understanding of the PUPA in Aleppo’s CDS. In the first part, an overview of the city profile of Aleppo is presented, followed by analyzing the urban governance and urban development approaches in the indicated period that supports further PUPAs. The following parts focus on analyzing the PUPA in the CDS Aleppo, where the PUPA mechanisms and actors have been analyzed, in addition to the urban governance settings, in which the PUPA has been developed. Finally, success and challenging factors of the PUPA in the framework of the CDS have been identified.

4.2.1. A General Background on the City of Aleppo

The city of Aleppo is the capital city of Aleppo Governorate. Aleppo Governorate is located in the northwest of Syria, bordered by Turkey from the north, Al Raqqa Governorate from the east, Hama Governorate from the south and Idleb Governorate from the southwest (see figure 21). The Governorate area was about 1,850,000 ha. It constituted about 10% of the total area of Syria, distributed in 63% agricultural land, 15% rangeland, 3% construction, 19% rocks, sand, lakes, lagoons (Ayad 2011: 410), while the area of the city was 131 km² with a density of 182 persons/ha in 2010 (Saad and Stellmach 2010: 75). The Governorate consisted of eight districts and fourteen cities. Some of the cities are E’zaz, Mare’, Tal Ref’at, Al Bab, Afrin, E’zaz and Grabals (Ayad 2011: 410). Aleppo’s strategic location and closeness to Europe endowed its importance as the commercial center of the country, in addition to having about 40% of its industries. Further economic activities were in the agriculture and tourism sectors. Moreover, the city possessed a historic center that was one of the largest in the Islamic world and had an area of 400 ha (ibid).



Figure 21: Location of the governorate of Aleppo in Syria (SDC and UN-Habitat 2014: 1).



Figure 22: Governorate of Aleppo and its districts (COD/FOD 2015).

The city population of Aleppo was about 2,123 in 2004 (CBS 2005), which reached around 2.4 million in 2010 (City of Aleppo and GTZ 2009: 8). The city population constituted 57.5% of the Aleppo

Governorate' population, which had about 5.7 million in 2010 (Ayad 2011: 410). The city population was expected to increase to reach 3.6 million in 2025, to form the largest city in the country (Saad and Stellmach 2010: 75; Von Rabenau 2010: 1). The city population has changed over time, mainly through migration from rural areas and reached a peak in the 1970s and 1980s before it has slowed down in the following decades (City of Aleppo and the GTZ 2009: 8).



Figure 23: The city of Aleppo in its administrative boundaries (Google maps 2018).

The fertility rate in Aleppo was one of the highest in the country, where about 40 percent of Aleppo's population was 14 years or younger²¹⁴ (CBS 2004). The working labor of the young population was small, and therefore the generated income was lower than its potential. Besides, the participation of women in the labor force was too low in Aleppo, which makes up only five percent of the working-age women. Even the well-educated women had a low participation rate, an issue that was rooted in the culture of the society (Von Rabenau 2010: 18). Illiteracy rates were also high; more than 20 percent of women age 15 years and older were illiterate and 41.6 percent were literacy aware. These aspects have affected the quality of the labor force and its competitiveness negatively (Von Rabenau. 2010: 18-19).

Poverty rates in Aleppo, although there were no reliable numbers, have represented the percentage of the urban poor living in informal settlements outside of the municipal development area of the master plan. Almost 50% of the population were living in informal settlements in 2010, mostly of the poor. Poverty varied among the informal areas; some had very high poverty rates, for example, in Tal al Zarzeir, which is located in the southwest of Aleppo, and others had lower poverty rates. Most of these settlements had vulnerable building materials, narrow streets, and poor health and education standards, in addition to lacking basic services, for example, sewage facilities plus growing drug dealing and criminality incidents due to high unemployment rates. (City of Aleppo and GTZ 2009: 22). In 2004, unemployment rates in Aleppo showed that 7.1% of the working-age groups, 15 years and older, were unemployed. This rate was the highest among the groups between 15-24 years old and among women

²¹⁴ These numbers are based on the census in 2004 by the Central Bureau of Statistics Syria (CBS).

(Von Rabenau 2010: 137 based on CBS 2004)²¹⁵. In informal settlements, the men work in industrial areas that are also informally developed. For example, the Ansari Gharbi, which was located in the southwest of Aleppo, was in part informally developed. It had mixed social groups of middle and low-income; most of them were owners of the houses (90 %). Some of the inhabitants in this area were working in the public sector (20%) or the workshops in the area. Only the migrants' groups have shown a high unemployment rate (City of Aleppo and GTZ 2009: 46).

4.2.1.1. *An Overview of the Urban Development of the City of Aleppo*

The urban development of the city of Aleppo had undergone several phases in history. The old city returns to the early second millennium BC (Dumper 2007: 22-24). The structure of the old city was in large parts well-preserved, particularly its architectural elements, like the *Suqs*, *Khans*, schools, mosques, and the organic fabric of the narrow streets. The citadel of Aleppo, which has been built by the Seleucids (ca. 300 BC), was an outstanding monumental fortress that stood high on the hill and served as a significant symbol for the city. The urban extension in the 1870s had followed the European school of planning and architecture through the grid streets and multi-story buildings (ibid).



Figure 24: The old city of Aleppo with its boundaries from 1986 (UNESCO 2017 cited from S.A.R²¹⁶ 2012).



Figure 25: A view from the southwest of the ancient city of Aleppo shows Al Adliya Mosque (UNESCO 2017 cited from the Author: Silvan Rehfeld 2011).

At the beginning of the 20th century, the city districts started to extend rapidly, which led to problems in the structure of the old and the new city parts, caused mainly by the increasing need to facilitate transportation and accessibility from and to the old city through the narrow streets (Bianca 2000: 304-307). The French architect Andre Gutton had proposed a master plan during the French mandate (1919-1945) and in the period after independence. In this master plan, two highways should cut through the old city to facilitate mobility and transportation and to allow an opening of the city to the Mediterranean Sea. For that purpose, demolishing the western districts of the old city was necessary (Bianca 2000: 304-307; Dumper 2007: 22-24). The master plan has reflected many of the modern European planning concepts of that time by focusing on planning broad streets that allow motorized mobility in the city. The proposal of Gutton was partly implemented in later time through demolishing²¹⁷ the western districts of the old city, constructing new straight streets, and integrating new functions, like markets and bus stations (Dumper 2007: 22-24). However, the highways were not

²¹⁵ The 1970s and 1980s witnessed a wave of migration from the rural areas in the eastern regions, mostly from low-income groups, to settle in the standing ISs, which constituted almost 50% of the city in 2010.

²¹⁶ Syrian Arab Republic.

²¹⁷ For example in 1979 most of the Old City's northwest quarter (Bab al-Faraj) was demolished (Dumper 2007: 22-24).

implemented because another master plan was prepared for implementation in 1974. This master plan was developed by the Japanese planner G. Banchoya, who borrowed the main concepts adopted in the master plan of Damascus (1968) by the planner Echochard, like marinating the streets system of the old city (Bianca 2000: 304-307).

Under the pressure of urban growth through migration to the city between 1965 and 1980, demolition works along the old city walls districts were undertaken and streets have been widened to prepare for furthering the city beyond the walls. As a result, about 20% of the old city has been demolished by 1978, and new residential and administrative buildings have been erected (Graves 1999). Meanwhile, informal settlements started to develop rapidly beyond the development area indicated in the master plan (ibid). In 1979, the awareness of the need to preserve the unique cultural heritage of the city was increased, which was followed by preparing a proposal by the Syrian Ministry of Culture to declare the Old City of Aleppo as a world heritage²¹⁸ site. In 1986, UNESCO had recognized Aleppo's ancient city as a World Cultural Heritage Site. Hence, several development projects were initiated to realize the preservation plans of the old city in cooperation with DAs, like the GTZ and the Aga Khan Foundation²¹⁹ (Graves 1999).

The following master plans, after the master plan (1950-1975), were developed in the next years to contain continuous urban growth and to respond to the migrants' demands. Between 1995 and 2004, a new master plan (scale 1: 10,000) was in the preparation phase and has been approved in 2004. The plan included a description report and zoning regulations. It defined new administrative city boundaries of about 41,906 ha, including the informal expansion areas of around 25,423 ha (61%) that the municipality needs to formalize and regulate (Ayad 2011: 411). The master plan intended to extend the urban development area from 131 km² to 463 km² (Saad and Stellmach 2010: 75). The new master plan has been approved and prepared for implementation, yet, due to the changes in the city, caused by the rapid urban growth and urban informality, the master plan was outdated (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Later, several shortages were detected in the master plan by an analytical and evaluating study, done in the framework of the CDS' urban spatial vision between 2009 and 2010 by a German planning bureau²²⁰. The main problems were rooted in restrictive urban governance, for instance, strict regulations and ineffective policies for dealing with urban informality. The proposed strategy and the vision of the spatial development of Aleppo have adopted sustainable strategic and participatory planning principles. The planners suggested developing the urban structure organically and sustainably and working concurrently on realizing the vision while supporting the participation of the city stakeholders and negotiating with them. The vision has focused on strengthening the green corridors, and directing urban growth to the eastern side of the city, in addition to improving the transportation system and increasing public space areas (Saad and Stellmach 2010). The vision was faced by many obstacles, mainly in reaching consensus among the stakeholders over land ownership issues and dealing with corruption in real estate development, in addition to impediments regarding the regulatory framework of the approved master plan, decentralization of urban decision-making and promoting citizen participation in urban planning (Saad and Stellmach 2010; 2015).

²¹⁸ This approach was promoted by Bianca and Alqudsi prepared the proposal for the UNESCO. Two main challenges were recognized in the proposal to be worked on the future development. One of the challenges was the need to renew the infrastructure under the old paved streets of the old city, and the other was the need to do the works in a participatory process, where the residents take part in realizing the needed public services and renovation works. For this part, the residents will be given interest-free loans to collaborate and to actively take part in the process (Graves 1999).

²¹⁹ In the framework of "Agha Khan Historic Cities Program".

²²⁰ The planners are Ali Saad and Thomas Stellmach from the planning bureau "Uberbau".

4.2.2. The Urban Challenge of Informality

The city of Aleppo had to face many urban challenges in the last decades that resulted from uncontrolled rapid urban growth. These challenges were mainly the increase of informal settlements, environmental degradation, inefficient public transportation system, and lack of affordable housing, etc. The restrictive urban governance settings and the weak institutional and legal frameworks of urban planning have exacerbated these urban challenges.

The rapid urban growth of Aleppo caused by migration waves from the rural areas and near towns reached a peak in the 1970s and early 1980s with an annual growth of 4.0%. Most of the migrants came from poor rural areas in Eastern Syria and settled in informal areas in and around the city (Bitar 2012: 74). Different types²²¹ of accessing informal housing by low-income groups were identified, e.g., land grabbing²²², buying subdivided land²²³, densifying the subdivisions with smaller subdivisions, and by adding more floors²²⁴ to already informally developed buildings (ibid: 75). By 2011, Aleppo was the most populated city in the country. The high urban growth rates caused by migration and natural population growth, imposed challenges on resources, the economy, environment and infrastructure. Between 1981 and 2005, the population growth rate in the governorate was around 3.27%, which registered higher in urban areas, particularly in the city of Aleppo that had 2,132 Mio in 2004²²⁵ (CBS report 2004) and total 2.4 million²²⁶ in 2008 (CBS report 2008). It has resulted in high urban density in the city-populated area, where approx. 2.5 million people had occupied 19,000 ha (GTZ 2007: 8). Besides, increasing pressure on the resources had caused further environmental problems, like water scarcity and a drop in agricultural productivity due to illegal land development and an increase in informal settlements.

²²¹ This typology is based on a profile study of 22 informal settlements of Aleppo. The typology considered different types of constructions and the living conditions in these settlements. The study provided an overview of the existing problems and development potentials from the viewpoint of the residents. It was considered later in a proposal for policy action plans regarding housing provision in the city (Bitar 2012: 74-75).

²²² Land grabbing or squatting on undeveloped public or private land in the 1970s and 1980s has slowed down later. The grabbed land was usually a low-cost land being unproductive or defined for agricultural uses on urban fringes (ibid).

²²³ This type refers to subdividing peri-urban agricultural land (Bitar 2012: 74-75).

²²⁴ "Densification" of already built informal buildings and existing settlements by adding floors and subdividing properties.

²²⁵ The time reference considered in this research is the time of preparing the CDS from 2007 until 2010.

²²⁶ Statistics in 2011 showed a population in Aleppo around 5.927 Million about 24.2 % of the total Syrian population (based on CBS 2011).




Figure 26: Land use plan of Aleppo based on the data from 2011. (UN-Habitat and the SDC 2014: 8-9, based on google map in appendix 34).

The map²²⁷ above shows the development of informal settlements in different areas in the city, mainly the eastern side of the city, the peripheries as well as the suburban areas near Aleppo airport. This division reflected the fragmented social structure between the poor eastern and the high-income western sides of the city. The informal area constituted around 32% of the built-up area of Aleppo, 47% modern residential areas, and 13% mixed residential and commercial areas (UN-Habitat and the SDC 2014: 8-9). Around 45% of the total city population were living in Informal settlements (UN-Habitat and the SDC 2014: 8-9), a quota, which was immensely growing to reach 1.2 million people in 2010 (City of Aleppo et al. 2010). Informality can be attributed to many factors, like land disputes, which arise when the land is not registered or does not comply with the master plan, the land use plan or zoning. Besides, the quality of the constructions in these settlements was not compatible with the building regulations indicated in the masterplan, which affects the safety of the buildings, particularly when the used building materials do not comply with the predefined standards (UN-Habitat and the SDC 2014: 8-9).

Urban poverty had also increased as a concomitant effect of increasing inequalities (City of Aleppo et al. 2010). Informal settlements in Aleppo demonstrated different typologies from high, medium to low density (see appendix 35: the distribution of informal settlements in Aleppo urban area; and appendix 36: the map of informal settlements in Aleppo). Besides, different profiles were detected, like land tenure, socioeconomic potentials and constraints and environmental aspects in these areas (based on a study²²⁸ by the City of Aleppo and GTZ 2009: 16, 19; Bitar 2012: 74).

²²⁷ The main uses defined in the plan are 37% residential, 25% ISs, 23% for services, 7% mixed use land (commercial and residential) 4% industrial, 3% old city, and 1% commercial (UN Habitat and the SDC 2014, 8-9).

²²⁸ The City of Aleppo has conducted in cooperation with the GIZ a study where a typology of informal settlements in Aleppo has been developed based on a set of indicators, mainly; the density, land tenure, socio- economic potentials and constraints and environmental aspects. Through the conducted inventory, the settlements have been categorized in three

The informal land development had resulted in an encroachment on the green areas along the river in the south, and close to industrial sites in the northeast raising environmental and health risks in urban areas (Ayad 2011: 410; Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Urban informality involves not only the housing sector but also the economy since most of the informal businesses were located very close to the residences or in the neighboring industrial zones. The informal sector was large in Syria and considerably contributed to the job market (Von Uberbau 2010: 20, 58) by offering training and job opportunities, particularly for the youth (Von Uberbau 2010: 5; Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017).

Informality affected the physical structure of the city, resulting from the fragmented urban and social fabric. It led to raising divisions between the east and the west of the city, which underlined differences in income, education, and culture. Around 50% of the city population, representing the urban poor, resided on the eastern side of the city. The residents on the western side of the city, who represented the high-income groups, had the advantage of accessing public services and amenities (Bitar 2012; Saad and Stellmach 2015). The high-income groups held a supreme status in the city due to their economic activities, while most of the poor on the eastern side were excluded from the city benefits and retained their lifestyles based on their ethnicity, cultural background, and informal activities for survival. Urban planners and managers in the local government were confronted with the challenge of urban informality while considering its potentials and problems, especially the legal and institutional impediments in dealing with these issues (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017; Anonymous A, Personal Communication: April 2017). Even though 45% of the city area was occupied by informal settlements, hosting about 50% of the city population, the government has not taken any strategies to deal with them deliberately or to utilize their potentials sustainably in the development process (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Therefore, to redress the issue of urban informality sustainably, there is a need to develop effective and holistic planning policies on the national, regional, and local levels.

4.2.3. Institutional Constraints on Urban Development and Participation

In managing the planning process in the city, different actors and institutions were involved. On the governorate level, the governor, appointed by the president of the Republic, has supreme authority over the city of Aleppo and the entire governorate, while the Aleppo' City Council, headed by the mayor, was the governing body of the city and should be elected every four years. Additionally, the city municipality has directorates from different competencies, which share the administrative and technical responsibilities of service delivery in the city. The pertained directorates and departments in the city also participate in the planning decision-making process regarding urban planning and development. In sum, the main municipal planning actors were: City Council, Directorate of Planning, Directorate of Technical Services, and Departments of Regional Planning, Physical Planning, Topography, Informatics, in addition to Councils of the rural units or villages, and the Real Estate Directorate (Ayad 2012: 417).

The centralization of the planning system, administration and legislation was considered a main issue which hindered an effective management of the emerged urban problems on the local level (see Section 3.3), in addition to the lack of municipal capacity and autonomy in decision-making to manage urban problems effectively. The centralized planning decision-making process affected the urban

groups, high, medium, and low-density settlements, where the profiles were explained (the City of Aleppo and GTZ 2009: 16, 19).

development, local economy, and any possible participatory approach. Aleppo had a subordinated economic and political role in the country compared to Damascus. The central government is seated in Damascus, and the Governorate of Damascus had a much larger metropolitan area than Aleppo, which affected the economy and production in the country while having the variety of labor and industrial centers compared to Aleppo. Besides, in a centralized state, there was a tendency to strengthen the strategic political importance of the center over the periphery. This led to subordinating Aleppo's role, which had less political and economic advantages compared to Damascus (Von Uberbau 2010: 1-3).

According to the law, decisions regarding urban planning and development have to be approved on the national level. It applies to the approval of a new master plan for the city, or planning and implementing mega projects for economic development. (Anonymous B, Personal Communication: April 2017; Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). For implementing urban projects, there was a need to gain the governmental funding, a process that was bounded by the annual financial plan and defined according to the current national FYP. Yet, the scarcity of state financial resources and weak institutional framework were the main impediments for dealing with the rapid urban changes effectively (ibid). The municipality lacked the financial autonomy and was dependent on the limited financial support of the state, which had adopted outdated financial mechanisms for implementing urban development projects (Ayad 2011: 414). The decline in subsidies from the national government in the 1980s affected the local economy negatively as well as the municipal capacity for urban development. This was accompanied by economic stagnation, resulting in the drop of property values and taxes and fees for construction, which represented a main municipal income source, not to mention the need for resources to implement new urban projects. These factors, combined with the urban growth challenges, had led to an ineffective performance of the local municipal councils in urban development, management, and implementation of urban policies (Ramadan 2010: 3).

To deal with the centralization' barriers imposed on urban planning and development, measures to realize decentralization in the local administration and service delivery in the city of Aleppo were planned in the framework of the MAM program, which was undertaken on the national and local level between 2005 and 2011. It was intended to restructure the institutional system for service delivery in the city. For this purpose, a workshop was organized in 2007 with the municipal staff to discuss the possible measures for decentralization. According to these efforts, the existing situation was analyzed, and a plan for institutional improvements on the local level has been developed (MAM 2010). This workshop has been followed by a conference to discuss the process of implementing decentralization in the municipality, in which different local and international experiences were presented. Additionally, a field survey with residents' engagement has been conducted to assess the quality of the service delivery after decentralization measures have been carried out. Development measures were recommended to the city of Aleppo, like delegating some of the directorates' tasks to service offices established on the district level to enable an effective service delivery (ibid). These measures for decentralization were intended to support institutional development and municipal capacity in the city of Aleppo. The approach was also discussed in the start-up forum of the CDS in 2008. It emphasized the need for greater autonomy for the city council in the service delivery and financial management, while maintaining a good coordination with the center (City of Aleppo et al. 2008)²²⁹. Still, the efforts for decentralization in planning and administration that were put forward by the MAM, in the

²²⁹ Referring to the executive summary of the CDS startup forum in 2008, which was published on Madinatuna.com.

framework of the CDS and the adopted principles of the 10th FYP, were not implemented, apart from some pilot projects. Decentralization in Aleppo demanded a wider autonomy for the local government and support of participation of further actors from the private sector and the civil society in the planning process. Considering the limited time planned for the changes and the institutional restrictions rooted in the centralized planning system in Syria, this was not possible (Fernandes 2008, cited in Hasan 2012: 64).

Furthermore, the legal framework of urban planning and development was mainly defined on the national level (see Section 3.3), and each city had to apply the related laws and decrees issued by the national government in dealing with urbanization. The national government addressed challenging urban issues too late, like in dealing with problems brought about by increasing of informal settlements, particularly through the issuance of the Law^{230,231}1/2003. This law focused on buildings violations through deterrence, which was effective in decreasing the number of illegal buildings (Ayad 2011: 410). Yet, the outdated legal framework for producing and ratifying master plans, represented by the Decree 5/1982 (See 3.3.1.1), was responsible for the delays in producing a master plan in Aleppo that takes into account the ongoing urban changes in the city (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Hence, adopting efficient planning instruments and participatory mechanisms in dealing with urban growth and informality challenges was restricted by the legal framework of planning (Ayad 2011: 414). In addition, the lack of further effective planning instruments to regulate land-use and controlling informal land development, added more impediments to effective urban management and planning.

The actions for urban planning and development, undertaken by the state, were focusing on big projects for developing infrastructure, which targeted urban and economic growth and served the political agenda regardless of the real urban and social needs of the city (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Additionally, these actions lacked the holistic vision for the city development, in which the local government acts as a partner in a participatory process while including the society's diverse cultural and social groups. The absence of a strategic planning process led to further actions based on a reactive planning process or "crisis management" (stated by Al-Chibli cited in GTZ 2007; Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Promoting process-oriented strategic planning as an alternative to the hitherto adopted problem-oriented reactive action planning requires the development of adjusted tools of communication and cooperation between the officials and the citizens that can support the achievement of sustainable planning and feasible urban policies (Ramadan 2010: 3). These challenges in urban planning and management were reinforced by further institutional weaknesses like the absence of coordination between the departments and institutions on different planning levels in addition to the lack of planning and administrative competencies and technical means (Ramadan 2010; Ayad 2011: 414; Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). The incompetence of most of the municipal employees, their lack of commitment and transparency, and technical expertise and management skills were embedded in the bureaucratic and centralized administrative system, which affected the urban governance in Aleppo directly. The institutional and administrative system have overlooked these weaknesses and even played a main role in maintaining the incompetence of the employees. For example, the absence of training possibilities to integrate further management skills that can enable them to creatively and critically implement and monitor

²³⁰ It stated that any building violations done after the date of the law will be demolished.

²³¹ Further laws regarding controlling illegal development are the Law 59/2008 Illegal buildings, Property Regulation Law 33/2008 and Property Development Law 15/2008 (Hasan 2012: 89).

urban development policies, or in rare cases, only few selected employees based on their political views or kinship would be offered such opportunities regardless their competences.

Despite the institutional constraints mentioned above, the City of Aleppo had put efforts to improve urban planning and management. The City of Aleppo had possessed assets to promote good urban governance and PUPAs that are of importance for utilizing its spatial qualities. Aleppo was the country's commercial center and its historical old city had a great potential for tourism investment. These assets provided a solid ground for emerging a robust private sector, combined with the potential of the local informal economy. In addition, based on the developed strengths through past development projects in cooperation with the GTZ, the municipality of Aleppo provided the platform for learning, exchange and networking in the urban field locally, nationally and internationally, particularly in improving urban management through promoting local partnerships and collaboration (City of Aleppo et al. 2010). The local government had a competent urban management team with a reliable leadership of the mayor, who together with his team played a major role in building dialogues and partnerships horizontally and vertically. These partnerships and the platform for collaboration have gradually been built since the nineties. The main local partners of the local government were the private sector, governmental bodies, the civil society and the DAs. The partnerships and the developed management skills would not be sustained and utilized without the political support from the central government that has been gained over time. The political support, the promoted partnerships and developed communication and management skills had built the basis for developing the PUPA later in the CDS (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017).

4.2.4. Urban Development Interventions and PUPAs

Based on the history of urban development, the city of Aleppo had developed a certain basis to improve urban planning and management and integrate PUPAs into these processes. The contribution of the development projects initiated and implemented in Aleppo had a mostly positive and sustainable impact regarding building institutional capacity and inducing new perspectives for urban development unlike the limited impact a development project cycle would usually achieve.

Since declaring the old city of Aleppo as a World Heritage Site by the UNESCO in 1986, the state, the Directorate of the Old City of Aleppo²³² and the Municipality²³³ have supported development strategies and projects to preserve the old city. The major development partners were the GTZ and Aga Khan (AKTC),^{234,235} which initiated the first projects and programs for the rehabilitation of the old city and its monuments around the mid-nineties. The development approach of the GTZ focused on building a comprehensive vision or strategy for its work in the old city, where the Agha Khan intended to focus on projects within the comprehensive plan. For example, the project to rehabilitate the surrounding

²³² The directorate was initiated in 1999 under the Municipality of Aleppo to develop the studies, plans, permits and manage the implementation of the projects and the maintenance works regarding the rehabilitation of the old city (UNESCO 2017).

²³³ The municipality functions under the MoLAE and is headed by the Mayor.

²³⁴ The Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) *"is a group of private, non-denominational development agencies and institutions with specific mandates that range from health and education to rural development, culture, architecture and the promotion of private sector enterprise. These agencies and institutions, working together, seek to empower communities and individuals, often in disadvantaged circumstances, to improve living conditions and opportunities, especially in Africa and Asia. Established by the Ismaili Imam (office of spiritual leadership) and working in over 20 countries, the Network's underlying impulse is the ethic of compassion for the vulnerable in society and its agencies and institutions work for the common good of all citizens, regardless of origin, gender or religion."* (AKDN 2017).

²³⁵ Particularly the Khan Trust for Culture (AKTC), which works on preserving the old monuments in Aleppo, leads the project in the citadel and later the Beautification project around the River Quiek in 2010 as a cooperation partner with the CDS team and in partnership with the Syrian Directorate General of Antiquities and Museums.

area of the citadel of Aleppo was done by the Agha Khan (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Having a strategic framework for developing the old city was counted as a strength in the urban development process of Aleppo, which ensured the effective and coordinated contributions of different development partners and with political support from the central government.

Urban development projects have been gradually extended in Aleppo and other Syrian cities after the issuance of the 10th FYP. Through supporting sustainable development in the 10th FYP, partnerships with international DAs were strengthened particularly regarding planning projects and programs, some of which are listed in the table below:

Development Partner	Program or Project	Time/duration
UNESCO	Declaring the old city of Aleppo as a World Heritage Site	1986
Aga Khan	Cultural, urban and social development projects	mid 1990s-2011
UNDP	An assessment study for regional development, poverty reduction and institutional improvement	2005
EU-MAM program	Municipal Administration Modernization (MAM) program for municipal capacity building, institutional reforms and decentralization	2006-2008 (in Aleppo) 2005-2011 (in Syria)
GTZ ²³⁶	Urban Rehabilitation Project of the Old City of Aleppo	1994- 2007
GTZ –UDP ²³⁷	Sustainable Urban Development Program (UDP), Syria	2007-2011
World Bank, CA and GTZ	Aleppo City Development Strategy (Madinatuna)	2007-2010
GTZ	Developing a spatial vision within the framework of the CDS (assigned by the GTZ and the City Council to Uberbau ²³⁸ /TSPA)	2009-2010

Table 32: Development partners and examples of their contributions to the urban development of Aleppo (summarized by the author based on Ghazal 2010; Bitar 2012; UNESCO 2017; Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017, referring to the last decade after putting the 10th FYP into action).

The GTZ has started the project “Rehabilitation of the Old City of Aleppo” in cooperation with the Directorate of the Old City of Aleppo. The project aimed to improve the social, physical and economic conditions through a set of actions for conservation and development in these areas (FAD 2011; Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). The cooperation lasted around 15 years from 1994 and has been completed in 2007. As a well-completed urban development project, it represented a model to be transferred to other Syrian cities. The achievement of the project was shown in the improved living conditions and strengthened local economy and cultural identity of the old city (FAD 2011). With its positive impact on the urban development process in the country, this experience had been developed later to be replicated in the framework of the UDP program in 2007 for Aleppo and Damascus. The whole project cycle was supposed to be replicated in the old city of Damascus (Bitar, Personal Communication: April 2017). Some of the positive factors, which have been recognized, were:

- The project presented a comprehensive and integrated planning and development tools, including funding, management, coordination, and expertise.
- The consistent political support and commitment of the central government to the agreement with the GTZ and the provision of the required funding for the project, has facilitated the coordination between governmental institutions until the completion of the project.

²³⁶ On behalf of the BMZ.

²³⁷ It supposed to be worked on from 2007-2016.

²³⁸ Uberbau: “The German consultancy agency for urban design (from which TSPA emerged) conceived a spatial development strategy for the City of Aleppo commissioned by the German Development Agency GIZ in 2011. The goal was to develop spatially driven solutions to guide long-term sustainable development” (TSPA 2015).

- A competent urban management team and coordination skills supported politically. Mainly, the Director of the Directorate of the Old City, who had an essential role in the coordination between the GTZ and different institutions, including the Directorates of Endowments, Tourism, Antiquities, the University, and local NGOs (mainly Al Adeyat Archaeological Society²³⁹) (Bitar, Personal Communication: April 2017).

Participation through the conduction of the project was mainly adopted in the first stages²⁴⁰. It took, in most cases, the form of consultation sessions and workshops with the key stakeholders on the governmental level, in addition to meetings with local residents and leaders from the old city (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). The purpose of the meetings was to discuss the local needs and various urban problems with the key stakeholders from the residents and for collecting data. Meetings with men and women were organized separately corresponding to the cultural values of Aleppo's society (Bitar, Personal Communication: April 2017). These two steps were essential in the GTZ project cycle on the local level, the take-off and re-planning ZOPP. In this regard, the PRA techniques were defined and considered an essential component of the work on the ground (Nebel, Personal Communication: September 2013). Through the participatory approach, the urban development plans and the action plans were developed in a top-down process. The participatory process performed in a bottom-up approach was intended for gathering information through the participatory meetings with the local stakeholders. On this level of planning, needs for social services and infrastructures were identified, like health centers, schools, and playgrounds in the planning area. The bottom-up participatory process was also managed for implementing the action plans, where local funds regarding housing were generated (Ghazal 2010).

With the achievements of urban development efforts in the project of rehabilitation of the old city, similar development projects were intended to be scaled up to other Syrian cities as well as in the whole city of Aleppo under the program for Sustainable Urban Development in Syria (UDP). The partners in this program were, among others, the Syrian Ministry for Local Administration and Environment as well as institutions on the national and local levels, in addition to the quondam international DAs, who were working in the urban field in Syria. The aim of the program was to build municipal and national capacities for sustainable urban management and development (UNESCO 2017). The joint working themes of the program were combined in the CDS of Aleppo: municipal capacity building, upgrading of informal settlements, and resuming with the rehabilitation work of the old city. The program intended to work in cooperation with further development partners in the framework of ongoing development interventions, like the (MAM) by the European Commission and the (CDS) by the Cities Alliance.

In 2007, the GTZ organized a conference in Damascus to introduce the UDP program with the participation of major partner city councils and DAs, who were running projects in the field of urban development in Syria. This conference was held on the governmental level. Under the UDP, the GTZ started to work on rehabilitation works in the old city of Damascus, while resuming the work on the

²³⁹ Al Adeyat Archaeological Society was a non-governmental association founded in Aleppo in 1924. The association is concerned with the architectural, archaeological and non-Islamic heritage in Syria. The main aim is the preservation of the tangible and intangible heritage of Syria. It organizes cultural activities and trips for its primarily high-educated members and cooperates with the directorate for antiquities. One of the remarkable contribution in the end of the 20th century to stop the demolition works in the old city before its declaration by the UNESCO a world heritage city. It publish a periodic journal published in Arabic language (Wikipedia 2017; Aladeyat 2019).

²⁴⁰ The project's first phase (1994-1996) was dedicated to social, economic and environmental assessment, (1996-1998) the plan has been formulated to the next phases of the rehabilitation process (Bitar, Personal Communication: April 2017).

old city of Aleppo and furthering the work to comprehend the whole city. The GTZ, in cooperation with the City Council of Aleppo, worked on urban problems in the city. The outcome of the first assessment in this regard was a published study on informal settlements in Aleppo, their typologies and problems, which was a basic study for the future urban upgrading planned to be undertaken by the government (City of Aleppo et al. 2010; Bitar; Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Nevertheless, the PUPA on the local level was not extensively discussed in the conference and in further meetings on the governmental level. Replicating the experience of participation conducted by the GTZ and the municipality in the rehabilitation project of the old city of Aleppo in 1994 was planned in the UDP. The participatory mechanisms and tools for community development applied in the project cycle intended to be applied in other Syrian cities (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). This approach was not officially acknowledged in the consultative meetings, while the focus of the PUPA was supposed to focus on building partnerships among institutions, the private sector, and the local governments.

4.2.4.1. Improving the Institutional Framework of Planning and Urban Governance

Improvements in the institutional framework of planning were undertaken on the national, regional and local levels. This affected the big cities in the country, where most of the economic and social capital was concentrated. Administrative reforms were supposed to be implemented in the framework of the MAM national program, which was launched in cooperation with the European Commission. The MAM program was undertaken from 2005 to 2011 and aimed at modernizing the local administrative law and municipal capacity-building while including the citizens in the local governance and strengthening of the role of the local government. This model was sought to be inspired by the Turkish model and EU best practices (MAM 2011 cited in Hasan 2012: 64).

The program was partly implemented in the city of Aleppo. It was supposed to serve multiple purposes, mainly through achieving decentralization in the financial management, and offering training possibilities for the municipal staff and those in the smaller local units, in order to be able to operate autonomously regarding local planning and management (Anonymous C, Personal Communication: May 2017). The MAM in Aleppo has intended to connect the projects on the local level with the approaches on the national level through administrative restructuring that allow practicing forms of decentralization²⁴¹. This was planned in the fields of financial management and in building a basis for institutionalizing and scaling up the formed structures through the pilot projects in the old city (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Despite these efforts, the local decision-making process was still controlled by the central government, an issue that is embedded in a long tradition of centralization. Besides, the PUPAs indicated in the program, as imposed by the top-down approaches, remained mere formalized procedures and conditioned by the approval of the central government (Hasan 2012; Anonymous A, Personal Communication: April 2017). In the framework of the MAM, training programs were initiated in the city of Aleppo, which focused on themes related to adopting the local agenda 21. There was also a grant to support a women's NGO in Aleppo "The Syrian Women for Science and Technology" in its work on a small urban upgrading project. The project aimed to convert vacant land in one of the informal settlements in Aleppo into a playground integrating green lots into the neighborhood (MAM 2010).

Further approaches to improve planning actions and strategies were the interventions by the government and the UN that targeted spatial problems on the regional and local levels. One of these

²⁴¹ In the framework of the MAM' decentralization measures in Aleppo city, a workshop was conducted with representatives from the municipality, Governorate, MoLAE, NGO's, Services directorates, DAs, and Neighborhood committees (MAM 2010).

interventions was the ADB Program (Area Based Development). The ADB program was initiated by the UNDP and the UNOPS²⁴² to provide effective measures on the regional and local level to deal with institutional and physical challenges. It approached the challenges of informal settlements of the city of Aleppo and other cities in the northern region of Syria. A bottom-up approach was applied in involving multi-actors and multi-sectors vertically and horizontally. The main aims were poverty reduction, equity, and improving local governance (Ayad 2011: 409). In the city of Aleppo, the intervention intends to upgrade “Tal Al Zarazeer” as a pilot area (ibid: 418). Tal Al Zarazeer,²⁴³ located in the southwest of Aleppo, was one of the poorest of the informal areas in Aleppo, having a high density. Besides, the physical, economic, and social conditions were very poor (City of Aleppo and GTZ 2009: 20; Ayad 2011: 411). The strategy aimed to improve the living conditions in this area while integrating the locals in the development process (Ayad 2011: 418). This intervention resulted in an assessment of the institutional and development needs in the study areas. The expected outcomes of the strategy were: implementing land management policies, including the poor in the planning process, as well as improving the coordination and cooperation between different planning levels and actors. Furthermore, technical support regarding land management should be provided (ibid). While the program was limited to elaborating on the assessment studies, further perspectives for development were introduced on the local level, as, for example, the strategic approach for city development, represented by the City Development Strategy (CDS). In this strategy, the contributions of various actors in urban planning and implementation were required, like of the UN-Habitat or the GTZ (Ayad 2011: 414). Similar to the prior development interventions, the goal of the strategy was to improve the planning instruments dealing with the urban and institutional challenges in Aleppo and later in other Syrian cities. The strategy was based on a participatory approach including institutions and representatives of the local economy and local communities (Ramadan 2010; Ayad 2011; Tebbal 2011).

Further measures on the local level were the establishment of the local urban observatory in the city of Aleppo, which was the first in Syria. The city of Aleppo, represented by the local council, has established the urban observatory²⁴⁴ in 2003, supported by the UN-Habitat. The purpose of the urban observatory was to maintain a database on the urban changes the city was undergoing, and to communicate the information with the decision makers on the governorate and the national level. Another role was to contribute to the coordination between different institutions to monitor the data, and to assist in the formation of further urban observatories in Syrian cities and cities in the Arab region (Al Mhana and Hamida 2013: 542). In 2009, a workshop was organized at the City Council with the participation of several governmental and non-governmental entities, to ensure cooperation and coordination between the urban observatory and cooperation partners. The urban observatory cooperation partners were the City Council, the UN-Habitat, the ESCWA, the ATA, and the Arab Towns Organization (Bitar 2009). The urban observatory was involved in many activities regarding urban development programs and projects, like in the assessment process prior to formulating the CDS of Aleppo. Extending the activities of the observatory was planned by the City Council through developing

²⁴² The United Nations Office for Project Services.

²⁴³ Tal Al Zarazeer was located in the southwest of Aleppo. It was illegally built and developed through illegal development and adding floors. It was characterized by having very poor physical infrastructure like instability and endangering of the collapse of the high-rise buildings, narrow streets, and lack of health and educational services, in addition to prevailing violence, criminality and drug dealings, etc. (The City of Aleppo and GTZ 2009: 20).

²⁴⁴ The urban observatory was established by the Resolution No. 90 by the Aleppo City Council during its 13th session in the regular fifth meeting on the 30th of November 2003. The aim of the urban observatory is to develop and assess the urban indicators for the city of Aleppo (Ramadan 2010: 5).

urban observatory indicators in a participatory process (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017) that was supposed to help in achieving reliable and updated information on the development of the informal settlements in the city (City of Aleppo and GTZ 2009: 11).

4.2.4.2. *Aleppo City Development Strategy (Madinatuna)*

The Aleppo CDS' program was a culmination of the initiative from the City Council led by the mayor of Aleppo, the World Bank and the Cities Alliances undertaken in 2005. The initiative was discussed in a forum, organized by the MoLAE and the World Bank for applying for a grant to set the CDS for Aleppo until the year 2025. The CDS program was set up in cooperation between the City Council and the DAs; the World Bank, CA, and the GTZ²⁴⁵ and was called Aleppo City Development Strategy, Aleppo CDS, or "*Madinatouna*" in Arabic – the banner *Madinatuna* in Arabic means "our city" (Ramadan 2010: 4-5). The CDS in Aleppo was funded by the CA, the GTZ, and partially financed by the municipal budget (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 24).

This initiative was based on a solid partnership between the private and the public sector that was built before initiating the CDS. The participating actors from the public sector were the municipality, Chambers of Tourism, Industry, and Commerce, Directorates in the city, in addition to academia, civil society, as well as CSOs represented by the syndicates. Further local actors were the heads of the local councils (*Mokhtar*), who represented different neighborhoods including informal areas (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). These partnerships were long formed and strengthened in the framework of the GTZ' rehabilitation project between 1994 and 2007 (see 4.2.4.1) (Laue, Personal Communication: January 2014; Ramadan; Bitar; Anonymous A, Personal Communication: April 2017). The project cycle of the GTZ rehabilitation project had been replicated in the CDS with the technical and management support of the team of the City Council (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). The gained experience overtime was essential in adapting the transferred knowledge to the local context and making a shift in the governance through new approaches in urban management and development (Ramadan 2010: 4).

The CDS was intended to support institutional reforms through improving the municipal capacity and offering training for the stakeholders and enhancing planning instruments and coordination mechanisms. Competences in urban management were integrated in order to implement sustainable urban development and the PUPA (Ayad 2011: 418). Hence, the situation in Aleppo had been assessed through conducting a SWOT analysis, where the strengths of the city were identified and considered in initiating the CDS, like the cultural diversity and the strong role of the private sector, which contributed to about 70% of the local economy (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). The organizational plan and phases of the CDS in Aleppo had focused on different development areas, which comply with the goals of the city work plans (2003-2007) and (2007-2011) and with the Syrian national 10th FYP (The City of Aleppo et al. 2008: 2). These areas were development of the local economy and increase employment opportunities, poverty reduction, environmental improvement and public health and inclusiveness of urban poor in the informal settlements (CA 2006: 12).

The PUPA in the strategy was considered a main component for including citizens and officials as partners²⁴⁶ in urban planning and management. Particularly women and youth should be empowered

²⁴⁵ The GIZ has been working with the city of Aleppo since the 1990s, particularly regarding urban development projects in the old city and informal development of housing.

²⁴⁶ The partners included Municipalities, SPC, UNDP, as well as relevant key stakeholders, CSOs, donors from DAs and urban local bodies (Ayad 2011: 418).

to take part in the development process, in addition to strengthen the cooperation between the citizens, local governments, CSOs and DAs. The cooperative work with local communities was intended to generate financial funding for the planned small-scale projects (Ayad 2011: 418).

The political will, the partnerships, and the expertise in urban management had provided the conditions to further the urban interventions into a more comprehensive, sustainable, and participatory urban development approach in the CDS. Consequently, the GTZ had cooperated with the CA according to the agreement to continue the urban development work in Aleppo. The GTZ provided its support to the CDS through organizing and participating in events and conferences, in addition to providing its know-how in urban development, participatory mechanisms and the communication strategy (Bitar, Personal Communication: April 2017). The program of the CDS Aleppo was put into action in its first working phase in 2008. The development areas included in the CDS in Aleppo covered seven topics, which were activated at the same time (appendix 37).

The CDS, although developed in its first stages, was interrupted for many reasons. One of the reasons was the political instability in 2011. There were, however, fundamental threats for the CDS even before 2011, like the change of political leadership imposed by the national government for political reasons including corruption and threatening the national integrity (Anonymous A, Personal Communication: April 2017). In addition, land dispute issues were raised throughout the development process of the spatial strategy proposed by the German urban planners. The proposal has provided a sustainable scenario of the spatial development of the city. Yet, it contradicted the master plan, which was ratified in 2005, raising many debates on the risks of land speculations for more urban growth (Stellmach 2015: 123), serving the interests of few stakeholders through corruption. Further challenges were the limited resources, which were just enough for initiating the CDS. . Further phases were hard to be implemented, even if the participatory mobilization was prepared (Ramadan 2010). Still, Aleppo had an effective leadership and communication strategy, which unfolded positive outcomes in a short time. The accomplishment of the CDS process in Aleppo represented a model for scaling up in other Syrian and Arab cities. Even the national government had intended to replicate the process in other Syrian cities before the Arab uprising in 2011 occurred (Tebbal 2011). “[...] *Madinatuna, being the first program of its kind in Syria, will this way set a new trend and model for other Syrian cities thanks to lessons learned and henceforth allow for the implementation of urban governance in a more effective way throughout Syria [...]*” (Ramadan 2010: 9).

4.2.5. Analyzing the PUPA in the CDS Aleppo (2007-2010)

The PUPA was developed based on different communication strategies and participatory mechanisms on the city level and the local level. The strategic decision-making process was organized on the city level. On the local level, the focus was on raising awareness among the citizens and mobilizing different local stakeholder groups to take part in the small-scale projects and future action plans of the CDS. In the following, the PUPA in the CDS Aleppo has been analyzed.

4.2.5.1. *Urban Governance Framework of the PUPA in the CDS of Aleppo*

The following factors are going to be discussed in the urban governance frameworks in the PUPA of the CDS Aleppo.

i. The Political Support of the PUPA

The city of Aleppo was the second biggest city in Syria and the economic center of the country. Yet, the political and administrative decisions of the city were strongly centralized and controlled by the national government in Damascus. After getting the approval from the central government to initiate

the CDS, the city of Aleppo had the chance to work on a strategy that can affect its urban development significantly. The local government has realized this potential of the CDS, while its lack of autonomy had led to many delays in approving and implementing urban development plans in the past. For example, the last master plan took around ten years, from 1994 to 2004, to be prepared and ratified (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Yet, the reforms that were intended in the 10th FYP for sustainable urban development in the Syrian cities have provided the framework for approving the CDS, which granted the city of Aleppo a sense of autonomy and ownership of the strategy for the first time. This was one of the factors, which later gained the citizens' support to the CDS (Anonymous B, Personal Communication: April 2017). In the CDS, urban problems were addressed and prioritized in the action plans for social and urban development. For example, the issues of urban informality were emphasized, and actions were taken, where a department for "Informal Settlements' Development" at the municipality was initiated that was responsible for upgrading informal settlements in Aleppo (Wakely and Riley 2010: 2).

The political support of the CDS from the national level was gained by complying with the planned measures for urban development included in the 10th FYP, and the positive results of urban development projects in Aleppo, mainly, the GTZ' project of Rehabilitation the Old City of Aleppo. Based on this experience, the state intended to scale-up the project cycle to other cities, and for the national government, the CDS program was an extension of the efforts of the development project to other areas of action in Aleppo. Accordingly, the initial political support from the national government did not hinder the process of initiating the CDS of Aleppo and introducing the PUPA, since the reform, the progress of the GTZ project, and the political commitment on the local level by the mayor and the management team were ensured (Ramadan; Anonymous B, Personal Communication: April 2017). Yet, there were certain identified risks that could affect the realization of the PUPA in the CDS related to the political support of participation and the lack of public participation. These risks were included in the agreement between the Cities Alliance and the national government (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017).

On the local level, the political support of the mayor and the commitment of the urban management team in the City Council were two main assets for supporting the PUPA in the CDS. The team consisted of the mayor, the Assistant Director in the GTZ' UDP and urban planners in the municipality, in addition to consultants from the GTZ and the CA. The mayor and the management team were aware of the need to build a strategic spatial vision that is based on citizen participation rather than instruments derived from a top-down contingent planning in responding to the urban challenges (Ramadan 2010: 3). Considering that the CDS and the PUPA were new approaches for the citizens and partly for the municipal actors, some issues were considered through working on the CDS, mainly, the scope of action allowed politically and institutionally and the expected outcome adapting the participatory vision to the local context in practice (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Despite the uncertainty of the potentials of the CDS and the PUPA, the political commitment from the local actors in the government was ensured while considering the risks and the potential of the few accessible instruments to initiate the CDS on the local level (ibid). Hence, it is important to understand how the local actors interpreted and supported the PUPA and which risks and potentials were identified.

ii. Institutional Arrangements and Actors in Supporting the PUPA

In the framework of the CDS, a key city stakeholder group from the public and private sectors and the civil society was formed, in addition to supporting experts from DAs. The key stakeholders should represent the key interest groups, who shape the city (CA 2006: 12). These actors are expected to

jointly work on initiating the CDS. The urban management team at the municipality with the leadership of the mayor have worked together on developing the CDS and the PUPA. The consultants from DAs have assisted the team in providing technical analyses and in co-preparing the reports (Bitar 2012: 17). The first steps in realizing the PUPA were the mobilization of the key stakeholders, developing a sense of local ownership for the CDS and commitment to the development, and implementation of the CDS in a participatory process.

The PUPA was integrated into the principles of the formulated CDS of Aleppo (see appendix 38) through different forms of stakeholders' partnerships, consultation, and volunteering that were supposed to be sustained along the CDS stages. As an outcome, the CDS should be institutionalized.

CDS principles in supporting the PUPA in Aleppo
Political support for the PUPA by the Mayor of Aleppo.
Reliable partners and Stakeholders , an experienced steering committee and skilled working groups (leadership, negotiation and coordination skills) to mediate the interests of the citizens and to implement the PUPA.
"Local Ownership" among the working groups from the CDS team including citizens and volunteers, who can contribute with local knowledge and assume the commitment to the CDS and the PUPA.
Participation as a principle in the preparation for the CDS means including the private and public sector and civil society in the CDS process.
Building trust with the citizens required for participation and collaboration through rapid action plans implemented at the same time of preparing the strategy.
Institutionalization of the Aleppo CDS means the "operating procedures and systems" will be integrated in the future working tools that also means the developed participatory mechanisms and networks will be part of it.

Table 33: CDS Principles in supporting the PUPA in Aleppo (identified by the Author, based on Madinatuna.com by City of Aleppo et al. 2010).

The institutional arrangement for managing the CDS was based on initiating consultation committees from the governmental bodies, mainly the City Council headed by the mayor, the consultative committee, the management committee of the CDS, and the cultural committee. Further actors were the representatives from the local level, like neighborhood committees, the administration of the service departments in the local units, and CBAs (Ramadan 2010a). In the set-up phase, the CDS team was divided into two groupings that worked on both scales, top-down and bottom-up, at the same time (see also the institutional structure of the CDS in appendix 39):

Top-down organizational bodies	Bottom-up organizational bodies
Steering Committee (SC)	Communication Team
Technical and Coordination Unit (TCU)	Volunteering network
Working Groups (WGs):	Urban observatory
- Local Economic Development group	Resources network
- Spatial Development group	Local Partners ²⁴⁷
- Urban Service Delivery group	
- Urban Environment group	
- Informal Settlements group	
- Children friendly city group	
- Municipal modernization group	

Table 34: The organizational bodies of the CDS Aleppo (City of Aleppo et al. 2010; Ramadan 2010: 7).

The **Steering Committee (SC)** was headed by the mayor, who ensured the political support for the team's work. The steering committee consisted of the Assistant Director or Program Manager, who was a local expert assigned by the GTZ in the framework of the UDP. In addition, urban planners and

²⁴⁷ Mostly NGOs, actors from the private sector and international experts.

experts from the municipality should work as coordinators and experts in the Technical and Coordination Unit (TCU) and in the working groups. Further actors were representatives of the media, academia²⁴⁸, the Chambers of Industry, Tourism and Commerce²⁴⁹, Engineering syndicate, the local NGOs and CBAs and representatives of the GTZ and the CA. These actors have been invited to the consultation sessions. Their support to the CDS was represented by their investments and resources in the proposed projects, in addition to their commitment to the CDS process (Ramadan 2010: 7).

The **Technical and Coordination Unit (TCU)** included groups of twelve persons assigned for each of the working themes. This number has increased over time, due to the involvement of more actors from the city. The Steering Committee and the Technical and Coordination Unit worked as a joint point in coordinating different working groups and the governmental institutions.

The **Working Groups (WGs)** consisted mainly of local experts from different sectors. They ran the analysis and the assessment based on their knowledge and experience. The working groups were supposed to meet with the stakeholders from different institutions every three months for a feedback and for integrating new marketing ideas from commerce, tourism, or industry to the CDS. Interventions from DAs in these structures were limited and were integrated selectively by a decision from the local government (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017).

The **Communication Team** consisted of local communication consultants and representatives of the media, who organized and followed up the internet website, the campaigns and the forums.

The **Resources network** represented the groups of local sponsors from the private sector, who financially supported the awareness campaigns and the cultural activities (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017).

Further groups of **partners** of the CDS were represented by locals that volunteered according to their local knowledge, education and experience in the planning, development and implementation of the small-scale initiative projects and rapid action plans. To support the work of the local volunteers, two

²⁴⁸ Mainly experts from the University of Aleppo.

²⁴⁹ Mainly businessmen and merchants.

experts were appointed, one from the municipality and one from the involved DAs (Ramadan 2010: 7). The following figure shows the local stakeholders and partners of the CDS.




Figure 27: local stakeholders and partners of the CDS Aleppo, illustrated by the author based on Ramadan 2010a.

iii. Inclusiveness in Realizing the PUPA

The CDS was expected to be developed based on the PUPA, which was managed by the CDS team, with the political support of the mayor, mainly the SC, the TCU, and the CDS team' members were the local decision makers regarding the development and the implementation of the PUPA. The CDS team intended to develop participatory mechanisms and communication strategies (4.2.5.2) to promote a culture of participation, where wider groups of city stakeholders can be involved as partners in the CDS (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Accordingly, for realizing the PUPA, the following actions were intended:

- to bring the key stakeholders together in the inception stage through consultation sessions and workshops
- to organize activities and events for dissemination the outcomes of the initiation phase and for the outreach with this knowledge to a wider stakeholder groups in the city through awareness campaigns, cultural activities and forums
- to win more actors to work together within each of the working groups, a volunteerism strategy was developed to include the citizens in the CDS process and partnerships agreement with the private sector and international NGOs, like the JCI were formed
- to promote PPPs through initiating projects that were intended to include the urban poor in the strategy' themes, e.g., youth training program, surveys and awareness campaigns

The PUPA was mainly steered by the technical and coordination unit. The key stakeholders have been contacted and the founded networks through the previous work of the CDS team has facilitated the reaching out to different groups from the society, local economy, local NGOs, and the international partners and the collaboration with different institutions (see figure 27).

Inclusiveness of the urban poor in the CDS was stated as the third aim of the CDS: “[...] (iii) *improved environmental and public health status, inclusive of poor and informal urban communities [...]*” (CA 2006). Accordingly, including the urban poor, who constituted about 50% of the city population in Aleppo, and investing in their potential to promote an economically robust city, was hard to be achieved without developing adapted participatory mechanisms and communication strategies to ensure their participation in the CDS. Another obstacle for involving them in the CDS process was the lack of reliable representatives of the poor from the CSOs, CBAs (Al Jamiyaat Al Ahleyeh) and reliable local leaders, who were trusted by their communities and who can mediate between them and the CDS team. In addition, motivating the citizens to participate in the planning process was a novel approach, considering their, hitherto, traditional and passive role of being the receiver of public services versus the role of the local government as the provider.

Further challenging aspects for ensuring the inclusiveness of the PUPA was the lack of a reaching out mechanisms that take into account the vast variety of social groups of the city. The city of Aleppo had a fragmented social structure, based on the variable cultural, economic, and ethnic backgrounds of its citizens. Moreover, these mechanisms should help to identify and preserve the societal assets that support different collaboration forms between the social groups. For example, the local economy that is based on formal-informal dependencies and networking required participatory mechanisms that promote acceptance and partnership at the same time (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Within this context, understanding the social layers and their potentials and needs was very essential to develop the pertinent participatory mechanisms.

In the analysis stage of the CDS, the team has examined challenges and potentials of including the urban poor in the CDS and the ways to reach out the majority of the stakeholders in the city. Participation of the urban poor was a topic that was discussed among the CDS team and the key stakeholders in the consultation sessions; actions to include them in the CDS were planned after the launching phase to ensure the sustainability of the CDS. Particularly, there was a discussion about strengthening the role of the local CBAs, NGOs, youth and women in building a culture of participation and developing a sense of ownership among them (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017).

In this regard, the communication with the local communities from the urban poor as beneficiaries in addition to actors from the citizens and CSOs was facilitated: “[...] *Local public participation was viewed as essential, as past experiences commonly involved a very limited extent of such participation and often only temporarily. For this reason, there was a clear and urgent need for clear communication between the planners and beneficiaries, as well as partners, citizens and implementers for all development operations, including the funding bodies and donors [...]*” (Ramadan 2010: 9-10). In this respect, discussing participation and deciding on the forms of participation and inclusiveness are still managed in a top-down approach. In addition, viewing the citizens and local communities of the poor as “beneficiaries” emphasized the need for understanding the participatory approach where the poor can act as partners in the urban planning process. The leading actors need to shift their position when communicating with the urban poor and act as equal partners in the development process to gain their cooperation (Herrle et al. 2016), where urban policies and development plans in the past have totally ignored them (Ayad 2012). Ineffective and unaccountable actions in the past have resulted in the lack of trust of the city stakeholders in the local government, leading them to suspect and reject any new development approaches proposed by the government. Therefore, the lack of cooperation of the citizens was one of the challenges for initiating the PUPA.

Furthermore, the weak role of the CSOs in urban development interventions led to the absence of representatives from the marginalized. Yet, in the framework of the national 10th FYP (2006-2010) (SPC 2007), a new understanding of this role in the development endeavors was emerging. Particularly the endeavors to modernize the Local Administration Law, initiated by the MAM program, have encouraged including local actors in local governance through strengthening decentralization efforts (Hasan 2012: 64). However, this aspect was not promoted in practice, since the local government was reluctant to share its authority with other actors and understood it as a threat to its power rather than supporting its development efforts (ibid). Therefore, the role of the civil society was limited to a few fields of action, like charity and awareness-raising activities for topics such as education and the environment. Charity associations belong to CBAs, which was a common form for representing the people in governmental dealings. In addition to charity associations, there were also unions, syndicates and chambers. However, these groups belong to formal institutions, which have particular legal and institutional frameworks defined by the MLSA (see 3.3.2.3).

Since 2006, the city of Aleppo witnessed an emerging larger number of CBAs and local NGOs. Charity associations have been active in the city for a long time. They focus on providing social services in the fields of orphans, illiteracy, education, women empowerment, youth, etc. Besides, very few cultural associations, like Al Adeyat’ Archaeological Society, for instance, were included (Al Adeyat 2017) that worked with the City of Aleppo and the GTZ on the Old City Rehabilitation Project (Bitar: Personal Communication: April 2017). Selected CBAs have been included in the key stakeholders’ group as well as in the small-scale initiative projects. The local stakeholders’ NGOs were mainly represented by the Center of Syrian Business and Enterprises (SEBC), the NGO “For Aleppo” for education and eradicate

illiteracy, in addition to cooperating with the “Syria Trust for Development” to organize the second conference for development, which was supposed to be held in the end of 2010 (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Including marginalized groups was also intended to be considered in the CDS, partly associations that foster women issues and rights, in addition to youth associations. Approaching groups of women, youth and the poor has already been highlighted through the participatory practices in the urban development projects between 1997 and 2003 (Bitar, Personal Communication: April 2017). Despite the absence of accessible documentation of these practices, their impacts were significant in bringing new perspectives to PUPAs in Aleppo’s urban development and management. Realizing this aspect, women's role in the CDS has been highlighted in the planning and management team. The female presence as partners in the process equals to 50%. In addition, the role of women in the communication team was essential in approaching disadvantaged groups of women in conservative communities in the informal settlements (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Moreover, youth education and raising awareness for their role in the city development was one of the priority topics for action in the CDS. Approaching groups of the youth considering it as the main age group in the city (under 15 years old 39.7%, and 57.6% from the working-age group between 15 and 64 (Von Rabenau 2010: 130) was considered the key thematic approach in the CDS vision (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Accordingly, participatory mechanisms and communication strategies were prepared to reach out to the youth, including children and young people, as a target group in the action plans and the CDS initiative projects.

4.2.5.2. The Organization and Management of the PUPA: Mechanisms and Actors

The PUPA was planned in different CDS stages in variable forms. Consultation meetings, forming partnerships and reaching out participatory mechanisms, like the cultural strategy and volunteerism, have mainly represented these participatory forms. The main aim of the PUPA was to build local ownership for the strategy. A further purpose of the PUPA was to reach a consensus among the city stakeholders, to gain their commitment to the action plans and to raise their awareness to the need for participation in urban planning and governance, while including diverse social groups of the city into the CDS process (Ramadan; Anonymous A, Personal Communication: April 2017).

On the city level, consultation meetings and formed partnerships were mainly intended to bring key stakeholders together from private and public sectors and from regional and international partners. The developed concept of the PUPA was based on volunteering, cultural interaction, communication, networking and establishing the urban observatory (Ramadan 2010: 8) (see table 35). The analysis, planning and parts of the implementation stages were conducted through a participatory process. In this process, the CDS team was consolidated. Further arrangements were organized through establishing partnerships alliances, cooperation agreements, private and public sector networks, cooperation with NGOs and CBAs as well as the collaboration with Arab and international donors. These partnerships and participatory arrangements were sought to be sustained until 2025, the target year of implementing the CDS (The city of Aleppo et al. 2008: 2).

a. Planning and Implementing the PUPA

Promoting the PUPA in planning for and managing the CDS was envisioned in each of the CDS stages:

Stages	Working Plan	Participatory Arrangements
Stage 1: Inception 11/2008	The scopes of the CDS and its proceedings were defined, the political leadership, key stakeholders, and the cooperative modes between them were	The CDS team identified the key partners and developed ways to gain their support and cooperation, and defined the roles and responsibilities they should be given

	planned, responsibilities and tasks distributed and the road map to achieve ownership developed	and the ways to achieve a sense of ownership for the CDS
Stage 2: Assessment 10/2009	The challenges, which faced the local economy, urban form, ISs, services, environment, Youth, and Urban Administration, have been analyzed	The local actors from Aleppo in the CDS team worked on the assessment and external experts assisted in providing advice, choices and lessons learned
Stage 3: Shared Vision 4/2010	Based on the assessment, the CDS team formulated the vision of the future development of the city of Aleppo 2025	Collective vision was formulated based on gathered information directly from key stakeholders and citizens from diverse backgrounds
Stage 4: Identifying the strategic options 6/2010	The CDS Team identified the strategic options and actions, which bring about maximum impact, cost-effectively and minimum risks	Arranged actions aimed at raising awareness through education campaigns and introduced best practices of civil society activities
Stage 5: Identifying key projects 12/2010	A range of short-term activities (projects, programs, investments) have been planned for implementation as a kick-off activity, which focused on rapid implementation of high-profile, low-risk initiatives	The projects were selected based on the priority areas of actions identified in the long-term collective vision, through activities and interventions
Stage 6: Implementation until 2025	Implementation teams should be formed for each working theme/strategic option, and detailed action plans should be prepared and put in action (responsibilities, timelines, milestones, and expected inputs and outputs)	It was expected that citizens would actively participate in this process through formal and informal committees, including local and neighborhoods' committees, who should also be responsible in the follow up and monitoring of the action plans and projects

Table 35: Arrangements for promoting the PUPA throughout the planned CDS stages (summarized by the author based on City of Aleppo et al. 2010; Ramadan 2010: 7-9).

After setting the organizational structure, which comprised the SC, the TCU, and the WGs, mechanisms were developed to get as many partners as possible from the city stakeholders. This includes the public and private sector, the civil society, and NGOs, as well as local groups, which were hard to be reached out, particularly in the marginalized eastern parts of the city.

The first step towards realizing the PUPA was the initiation of a workshop by the City Council in 2003, and formulating the first plan by engaging the key stakeholders and adopting a Goal-Oriented Project Planning²⁵⁰ (ZOPP). Accordingly, the aims for urban development were defined for the next four years, which focused on undertaking an “[...] executive piecemeal (in stages) program [...]” for improving urban management (Ramadan 2010: 4). This plan was assessed by a team led by an international expert to ensure that the commitment to the plan will be retained, even after political or administrative changes that might occur in the following elections of the City Council. This commitment ensured that the program would be implemented regardless of the political actors involved. The assessment of the plan confirmed that the plan was a product of a shared view of the stakeholders and their commitment to its goals and principles (Ramadan 2010: 4).

The following consultation meetings and partnerships laid the foundation for the CDS, even before the work on the CDS began in 2008. The shared vision of the city was already discussed in 2005, in a

²⁵⁰ Goal-Oriented Project Planning or ZOPP (in German) was adopted as a working approach for development projects by the GTZ (see 2.3).

workshop where 80 persons were invited from the city stakeholders, including the public sector, private sector, academia, CBAs, and NGOs (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017).

Still, after deciding on the working areas and projects (top-down), the big challenge was to gain support and cooperation to build an inclusive PUPA for the CDS from the citizens and the local communities in the poor areas, a step, which was followed by analyzing the challenges and potentials of the PUPA. The CDS team set the main goals, the target groups, participatory mechanisms and communication strategies to approach different social groups and to create a foundation for a culture of participation for the city.

These efforts have faced further challenges, like the lack of the capacity of the local government to apply PUPAs on the city scale, considering the cultural diversity and fragmentation in the social and spatial structure of the city, in addition to limited municipal resources and lack of expertise. Moreover, the lack of a sense of citizenship and trust in the government posed another challenge (Ramadan; Anonymous A, Personal Communication: April 2017), which is rooted in the bad urban governance.

b. Participatory Mechanisms for Mobilizing the City Stakeholders in the CDS

Developing the PUPA was intended through setting participatory mechanisms for community development. This was planned through building trust between the local stakeholders from the citizens, the poor, and the local government. To link the efforts of the local government with that of the citizens, it was important to raise their sense of citizenship and responsibility for their city (Ramadan; Anonymous A, Personal Communication: April 2017).

After identifying the stakeholder groups in the first stage of the CDS, participatory mechanisms and communication strategies have been developed in cooperation with the partners from the local government, governmental institutions and local and international NGOs and DAs. These mechanisms and strategies were supposed to promote participation in the process of planning and management of the CDS and its action plans and to sustain participation to the future projects. Although there was no clear idea of the outcome of the developed PUPA and related mechanisms, the CDS team was aware of the need for the PUPA despite the challenges (Anonymous A, Personal Communication: April 2017). The main challenges were managing the PUPA within a limited timeframe and resources and lacking a supportive political and institutional framework of participatory practices in planning.

The participatory mechanisms and communication strategies were arranged in the framework of three main strategies, the communication strategy, the cultural strategy and volunteerism. They were adapted to be applied through the seven intervention areas of the CDS (Ramadan 2010: 9-10). Some of the organized participatory activities were the “Aleppo vision” media campaign, awareness campaigns, “Madinatuna” interactive website, small-scale projects and training initiatives, surveys in addition to the start-up and med term forums and the volunteering strategy (ibid).

A Communication Strategy for Reaching out the City Stakeholders

To gain more participants into the CDS processes from the citizens, a communication strategy was developed that provided participatory platforms for the core stakeholders’ group in the inception phase. It also promoted dialogues between them and later with the citizens. The internal dialogue has been proceeded within the SC and the WGs through consultation sessions and workshops. The aim of these meetings was to exchange information and to work on the main CDS’ themes. Limiting the internal dialogue to the core stakeholders’ group was essential in the inception phase within the available resources, while furthering the dialogue for more stakeholders’ participation in the city required more resources, efforts and adjusted tools (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017).

Promoting dialogue and raising awareness for participation with the citizens was intended for dissemination the CDS themes and for the outreach to mobilize the citizens for participating in the CDS' following stages.

To raise a sense of ownership among the city stakeholders for the CDS, the logo in Arabic "Madinatuna", which means "our city", was set as the slogan for branding the CDS of Aleppo (Ramadan 2010: 9-10). This was followed by a media campaign to engage the citizens in preparing the third stage: formulating the shared vision. In addition, in raising awareness to their responsibility for the city, many citizens were interviewed regarding their vision for a better future for their city. The media campaign has targeted lay people and popular figures from the city to gain an influential impact on the citizens. The collected views and statements were published on the website and designed in posters that were distributed in public spaces (Ramadan; Anonymous A, Personal Communication: April 2017; Anonymous C, Personal Communication: May 2017).

Further participatory mechanisms were setting up the interactive website of "*Madinatuna.com*" in addition to installing boards in different city crossroads to receive feedback from the passengers. Five locations were identified to conduct the surveys: the city park, the Justice Palace, the airport, Aleppo citadel and the commercial center (Anonymous C, Personal Communication: May 2017). Volunteers were engaged in conducting interviews and surveys.

The website of *Madinatuna* was an open and interactive participatory platform and communication tool for dissemination and receiving feedback (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). On this website, announcements for planned events and outcomes of the CDS process were published, in addition to related reports and photos. This platform was based on transparency in providing an open access to information for the public of all the events taking place in the framework of the CDS and future actions (City of Aleppo et al. 2010). The website contained information on themes and projects, which have been discussed and set through the CDS and the agreements and the partnerships that were made, in addition to networks with international and local NGOs. Furthermore, it provided details on the activities held in the framework of the CDS. The majority of these activities were participatory²⁵¹, and they varied from raising awareness campaigns to participatory initiative projects, for instance, the project of beautification of the riversides. Besides, events for municipal capacity building and training purposes were listed and described. One of these training programs was capacity building for strategic planning decision-making and participatory approaches in development for future plans and projects (summarized based on the website of Madinatuna (City of Aleppo 2010) (see appendix 40: the participatory activities derived from the data published in the website of Madinatuna.com).

Organized events for stakeholders' consultation, for example the start-up and med-term forums were announced for the public for participation. They were open for participation of the key stakeholders and cooperative partners from local communities and CBAs. The start-up forum intended to launch the CDS after deciding on the main themes and the initiative projects. About 100 persons from public and private sectors and local NGOs and CBAs attended this forum, where the med-term forum included 400 participants²⁵² (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Inputs from the participants were provided through the workshops organized in the forums and were considered in reports and further

²⁵¹ The table in the appendix summarizes the participatory activities in the CDS. The information is derived from the Website *Madinatuna.com*, which is despite the suspending of the CDS is still available online. The information provided were downloaded in February 2017.

²⁵² There is no documentation of these numbers; these estimates were based on the Personal Communication with Ramadan: April 2017.

discussions during the following stages of the CDS (Anonymous C, Personal Communication: May 2017).

Reaching out to the poor communities in informal settlements was organized through developing particular communication strategies. For example, training of young people from the poor in ISs, volunteerism, and some practices of PB (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Offering training positions for young people from informal settlements was one approach to build trust between the local government and the local communities of the urban poor. Informal settlements was a thematic component of the CDS (CMI 2011: 76); approaching this theme was in cooperation with the GTZ.²⁵³ In this regard, the physical needs in these areas were discussed and the need for their participation and developing their sense of ownership and trust in the local government were addressed (Bitar 2012: 73). The CDS communication-WG was responsible for conducting the surveys for the analysis stage through collecting the data needed on the ISs. The survey required interviewing the households from men and women, local leaders, informal land developers, agents and private landowners, who, despite their cooperation, did not wish to declare their identities (ibid).

Hence, the main challenge in this approach was to gain the trust of local stakeholders from the poor communities and the marginalized, and from women and youth in the local government, who was through its role in past projects seen as unaccountable and corrupted (Ramadan 2010). With the help of intermediaries or local mediators as “new partners” in the CDS, the access to this group of stakeholders was ensured and this has enabled an open dialogue between them and the local government (Anonymous C, Personal Communication: May 2017). The local leaders, who were elected by the community, have assisted the CDS team members in accessing the conservative communities. The local leaders have traditionally performed the role of a local mediator, who should be a trusted agent by both parties. Those persons are usually well known by the local community and possess the local knowledge (Anonymous C, Personal Communication: May 2017; Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). The outcome of the surveys and interviews with this group of stakeholders was essential to reveal critical issues that need to be considered in the CDS themes. These issues were related to informal acquisition and illegal land development and the persons involved in these processes (ibid).

Building Ownership and Promote Inclusiveness through Cultural Interaction

In the framework of the PUPA, inclusion of diverse social groups in the cultural city life was one milestone to promote participation and support raising a sense of ownership for the CDS. Participating CBAs, citizens and representatives of the marginalized, in addition to local actors from the private sector in managing these activities have helped to create a “local cultural strategy” (Ramadan 2010: 9-10). Through this strategy, citizens from diverse ethnic and income groups were reached out and they were motivated to actively take responsibility for their physical and natural environment, for example through involving them in events and activities in the field of waste management and energy saving. These participatory activities were intended to strengthen the social ties between the citizens regardless their differences (ibid: 10-12). Moreover, cultural events in the framework of the CDS were organized with free entrances to all citizens, such as music, festivals, films, or exhibitions. The financial allocations for these cultural activities were provided by the Directorate of Culture (a delegate of the Ministry of Culture in Aleppo), in addition to the private sector. For the CDS, the cultural strategy intended to build a new image and marketing concept for the city nationally, regionally and

²⁵³ GIZ' Urban Development Program of Aleppo and the Old City Rehabilitation project.

internationally, and support the local economy. Leaflets “Aleppo Scope” have been printed in English and Arabic and circulated in hotels and museums. This has resulted in an increased tourist number, who visited the cultural activities. Besides, the local people in informal settlements on the eastern side of the city have also received these distributed leaflets, so they can equally participate as the invited citizens from higher-income groups (Ramadan; Anonymous C, Personal Communication: April 2017).

Volunteering Working Groups: Participation through Volunteerism

Volunteerism strategy was one of the participatory mechanisms that were developed in order to gain volunteers from diverse cultural backgrounds and from low to high-income groups to work on the planning and implementation of the CDS’ action plans and projects. Volunteerism was expected to strengthen the sense of citizenship, ownership and local responsibility for urban development which can help building a culture of participation and entrenching it in the society (Ramadan 2010: 12-14). Through this approach, the municipality aimed to win the support and trust of the citizens and different development partners and therewith transforming its image to an accountable, transparent and cooperative partner. It was expected from the volunteering work to help creating a basis for community participation and development, based on “[...] *free will, commitment, engagement and solidarity [...]*” (City of Aleppo et al 2010), in addition to promoting the principles of responsible action by engaging them in identifying urban challenges and solutions (ibid). Solidarity within Aleppo’s society was considered an asset for the CDS, primarily through the fundraising for the CDS action plans, which was one informal form of charity ingrained in Aleppo’s society in history. In this respect, social solidarity was shown where the rich allocated money for the poor without registering it (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017).

The volunteering was organized by local NGOs to initiate activities, like awareness raising and cleaning campaigns (Anonymous B, Personal Communication: April 2017). The volunteering project was open to everyone regardless of the skills or knowledge, if that with short or long-term commitment. (City of Aleppo et al 2010). The expected roles of the volunteers were a “Facilitator” and a “Catalyst” while giving them the leeway to extend the voluntary work creatively and encourage new volunteers to participate. The municipality has developed a registration form²⁵⁴, published on the website of Madinatuna.com. Gaining new urban partners through volunteerism proved to be an effective and innovative participatory mechanism in the CDS of Aleppo, which has the potential to make a sustainable impact of the PUPA and to consolidate it in the CDS’ following stages.

Most of the volunteers were from the youth who worked together with participants from international and local NGOs, like the international youth NGO “Junior Chamber International (JCI)”, whose members were mostly active in the “Aleppo vision” campaign (Anonymous C, Personal Communication: May 2017). The volunteers had to fill in application forms in order to be organized in the working groups. They have to choose one of two options, to be able to act effectively: as a friend of Madinatuna, or as professional volunteer. In the first, skills are not required, while in the second the type of contribution would fall be assigned to particular themes, e.g., Local Economy, Urban Form, informal settlements or Children and Youth, etc. (City of Aleppo et al. 2010) (see appendix 41: volunteering forms and options derived from the Madinatuna website).

²⁵⁴ Volunteers can register online and are not allowed to register more than once. The registration forms were organized in a database, which facilitate communication via E-Mail to organize the contributions to the projects of the CDS. Comments and questions were welcomed on the website and via email (City of Aleppo et al. 2010).

4.2.5.3. *The Impact and Sustainability of the PUPAs*

The first CDS stages were carried out, however, further stages including the implementation of the action plans were put up in 2011 and the CDS actors were replaced for political reasons. Yet, the outcome of the CDS, considering the limitations of the time and resources, was described as successful (Ramadan 2010; Tebbal 2011; Bitar 2012). One of the positive actions was promoting a communication strategy that focused on empowering local stakeholders from the poor, youth, and women, although on a small scale. The raised awareness in the CDS to the urgent urban needs and developing action plans to deal with them were some important outcomes of the PUPA. Another outcome of the PUPA was fostering a sense of ownership among the city stakeholders through involving them in pilot urban projects, training, public interest campaigns, local and international partnerships, alliances, cooperative agreements and networks with local and international NGOs (*Madintuna* 2010; Ramadan 2010: 9-10) (see appendix 40).

The impact of the PUPA, particularly through the communication strategy, can be seen in the context of raised awareness among institutions, the local economy and the local communities, women, and youth to sustainable urban development issues and their role in the development process. The communication strategy offered platforms for information exchange and for dissemination through the local media, the website of Madinatuna.com, posters and the direct contact with different social groups (Tebbal 2011). The commitment of key actors and city stakeholders to cooperate with the local government had ensured the continuity of the CDS process.

In addition, through the PUPA, the CDS team was consolidated as a catalyst for sustainable urban development. The SC was empowered through the support of the private sector who participated in monitoring and evaluating the CDS plan and helped to develop indicators to measure the results every four years. Adopting the PUPA in the CDS and the achieved cooperation and trust helped in increasing the number of electors of the local council (usually, every four years) (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Further impacts on the local level, although on a small-scale, were detected on institutions, CBAs and on the local communities. Citizens have influenced the decision-making process with their contributions and participation in the CDS process. As a result, the volunteering work and activities were expanded, CBAs were empowered, and municipal organizational and communication skills were improved. On the national level, the impact of the PUPA was seen in recognizing the CDS of Aleppo as a model development project, considering not just its outcomes in the limited time frame but also its methodological approach represented by the developed PUPA that was supposed to be scaled up to other Syrian cities. Later, the PUPA was considered in the new Local Administration Law in 2011. According to this law, the local council in each city should work on involving the private sector and NGOs into the urban development process (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). However, it was not clear, how this component was institutionalized and if this was adopted in practice.

4.2.6. *Discussing the Success and Challenging Factors in the Case Study of Aleppo*

To understand the PUPA in the CDS of Aleppo, the identified success and challenging factors of the PUPA, based on the analysis above, are discussed regarding the following aspects:

4.2.6.1. *Urban Governance Framework of the PUPA in the Aleppo's CDS*

Planning and urban decision-making were highly centralized in Syria. The planning system was traditionally based on the master planning with hierarchical structure in proceeding through the planning process. Therefore, approving development plans and projects from the central government

had led to many procrastinations in implementing development projects in Aleppo. However, the endeavors of development projects undertaken in the old city in the past, had endowed the Municipal or City Council credibility and trust from the central government to manage further urban development projects in Aleppo. The Municipal Council played a crucial role in developing and conducting the CDS' participatory approach with the political support of the mayor. It built the core group for consultation, including members from the public and private sectors and the civil society (Ramadan 2010: 9).

Hence, the political support from the national government to the CDS and the PUPA in Aleppo was ensured. The national government provided the funding and the commitment to its supportive role to the CDS process, as stated in the agreement with the Cities Alliance. This included the commitment of the partner institutions on the national and local level to the CDS process (Ramadan, Anonymous A; B, Personal Communication: April 2017). Chiefly, the state had supported the CDS to demonstrate its intention to implement the reform measures as stated in its 10th FYP (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017), especially in relation to promoting decentralization and attaining sustainable urban development in Syrian cities.

The workshop in 2003 at the City Council resulted in setting goals for the city development of Aleppo for the next four years. This included improving urban management processes according to a clear program to achieve this goal "*[...] improving urban management process in Aleppo through setting transparent priorities and executive piecemeal (in stages) program [...]*" (Ramadan 2010: 4). Later, the program was incorporated in the CDS' plan. The resulting plan was a product of a shared view of the stakeholders and their commitment to its goals and principles and later to its implementation. The participatory component was a basic condition in the agreement, as prescribed by the donors. Accordingly, the commitment of the stakeholders to the plan was ensured while considering the possible risks that could arise of political or administrative changes that would occur in the next local elections. Respectively, the risk of changing the political actors should not influence the CDS (ibid).

The PUPA in the CDS process was well developed and implemented by the CDS' management team that was supported politically and locally, especially through building and coordinating the partnerships and networks with the variety of local stakeholders and development partners. The steering committee had represented an institutional participatory body within the City Council at the municipality. The committee had empowered actors, like academia and the private sector, to participate in the CDS' planning process. The working groups were effectively engaged in mobilizing city key stakeholders in formulating the vision and developing participatory action plans. Involving municipal officers, for example, the heads of departments, along with the organizational structure of the CDS, engendered a sense of ownership for the CDS among them (Tebbal 2011).

The political leadership of the mayor had affected the consistency of the CDS through maintaining collaboration with different actors from the governmental institutions, regional and local partners, in addition to gaining the cooperation of the international partners and their support for the CDS' further stages. Yet, preserving the promoting conditions for the CDS was a challenge for the mayor, the local government, and the CDS team, particularly in achieving timely tangible results for the media, for the development partners, and the national government (Ramadan 2010: 9). Therefore, collaborations in the framework of the CDS were intended to be formed with influential local and regional partners from the governmental institutions and the private sector to support building the city image and initiate pilot projects for strengthening the local economy (ibid).

The role of the civil society in Aleppo was very limited and controlled legally and politically, particularly in development projects. With the absence of an active role of the civil society, including the CBAs, the citizens, and the poor communities from informal settlements in the CDS process was organized in small steps by the CDS management team. This was planned after the strategic planning decisions have proceeded on the governmental level, as information through the media and engaging them through volunteering and cultural events (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Yet, only few of the engaged NGOs were mentioned throughout the CDS reports, which can be attributed to the passive role of the civil society or their limited level of participation intended in the CDS process.

Although these planned steps have helped to improve the image of the city in promoting the inclusiveness of diverse social groups in the CDS, they remained limited in scope and kept on the level of informing. The citizens and the locals in informal settlements were skeptical regarding the new participatory approach and viewed it as a beneficial action for the next local elections campaign (Anonymous A, Personal Communication: April 2017). The passive attitude, of the people particularly from the poor, can be attributed to the lack of trust between the local communities and the local government. Institutional weaknesses of the local government affected its accountability, transparency and effectiveness in implementing urban plans and projects. Realizing these weaknesses, the CDS team was aware that motivating the citizens from the marginalized in the city to the CDS process required intensive communication. In this regard, the CDS team sought to build the basis for the culture of participation in urban planning and management required for realizing the CDS. Accordingly, the PUPA in the CDS was designed to motivate and reach out a wide variety of city stakeholders, including the urban poor incrementally. The PUPA aimed to gain their cooperation and collaboration for the future of the CDS. This aim should be achieved by communication, listening to their needs, and building trust between them and the CDS team (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017).

4.2.6.2. *The Organization and Management of the PUPA: Mechanisms and Actors*

Participatory mechanisms and communication strategies were planned and applied in practice. Yet, it was hard to expect the outcome of the PUPA on the ground, despite understanding the possible risks that could arise on the local and national level (Anonymous A, Personal Communication: April 2017).

a. The PUPA' Actors: Leadership and Included Stakeholders

One of the supporting aspects of the PUPA was the political leadership and commitment of the mayor to the CDS together with his municipal team. He supported the CDS management team in their efforts to develop innovative forms for including the citizens and the urban poor and to adapt the expectations from the PUPA in the CDS to the given social, institutional, and political settings (Ramadan; Anonymous A, Personal Communication: April 2017).

The urban management team of the CDS had gained its experience in developing participatory mechanisms and activities through their engagement in different development cooperation projects that started in the old city of Aleppo in the 1990s²⁵⁵ (Laue, Personal Communication: January 2014). The past projects in the old city of Aleppo from 1994-2007 with the GTZ and the UDP from 2007-2010

²⁵⁵ In 2003, the election year of the City Council and the Mayor, the team of M. Ramadan (the CDS Head of the Management Team) and M. Chibli (the Mayor) were elected. From 2003-2007, the elected City Council tried to scale up the experience of the GIZ of the Old City to a larger scale of the whole city, particularly to deal with the problems of informal settlements (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Later on, in 2007, further projects and programs were initiated and experts from the MAM program and the UDP/GIZ has started to make an impact through the training efforts with the municipal employees.

along with the cooperation with Agha Khan have provided the local government with the tools and knowledge in urban planning and management, in addition to participatory mechanisms of strategic planning (ibid). The later was consolidated through the CDS training workshops organized for the CDS team and the working groups (City of Aleppo et al. 2010).

Working on collaborative endeavors and participatory activities and workshops was part of the cooperative project with the GTZ of rehabilitating the Old City (Nebel, Personal Communication: September 2013). The PUPA adopted by the GTZ was experienced on both levels, on the national and local planning level. While strategic decisions were taken on the national level, PUPA on the local level was following the ZOPP methods, practiced through conducting PRA techniques and organizing meetings with local stakeholders (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). This project cycle and tools were also repeated in the CDS, particularly in managing the workshops and maintaining the formed partnerships and networks. The CDS team was able to bring many actors together, including the former cooperative partners, and ensured a regular basis of meetings with them to develop the CDS. The raised ownership among the municipal actors had helped in ensuring the continuity of the efforts despite the change of the Head of the Municipal Council or the mayor during the CDS process (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017).

The PUPA in the CDS intended to include the urban poor in formulating the vision and engaging them in the action plans, a step that was planned after the strategic themes were identified and approved. Identifying and inviting the participants from citizens and the marginalized was decided on by the local government, as well as the decision regarding the selection of the participatory mechanisms to involve them in the process. In practice, there was no clear documentation of the civil society' representatives, who were invited to the consultation sessions or to the forums in the formulation stage of the CDS. However, it was confirmed that some CSOs, particularly active charity organizations in informal settlements, have attended the forums, besides the attendance of some ordinary citizens and the media (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017), for example, the participation of NGOs working with children in the small quick projects, like the Flowers NGO (City of Aleppo et al. 2010).

Inclusiveness of the PUPA, as an essential factor for the effectiveness of the CDS, was faced by different social, political, and institutional challenges. Social challenges were represented by the nonexistence of a reliable and active civil society that is independent of the state, and hence, the absence of a culture of participation and civil activism. This can be attributed to the lack of trust in the state and its governance and to the fear and lack of voice and freedom of action due to the absence of democracy. Additionally, perpetuating the dependency of the society on the state in urban management, public service delivery and urban development decision-making made it difficult to promote the PUPA in a limited time frame and resources that were intended for planning the CDS.

Further challenges faced the CDS team and the local government in implementing the participatory action plans were mostly political and institutional challenges. The local actors of the CDS team were required to fulfill the terms of the agreement with the donors through implementing a PUPA that is inclusive of the poor and the marginalized. This approach was hard to be attuned with their political obligations in maintaining the political stability on the local level and the existing planning system in addition to controlling the level of political freedom and civil actions allowed in the CDS process. Under these circumstances, the CDS team has demonstrated the central role urban planners and managers can play as communicators, mediators and agents for change based on their understanding of the limitations and potentials of the given national and local contexts. Even after suspending the CDS

processes in 2011, the urban management team assume that the sustainability of the partnerships formed through the CDS will provide the basis for another CDS that can be developed and implemented in future post-war reconstruction (Ramadan, Personal Communication: 2017).

b. Participatory Mechanisms and Communication Strategies

The first step towards developing the PUPA was in initiating the workshop in 2003, by the City Council and formulating the first plan by engaging key stakeholders and adopting ZOPP. The participatory mechanisms and activities promoted in the CDS Aleppo were mainly planned without a clear idea of their outcome in the planning practice. Initiating interactive and communication platforms, like the Madinatuna website and forming the volunteering groups, were the main participatory mechanisms adopted by the CDS team to motivate the citizens to participate in the CDS.

The CDS website “Madinatuna.com” has supported interactive contributions from the citizens in discussing the development plans and raising their sense of responsibility and ownership for the CDS. Exposing the citizens to the urban problems and the possible solutions, allows them to understand the decisions that the local government has to take in its position of responsibility (Ramadan 2010: 9). Yet, considering the groups that were reached out through the website, questions were raised concerning the accessibility of the marginalized to the internet to take part in the CDS process via the website and if further tools were developed to facilitate their participation.

Further participatory mechanisms were promoted through volunteerism as one of the adapted forms of participation to the local and political contexts. Volunteerism, as an alternative for real participation, was politically and socially accepted by the government, and favored in the Syrian society. In the CDS Aleppo, volunteerism was adopted as an instrument to build the culture of participation. This was also beneficial in gaining the global advocacy of the donors, like the CA and other Das, to the efforts of the state in promoting a democratic urban life.

Volunteerism is globally recognized by organizations and governments as powerful tool to mobilize communities for social change and creating opportunities for participation. In this regard, it is important to understand if this tool had an influence on urban governance of Aleppo and if it can be applied as a sustainable tool for building a culture of participation in Aleppo in the long term.

The United Nations defined volunteerism as “[...]an activity undertaken out of free will, for the general public good, and where monetary reward is not the principal motivating factor [...]” (UNV 2012: 1). In community development, this tool was recognized for building skills for proactivity and negotiation, required for an active civil society and “active citizens” which promotes creativity and change. Volunteerism became a mechanism to involve young people in bottom-up processes especially where the youth lacks formal education and confronted with urban poverty and marginalization through informality, which hindered them from utilizing the existing opportunities and left their potentials untapped. Volunteerism, in this regard, can offer a platform for the youth to acquire skills for leadership, teamwork, problem-solving, planning, management, creativity, communication and negotiation, which are important to the development process (UNV 2012: 1). Considering all these benefits, the conceptual framework of the Aleppo’s CDS has focused on the youth and their interests as the main theme in realizing the CDS initiative projects. Volunteerism was applied as a tool to mobilize the youth especially in the poor communities in the small-scale projects. Targeting this social group, which formed around 40% of the city inhabitants (under 14 years old, based on the statistics in 2004), was sought to benefit the development process immensely (Von Rabenau 2010: 2).

Volunteerism was also recognized as a form of co-production based on charity efforts (Watson 2014: 65). From the state's perspective, its role remains as the initiator in the co-production process who has the control and power on the process (ibid), which does not necessarily lead to community development and empowerment. Co-production was viewed as a process concerned with the outcome that is effective and cost-efficient for the state, without showing an interest in its impact on community empowerment (Bavaird 2007 cited in Watson 2014). Unlike the co-production initiated by the state, the one initiated by "social movements" or bottom-up, intended to influence the governance (Watson 2014: 66). With the suppressed political freedom in Syria and limited forms of activism in society, the only possibility to change governance is through the institutions or the local government. Accordingly, the concept of volunteerism was accepted by the state, the initiator, as a basic tool for mobilizing the youth in NGO activities that flourished in the country since 2006, as long as they are supervised and controlled by the state. These activities were encouraged especially in the framework of awareness raising campaigns for cleaning and recycling for the purpose of environmental education. The state's acceptance of volunteerism for informal activism, although limited in scope, has the potential to involve the society in urban management tasks and shift the state's traditional role from repressing to supporting an emerging (formal) active civil society. From the perspective of the Syrian society, volunteerism is understood as a societal value for offering help to others, which is a religious duty embedded in the eastern Islamic and Christian religions (UNV 2015: 9).

Yet, the local government had to ensure the balance of the political powers if interested in mobilizing and investing in the city's social capital. The role of the CDS team was essential for the sustainability of the PUPA, as long as it is transparent, consequent and supported (Watson 2014: 73). When local experts are willing to work together with the communities, then a channel for learning exchange will be opened and a co-production process will be conducted. Particularly in situations where the power cannot be shared, the advocate planners for empowering communities emerge as "a new type of public service professionals", who can break the traditional relationships that hinder the participatory approach ((Bovaird 2007: 858) cited in Watson 2014: 73).

Accordingly, in the framework of the CDS, a range of actors was identified in organizing the volunteering groups. The options given in the application form for volunteering intended to utilize the potentials of the citizens, regardless the age, profession or social status (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017) (appendix 41). The volunteering work has demonstrated how politically supported forms of civil work, based on free will, can result in effective participatory processes in different urban development endeavors. Yet, this form of citizens involvement has also some setbacks; the cooperative work and the mobilized volunteering groups tend to be dissolved in the end of the project, a factor that proved its unsustainability regarding maintaining the impact of the PUPA but beneficial for the political stability. Furthermore, controlling the scope and the time frame of civil mobilization for the voluntary activities posed a challenge of advancing it to a bottom-up participatory practice. These limitations were mostly emerged through the contradictory efforts of the state in preserving the political stability and control and those of the local government actors in their role as catalysts for social development and empowerment.

c. The Outcomes of the PUPA in the Aleppo's CDS

Through initiating dialogues, new forms of informal interactions have been built between the local government and the citizens (Herrle et al. 2016: 7), despite being limited and selective. With the absence of an active role of CSOs, the local government was the initiator of the dialogue and the existing CSOs acted as institutional agents rather than catalysts for development from the bottom. In

other countries, grassroots CSOs play the main role as catalysts for change and they act in their organizational arrangement as development cooperative partners, e.g., the cooperation among NGOs and representatives of the poor in India or Thailand (Herrle et al. 2016: 15). In Aleppo, the CDS team played the main role as the initiator and mediator between the urban poor and the CDS partners from the government, the private sector and DAs. Hence, the role of the local government was strengthened through the CDS as catalyst for change in urban governance relations and actors. As an outcome, partnerships have been built and dialogue has been intensively conducted through the CDS stages and emphasized especially in the initial stage (based on the interviews and the reports).

The initiated dialogues had helped to reveal the real local needs as well as the conflicting issues, for example regarding land secure tenure rights and land use in informal areas (Bitar 2012). The new forms of communication and cooperation with the local communities were seen as innovative and empowering, while intended to integrate diverse groups of the society in the CDS process. For example, the private sector offered training for groups of youth from the poor in the informal settlements, in addition to promoting volunteerism by the CDS team, which was open to all city residents (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017).

4.2.6.3. *The Impact and Sustainability of the PUPA in the CDS Aleppo*

Acknowledging the CDS of Aleppo as a successful case was due to the political support and the adopted PUPA, particularly through developing the communication strategy and launching the media campaign (Tabbal 2011). The PUPA and the conducted CDS process were planned to be adopted in urban planning and development of other Syrian cities. Despite acknowledging the PUPA, the state was reluctant to institutionalize participatory planning as a formal planning tool. Therefore, the impact of the PUPA on urban governance was limited.

The CDS team and groups of actors from the public and private sectors, who worked closely on the CDS, benefited from the offered training and the knowledge transfer with the experts and with the stakeholders. Impacts on the citizens' living conditions was hard to be detected, as well as the impact on their role and power in the planning and governance processes. Considering the limited impact of the PUPA on urban governance and on the city stakeholders especially from the poor communities, the development efforts in the city were seen more as "cosmetic" in their impact and sustainability and yet "inevitable" (Anonymous A, Personal Communication: April 2017). Any kind of development was seen as "better than no action", even if they were just beautification or cosmetic projects and the urgent development issues, like poverty, institutional dysfunction, and social and political issues were overlooked (ibid).

Although the PUPA led to positive outcomes through developing new forms of communication and cooperation, the challenges to sustain the PUPA were political, institutional, technical and social challenges, e.g., the lack of education, freedom for civil activism and absence of the tradition of participation in urban development. Initiating and sustaining the PUPA within these conditions contradicts the traditional role of the local government as a provider of public services and the local community as a receiver. Besides, the lack of municipal capacity, effectiveness, and accountability have led to the distrust of the citizens in the local government. Further institutional challenges to adopting the PUPA effectively were the limited resources and time, ineffective urban policies, delays in developing and ratifying new urban plans, in addition to the absence of an active role of the CSOs and local NGOs and reliable and cooperative media (Anonymous A, Personal Communication: April 2017).

Finally, the missing democratic atmosphere posed another challenge for the PUPA. PUPAs impeded in communicative and collaborative planning, as well as in the co-production forms, which share the need for democracy to be initiated and conducted (Watson 2014: 70). Given the fact that forms of democracy differ “in nature and form” and it depends largely on the given political conditions (ibid), participation in an undemocratic context, like that in Syria, is hard to achieve. In Aleppo, the initiated strategies to engage the people and to involve them as active citizens, lack the democratic basis. Similarly, building partnerships in any PUPA requires sharing the power equally in the decision-making process (Hamdi and Goethert 1997), which was not promoted in the centralized planning system in Aleppo.

Hence, the impact and sustainability of the PUPA was mainly dependent on the political support of the state. Understanding this reality, only informal forms for social mobilization can be promoted, where societal ties and traditions can be revived, maintained and developed to a culture of participation. To attain this goal, deliberate and sustained efforts have to be made apart from development projects, in which only quick and tangible outcomes with limited resources and time are demanded.

Hence, the identified successes and challenges of the PUPA in the Aleppo’s CDS are summarized in the following table:

Key Factors	Successes	Challenges
<p>U. Governance framework</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political support along the CDS stages - PUPA was built on partnerships and networks coordinated by an experienced team, supported politically and locally - gaining of cooperative partners from the DAs based on the history of development cooperation and on a well-established network with partners and institutions - built networks with influential international, regional and local NGOs - collaborations with influential local and regional partners ensured building the city image and initiating pilot projects that targeted strengthening the local economy - raised awareness to the PUPA and related risks by the CDS team esp. in connecting with the marginalized groups in the city - the CDS team has put Efforts to communicate with the poor to gain their cooperation and trust in conducting the projects and the following CDS stages - setting a far-reaching goal for building a culture of participation among the citizens and an incremental plan to achieve it 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Top-down approach and state’s high degree of centralization of the planning system caused delays in implementing the CDS’ plans - Lack of trust between the local government and the citizens - Limited to non-participation of CSOs and local NGOs or citizens - Limited funding and time for achieving timely tangible results for the media, for the development partners and for the national government that limited the frameworks for carrying out an effective PUPA - A dominating role of the municipal team, as a participatory body for coordinating the CDS process, and lack of decentralization to develop organizational structures to facilitate municipal tasks in managing the PUPA - inconsistent political support for the later CDS stages from the central government - Collaborations were merely arranged with influential city stakeholders with excluding of the disadvantageous groups in the city, esp. in the preparation stages; the citizens were supposed to be included in realizing the pilot projects, not in the planning process - inclusiveness strategies remained limited in scope and kept on informing level and top-down - a weak role of CSOs, due to political restrictions and cultural barriers

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - institutional weaknesses of the local government affected its accountability, transparency and effectiveness in realizing the plans and led to distrusting it by the citizens
The Organization and management of the PUPA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political support and leadership of the mayor to the CDS - competent CDS management team for managing the PUPA - innovative forms of communication with the poor that considered the social, institutional and political contexts and risks - the experienced and trained CDS municipal team helped to apply the participatory mechanisms and to win over the cooperative partners and networks into the CDS process - engaging volunteering groups from the (poor) youth in supporting the ownership of the CDS - realizing few small- scale participatory activities on the local level as an outcome of the first CDS stages within limited time - the central role urban planners as communicators and mediators and agents for change based on their understanding of the limitations and potentials of the given national and local contexts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Limited participation from the citizens and CSOs in the city consultation sessions and the workshops - centralized decision-making process regarding the CDS projects and in involving city stakeholders - the PUPA was taken on two levels, consultation for taking strategic decisions of planning on the governmental level and conducting PRA for informing and collecting one-sided data on the local level - limited contact for exchange and feedback from the citizens, where public meetings were arranged for informing - no clear documentation of the number and the contribution of the participated NGOs in the CDS process - challenges faced achieving inclusiveness in the PUPA were social, political and institutional - nonexistence of a reliable and active civil society independent from the state and hence the absence of the culture of participation and civil activism - the Website was not accessible for the urban poor, who lacked the accessibility to the internet
Impact and sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Raise awareness among the youth for the CDS themes and development needs - develop management skills of the local CDS team regarding applying participatory concepts and tools in the planning practice - the PUPA and the project cycle of the CDS process were supposed to be transferred to other Syrian cities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lack of consistency of the CDS process and the tools for implementation - impacts were limited to the involved actors who worked closely on the projects and benefited from the training and knowledge transfer - the cooperative work with the mobilized volunteering groups tend to be dissolved In the end of the project, a factor that proved its unsustainability regarding maintaining the PUPA - limited to non-impact on urban planning and governance - failing of institutionalizing and scaling up the CDS and the PUPA, impact and sustainability are conditioned by the political support

Table 36: Success and challenging factors of the PUPA in the CDS of Aleppo, summarized by the author.

4.3. Comparative Analysis: Main Commonalities and Differences

In this part, findings from the case studies will be presented and compared. The analysis and comparison are based on the conceptual approach (see 2.5). The objective of the comparison is to identify commonalities and differences that provide lessons for learning between the case studies.

4.3.1. Comparing the Urban Governance Frameworks of the PUPA

The following aspects in both case studies are going to be compared:

- political support and commitment to the PUPA
- supporting institutional and legal frameworks of planning
- involved actors in urban governance and planning processes

On the national level, the experience through adopting the PUPA in the CDS in both countries Egypt and Syria has shown commonalities and differences that they share with other Arab countries that joined the experience of the CDS. The outcomes of the strategies were also varied and “unequal” in the countries in the Arab region (Tebbal 2012: 2). Different factors in these countries have affected the ways of implementing the strategy, e.g., economic, social or institutional factors (ibid) (see 3.1.3 and 3.4). Yet, dealing with the PUPA, Arab countries have shown similarities regarding the provision of political support and commitment to the PUPA in the early CDS stages. This political support was not sustained to the later CDS stages, which can be attributed to the political and administrative changes at the local level that negatively influenced the sustainability of the PUPA.

The planning system was strongly affected by the political system and administrative procedures in Egypt and in Syria. It was characterized by a high degree of centralization in proceeding the planning process. This has posed a challenge on conducting the PUPA in the CDS, particularly through posing restrictions on the autonomy in local decision-making and on approving the action plans and providing the resources for implementing them.

In Syria, the outdated planning system under the Planning law 1982 was amended many times, still without comprehensive reforms. The amendments were undertaken in very cautious steps in the past with no clear-cut planning and legal instruments that support participatory planning or modernization of planning. Participatory approaches in planning were not adopted as such, yet the need to support the role of the third sector, including the CSOs and the NGOs, in the development process was indicated in the 10th and the 11th FYPs. Moreover, participatory projects led by DAs had limited effects on the society and on the municipal actors and the conducted PUPAs remained exercises in the framework of these pilot projects. The changes in the new administrative law in 2011 has called for forming partnerships between the local governments and further involved institutions, still without referring to the need for inclusiveness of non-governmental actors in these partnerships (Ryser and Franchini 2015). In Egypt, the raised awareness for planning reforms led to replacing the Comprehensive Planning Law 3/1982 by the Strategic Planning Law 119/2008 that adopted participatory planning approaches. Recognizing these changes in the legal framework of planning, proceeding the planning process in practice remained unchanged and the participatory approach was translated in collecting signatures from the local stakeholders, without a real involvement.

In both countries, there was a lack of political support to the role of CSOs. In addition, the existing legal frameworks have limited their scope of activities and their active role in PUPAs. Yet, in the field of urban planning and development approaches, the emerging role of CDAs in Egypt was supported especially in urban upgrading projects and in fulfilling the demands for public services of informal settlements in the last decades. In Syria, the role of the CSOs and the emerging NGOs remained limited to awareness raising campaigns and charity activities. The growing role of CDAs in Egypt has led, in many urban areas, to supporting bottom-up actions in planning by the state (based on case studies, for example, from the “Participatory Development Program in Urban Areas” by GTZ in Cairo). Yet, despite the efforts for modernizing the society through strengthening the role of civil society and

modifying the constitution and the party system in the last decades, many social groups were excluded from the benefits of these reforms, particularly the poor from the Muslim Brotherhood and from rural areas in Upper Egypt. In Syria, the civil society continues to play a traditional role, controlled and guided by the state, which hindered bottom-up participatory initiatives. The NGOs laws and activities were controlled by the government and present a façade of liberal society, masking the excluding NGO policies and the constraints on the civil freedoms in these countries.

The limitations on the active role of civil society led to the reluctance of the citizens to cooperate in many of the development projects headed by the local governments, especially with the lack of trust between them. The lack of trust was attributed to the unaccountable and ineffective role of the local government in addition to the lack of transparency in the past. According to the indicators for good governance, Egypt had better ranking in Voice and Accountability 24-14 between 1996 and 2014 comparing to Syria (in 2004), this also applies to Government Effectiveness. In both countries, the ranks of Control of Corruption were almost the same and less than 50 (see 2.3.2.1 and 3.3.2.1).

On the local level, in addition to the imposed constrained by the high centralization, the absence of good urban governance and local autonomy in proceeding the CDS created another hindrance for conducting the PUPA. Urban governance in both countries showed similarities in the structures and the roles of the governance actors. Urban governance was based on two structures, one regulated by the national government and the other by the mayor or the governor according to the administrative law (Tebbal 2012: 2-3). However, any decision made on the local level by the mayor or other local actors should be approved on the national level.

Further common institutional weaknesses on the local level were represented by the weak municipal capacity, particularly regarding the lack of decentralization, autonomy and the capacity for financial planning needed for funding the urban projects identified in the CDS. The hierarchy between the national level and the directorates in both cases has posed a challenge to the effective coordination of public services (Tebbal 2011b: 6). Local actors, although being aware of the urgent urban problems and were able to identify the actions and projects and their feasibility within the available budgets (Tebbal 2012: 2), their lack of training and accountability led to the weak municipal performance, which affected the whole CDS process and the PUPA.

The challenges for good urban governance were discussed in the CDSs in relation to common problems in the Arab cities, like unemployment, economic weaknesses and lack of effective financial management. However, there was a reluctance to discuss the issues of “urban governance and local democracy” openly in the last decades. Later, this debate was driven by the urgent demands for social and political transformation, triggered by the Arab uprising in 2011. In this regard, the need for urban change has raised the topic of urban governance in Arab cities as an essential area for action in the future of urban development (ibid).

From the CDS’ lessons learned, the success of the CDS demands the right methodology to be effectively implemented. This methodology should eventually be connected to or considered as a spatial planning tool²⁵⁶. It should also be put in action in one or more projects, and be supported by a solid urban governance system (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 62). For successful CDS, the PUPA needs to be integrated as an effective instrument that can achieve a better impact on the outdated planning instruments. For this purpose, connecting the legal framework to the practice of planning is essential,

²⁵⁶ Based on the experience of the CDS in Spain, in addition to CDSs in other western countries with democratic systems.

through empowering the local governments to self-governing and management of their financial resources. In this role, initiating new participatory structures can support in managing the financial and human capital of the city. Achieving these measures requires healthy governance settings, primarily transparent and accountable settings. The absence of these conditions in Egypt and Syria, the CDS stages and aims have to be adjusted to the given urban planning and governance contexts without considering the challenges imposed on the local and national levels.

4.3.2. The Organization and Management of the PUPA and Processes

In this part, the PUPAs in the CDS of Aleppo and Alexandria will be compared. The main findings from the comparison are discussed below, which underline the success and challenging factors of conducting the PUPAs.

4.3.2.1. *The Actors and Participants*

The political role of the governor or the mayor in both cases was essential on adopting and conducting the PUPA as well as for its continuity and sustainability, which, in turn, was important for the development of the CDS. The main role of the political leader was in “personifying” the strategy, mobilizing the actors and help to build consensus over the discussed issues. Therefore, the leader was supposed to be trusted by all the actors (Tebbal 2012: 3).

The traditional role of the political leaders in the local context has affected the fulfillment of inclusive participatory processes. In the CDS Alexandria, the leadership of the governor was essential for the completion of the two stages of the CDS process and the development of the PUPA. Still, the inclusiveness of the local actors and the participating citizens in the activities was not supported, due to the dominant role of the governor, the decision-maker in these sessions, and the lack of freedom of speech given to the participants. This turned public consultation into pro forma processes or an approval session to the decisions already taken by the governor (Ghattas, Personal Communication: April 2016).

The raised ownership among the municipal actors of Aleppo had helped in ensuring the continuity of the CDS and the formed partnerships, despite the change of the Head of the Municipal Council during the CDS process, unlike the case of Alexandria, where the change of governors led to a delay of the CDS (Tebbal 2010). The change of the governors has affected the commitment of the CDS partners and accordingly substantial components of the CDS process were not accomplished, particularly institutionalizing the CDS and maintaining the cooperation with the stakeholders: *“Governor’s leadership: very positive impulse and high visibility to the process during the first phase. However, CDS suffered during its second phase when leadership changed from lack of consolidation of the participatory process and its weak institutionalization.”* (Tebbal 2010). A strong leadership can benefit the project, but not sharing the leadership with other local actors can be seen as a threat for the whole CDS process. The leader should be guided by a sense of ownership for the project, instead of his interest in asserting his political power and control.

In Aleppo, having a solid CDS team was one of the virtues that served the PUPA on both the political and the operational level. Supporting the PUPA politically was achieved through mobilizing different city stakeholders to participate in the CDS, by the CDS working groups. City key stakeholders from the public and private sector and academia have worked on formulating the vision and developing the participatory action plans. Participation from further actors on the local level was planned for the next phase in realizing the action plans (Tebbal 2011: 6). The municipal ownership was raised by involving key municipal officers (heads of departments) in organizing the CDS process. This helped to ensure the

sustainability of the process despite the change that occurred during the process of the head of the Municipal Council (Tebbal 2011b: 6). The change in the mayors position did not affect the continuity and sustainability of the PUPA, due to the solid collaborative structure of the CDS team and the formed partnerships with the city stakeholders, guided by a sense of ownership for the CDS (Tebbal 2011: 6). Having reliable leadership actors and sharing the power was the basis for the continuity of the efforts throughout the CDS process. A similar case was the CDS of Sfax, where the change of leaders did not affect the process dramatically, like in the CDS of Alexandria. In this case, the technical team took over the leadership for the process (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 26-27) (see 3.1.3.4).

The role of the local planners, who were the main actors in the CDS steering committee, was essential for the CDS and the PUPA. Planners and planning practitioners can play not just the role of mediators and representatives of the interests of the people and the administration but also act as agents for change of urban governance. This shift of the role of planning in favor of entrepreneurial planning, referred to by Healey 1996, raises the need for enabling civil society and subordinating the role of the state and the market. (Healey 1996). Although this view has referred to neo-liberal contexts in ICs, an emerging role of the planners in DCs can be detected, partly as entrepreneurs. In the CDS Aleppo, the local planners in the CDS (municipal) team had the role as entrepreneurial governance agents. They had, with this vital role, the potential to integrate the PUPA into the planning culture of the city while including the society, the private sector, and the government into the process. Realizing this potential had helped the planners to develop communication strategies and participatory mechanisms that were adjusted to the local context and helped to promote an attractive city image in the media. In Alexandria, the local planners were working in close collaboration with academia and the cultural institution of Bibliotheca Alexandria (Bayad; Mehina, Personal Communication: May 2014). This collaboration brought enrichment to the CDS institutionally and operationally, particularly through discussing recent discourses on participation in the Egyptian cities.

Another actor in the CDS process was the private sector, showing a strong representation and commitment to the CDS in Aleppo and Alexandria. The private sector in Aleppo was involved in many of the CDS stages, in the analysis, evaluation, and decision-making process over the economic development plans. “[...] *The private sector plays a very dynamic role in Aleppo where the CDS process is strongly characterized by the large participation of associations of professionals, both in terms of the number of their representatives in the different steering structures (follow-up committee and working groups) and in a most remarkable way by their contributions to a number of analyses and evaluations, as well as through their direct involvement in the preparation of studies and in decision-making (particularly in local economic development) [...]*” (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 28). The private sector in Alexandria, even though it participated in the CDS process and particularly in the steering committee, had a more advisory role (ibid).

Yet, the lack of inclusiveness of further groups of city stakeholders in the early CDS stages was criticized in both cases due to the low representation of the civil society and the marginalized groups in the participatory processes. Moreover, conducting the PUPA in two separated phases and levels was a top-down decision by the government, who sought that the role of the civil society would be more effective in local planning or in the implementation of the planned projects (Abou Omira, Personal Communication: May 2014; Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Considering this decision, the PUPA was merely a top-down approach, and the city stakeholders from the citizens and the local communities from the urban poor were not included in the strategic decision-making in the first stages. This can be attributed to the non-existing public participation and the weak role of the civil society.

Moreover, mobilizing the citizens and civil society for the CDS cannot be realized within the limited time, resources and capacities of the local government.

In the later CDS stages, inclusiveness of the poor and the marginalized groups as an integral part of the CDS and the PUPA has been given insufficient attention in both cases: *“Traditionally less present in the debates, the marginalized populations of the informal city often express themselves through organized, committed groups, in particular youth or women’s groups (Alexandria, Aleppo, Tetouan).”* (Tebbal 2012: 3). Including the poor in Alexandria in the pilot projects was pro forma and limited to collecting information in the pilot projects. Yet, preparing the institutional structure through the local units on the district level was supposed to serve conducting participatory and consultation meetings with the local stakeholders in the pilot projects, which were supposed to be managed together with the CDAs at their offices.

In Aleppo, the need for inclusiveness in the CDS was raised and long-term strategies to integrate it within the following phases was planned, particularly through developing communication strategies to include women, the poor and the youth in the topics of the pilot small-scale projects and to open the channel for volunteerism to all the citizens. Yet, compared to Alexandria, the absence of the role of CSOs in urban development, who can mediate between the local government and the social groups led to adopting mechanisms and communication strategies, which were not easy to implement in the limited time-frame and municipal capacity of Aleppo. For the CDS Alexandria, anchoring the institutional structures and bodies to coordinate and manage the PUPA was politically and administratively facilitated compared to Aleppo, who had more rigid institutional settings and an absent role of CSOs.

Developed communication strategies to approach the vulnerable groups was only possible where the political will existed, the cooperation among the local actors was promoted, and their self-initiative and ownership was encouraged: *“[...] in general, it appears that steering teams understood the importance of the participatory approach and communication, and played a central role in the process. The technical team was given a free hand to design and carry out communication campaigns [...]”* (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 29).

Participatory local planning for implementing the small-scale projects was undertaken through very low levels of participation by conducting rapid participatory techniques in the informal areas for collecting data. This led to a pro forma participatory process through the pilot projects. Yet, considering the political and cultural challenges for participation in both case studies, conducting participation in this form was a necessary preparatory step for furthering PUPAs and practices and for building a culture of participation.

4.3.2.2. Conducting the PUPA: Participatory Mechanisms and Communication Strategies

The methodological approach of the CDS was based on different stages that were developed differently in the case studies. The PUPA was planned in each stage, primarily in formulating the CDS vision. The PUPA was supposed to be maintained and supported along the CDS stages for the next 15-20 years *“[...] the sequences of CDS development are stages for which a participative spirit and of the process are expected to be built [...]”* (Tebbal 2012: 3).

Comparing the thematic components and thrusts in both CDSs, in Alexandria, the PUPA was defined explicitly in the strategic thrusts compared to the CDS Aleppo (CMI 2011: 41). In the CDS Alexandria, there was greater awareness and a stronger recognition of the PUPA in the thematic components compared to Aleppo. Yet, in practice, planning and conducting the PUPA was raised explicitly in the

CDS of Aleppo through developing the communication strategies and participatory mechanisms to formulate the vision and sustain the PUPA. In the CDS of Alexandria, the PUPA was conducted in a pro forma process on the governorate and district level, despite the efforts to establish the institutional foundation, like the ADA, to maintain the partnerships and the PUPA (see appendix 42: the thematic components in comparison).

In formulating the city's vision, in stage three of the CDS development process the level of participation was expected to be the highest, where a large number of city stakeholders should participate and share their views. Eventually, the vision should be approved and committed by different social groups in the city, who took part in its formulation. This also implied resolving emerging conflicts on challenging issues regarding land tenure in informal areas: “[...] *This stage of formulating a vision has often been a difficult exercise requiring reconciliation of conflicting positions [...]*” (Tebbal 2012: 3). Different participatory mechanisms have been developed and implemented, and skilled actors and mediators were responsible for managing the participatory processes. The role of the media in this stage was very important through applying different means²⁵⁷ to disseminate the information on the vision and action. Some of the communication mediums were the radio, newspaper, and the media campaign for the CDS Aleppo. In the campaign, popular figures and regular people were interviewed. They were asked about their vision of their city in the future. Their views and opinions were collected and published in the form of posters that were distributed in the public spaces. (CMI 2011: 35, 61) (see appendix 43: city vision in Aleppo and Alexandria in comparison). Conversely, in Alexandria, the CDS vision was formulated with limited participation. Only the key stakeholders have participated in this process while the media took a limited role, represented by the official newspaper only, which was the medium to announce the public consultation meetings.

In the following CDS stages and in the pilot projects, Alexandria and Aleppo represented good examples among the CDSs in the Arab cities for producing feasible action plans and projects. This has provided the technical and financial framework for implementation in Alexandria and Aleppo along with Sfax. In other Arab cities, there was a wish list of projects but no feasible framework for action planning. Alexandria has a good action plan and national and international funding where Aleppo combined the action plans with the already running project of Rehabilitation of the Old City (Tebbal 2012).

The communication strategies and participatory mechanisms differ in the case studies. Announcing the CDS and disseminating the related information was crucial in conducting the CDS and the PUPA. This required a solid communication plan, strategies or tools and participatory mechanisms to reach out to as many city stakeholders as possible. The communication plan included the documentation and update of the information along all CDS stages, in addition to developing tools to promote interactive communication and exchange among the CDS actors and partners. Particularly, transparency in dissemination of reliable information was essential to gain a continuous support of the public and private partners to the CDS (CMI 2011: 62-63). The experience in the SEMC case studies showed that the events to initiate communication and participatory activities were limited to consultation, and they were just conducted in the first development stages of the CDS, while these efforts were dropping down in the following stages. The lack of sustained efforts to conduct the communication plan was raising difficulties for the whole PUPA of the CDS, especially the lack of motivation among the leaders who expected immediate results of the whole process within their term

²⁵⁷ Like radio, focus groups, newspapers, posters, direct solicitation of prominent figures and target citizens.

of office. Yet, an effective communication plan should be initiated independent of the leaders and their terms of office. Therefore, the steering structure, the committee and working groups, should be able to conduct the plan independently, in addition to ensuring the sustainability of the PUPA, through the institutionalization of the whole CDS process with its different components (CMI 2011: 62-63). Alexandria had a strict communication plan and participatory mechanisms, where the CDS team of Aleppo has focused on developing communication strategies to reach out different and more city stakeholders. Aleppo PUPA has utilized the leeway given through the CDS to manage the communication strategies and the campaigns, whereas the Alexandria team considered the approach “as usual business”.

Aleppo’s strong communication strategy of the CDS was represented by involving the local media, initiating a website, posters, and conducting surveys with local stakeholders. Besides, the strategy was essential to promoting the PUPA and furthering the CDS process, especially by raising awareness of the process, and ensuring its inclusiveness and sustainability of the collaborations, as well as developing tools to reach out to more actors from the government and social groups in the city (Tebbal 2011b: 6). However, these actions were intended to sensitize the people through the media to the CDS. The limitation of time vs. the expected outcome of the CDS launching phase, and the pressure on the CDS team to work results-oriented, were challenges for conducting thorough participatory processes. Yet, evaluating the PUPA and its impact is not possible due to the interruption of the CDS process before its implementation.

The Alexandrian communication plan was targeting selected groups of actors from the government, the private sector and academia through consultation and forums organized on the governorate level. The local stakeholders from the poor were approached through adopting PRA techniques in the framework of participatory urban upgrading pilot projects. The aim of applying the PRA techniques was for collecting the required data before implementing the pilot small-scale projects. Public consultation in the CDS was organized to disseminate the results of the early CDS stages.

Still, despite developing innovative communication strategies and participatory mechanisms that were adjusted to the local context in Aleppo, these tools were not successfully implemented especially with the lack of autonomy and support to the CDS team, who played the main role in realizing the PUPA. In Alexandria, initiating institutional participatory structures, like the ADA and the local units, in addition to delegating the task of coordination and mediation to the CDAs, has created better conditions to implement the PUPA on the local level.

The organization of the PUPA	CDS Alexandria	CDS Aleppo
Key stakeholders and actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inclusiveness of the marginalized groups in the city was not considered in the decision-making process but was planned for the local planning and implementation of the action plans in the following CDS stages - a participatory institution on the governorate level was initiated to manage the CDS process including the key stakeholders and local units were established to conduct the action plans 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inclusiveness of the marginalized groups in the city was inadequately considered in the decision-making process and early CDS stages but was planned in the following CDS stages - a core group to manage the partnerships, and an experienced urban management team and working groups were responsible for furthering participatory activities (with the support of DAs)
The organization and outcome of the PUPA	- A divided PUPA into a top -down approach and participatory local planning approach	- A top-down PUPA, and a top-down reaching out strategy

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the PUPA was interpreted in the partnerships formed on the national and governorate level and in including the CDAs on the lower level in realizing the pilot projects <p>Participatory mechanisms and communication strategies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Participatory meetings and workshops and (pro forma) consultation sessions, with limited participation from CSOs, citizens and the marginalized - on the local level, the intended participatory pilot projects were conducted mainly by the experts from the GTZ who carried out the data collection through PRA techniques with the locals and the CDAs - the campaign of the CDS Alexandria was very limited on the governorate level - communication with the core stakeholder groups: Forums and Media campaigns; dissemination and announcement were mainly undertaken through the official newspaper (based on GoA reports 2007) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the PUPA was interpreted in a set of communication strategies to strengthen partnerships and reaching out to different groups of city stakeholders especially from the local economy <p>Participatory mechanisms and communication strategies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Consultation meetings and workshops mainly with the key stakeholders' group with limited participation from CSOs, citizens and the marginalized - the action plans through the small projects were based on participatory meetings with institutions and NGOs in addition to surveys which were managed by the WGs - the media campaign of the CDS Aleppo included reaching out tools to wider groups of city stakeholders - communication strategies in the CDS Aleppo: forums and workshop (private sectors, representatives of the urban poor from the ISs, etc.), interactive website and a broad media campaign and volunteerism (CMIland Med cities 2011: 29)
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Table 37: The organization of the PUPA in the CDS of Aleppo and Alexandria in comparison regarding the participatory mechanisms and communication strategies.

The awareness raised among the involved actors and the informed city stakeholders through the PUPA was a significant outcome of the PUPA and has the potential to further it in future development projects and CDSs. In Aleppo, the expected outcome of the participatory mechanisms and the communication strategies was in achieving consensus, collaboration of the partners, in addition to sensitizing them to the need for sustaining and furthering the PUPA in the future development initiatives. Moreover, through the PUPA, a sense of citizenship was developing among the participants from the citizens who took part in the participatory activities and who were involved in the media campaign, which raised the sense of ownership for the CDS and solidarity (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). In Alexandria, the outcome of the PUPA was forming partnerships and gaining partners from the private sector that were committed to the CDS and to furthering the approach through the ADA, which was supposed to manage the PUPA on both levels.

4.3.3. The Impact and Sustainability of the PUPA

The impact of the PUPA was recognized in building consensus among of the city key stakeholders and ensure their commitment to the CDS that have facilitated conducted some pilot projects and plan further projects and action plans. This was expressed in the CDS report “[...] *the CDS procedure, based on consensus and a broad, participative approach, has allowed cities implementing one to project their development on the long term and, for some, to launch short and medium-term action plans as well [...]*” (Tebbal 2012: 2).

Further impact was sensitizing the involved city stakeholders to the urgent urban problems in the city that require their input and cooperation in order to effectively deal with them. With this impact, the PUPA had the role of addressing the need to improve urban governance and the need for inclusiveness in attaining sustainable urban development. The issues of urban governance emphasized the need for participation as an instrument that can promote civil mobilization and integration in the CDS process. In this respect, the institutional changes undertaken through the CDS process on the local level have

the potential to affect the citizens and the governance on the national level. Moreover, the expected impact of the PUPA in building a culture of participation in the urban planning practices was a far-reaching approach that require furthering the PUPAs and practices over a long-term perspective.

Despite the interruption of the CDS process and dissolving the partnerships and collaborative networks, impacts from the conducted stages of the CDS demonstrate how the PUPA was perceived and reveal the actors benefiting from the PUPA.

In the preparatory stage, the objectives of the CDS were set, based on discussing different areas of intervention to tackle economic, environmental or social problems. In relation to these issues, many questions regarding urban governance and local democracy were raised and discussed cautiously, despite its importance for realizing the CDS (Tebbal 2012: 3). Raising urban governance issues in dealing with urban challenges has shown the need to effectively addressing urban governance in the following stages.

Participation as an instrument to reach consensus, ownership and commitment to the long-term approach of the CDS need to be developed and institutionalized while ensuring the sustainability of the PUPA. For this purpose, institutionalizing participation as an essential instrument for CDS planning and scaling up is very important. In 2008, adopting strategic planning led to considering participation as legal and regulatory instrument for planning in Egypt. In Syria, however, participation was mainly adopted in development projects apart from considering it in the process of master planning. Yet, learning from the CDS of Aleppo, planning to scale up the CDS process in other Syrian cities, indicate the potential impact of the CDS and the involved PUPA on urban governance. This was also evident in the new administrative law in 2011, which had acknowledged the importance of partnerships among the city stakeholders for the planning process, still without referring to the participatory approaches as such. *"[...] the CDS process in Aleppo was successful in attracting attention of different other Syrian cities that attended main fora as well central government that was considering its replication. Given current circumstances this decision is postponed [...]"* (Tebbal 2011b: 6).

Sustaining the PUPA requires structural arrangements and actors who are competent for managing the participatory processes, activities and communication strategies. Just few case studies from the SEMC were aware of the need for an arrangement or a body, like the ADA in Alexandria (Tebbal 2012: 3). The centralization of the administrative and political decisions was one of the main constraints for establishing participatory institutions in the CDSs. Unlike Alexandria, which intended to establish the ADA as a formal organizational and coordination body for the CDS and further development approaches, it was not possible to establish an institution parallel to the municipality who was the only actor allowed having the legitimate power to conduct the CDS in Aleppo. Hence, the PUPA requires a supportive political framework of planning. In undemocratic governance settings, the CDS cannot be adopted as a planning instrument outside the traditional planning system in Syria. In contrast to Egypt, which welcomed modernization approaches in the planning system through institutionalizing PUPAs embedded in strategic planning. Therefore, Aleppo relied largely on the long-term formed committees and trained actors to run further urban development practices inside the CDS and outside it, like the GTZ project in the old city, although the need for participatory arrangements, structures, or bodies was identified. *"[...] the structures that will be in charge of implementing the action plan (dedicated agency or service) are rarely set up at the beginning of the process and therefore do not collaborate with the steering structures. Hence, opportunities are lost to ensure the continuity of the process [...]"* (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 28).

In general, urban development projects supported by the national government had limited impact through their PUPAs on urban planning and urban governance. They have rarely led to changes in the political, institutional and social conditions. National governments tend to view urban development projects as opportunities to support their neoliberal agendas, without provoking meaningful changes in their governance and planning system.

Drawing up these aspects requires underlining some limitations by examining the CDS reports of the case studies. In the CDS reports, there was inadequate information about the methodological approach for conducting the participatory processes, especially in the later stages. They have merely explained the organization of the PUPA in the initiation stage, and that the PUPA was weaker and hard to sustain in the later stages. Moreover, in most of the report sections, there was a confirmation on including representatives of the civil society, which contradicted the results of the reports that pointed out the absence of civil society representation. Hence, it was unclear if the PUPA included the key actors in the city. These methodologies need to be clarified in a separate document to facilitate developing the participatory approach deliberately in the future. The impact and sustainability of the PUPA, as it was conducted in the CDS, were hard to be examined because conducting interviews with more involved local actors, particularly from the CSOs and the private sector, was not possible. The CDS reports have evaluated the CDS process and its outcome and roughly addressed the participatory processes across them and only from the perspective of the steering committee at the local government. Therefore, there is a need to develop a set of criteria to examine and evaluate participation from the perspectives of different actors involved in the participatory process by the DAs and the steering committee.

The table below presents the Commonalities and differences identified in the case studies in comparison:

Comparing the Key Factors in the PUPAs in the CDSs of Alexandria and Aleppo	
Commonalities	<p>Successes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The novelty of the approach on the city level though bringing stakeholders for the first time together • political support in the first CDS stages to the PUPA • raised Institutional awareness for the PUPA • developing a sense of ownership and ensuring the commitment and collaboration among the partner institutions on the national and local level and from the private sector in addition to the support of the donors from DAs • supportive role of academia and the private sector • positive impacts of the PUPA were in scaling up the CDS and the PUPA to other cities and projects (particularly the forms of partnerships and collaboration) <p>Challenges</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Centralization in decision-making regarding the planning process, establishing participatory structures, involving city stakeholders, permitting participatory activities and funding • lack of the political support for the CDS later stages • lack of inclusiveness and transparency, where both have implemented the PUPA with minimum engagement of the citizens and the urban poor in the consultation sessions, in local planning and in the implementation of the pilot projects • participatory events and activities required political support • lack of municipal capacity, autonomy and expertise to plan and conduct participatory processes, in addition to the limited time and resources allocated for the projects

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • weak role of CSOs and representatives of the urban poor in the PUPAs led to conducting the participatory processes on a pro forma basis, in addition to the lack of culture of formal participation in planning and governance • limited role of the media, represented by official media in informing and dissemination • the supportive role of academia for participation was hindered politically and led to a gap between the theory and practice • impacts of the PUPA on the local level was limited to benefits for the involved local actors through municipal capacity building and technical training • reluctance to institutionalize the CDS led to the unsustainability of the PUPA 	
Differences	Alexandria	Aleppo
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional awareness for adopting the PUPA, through establishing an institutional body for coordination and for sustaining the formed partnerships along the process • threat for the continuity of the CDS and the PUPA through the change in the political leadership • the pilot projects were anchored institutionally in cooperation with the CDAs and the DAs experts • unclear management plan of the PUPA regarding the activities or reaching out strategies • the PUPA and the CDS have led to changes on the policy level and improvement in the urban governance through establishing bodies for coordination and conducting further PUPAs in the city, despite its dissolving after closing the CDS • on the national level, PUPA was supported legally and institutionally represented in the new planning Law 119/2008 • the local actors were obligated to follow the regulations and performed their role in developing and managing the PUPA as “business as usual” without considering the local context 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inflexible institutional framework, for supporting the PUPA, the municipal team was the main contact body in managing the PUPA and related activities without institutional support from the national level • municipal solid structure and ownership for the CDS, politically supported even after the change of the Mayors • there was no bottom-up approach in implementing the pilot projects due to the absence of active NGOs and CSOs, the CDS team was the central body in this process • innovative participatory mechanisms and communication strategies through the media campaign and the volunteering strategy • no changes on the policy level and no improvements in urban governance were made through the PUPA, due to the lack of the political and institutional support • cautious steps and measures in adopting PUPA were limited to development interventions, without affecting the planning system or laws • the local actors were motivated to developing innovative ways for communication and participation that considered the local context and the political and institutional constraints

Table 38: The detected commonalities and differences in the PUPAs in the CDS of Aleppo and Alexandria in comparison.

4.4. PUPAs after the Uprising and Factors for Improved Implementation in the Future

This section provides an overview over the changes that affected urban planning and governance in Egypt and Syria after the uprising in 2011, and highlights the main factors that can enhance the impact of PUPAs in the future based on the conducted analysis in the previous chapters.

4.4.1. The Effects of the Uprising of 2011 on PUPAs in Egypt and Syria

The mass protests against authoritarian regimes in the Arab countries²⁵⁸, beginning in 2011, did not limit their demands for political change but also social, economic, and institutional modernization and improvements. The claims for more social justice, eradication of corruption, and decent jobs reflected the deep imbalances in the socio-political systems in these countries.

Arab spring broke the taboos and encouraged criticism in public while the lack of freedom of speech was one of the factors that hindered implementing participation effectively before 2011. Freedom of expression and participation took many forms, like demonstrations in public spaces, active discussions on social media and civil activism by initiating new movements and NGOs on the ground. The effects of the changes brought about by the uprising differed in Egypt and Syria.

In the case of Egypt, changes occurred only for a short period of time from 2011 to 2013 before the coup d'état and the return of authoritarianism and repression took place. The state exercised even stronger repression against the freedoms after 2013, and marginalized different political actors, movements and urban activists that emerged between 2011 and 2013. Marginalization and anti-democratic actions included the state's policies and laws that intended to restrict the freedoms of speech, protests, and civil activism, for instance, the new NGO law restricts the NGOs' activities politically and financially as well as their cooperation with international NGOs (BS 2019; Khairy, Personal Communication: August 2019).

In the case of Syria, the uprising ended up with an armed conflict and war. The war resulted in massive destructions of cities and infrastructure, including historic monuments, houses, hospitals and schools (HRW 2019). For example, in Damascus suburbs, Homs, Daraa and substantial parts of the city of Aleppo, about 27% of housing stock was destroyed, based on surveys conducted in 10 Syrian cities²⁵⁹ (World Bank 2016: 18). The war led to a massive displacement of people and death, some through the military interventions and part from malnutrition, lack of water, and medical care (ibid). Moreover, the war resulted in dividing Syria into different territories that were controlled by different military powers. The local authorities in these territories have undertaken urban governance and management processes, which were affected by the central decisions of their military leaders.

Another effect of the uprising was that the protesters claimed their rights for political participation and democratic life, which is a precondition to implement effective PUPAs and improve urban governance in Arab cities. In the beginning, the uprising has succeeded in overthrowing Mubarak in Egypt, modernizing the constitution towards more freedom of protest and participation, in addition to initiating new political parties, where more than 40 political parties from religious to secular formed after 2011 and new parliamentary elections were planned, which were expected to be inclusive and transparent (BS 2019).

Moreover, new institutions and political actors have emerged at the local level through achieving a degree of autonomy from the center, particularly in the case of Syria. The lack of decentralization had posed a great challenge for setting urban policies, managing urban development projects, and adjusting urban plans. During the war, local institutions have suffered an institutional dysfunction, as it was the case in the armed conflicts countries as Libya and Syria for example. They were not able to provide services in opposition-held areas and governmental areas. For instance, in the opposition-held

²⁵⁸ Mainly, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria.

²⁵⁹ The cities surveyed for this report were Aleppo, Dayr az-Zawr, Raqqqa, Dar'a, Idlib, Douma, Kobane, Tadmur (Palmyra), Homs, and Hama (World Bank 2016: 20).

areas, local councils were established to undertake urban management tasks and to provide public services during the war. Despite being elected by the people, they lacked representation of the marginalized, legitimacy, and skills of management, organization, and coordination (Said 2019). Moreover, their experience in urban management was not successful since they were overwhelmed by the military group that greatly influenced the local decision-making and with whom they have to manage and share their revenues. Still, new forms of local governments arose during the war that allowed for exercising bottom-up local governance for the first time. (Said, Personal Communication: September 2019). In Egypt, despite forming new political parties that agreed on the claims of democracy in the new political system after 2011, their differences “conservative-Islamist to secular-liberal to secular-leftist” (BS 2019) resulted in cleavages between Islamic-based principles and modern-liberal views. After 2013, the new government has disempowered the initiated political parties and some of them were dissolved, in addition to ignoring their democratic claims over its highest aim of restoring security and rebuilding the economy (BS 2019).

In the post-war time, urban management of housing and land property rights are getting instruments of authoritarian governance (Baumann 2019: 9) in the Arab states, reflecting the social and political discrimination according to the loyalty to the ruling regimes, like in the case of Syria.

Although the Arab uprising ended up in a war in Syria and the return of the military and authoritarianism in Egypt, the protest movements since 2011 have affected urban planning and governance in Syria and Egypt in different ways. While no radical social and political changes that support freedom of action and PUPAs took place in both countries, these social and political movements have, at least, contributed to the discourses of improving urban governance and planning, in particular in line with the post-war reconstruction of the destructed cities in Syria. Since the dynamics and political developments on the ground have differently developed in Syria and Egypt, the impacts of the Arab uprising on PUPAs in Syria and Egypt are also different. Particularly the city of Aleppo went through radical changes in its physical structure and urban governance, where Alexandria experienced different types of changes that are less apparent and influential.

4.4.1.1. *The Return of Authoritarianism and Restriction on Freedoms and Participation in Egypt*

In Egypt, the uprising has contributed to raising political awareness and a sense of citizenship among the citizens, especially from the youth. They participated in discussions and forums on social media and translated them into forms of civic engagement on the ground. However, it has changed after the coup d'état in 2013, which marked the return of the authoritarian regime.

The political changes have affected urban planning, participatory approaches, the institutional structure, as well as the roles of the CSOs, academia, and the media. However, these changes have manifested differently in the three stages Egypt went through after the uprising.

The first stage (2011- 2012): there was a flourishing of freedom of opinion, social media, and civil activism, and momentum for participating in urban changes. The role of CSOs and local NGOs was growing, and they were getting more active and daring in discussing taboo subjects concerning the political reforms and social development issues. There were many active NGOs and grassroots movements in urban development projects, who were supported politically. Rising of such civil initiatives have led to a raising sense of ownership for the ongoing political and social changes. Many associations were initiated, based on discussion groups that were active on social media at the time of the uprising (Khairy, Personal Communication: August 2019).

The second stage (2012-2013) has marked the “Egypt protests” after Mursi, the elected president and the representative of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party “Freedom and Justice Party” who declared constitutional changes endowing him unlimited powers. In this stage, renewing the constitution complying with Islamic law led to cleavages between both the religious groups and the supporters of liberal and democratic changes in the country. Further actions led to political instability and uncertainty, caused by the planning decisions and institutional and legal frameworks, which did not change from the time of Mubarak. Mursi's government has adopted the same old urban policies in constructing new cities in the desert while dismissing urgent urban problems in the existing cities, in addition to using public funds to realize unrealistic plans, for example, the plan (2013-2052) to build 44 cities in Egypt (Ibrahim and Singerman 2014). Furthermore, in waste management, the urban poor and private companies were engaged in collecting the waste without the contribution of the local government, which was supposed to undertake priority issues on the strategic level (ibid). Considering the short ruling period of Mursi’s government, establishing security and political stability were of high priority after the change of the government, while addressing urban issues remained secondary concerns (Standiki et al. 2014).

The third stage as of 2013 until now is characterized by authoritarianism and repression of freedom and participation. The local initiatives formed after the uprising faced the challenge of defining their role in responding to social needs, and at the same time seeking the authoritarian state’s legitimization and institutionalization. The local governments have excluded local actors and associations from the decision-making process over urban policies, and they were reluctant to engage them in public hearings. Hence, the lack of participation and inclusion led to closing every communication channel between the local communities and the government, especially after the political parties that were active during the uprising lost their power against the state’s ruling party. Participatory urban planning approaches do not exist in this stage, notably, with dissolving the Local Popular Councils (LPC) after 2011 and lacking clarity regarding the new Local Administration Law of 2016. Since then, only the Executive Councils are taking part in the local administration and urban management on the local level (Ibrahim and Singerman 2014; BS 2019; Khairy Personal Communication: August 2019). Moreover, the contributions of community development associations in urban development projects, which were significant before 2013, became more restricted with the new NGO law, bureaucracy, and lack of funding (Khairy, Personal Communication: August 2019). The involvement of the civil society in policy-making or governance processes was getting more controlled with the new laws, and protesters brutally arrested. These incidents demonstrate the contradictions between Sisi's claims of promoting civic engagement in political issues and realizing this approach on the ground (BS 2019).

Accordingly, the planning decision-making is even more centralized than before the uprising, and the amendments in the local administration system in the 2012 constitution were restricting the power on the local level and maintaining the control over the local administration given before 2011 (Ibrahim and Singerman 2014).

The central government does not include the citizens in its urban agenda, urban policies, public services, and housing, and subordinates their needs leading to the rise of the housing crisis. The government implemented projects that targeted erecting buildings and settlements for high-income groups that led to an increase in the demand for affordable housing and the rise of the prices in the real estate market. Additionally, the growing demand for affordable housing and lack of state’s actions to respond to them resulted in the development of more informal housing to host millions of people,

such as the informal settlements in Cairo (Abe 2015). Rapid informal developments in Cairo coincided with losing political control in the country even directly after January 2011 (Standiki et al. 2014).

Today, the state lacks a clear vision and transparency regarding urban development plans. The actions taken in the last six years have focused on realizing infrastructure projects, and pro-growth and real-estate development plans that do not respond to the development demands for poverty reduction and housing provision (Khairy, Personal Communication: August 2019). The government's vision of the metropolis of Cairo is a project in partnership with investors from the GCC and China, while adopting the model of Dubai-city in building skyscrapers and planning mega infrastructural projects to realize this vision (Abe 2015). The government has taken similar actions in Alexandria, for example, through demolishing historic buildings in the center of the city and planning profitable projects on their sites. These plans and projects were prepared without consultation or deliberation with the citizens. Excluding the citizens from planning decisions has evoked initiatives, like "Save Alex" that was created in 2012 by planners and academics from the city of Alexandria, intending to raise awareness of the architectural heritage of the city and endeavors to protect it through preventing unjustifiable demolitions by documenting them and organizing protests (Abo Alkair, Personal Communication: May 2014). The government has excluded "Save Alex" and its members from planning decisions and consultation meetings to prepare the strategic master plan for 2032 (Mustafa, Personal Communication: May 2014). The strategic master plan for 2032 for Alexandria started in 2009 and is based on participatory planning approaches and a communication strategy that addresses all city stakeholders (UNDP Egypt 2019). Still, the PUPA in this process was merely based on consultation sessions managed on the governorate level on a pro forma basis (Mustafa, Personal Communication: May 2014), which underlines the fact that participation does not exist in planning in Egypt after the uprising.

The new government intends to leave out opponents of its agenda from the planning decision-making process, including key actors, e.g., think-thanks, local planners, academia, the media, civil society associations, activists and experts, whose representation and participation in urban planning is essential (Standiki et al. 2014). Urban decisions are taken directly by the president, and the new government has undertaken actions without considering the character, heritage, and memory of Egyptian cities, even without offering alternatives for the local stakeholders who were affected by them (Khairy, Personal Communication: August 2019). Participatory approaches in planning and urban development seem to lose the key actors and political support required to initiate them. The role of academia as a think tank and a cooperative partner in urban development projects is limited to producing preliminary studies that are disconnected from reality and action planning. Compared to other urban actors, there is a growing role of academia in urban planning and development through research institutes at the Egyptian universities, which collaborate with the private sector and the government as contractors, and with civil society. Yet, the type of projects has changed after 2013 from action planning to mere assessment studies also in cooperation with DAs, including the EC, UNDP, and KfW. Moreover, after 2013, the work of these institutes is controlled by a restrictive political and institutional framework (Khairy, Personal Communication: August 2019). Besides, the role of the media is getting more limited to representing official platforms and contents that are controlled by the state. The activism in planning on social media is also diminishing after 2013 and losing its momentum due to the exclusion of activists from planning decision-making processes (ibid). Under the political conditions and the restricted role of essential actors and partners in urban planning, initiating and implementing PUPAs, and improving urban governance in Egypt, is getting more challenging.

4.4.1.2. *The Reconstruction of Post-War Syria: A Despotic Mapping of New Urban Identities*

Discussing PUPAs in the reconstruction of Syrian cities is essential for promoting a radical political and social transformation. The state of post-war Syria is severe through the massive destruction of the cities, and substantial parts of their historical and cultural heritage, as well as the humanitarian disaster that unfolded the death and displacement of thousands of people. Besides, the central government lacks the needed resources and suffers from brain-drain, essential factors for post-war reconstruction. Several recaptured areas still lack the administrative capacity to act, resulting in disorder, poverty, and insecurity.

For the rebuilding of the destroyed districts of Syrian cities, the regime has developed urban planning approaches that reflect its military and political agenda in the so-called “urbanism of war”, as it is the case for peri-urban districts of Damascus, which were controlled by the opposition (Clerc in Standiki et al. 2014). The regime intended to instrumentalize urban planning approaches politically in realizing an authoritarian governance by using the property and tenure rights to reward the regime's supporters and punish the opponents. Through manipulating the land property rights of the fleeing population and stripping them of their property rights, the regime meant to wrest the power from them (Baumann 2019: 8, 10). Meanwhile, the planning process in post-war Syria remains a top-down process, and the new spatial policies are represented by stipulating real estate and land regularization laws and decrees that ignore human rights and the historical and cultural identity of the Syrian cities, as for example Decree 66/2012 and Law 10/2018.

The authoritarian governance has also influenced the urban development projects undertaken by DAs for the reconstruction, restoration, and humanitarian aid raising human rights risks. Some of these projects are dedicated, for instance, for re-fixing sanitation water networks by OXFAM and UNDP, others for health care infrastructure by UNICEF and MEDAIR. These projects were permitted by the Syrian authorities to be implemented in areas held by the Syrian government, where the areas that were held by the opposition, which are more in need for interventions regarding health, water, food, and shelter, were intendedly neglected by the government that blocked their accessibility by DAs for providing aid. The lack of transparency of the Syrian government, its discriminating policies of the people who oppose its political agenda and approving development projects according to the regime's loyalty, in addition to the abuse of funding for own interest, are considered violations of human rights (HRW 2019).

The post-war policies in the last years intended to change spatial planning in the country radically. Mapping the new spatial identities of the Syrian cities today lies in the hands of the political and economic elites and investors who seek their profit, ignoring all conditions of aggravated poverty, destruction and oppression in the country and denying the right of the refugees to return.

Discrimination in reconstruction policies is represented by new urban regulations, which became political instruments during the war and in post-war time to deprive the rebelling groups and the displaced, especially of the urban poor, from their property rights and their right to return. For instance, the Decree 66/2012 was issued to regulate urban reconstruction in the destroyed neighborhoods in Syrian cities during the war. This decree allows expropriating the private land from its owners, who fled the war and planning new housing on them to accommodate new residents from the regime's supporters and elites. Moreover, with its military power the regime steered the displacement of people from one area to another and enforced discriminating policies that allow illegal

resettlement in a regime-protected neighborhood, like "Jaramana" Damascus-Suburb while evacuating others to implement its plans (Said and Yazigi 2018).

The successor of the Decree 66/2012 is Law 10/2018, for re-planning destructed neighborhoods and expropriating the displaced owners from their rights to their properties. It demands to prove the ownership of property under unfair conditions, like proving that one fulfilled security or military services or was not involved in protests, which, if not sufficient, the authorities are empowered to expropriate the property rights to the state (HRW 2019). Consequently, the old owners, who prove their rights, become shareholders of the new constructions. Still, the people who occupied the informal areas do not have the right to be shareholders that turn them again to being without shelter. Law 10/2018 covers development areas of about six million refugees, who, according to this law, cannot have any warranty for their right to their properties or the real value of them (Syrbanism 2018). The Syrian government has used this law to legitimize the expropriation of the property rights of the fled population and to realize the neoliberal agenda of the political and economic elite set before the war. In this manner, housing, land, and property rights became tools used by the regime for practicing social injustice through its authoritarian governance (Baumann 2019: 9). For implementing the neoliberal agenda, the Syrian government has adopted planning a so-called "Marota City" that focuses on building complexes of residential towers and shopping malls, which serve the elite and high-income groups with many luxurious services while denying the needs of the displaced people and the poor after the war (Syrbanism 2018).

In the case of Aleppo, the city has witnessed radical urban changes in its physical fabric and urban governance during the war between 2012 and 2017. In the early stages of the war, the city was controlled by the regime and parts controlled by the opposition, mainly the eastern districts. Those districts were immensely destructed by the regime's aerial military attacks, which destroyed around 8% of the housing stock and partially 23% of them, and 50% of medical and education infrastructure (World Bank 2016). Moreover, the regime tried to intimidate the opposition by cutting off services of water and electricity and blocking the ways of transporting food to their areas, which led to the starvation and death of many civilians. The regime used the shutdown of water as a weapon against the opposition by destroying the infrastructure and exploding the water pipes many times during the war (Ghafari 2016). The conflict led to the displacement of a large number of people from their houses. They fled from violence and lack of food and services from one area to another, and some of them refuge in other countries.

The regime-controlled districts were partly damaged, while destruction of the eastern neighborhoods and substantial parts of the historical city resulted from the "Great Battle of Aleppo" between 2012 and 2016 (UNESCO 2018). For example, great damages were recorded between 2014 and 2015 in historical buildings south of Aleppo Citadel, like Madrasa al-Sultaniyya and Hammam Yalbougha al-Nasiri (ibid). With the end of the war in 2017, the Syrian regime re-acquired all parts of the city.

Urban governance and related actors alongside the war were also changing. New forms of local governance had emerged in 2012 in the areas held by the opposition, which had their autonomy from the central authority in Damascus, through establishing local councils to provide public services and to rebuild the damaged infrastructure, like schools, health centers, and shelters. The areas held by the regime had less centralization and dependency on Damascus during the war, which led to the local authorities governing their areas more autonomously than before the war. However, on both sides of the city, the political leaders, who represented the military, were the main decision-makers on the

local level. Governance actors were expected to meet emerging urban demands during the war, like sheltering the displaced communities, providing infrastructure and services, and managing these processes under military attacks.

In the reconstruction of the damaged cities, especially Aleppo in the post-war era, there are two narratives, one of the regime and one of the opposition. While Aleppo is now entirely controlled by the Syrian government, the reconstruction discourses focus on the changes in urban planning and governance adopted by the ruling government. Today, Aleppo lacks autonomy in decision-making regarding urban planning and development, the same as before the war. The government started to plan the destructed areas through developing new legal instruments, issued from 2012 to 2019, which showed that the Syrian government still adopts a top-down approach in urban planning without any participatory approaches. Moreover, the planning decisions reflect an excluding and discriminating urban planning and governance. The Syrian government continues with its authoritarian urban governance in the city of Aleppo by permitting urban development projects in its areas and depriving the opposition areas of aid and reconstruction interventions. In 2018, for example, it approved renovation works of a health center in al-Hamdaniyeh, Western Aleppo, without being impaired during the war while disregarding the rebuilding of the two destroyed hospitals in Eastern Aleppo (Al-Modon cited in HRW 2019).

Besides, in urban governance, top-down procedures were not just focusing on limiting the legal framework of urban planning and manipulating the permissions for urban development, but also in rebuilding the state institutions, selecting their actors and exerting the regime its power and control on the local level. One of these procedures is appointing the governors directly by the president to ensure the control on the local level (Favier and Kostrz 2019: 16-17). Governors are the local decision-makers on urban planning, and respectively, on the reconstruction process. They also decide on the local administrative structure and the involved actors in the planning process on the lower local levels. Moreover, the local elections held in September 2018, without having a democratic choice of candidates, were concentrated in the regions held by the Syrian regime, which put great efforts to mobilize the people to participate in the elections. Despite these efforts, the distrust of the people in the Syrian government, which lacks transparency and accountability, has led to their reluctance to participate in the elections, except the beneficiaries and supporters of the Baath party. Additionally, in some areas, people were forced to elect, like civil servants and members of students' unions, while others were dread to register and participate because they feared an act of revenge by the regime. Still, five million refugees were not allowed to vote as well as six million people who were displaced to different parts in the country and were far away from their localities, where they only were allowed to participate (Favier and Kostrz 2019: 9). The elections ended with the Baath party asserting its power on the local level (Favier and Kostrz 2019). Furthermore, the members' list in the local councils of the governorates had to be approved by the president according to a Decree 304/2018 and to the Local administration Law issued by the Decree 107/2011 (Sana 2018). Hence, there is no participation on the local level in post-war Aleppo, if that in the elections, legal instruments or planning decisions.

The claims of the regime to achieve decentralization in local government stem from the legal instruments Decree 107/2011, Decree 19/2015 and Law 10/2018 that endow the local administrative bodies the autonomy in managing local projects, yet the decision-making process remains in the hands of the president, the ministers and governors. Consolidating the regime's power in decision-making on the central and local levels, and providing a legal framework of planning that facilitates its political agenda, are factors that supported the regime acquiring full control over the reconstruction process

(Favier and Kostrz 2019). Besides, the government has prepared new local councils to manage the implementation of the reconstruction projects on the local level together with the executive councils. Yet, there is a growing resentment regarding the inefficiency in providing public services by the new local councils, and over the discriminating parameters used against the opposition in urban development projects, services, and housing. Hence, it is questionable if the perpetual repression through these policies and actions will ensure political stability in the long term or result in another uprising (Favier and Kostrz 2019).

In the city of Aleppo, the role of the local councils has changed after 2016. Local councils formed by the opposition in eastern Aleppo were cut-off from financial support and dissolved in 2016. The local administrative restructuring brought executive councils' leaders from pro-regime militia, who should ensure the security in the city (Favier and Kostrz 2019: 16). Moreover, municipalities, according to the new legal framework, are allowed to contract with the private sector and investors for urban reconstruction. The private sector is represented by the former economic and the political elites, thus allies of the regime (Said and Yazigi 2018), while depriving the citizens from participating in the decision-making process and expressing their urban needs. The Syrian regime supported its loyal business elite from pre-war time who became "warlords" and leaders of real estate and construction processes since 2012. It has empowered them to invest in real estate and reconstruction projects through enacting supportive laws, like Law 15/2012 real estate financing companies, Decree 29/2012 for reclamation of agricultural land and Decree 40/2012 for demolishing buildings violations. The regime has tolerated the criminal acts by its allies and their militias, who utilized the war for accumulating their capital through, for instance, abductions to obtain ransom. It also gave them the right to decide on new projects and housing, while focusing on building high-income complexes, like Marota City, and ignoring the needs of the poor communities for shelter (Said and Yazigi 2018: 7).

In sum, Egypt and Syria today lack the political framework for supporting PUPAs. The return to authoritarianism brought more exclusion and marginalization of essential actors in urban planning and governance that led to changing the spatial landscape and urban identities of Syria by losing many territories and causing displacement of millions of people. In Egypt, they led to more poverty, faulty planning decisions, and rage that cannot predict if another uprising will erupt soon. In both countries, participation and decentralization are needed now more than ever for meaningful and incremental rebuilding and recovery.

4.4.2. Identified Success Factors for Adopting and Implementing PUPAs in the Future

Upon the main findings from the third and fourth chapters and the recent changes in both countries, there is a need to consider certain preconditions and factors in adopting, implementing and furthering PUPAs effectively in case studies in the future.

One of the preconditions is providing political support for PUPAs by fostering the democratization efforts started before the uprising and ensuring a solid legal and institutional framework for participation in planning that is backed financially and technically by the central government. The political support is not limited to supervising the participatory process and the involved actors, but it also encompasses acknowledging power relations, developing conflict resolution strategies, and adjusting participatory forms for bringing the conflicted parties together. Accordingly, power sharing and cooperation between the political actors and the city stakeholders in the participatory process is important. Moreover, PUPAs require democratic political conditions to ensure its effectiveness. Therefore, democratization is needed to build a culture of participation in the Arab region, especially

when centralization and authoritarianism prevail. Rooting democracy will surely take time that requires adopting a long-term perspective and vision for achieving it. Furthermore, enhancing the political framework demands transparency and a sense of citizenship, which are essential aspects in triggering political transformation and making participation, succeed in urban planning and governance (Hickey and Mohan 2004).

Another precondition for effectively adopting PUPAs is realizing institutional changes that can help in improving governance and planning processes. Participation can be an effective tool to decentralize urban decision-making process in Egypt and Syria by mobilizing the city actors and stakeholders and empower them into the decision-making process. As an instrument, participatory planning can contribute to the balance of the limited vision of the central government in their top-down neoliberalism agendas and pro-growth mechanisms to a more just, sustainable and resilient city development plans and actions.

Facilitating PUPAs depends upon making essential institutional changes that can make urban planning and management instruments effectively work. The changes can be induced by conducting “de-concentration” and promoting “contractualization” thoroughly in providing public services. Deconcentrating services in Morocco, for example, has allowed the local authorities to focus on strategic tasks through delegating the management of permits for constructions to lower levels in the administration (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011b: 64). Further successful measures of decentralization are hard to be detected in other Arab cities, or only on a small scale or as pilot projects. Moreover, it is necessary to improve the municipal capacity by adopting clear incentive systems, plans and monitoring measures as well as integrating participation in the urban management process and promoting citizens' empowerment and engagement in the process (Pieterse 2000: 19). Brazilian cities, which experienced participatory budgeting and institutionalized this approach, had more social benefits than other cities that did not adopt it. These cities have managed to improve their health, education, and public services and to make effective urban policy changes (Wampler and McNulty 2015) (see 2.2.3.1).

Moreover, developing participatory approaches in urban areas entails re-guiding existing institutional structures and policies or initiate new ones that can facilitate participatory approaches and ensure their sustainability.

The centralized planning authorities usually exclude not just the poor communities from planning decision-making processes, but also the local authorities on smaller levels, wherein the cities, informal governance systems develop beyond the formal ones. Therefore, it is essential to include the informal structures formed by the poor (Hassan 2010) and the representatives of the elected local councils in the smaller units in the partnerships and the participatory planning processes.

Furthermore, initiating participatory planning structures can help in the coordination and collaboration between modern government institutions and traditional ones on all planning levels. In this regard, initiating participatory institutions in the Arab cities, for example, a “Participatory Observatory” can ensure institutional transparency of the participatory processes, and objectivity to disseminate the outcomes to the citizens and further institutions (Bayad, Personal Communication: May 2014). This body intends to monitor and evaluate the PUPAs periodically to define the areas of improvement in the light of the changing urban governance mechanisms, political leaders, and local actors. Additionally, it ensures developing the tools to evaluate participation in the planning processes while

including both the formal participatory forms and the informal and self-help participatory initiatives and projects.

Making these changes and scaling up the PUPAs calls for the commitment of the local government, organizing the community and building the capacity of both. Local governments should be given more political and administrative power through decentralization, in addition to financial and technical means. They need to be guided to develop flexible planning processes, which take into account the potentials of the local communities that, in turn, requires the transformation in the whole governance structure (Mitlin and Thompson 1995: 249-250) and the relationship between the local government and the communities. Local governments in the Arab cities lack the trust of the communities. For enhancing the relationship between the community and the local government and achieving a “model for participation” in the planning phase, both need to share the control and decisions over the process; from the initiating to the monitoring phase (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 77). In this regard, the relationship between the government and the community should be cultivated over time, considering possible changes in the government and its role in the participatory process (Choguill 1996). Besides, to build trust between those actors, there is a need to improve the transparency of the local governments regarding their financial and implementation plans, and by establishing a clear information system and contact centers for all citizens as well as promoting reliable media, communication tools, and interactive platforms.

Furthermore, development agencies and actors need to adopt changes in their methodological approach in the Arab cities. They need to develop adapted participatory mechanisms to the given political and local contexts, where more cooperation and decentralization can be promoted and maintained. Even though development projects have limited schedules and resources, the local actors, including planners, and urban managers need to incrementally build the required skills for implementing PUPAs independently after the end of the development project, together with DAs' actors. DAs have also the responsibility to offer their expertise as learning material for the local actors, who acquired the skills to transfer and maintain them in practice. They can provide their assistance in flexible and adaptable forms to the target groups, where the definitions and principles of participation can be discussed and understood by all the stakeholders – not just as a technical instrument, but also as a tool for social empowerment. Likewise, in their reports, they need to focus more on the methodological frameworks for implementing and evaluating the PUPAs not as an instrument for planning, but also for social development and empowerment. For this purpose, political issues and inclusiveness should be identified and discussed in the cooperation agreements to set measures for dealing with them before initiating the PUPA. Besides, considering the experience of development cooperation in Aleppo and Ramallah, there is a need to extend development cooperation beyond the pilot development interventions. Moreover, it is necessary to establish long-term PUPAs in the Arab cities in the participatory programs and projects, where participation can be exercised and sustained, and the gained commitment and engagement can be utilized and transferred. The example of Aleppo has shown that resources and political support are essential for ensuring the effectiveness of DAs' efforts, especially if they sustain them for a longer time along the development cooperation.

Finally, institutionalizing PUPAs is crucial to ensure their sustainable impact on urban planning, governance and society in the Arab cities, where the reluctance of the central and local authorities to institutionalize them indicates their potential impact on transforming the existing political and institutional settings (CMI and MedCities et al. 2011a; 2011b). Therefore, consolidating the PUPAs on the ground and ensuring their sustainability requires undertaking meaningful practices of

participation, investing resources for training and pilot projects and providing a technical handbook accompanied by the law, and the tradeoff between the practice and the theory.

A further precondition to facilitate implementing the PUPAs is through understanding the social context in the targeted cities, which entails an exploration of the character of the urban communities and planning cultures and traditions. For instance, in utilizing different informal forms of cooperation and solitary work that is accepted and practiced by the society, the local economy in Aleppo has cooperated in offering jobs and training opportunities for young people from the poor; this cooperation was based on social solidarity, embedded in the traditions of the Islamic society (Ramadan, Personal Communication: April 2017). Hence, the needs of the citizens and the vulnerable groups from the planning process should be addressed, and their potential roles should be recognized, not only as the “beneficiaries” but also as partners and actors in the process (Hamdi and Goethert 1997).

Motivating diverse social groups to participate in urban planning and governance demands prior efforts that focus on community development and political empowerment. Such an approach should be planned over time, considering the fragmented and heterogeneous social structure encountered in the city and neighborhood level, in addition to the absence of local leaders and active CSOs, and the lack of trust between the local government and the communities. To overcome these limitations, allocating efforts and resources for awareness-raising and education of the citizens should be undertaken over time through small pilot projects, like campaigns to raise awareness for environmental issues and urban health, in addition to conducting participatory budgeting workshops and involving the citizens in the municipal responsibilities, for instance, in services provision regarding sanitation, transportation and education. These processes need to include all stakeholders, the poor and the marginalized, which requires empowering and mobilizing local communities as well as the private sector and civil society. All stakeholders can take part and get their share for now and the future.

Hence, citizens' involvement should be planned from the beginning of the project phases, parallel to the initiation – not only after prioritizing the action plans. Moreover, it is essential to maintain the motivation of the citizens to participate in the implementation of the project and the overall management process, including proceeding the financial and operational tasks and evaluating the participatory processes. Furthermore, there is a need to develop community development²⁶⁰ indicators adjusted to the given case studies to plan the education and training of the communities accordingly. Applying these indicators facilitates identifying the changes in the communities' collective values and attitudes towards the city through their organization, education, and empowerment (IACD²⁶¹ 2019).

Empowering and engaging the society in planning requires identifying local natural leaders and planning agents and engaging local NGOs in the mediation and negotiation between the local stakeholders in solving possible conflicts. Besides, to promote dialogue with the citizens and the poor communities, including women and youth while considering the cultural context and diversity, the communication skills of the natural leaders should be developed to enhance their capacity and competences to take part in the participatory planning processes, where they can communicate their needs and negotiate with the authorities. Additionally, keeping the communication channels open and

²⁶⁰ Community development is “A process where community members come together to take collective action and generate solutions to common problems.” (UNTERM 1995).

²⁶¹ The International Association for Community Development (IACD) is a global multi-disciplinary network for the workers in the community development field.

sustainable between all stakeholders throughout the planning phases requires a great deal of time and resources.

Finally, educating the community and building its capacity to participation presents a new definition of public responsibility in Arab societies and a shift in the role of the local government through moving from a model of “provider” to a model of “enabler”, while preserving mutual considerations of local interests and city strategic needs (Hamdi and Goethert 1997: 25; Mozayyeni 1997). Local actors who advocate this approach need to take responsibility as urban managers along with the local planners, who possess the modern knowledge and the visions for a democratic society, and sustainability and freedom of decision in the planning process. In addition, the education of youth and training them through supporting volunteerism and co-production forms (bottom-up) call for an active role of CSOs in the process through better structure and organization reinforced by local knowledge. A successful participation of the civil society demands a politically supporting active citizenship and equity by ensuring the legal framework. Moreover, the community and the local NGOs should be trained and become well-organized and informed to be able to act and negotiate effectively in the participatory processes.

In addition to the abovementioned preconditions for developing and implementing PUPAs, providing political support, making institutional changes and understanding the social context, on the local level, there is a need to consider adjusting participatory mechanisms, promoting communication tools, as ICT tools and empowering essential local actors to implement PUPAs effectively.

4.4.2.1. Developing Adjusted Participatory Mechanisms and Tools to the Given Political and Local Contexts

To develop practical mechanisms and tools to manage the participatory planning process effectively by the managers of the PUPA, they need to analyze and understand the types of communities participating in the process while considering the spatial scale. Before selecting or developing the right tools of participatory planning, it is recommended to consider defining the community type, the structure, planning methods, the methodology, and estimating the costs, time and materials (derived from Community Action Planning by Hamdi and Goethert 1997). Besides, the roles of the institutions and the moderators of the participatory planning process are crucial for conducting the process and ensuring its sustainability to the follow-up stages and further planning scales (see 2.3).

Developing a typology of the communities can be based on their political inclination or social aspects, for example, if they are traditional or religious or from low or high-income, etc. Additionally, social cohesion and organization of a community are of high relevance to plan and implement participatory processes, either on the city or neighborhood level. To initiate participatory meetings in large communities or on the city level, it is recommended to form smaller groups of participants to facilitate the participatory process. It makes a difference if the community has the poor or the organized type. The latter is usually reluctant to participate (Hamdi and Goethert 1997). The spatial pattern can be associated with certain types of communities, for example, in urban areas, upgrading projects and programs target lower-income communities (ideal type), who occupy the inner ring, and the squatter communities in the suburbs, like the fishermen settlements in the city of Alexandria. Respectively, in choosing the tool for the community’s type, factors such as time and the capacity of the community to organize themselves and to achieve the determined goals should be considered. In the end, the managers can develop a stakeholder participation matrix as a tool to define who would participate in a project at which stage and after conducting the participatory process; the whole PUPA should be

evaluated regarding the levels of participation and the process itself (Hamdi and Goethert 1997). Considering the situation after the uprising and during the war in Syria, adopting and managing tools of community action planning by the communities was an alternative when the role of the institutions was absent in the provision and management of public services. An example from eastern Aleppo during the war was initiating local councils that undertook urban management tasks. The process of forming the local councils resembled a democratic practice where decisions and elections proceeded transparently. Yet, these practices revealed the need for building the capacity of the communities and their leaders, who lacked the experience and organizational skills for structuring and performing different urban management tasks (Akhbaralaan 2015; Said and Yazigi 2018).

4.4.2.2. Integrate ICTs Tools in Supporting PUPAs in the Present and Future of the Arab Cities

As was shown in the previous chapters, the impact of the PUPAs through the CDS on urban governance was limited, and the existing urban governance settings have restricted the potentials of these approaches on the national and local levels (see 3.1.3.3, 3.4 and 4.2.6). Nonetheless, elevating the importance of participation in improving urban governance and realizing a real political and social transformation coincided with an emerging role of social media after the uprising in Syria and Egypt. The potential role of social media and the digital revolution of information in the future is expected to affect the PUPAs in many innovative ways, including E-forums and E-volunteers, or later through E-government or E-governance, etc.

The uprising in the Arab region since 2011 marked a revelation of the need to balance the efforts for globalization and economic liberalization with social needs and equity. Especially in the capital and big cities, where the population is concentrated, the events exposed the failure of urban governance in responding to the urban challenges, like high unemployment rates among the youth, income disparities and ineffectiveness and corruption of the administrative systems. Raising these governance challenges in the media during the uprising led to discourses on the role of PUPAs in improving urban governance in the Arab cities in the future (Tebbal 2011b: 5; CMI 2011: 13; UN habitat 2012: 23-24).

Different forms of participation in social media unveiled the voices of the citizens, including the vulnerable groups from youth, women, and the poor. The growing activism by using Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), and social media, raised the importance of these tools in empowering the Arab activists and raise their awareness of citizenship and participation, and for changing the governance process and actors in reality. Hence, adopting PUPAs in the Arab region in the future is expected to be affected by these tools.

The ICTS can contribute to the political change by allowing for political freedom in autocratic contexts, especially in supporting the opposition movements. Still, in the Arab context, ICTs are not enough for changing the existing regimes (Howard 2011 cited by Leihs and Tzellos 2015), but they can be tools for activism through journalism and reporting by ordinary citizens. Activism on the internet through blogging and commenting on Facebook has helped in bringing issues of governance into discussion, leading to the emergence of a community with a new political identity. Citizens, who were active in reporting in crisis times using their cameras and phones, like in Iraq 2003 or Gaza in 2008, were considered as the main agents for change in the Arab region (Hamdy 2009 cited by Leihs and Tzellos 2015). Even after the crisis, active citizen reporters played their role in drawing attention to internal politics, including corruption and institutional ineffectiveness. The collective activities on internet platforms helped in strengthening citizenship and solidarity and in forming a new collective identity (Leihs and Tzellos 2015).

Collective activism on the internet was raised in many discourses considering the potential role of social networking in empowering the marginalized, especially from women and youth. Arab users view social media as a platform to practice political participation, which has the potential for inducing a social change in reality. Based on the surveys, many Arab users of social networking tools were feeling empowered to influence social change, especially in political activism contexts, which also helped in strengthening their connection to the community, understanding it, and contributing to it. Moreover, the results have revealed a strong connection of the Arab users to national fellows, global citizens, and regional fellows, with less emphasis on the religious identity on social media. In this respect, interaction and exchange led the Arab users to be more open and tolerant concerning other views (Mourtada and Salem 2012).

Social networking through social media can also be more successful in building collaboration, innovation, and knowledge exchange in the planning realm among the government, the society, and the private sector. As a result, a communication revolution happened rather than a technology revolution, where the planning issues that were divorced from topics of politics were discussed in their political context on social networks. The political context came to articulate issues that were not understandable for the people because of their lack of political awareness and freedom. On social media, planners are discussing planning and legal issues openly and analyzing the different interest groups in the post-war events, where they also critically address the political and social validity of the planning instruments. Some of the important platforms for activism in urban planning and awareness raising to planning issues are "Syrbanism"²⁶², and "Tadamun"²⁶³. These platforms²⁶⁴ were initiated and managed by academics and planning professionals.

The ICTs and social media can be useful tools for the institutions in transforming the governance process. The increase and diversity of the use of social media in the Arab region triggered by the Arab spring²⁶⁵ was not just for social interaction but also for practicing political participation and civic engagement, entrepreneurship, and social change. While some governments view this potential as a threat for its legitimacy, others understand it as an opportunity for improving governance and inserting new governance modes that are inclusive, participatory, and transparent (Mourtada and Salem 2012). In improving the governance process by using ICTs and social media, local governments need to be involved in these platforms and interact with the citizens openly or dedicate staff to organize the interactions. Furthermore, they should also take the comments and views on social media seriously,

²⁶² Founded in 2017 on Facebook, Syrbanism has about 2000 followers. It is a platform that promoted dialogue and discussion on urban issues and discourses in Syria. It was founded by two Syrian researchers, Edwar Hanna, an urban practitioner, and researcher; and Nour Harastani, an architect and urban researcher specialized in social justice, informality, and spatial changes during the conflicts (Syrbanism. 2019).

²⁶³ Tadamun defines itself as an initiative for social equity and right to the city and for urban change through collaboration: "[...] the TADAMUN Initiative believes that all citizens have an equal right to their city, as well as a shared responsibility towards it. TADAMUN also believes that solidarity among citizens is the only way to achieve social justice and a decent standard of living, particularly for many who have been ignored for too long. TADAMUN strives to work with all stakeholders as it builds alliances and coalitions to encourage change and introduces realistic alternatives and solutions for existing urban problems. What we need is not more undemocratic and elitist decisions, but for all citizens to claim and demand their urban rights and to devise new urban policies that are more effective, equitable, participatory, and sustainable." Some of the shared topics are planning [in] Justice, MENA urbanism, Know Your City, Know Your Government, Constitution Campaign, Urban Initiatives, urban database etc. [...]" (Tadamun 2019).

²⁶⁴ Another platform for publishing after the uprising is jadalyieh.com, which is produced by the Arab Studies Institute. It covers different topics, including urban issues in different Arab countries and it is based on non-profit and unpaid contributions.

²⁶⁵ Youth have more presence on Facebook after 2012. The participation of Arab women until 33% compared to women in the world. Contributions on Twitter and Facebook increased and on YouTube the views by Arab users was very high after 2012 (based on Mourtada and Salem 2012).

considering the reflection of these opinions of reality. Therefore, ensuring freedom of opinion on the media and transparency are important in providing information and solutions as well as in discussing urgent problems with them.

Moreover, applying communication tools through social media in the Arab uprising helped in putting pressure on the authoritarian regimes. Yet, there is a need for political awareness and organization to channel the political forces and processes into structural forms or institutions that serve the citizens in reality (Leih and Tzellos 2015). Social media has led to emerging new actors and information platforms after a longtime absence of reliable national media in the Arab countries. However, it is important to consider certain risks when relying on the content and means provided on social media, like the evolvement of forms of "Counter Media" to the newly emerged media after the uprising that can lead to many delusions and mistrust of the social media. Therefore, ensuring trust and transparency is essential when using social media as a platform to practice and promote participation.

4.4.2.3. *Fostering the Potential Role of the Local Planners in Supporting PUPAs*

Empowering local planners and training them is necessary not just to apply the participatory planning process within its technocratic approach, but also as a tool for empowering the citizens as partners and supporters of urban change as well as the private sector, the local government and other institutions, whose roles are usually subordinated in the centralized planning decision-making (see 4.3.2).

For empowering the planners in Egypt and Syria, there is a need to connect the educational topics with the new planning methods and tools while bridging the gap between planning theory and practice. Besides, it is important to develop their knowledge on the main areas of debate in the planning, like environmental planning and practices, in addition to linking them to the technological systems, transportation, and market dynamics locally and globally (Madbouly 2009). Moreover, measures, methods, and best planning practices of post-war reconstruction should be integrated as learning materials.

It is helpful to expand the knowledge regarding planning tools that are tailored to the Arab context, especially regarding the evaluation and monitoring techniques of development projects while considering the commonalities on the national level and the individual case studies for an in-depth examination of the local level. In achieving this goal, participatory forums for planners need to be initiated to discuss new ideas and ways of implementation and methods for conducting environmental, social, economic, and political surveys. These forums are required not just in bringing local actors in one city but also with regional and national actors and from Arab and non-Arab cities, which can facilitate lessons learned among them. Furthermore, to master the new planning tools, training programs need to be provided for planning students and planning professionals as well as the planners working in the government. In this regard, training the local planners to work interdisciplinary in finding and implementing the solutions in their cities, and developing the culture of participatory planning from the bottom, is essential for modernizing the planning instruments and practices towards participation in the Arab region. Planners that work together with development agencies benefit from the offered training opportunities, which, in turn, are conditioned by the project cycle and funding. Therefore, planners should have the freedom to apply new instruments even after the end of development projects and get equal chances for professional development and self-improvement.

Although academia has the tools to influence PUPAs, it lacks the freedom and political support to guide the educational process towards participation. Supporting the new generation of planners in

understanding and utilizing the potentials of the PUPAs, it is necessary to discuss the political influence of the state on the participatory planning practices and integrate the political aspects into the planning education to extend the understanding of planning, beyond its technocratic role, into its social, economic, political, and structural dimensions. As a result, the lessons-learned can support adopting PUPAs by the planners deliberately in the future (Madbouly 2009: 103-107; Bayad, Personal Communication: May 2014), and strengthening their role in making positive changes in urban governance.

The change in the urban development policy for more efficient planning and good urban governance is directed mostly to emphasize involving planners in promoting the managerial urban governance in reshaping and regulating the city through enabling the private sector and running the management process. This marks the shift in urban policy to entrepreneurialism, which is necessary for a city to present itself as competitive in the global market (OECD 2007). Development approaches adopted to improve urban planning and governance, like the CDS, led in the past to involving the local planners in promoting managerial urban governance in reshaping the city, which marked a shift in urban policy towards entrepreneurialism. While this shift is necessary for a city to present itself as competitive in the global market, it still poses challenges for achieving sustainable urban development in Arab countries and contradicts the goals intended by adopting inclusive PUPAs. In this respect, planners should be aware of these challenges, and they are requested to ensure the balance between their role as entrepreneurs and in ensuring social equity and inclusion of their city.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

The spatial tendencies in the Arab countries in the past had shown high urban growth rates, affected by the uncontrolled urbanization and urban sprawl. This tendency was expected to continue, as policies have failed to slow down migration and tackle the challenges of urban informality and lack of public services and infrastructure.

These tendencies and challenges were changing after 2011 in some of the Arab countries influenced by the political and social dynamics upon the “Arab Spring” and by the rise of environmental problems resulting from climate change. Urban challenges in many Arab cities emerged before 2011, were mainly induced by ineffective urban governance, lack of decentralization, and a reliable legal and institutional framework of planning, in addition to a weak role of civil society.

In responding to the urban challenges, measures to improve urban governance were taken in many development endeavors. They focused on modernizing the planning and administrative systems by applying instruments for decentralization, municipal capacity building, and participatory urban planning approaches (PUPAs). Such approaches aim to achieve consensus over urban projects and planning and to motivate cooperation partners to co-finance the implementation of the projects. Additionally, they envisioned to include the urban poor and the marginalized social groups in the development process to ensure its sustainability. However, these projects remained pilot projects without a real impact on urban governance, planning system, and social development, which indicated the ineffectiveness of the participatory planning approaches in the Arab countries.

Hence, the aim of this research was, firstly, to examine PUPAs adopted and implemented in the Arab region before 2011, and to investigate in details the PUPAs of urban development projects in two case studies in comparison; Alexandria and Aleppo between 2003 and 2010. Secondly, it aimed to explore the challenges facing both adopting and implementing participatory approaches in urban development projects in the Arab cities. Finally, the research resulted in identifying the main factors for the successful implementation of PUPAs in the Arab cities and emphasizing the potential of the local actors in fostering participatory approaches.

The present research provides a significant contribution to urban planning research and urban development practices in the Arab region, as its findings are crucial for understanding the problems of urban planning and governance in the Arab cities and for proposing solutions approaches for these problems, in particular in the studied cities. While the theoretical part (Chapters 2) intended for analyzing the concepts, theories, and practices of participatory planning in urban development in industrial and developing countries, the empirical part (Chapter 3 and 4) focused on investigating these theories in the Arab cities with the focus on Aleppo and Alexandria. The examination of the PUPAs in the City Development Strategies (CDSs) of some Arab cities²⁶⁶ was carried out based on secondary literature (Chapter 3). It delivered an analysis of the challenges and local experiences in the existing urban governance settings. Through the empirical research, PUPAs in the cities Aleppo and Alexandria were elaborately analyzed (chapter 4).

The empirical study was undertaken based on qualitative research methods, including collecting primary data on the ground in the field research in Alexandria and conducting 28 interviews with key

²⁶⁶ Among others Tetouan (Morocco), Sfax (Tunisia), Alexandria (Egypt), Ramallah (Palestine), Amman (Jordan), Aleppo (Syria), and Tripoli (Lebanon).

stakeholders, experts, and planners between 2014 and 2017 from both cities Alexandria and Aleppo. In order to assess the PUPAs in urban governance and planning and compare their implementation in the case studies, three main factors have been identified based on the theoretical analysis: 1) urban governance frameworks and political support of the PUPA, 2) the organization and management of the PUPA, and 3) its impact and sustainability.

The key outcomes concerning participatory planning practices in the Arab cities underline the need to address governance issues in urban planning research and practice in the framework of the political system, which is usually a “red line” in undemocratic regimes, such as the Arab ones. Besides, there is a need to empower local planners in realizing PUPAs and uphold their role as agents for urban change in the future. The research also emphasizes that close collaboration among local actors, including the local government, the local planners, academia, and NGOs, is fundamental to develop new planning instruments, which support PUPAs.

Although adopting and implementing PUPAs in the studied cities was challenged with lacking political backing to participatory planning, poor urban management, and inefficient institutional framework, which led to their weak impact and outcome, yet, the participatory approaches provided a platform for emerging new actors and ideas that can improve urban governance in the future. Chiefly, local actors and authorities demonstrated a great potential to implement PUPAs successfully. Therefore, participatory planning practices at the local level should be considered by the governments in their institutional reform and ensure their sustainability. The case studies have also shown that innovative tools of participation created in the local contexts in Alexandria and Aleppo can be shared with other cities, even if they do not have similar planning and governance settings.

Developing the foundation for effectively implementing participatory planning approaches is necessary for Arab cities, especially after 2011, which signifies the time of awakening to undertake earnest political and social changes. Now more than before, Arab cities necessitate new ways to face urban challenges, in addition to reliable planning tools, in particular for reconstruction and rebuilding the cities and their governance sustainably. In addition, participation as one of the demands of protesters of 2011 needs to be asserted as a planning tool to bring city stakeholders together in the planning process and to be attained as an objective for promoting citizenship and inclusiveness through involving the local communities in the process.

Accordingly, the following sections provide a summary of the research findings.

One of the main findings of analyzing the PUPAs in the CDSs in chapter 3 was the nonexistence of participation in urban planning and governance in the investigated cities (see 3.1.3). Providing that participation in formal planning does not exist in any of these cities, the participatory approaches adopted in urban development projects were short-lived practices of pilot nature. Nevertheless, the comparison of the CDSs has shown uneven experiences in adopting and implementing PUPAs in urban governance. Moreover, realizing the PUPAs was not sustainable in most of the cases due to the lack of political and institutional support, where other cities, e.g., Alexandria, Amman, and Tripoli have demonstrated that the decrease of the commitment of the local actors and the weak role of CSOs were the obstacles to the implementation of PUPAs. Besides, almost all cities under study demonstrated that the deficit of long-term backing from the international agencies hindered a long-term realization of PUPAs. In most cases, efforts for successful fulfillment of PUPAs declined or stopped, as soon as the international assistance ended.

The absence of democracy is one central factor for the lack of political support of the national governments to participation. It affects not just the political life, but also civic life, which imposes restraints on citizens' involvement in different participatory projects and activities that cannot be carried out without the permission of the central government. Even the supportive local governmental and economic actors could not sustain their backing of the PUPA gained in the early CDS stages, due to the running out of the resources and the weak municipal capacity and expertise for managing the CDS. Moreover, the replacement of the CDS' political leaders, who have hardly delegated the powers to other local actors, has undermined the motivation and continuity of the participatory process, like in the case of Alexandria and Tetouan.

A further reason for the deficient implementation of PUPAs in the examined cities was the weak role of CSOs. Although CSOs grew in number in many Arab countries in the last two decades, they faced several difficulties that hindered them from developing to an influential partner in the planning process of the CDS. Some of these difficulties are the weak structure and organization of the CSOs, limited resources, and the restrictive legal framework for their work.

Finally, the contribution of the DAs in formulating the CDS and in increasing the participation of the local actors in planning and implementing the CDS was limited to the first two years, as the development projects were short-term planned and relied on the external expertise. The local and political support to participatory approaches usually ceases with the end of the project, which makes any participatory CDS dependent on the international backing and the duration of the funded projects. For example, the city of Ramallah was aware of the risk of dependency on international assistance and its unsustainability. Therefore, the local actors intended to build their local capacities by involving local experts in many of the CDS stages and reduce the reliance on external ones.

The main successes of the PUPAs recognized during the CDS process before 2011 in the Arab cities were represented by raising a sense of ownership for the CDS, and commitment to realizing the PUPA, in addition to addressing issues of inclusiveness, achieving improvement in the communication with city stakeholders, and increasing institutional awareness.

Raising the awareness to the participatory approach through creating a collective vision, was observed in cities, like Aleppo, Alexandria, and Al Fayhaa, in particular by involving local and economic actors in the CDS, where the CDS in Sfax has demonstrated a raised sense of ownership and commitment by the local actors. Ownership was crucial for maintaining the motivation of the local actors and the efforts of the steering committee, who ensured the funding for the following CDS stages. Moreover, the need for inclusiveness in the CDS was addressed, especially in Ramallah, which translated the PUPA by forming partnerships with community organizations, improving transparency in the relationship between the government and the citizens, and encouraging voluntary cooperation with CSOs. Inclusiveness was also a significant element in the CDS of Tunis, which emphasized the roles of the women and children in different CDS' themes and slogan. A further aspect was the improvement of communication between the local actors and the citizens in several cities. Aleppo and Ramallah, for instance, succeeded in developing communication strategies and outreach tools to approach the local communities and different social groups from the earliest stages of the CDS, other cities have focused on initiating CDS websites and public forums to reduce communication expenditure. In some cities, raising awareness of the participatory approaches has affected urban governance and promoted decentralization of services provision. For example, Morocco has managed to delegate various

strategic tasks, like issuing permits for constructions to the local authorities and lower administrative levels. Moreover, it was also a pioneer in institutionalizing the central parts of its CDS.

Providing that PUPAs, in their adopted forms in the Arab cities in the past, were inappropriate tools for the political, institutional, and social settings, there is a need for new planning ideas and tools that are derived from the given contexts. Particularly after the uprising in 2011, which denotes the time of awakening for undertaking substantial political and social changes in the Arab cities, there is a need for reliable planning tools for rebuilding the cities and their governance sustainably.

The in-depth examination of PUPAs in the initiated CDSs in two Arab cities, Alexandria and Aleppo, between 2003 and 2010, revealed that the high degree of centralization in the planning decision-making process and institutional weaknesses were the major obstacles for adopting and implementing PUPAs. The legal and institutional framework for the urban development strategy was not only highly centralized but also rooted in an outdated planning system based on an ineffective technocratic approach and instruments. Such development approaches have dismissed the participation of local actors, whether they are from the civil society representatives, local leaders, or local governmental planners. Adopting PUPAs at the governmental level without sufficient representation of the civil society, the marginalized groups, and the local administration has undermined the potentials of the participatory approaches and their positive impact on society and urban development projects.

A further research finding is that the CSOs²⁶⁷ in Aleppo and Alexandria had demonstrated a weak role in urban planning and urban governance due to three main factors: 1) the political environment didn't support participation either in decision-making process or in planning and governance functions; 2) the incapability of local governments to involve CSOs; and 3) COSs lack of financial backing, legislative framework, communication strategies and negotiation skills to manage the participatory approach.

Furthermore, the political system in both countries, Syria and Egypt, are characterized by authoritarianism, political repression, and high concentration of power, however, to different degrees. The comparative analysis of Aleppo and Alexandria has shown that the Egyptian government has made more efforts than the state in Syria to increase participation by involving the CSOs in its development actions and plans during the studied period. An example of these efforts was the increasing role of community-based associations and local NGOs in urban development, especially in upgrading projects in informal areas in cities, like Cairo and Alexandria (considering the projects in the framework of the PDP program).

Despite the challenges facing the PUPA in the CDS in Aleppo and Alexandria, the research demonstrated the potentials for improvement on the local level under certain conditions. For instance, the role of the local political leaders represented by the mayor and the governor in promoting PUPAs was important for both adopting and implementing the PUPA in the CDS, as they were also the leaders of the participatory processes through the forums and consultations. Their support ensured the participation of key stakeholders in the CDS and guaranteed their commitment to the implementation of the action plans.

While participation-supportive political leaders were an asset to the CDS, the dependency of the participatory process on their backing proved to be unsustainable. The findings of the field research have shown that the change of the supportive leaders can pose a threat to the continuity of the CDS since the collaborative efforts considerably linked with the person in power. For instance, realizing the

²⁶⁷ See the sections 3.1.2.2, 3.2.4.5, and 3.3.2.3 and 4.1.3.2 and 4.2.5.1.

PUPA in Alexandria depended on the governor's commitment and was thus at risk when he was replaced. On the contrary, the change in persons in power did not affect the CDS process in Aleppo during the observed period, owing to the collaborative approach adopted by the CDS team and the cooperative partners.

Another result of the case studies is that the weak municipal capacity, combined with the lack of expertise and decentralization in the urban decision-making process, has posed an additional challenge for implementing the PUPAs in these cities. For instance, local actors in Alexandria and Aleppo, who do not have the expertise in implementing PUPAs, have imposed different PUPAs based on their interpretation and definition of participation, and their hierarchical role in the administrative system, but not based on their understanding of the needs of the local stakeholders. The analysis of the city development strategy in Alexandria revealed that the absence of decentralization and autonomy on the lower administrative levels made the staff in the sub-national planning authorities dependent on the instructions from the central authorities for implementing the participatory process. Eventually, both practices at the municipal level conformed to the "top-down" approach in applying PUPAs.

The top-down approach was adopted not only within the government institutions but also in implementing the PUPA by the local governments. According to the outcomes of chapter 4, the participation of the citizens and local communities in urban development projects was only possible with the leadership of the local government as the key actor, which led to limiting their role in the initiation phase. In this case, local governments decided to involve city stakeholders in planning the CDS, as beneficiaries of the process and not as partners. The top-down planning approach can, by any means, empower the citizens and ensure a meaningful intervention in the planning process. It also emphasized the dependency of the citizens on the vision, organizational capacity, and efforts of the local government to engage them in this process. Given this dependency, the role of the local government proved to be essential for improving and promoting participatory practices, at least in the case studies, Aleppo and Alexandria. Yet, strengthening this role requires considerable efforts for capacity building to manage the participatory approaches.

A Further institutional challenge is the incapability of the local government for managing PUPAs caused by corruption and lacking organizational skills and expertise led to losing the local actors the trust of the citizens and their credibility as development agents. This situation resulted when the pressure on the local governments increased to fulfill the neo-liberal agenda adopted at the national level, which focuses on advertising for the cities in the global market to attract investments and tourism, leading to masking aspects of urban poverty. Thereby, the role of the local actors shifts from bureaucrats to entrepreneurs without dealing with the institutional weaknesses facing them and the PUPAs.

A central finding of the field research was that the participatory processes were politically inclined. The PUPAs were performed with close governmental supervision and monitoring on both city and community level. Although the presence of the political leaders was essential in the consultation meetings, as the leading actors, they influenced the decision-making process considerably regardless of the participatory process and the views of the participants. While this conclusion is built on the accessible data during the field research, a thorough examination of this conclusion requires an extensive database and documentation of the course of the participatory processes and meetings.

Still, the political motivation for undertaking PUPAs does not reflect the real intention of the state. According to the interviews conducted by the author with a selected group of local experts and stakeholders, implementing the PUPA was merely based on pro forma processes, which was limited to

organizing pro forma public meetings with the stakeholders, without considering the value of inclusive participatory planning processes. The interviewees in both cities stated that the consultation sessions and workshops were held transparently and inclusively. However, without documentation of the participatory processes, it is hard to validate these views. The examination of the available data in the CDS reports on the PUPAs presented inconsistent data regarding implementing the PUPAs and managing the participatory processes. Yet, they revealed that most consultation meetings were organized for informing the stakeholders about the resulted plans and decisions, rather than for involving them in the process of creating the plans and making the decisions. Moreover, in the reports, there was insufficient documentation of the arisen conflicts in the held meetings or the measures undertaken for conflict management.

An essential issue raised through the interviews was that the CDS process did not succeed in involving city key stakeholders equally, especially from the citizens and the vulnerable groups, which led to undermining the impacts of the PUPA. The lack of inclusiveness of the CDS had negative effects on the effectiveness of the PUPA (see 4.3 and 4.4). The CDS in Aleppo and Alexandria has targeted influential city actors, e.g., businesspersons, governmental institutions, leading NGOs, academia, and the official media. Meanwhile, having limited tools to include and mobilize representatives of the marginalized social groups in the CDS process, the goals for applying participation as an instrument for social improvement and democratization were not achieved in the case studies. Moreover, in the absence of participation as a practice and culture in the local communities of Aleppo and Alexandria, participation remains an imposed process and a formal procedure managed by the local government without promoting social initiatives. Hence, institutionalizing participation as a planning instrument will not influence urban governance as long as the government does not consider the needs of the citizens and the marginalized groups in the planning process, realize decentralization in urban governance efficiently, encourage civil activism, and build communication capacities and negotiation skills of its employees.

Despite the above-identified challenges, this research recognized several successful experiences in implementing the PUPAs throughout the CDS stages.

There was an elevated institutional awareness for PUPAs and decentralization detected in the case of Alexandria, which encouraged forms of PPP and initiated bodies for managing the CDS' action plans on the governorate and district levels in cooperation with CDAs. In Aleppo, although the CDS team has raised awareness for the PUPA on the local level, this approach was not backed institutionally by the central government, due to the lack of political support to decentralization and civil society. This aspect indicates a different understanding and interpretation of PUPAs in practice in the two cities. Therefore, examining PUPAs in the Arab region requires considering both the local as well as national frameworks. For instance, adopting the participatory approach in the CDS of Alexandria has helped in reinforcing poverty reduction measures through promoting public-private partnerships in the studied period. Particularly in the field of urban informality, involving local NGOs and applying socio-economic development tools have targeted low-income groups in the pilot informal areas and helped to create job opportunities for them.

Furthermore, the involved professionals, planners, and urban managers²⁶⁸ in the local government have the potential to play a more substantial role in facilitating PUPAs when they get the political support, a leeway for innovation, and awareness of their impact on the urban governance process. The

²⁶⁸ Referring to the members of the technical and the management teams of the CDS at the local government.

local actors in the CDS Aleppo had more recognition of the PUPA and its importance on the local level, compared to the CDS Alexandria.

In general, the research revealed that developing a CDS in the two cities with limited resources and time-frame was an exercise to improve urban governance based on collaborative planning and tools of strategic planning. The CDS process has facilitated identifying the actions and instruments for dealing with urgent urban challenges. Through fostering the PUPA, institutions, actors, and organizations were brought together in the planning process, some for the first time. The CDS process and the PUPA had helped in propelling pending urban development projects and initiating new ones. Yet, the centralized planning process, weak municipal capacity, and lack of inclusiveness of city stakeholders, particularly from the poor, hindered implementing an effective PUPA leading to a limited impact of participation on the society, planning, and urban governance.

Upon the key findings and the recent changes²⁶⁹ in both countries, Egypt and Syria, the research suggests the following recommendations²⁷⁰ to improve the adoption of PUPAs and their implementation in the CDSs and development projects in the future:

- 1) *Ensuring the political support for participatory planning* by promoting democratic urban life and citizenship. The absence of democracy was one of the main hindrances to establishing a strong civil society, encouraging civil activism, and adopting PUPAs in the Arab region. Therefore, it is essential to develop measures that promote democratic practices in urban governance, for example, by realizing an incremental decentralization and empowering the citizens and CSOs. Besides, the state requires increasingly considering democratic approaches in its agenda and action plans, and reallocating the needed resources for a successful implementation, if it seeks to achieve meaningful changes in urban planning and governance.
- 2) *Providing a flexible and enabling legal and institutional framework* is a prerequisite to facilitate the adoption of PUPAs and to ensure their effective socio-urban results. For this purpose, institutional change should include combating corruption and reducing bureaucracy, in addition to increasing effectiveness and decentralization in urban decision-making and public services provision.

Moreover, there is a need to re-guide existing institutional structures and policies or initiate new ones that can support realizing participatory approaches and safeguard their sustainability. For example, it is recommendable to establish a “Participatory Observatory”, which is responsible for ensuring transparent and inclusive participatory processes and objective dissemination of their outcomes to the citizens and institutions (see 4.4.2).

In addition, to ensure a sustainable impact of PUPAs on the planning and urban governance, and society, PUPAs should be institutionalized. For institutionalizing PUPAs, it is essential to provide a technical handbook accompanied by the law. Moreover, participatory planning as a tool needs to be complemented by meaningful practices of participation through investing resources for training and pilot projects and for trading-off between the practice and the theory to consolidate the PUPAs on the ground.

- 3) *Fostering capacity-building efforts and transparency by improving the municipal effectiveness and increasing trust between the local government and the citizens, including the poor.*

²⁶⁹ See 3.1.2.3, 3.1.3.4, and 4.4.

²⁷⁰ See 4.4.2.

Achieving this goal can be through establishing a transparent information system, communication tools, reliable media, interactive platforms, and contact centers for all citizens.

Particularly local planners at the local government need to be trained and develop their skills to work interdisciplinary in detecting and implementing the solutions for urban challenges and in managing PUPAs. Developing these skills should not be limited to training opportunities offered by DAs; governments should allocate the required resources, and ensure equal training chances for the planners. In this regard, empowering and training them is not limited to managing planning practices, but also through the education of spatial planning. Efforts are needed to enhance the educational content of spatial planning. Educational topics of planning require to be connected with the new planning methods and tools while bridging the gap between planning theory and practice through promoting more empirical research with the engagement of academia, CSOs, the private sector and the government. Particularly, the new generation of planners requires to understand the potentials of PUPAs and cultivate innovative tools in dealing with urban challenges. In addition, initiating forums for planners and experts is necessary to discuss new ideas and methods of planning and exchange lessons learned among them.

In addition, the state needs to enable academia politically by allowing more freedom in discussing the political issues in planning research and teaching. In this respect, it is necessary to address the state's influence on the planning education in Arab countries and on the participatory planning practices. Achieving a new understanding of the planning in its political context can support adopting PUPA deliberately in the future and utilizing the untapped potential of the local planners in making positive changes in urban governance.

- 4) *Raising social awareness* and strengthening the role of the civil society in addressing the needs of the citizens and the vulnerable groups in the planning process and their potential role in this process as partners and actors. In promoting this role, efforts for community development and political empowerment are needed, in addition to the resources for awareness-raising, and education of the citizens over time, for example by launching campaigns to raise their awareness for environmental issues and urban health and conducting participatory budgeting workshops, which involve the citizens in the municipal responsibilities and services provision. Moreover, developing adjusted PUPAs to the local context requires a deep understanding of the community types and the given governance structures, which can facilitate reaching out to different social groups from society. Besides, cooperation forms with local actors, e.g., planners, local NGOs or CDAs, academia, local leaders, and active citizens are necessary, to achieve effective and inclusive PUPAs as well as tailored communication strategies and participatory mechanisms. In this regard, it is recommended to identify the natural leaders and utilize different informal forms of cooperation and solidarity work that are acceptable and practiced by society.

Finally, utilizing social media in developing and furthering participatory approaches in the future as well as incorporating information and communication technologies (ICTs) provide the basis for applying PUPAs in the present and future of urban development in the Arab cities. The ICTs and social media are not just tools for protesting, they present platforms for planners to discuss arising urban issues and identifying the interests and the beneficiaries in the post-war urban development projects, in addition to contributing with their insights for solutions

and future development approaches in the Arab cities. Moreover, social networking through social media has the potential to be translated in reality to civil society initiatives, considering the experience in Egypt between 2011 and 2013 (see 4.4). In addition, ICTs can be useful tools for the institutions in modernizing their governance and inserting new modes that are inclusive, participatory, and transparent, which can improve the communication between the local governments and the citizens.

In terms of future research on PUPAs in the Arab region, it is recommended to consider analyzing and comparing further case studies to acquire a better understanding of PUPA practices in the Arab region and extract lessons learned. Moreover, there is a need for documenting and assessing all formal and informal forms of participatory planning that are culturally accepted and practiced in each case study, while considering their historical and social milieus. Additionally, undertaking further research on PUPAs needs to consider the views of the participating citizens and representatives of the vulnerable groups of the society, which was not possible in this research due to the political instability in Egypt and Syria.

Besides, it is essential to investigate the influence of spatial planning' education on the skills and competences of the local planners and planning decision-makers. It is also advisable to detect appropriate approaches for modernizing the educational content in both undergraduate and postgraduate studies and provide the training for applying PUPAs in the future. Finally, urban planners and researchers from the Arab region need to be critical in evaluating the work of DAs and the policies and projects undertaken by Arab governments. In addition, they need to consider the political context in their research on PUPAs without fear of persecution. Otherwise, they cannot provide credible evaluation and results that can help in improving the planning systems and urban governance through PUPAs or any new forms of collaboration.

Further recommendations for future research on PUPAs in the Arab cities are to develop strategies and tools to overcome the limitations experienced in this research in both, conducting the field research and analyzing the PUPAs based on the available CDS reports, mainly, the difficulties of obtaining transparent information and documentation of the old projects, due to the political unrest at the time of conducting the field research. Despite these limitations, it was intended through this research to draw attention to the topics of urban planning and participation in the Arab region, since these topics are insufficiently addressed in urban studies in the Arab context. This research presented key factors for analyzing and comparing the case studies to examine the PUPAs, yet, there is still a need to develop further tools to compare the processes of participation and the PUPAs as a whole.

In conclusion, the research has contributed to the planning research in many ways. Through the theoretical investigation, an understanding of the concepts of participatory planning in ICs concerning the practices of participatory planning in urban development in DCs has been developed. The research has provided a valuable contribution to urban planning research and urban development practices in the Arab region. It was conducted based on qualitative methods by adopting a case study approach and carrying out field research and interviews. With these means, the research presented an in-depth analysis and evidence for the results, which were essential for furthering urban planning research in the Arab countries. Moreover, the need to address governance issues in urban planning research and practice in the Arab cities was underlined, along with the political aspect. Emphasizing the political influence on planning is particularly important in this research, where political issues would rather be evaded in education and practice in undemocratic contexts. In this respect, the need to empower local

planners in realizing PUPAs was raised, in addition to their role as agents for urban change in the future. Besides, to adapt PUPAs to the given local context and develop new planning instruments, close cooperation should be consolidated between academia, DAs, and the government.

Exploring the theoretical framework of emerging participatory planning concepts in theory and related practices in the field of urban development has provided an understanding of the PUPAs, their goals, and tools as well as their potentials and weaknesses. This understanding has provided the basis for identifying the main factors for analyzing the case studies. Yet, it was essential to raise the need to adopt participation as a technical tool of planning and to underline it as an objective in supporting social justice and inclusiveness of the poor in the planning process. Moreover, viewing the participatory planning approach while considering participatory governance' aims and practices led to mainly emphasizing the increasing need for democratization and decentralization in DCs, as preconditions for adopting efficient participatory planning approaches. Considering the practice of participatory planning through community involvement and its methodologies, achieving a model of participation requires sharing the power, urban decisions, and responsibilities between the government and the community (referred to by Hamdi and Goethert 1997). Still, applying these approaches should consider the provided governance frameworks and social settings in promoting participation. Finally, the research endeavored to contribute to the planning research, in general, and to raise the awareness of the planners in academia and practice in ICs to the urgent issues in the planning and governance in Syria and Egypt. Furthermore, developing a deep understanding of these issues is essential in supporting the development agencies in their efforts to restructure the planning systems of the Arab countries and rebuild the damaged cities in the future.

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List of Interviewees

Interviewees _ Case Study Alexandria		
Name and Title	Occupation	Place/Time
Actors and consultants from academia		
Dr. Heba Abo Al-fadl	Professor and Consultant	the faculty of Engineering, Alexandria University May 19, 2014
Dr. Mohamad Awad	Professor and Consultant	the faculty of Engineering, Alexandria University May 14, 2014
Dr. Hany Al-Ayad	Professor and Consultant	the faculty of Engineering, Alexandria University May 28, 2014
Dr. Mohsen Bayad	Professor, Consultant and a member of the ADA	the faculty of Engineering, Alexandria University May 25, 2014
Dr. Ahmad Soliman	Professor and Consultant	the faculty of Engineering, Alexandria University May 20, 2014
Dr. Mohsen Zahran	Professor and Consultant	the faculty of Engineering, Alexandria University May 15, 2014
Alaa Abd Al-Fataah	Director of the planning authority in the governorate	at her office at the Governorate of Alexandria May 18, 2014
Tahany Abou Omira	Director of the planning department in the city administration at the governorate	at her office at the Governorate of Alexandria May 18, 2014
Mohamad Zakaria	Mohamad Zakaria is a planner from the GOPP regional office of Alexandria (Personal Communication was conducted through a meeting in May 2014 in Alexandria)	at the GOPP regional office at eh Governorate of Alexandria May 18, 2014
Dr. Mohamed Mehina	Deputy Director of the Center for the Study of Alexandria and the Mediterranean, a member of "Alex Med" think tank of Bibliotheca Alexandria and a member of the ADA	at Bibliotheca Alexandria May 25, 2014
Further local actors and Egyptian planners		
Dr. Amro Ali	External researcher and lecturer in political sociology.	Alexandria City center May 27, 2014
Mohamad Abo Al-kheer	Urban planner, researcher and lecturer at the Faculty of Engineering in Alexandria. He is also an active member of the initiative "Save Alex".	personal interview at the faculty of engineering in Alexandria May 21, 2014
Hany Al-Meniawi	Urban planner and mediator at the CDS Alexandria.	May 13, 2014
Dr. Nivin Ghattas,	Engineer who has worked 12 years at the General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) regional office of Asyut city.	at TUK 21.04.2016
Daria Luca	Working at an NGO for Innovation, Collaboration and Entrepreneurship.	Alexandria City center May 28, 2014
Ahmad Mostafa	Urban planner, researcher and lecturer at the faculty of engineering in Alexandria. He is also an active member of the initiative "Save Alex".	Alexandria City center May 24, 2014

Abdallah Deif	Initiator and manager of the NGO “Judran” for art and culture.	at Judran’s Office May 22, 2014
Ahmad Salem	“Fabrika” community initiative for graphic design and art.	at Fabrika’s Office, May 21, 2014
Tayseer Khairy	a senior urban researcher and community development specialist	Semi- structured interview on the phone, 21.08.2019

Interviewees _ Case Study of Aleppo		
Name and Title	Occupation	Place/ Time
Anonymous A	Urban planner and Communication Consultant at Aleppo CDS executive team, mainly, on the environmental awareness campaigns and the questionnaires for the city vision campaign. The planner worked also at the GTZ Urban Development Program (UDP) for Aleppo.	Semi- structured interview on the phone, 30.04.2017
Anonymous B	Economist worked on the CDS’ theme: development of the local economy on two areas; administration of the economic development unit and financing. The economist worked also as an external expert by (GTZ/ CIM) and in 2010 represented the chamber of industry of Aleppo.	Semi- structured interview on the phone, 06.04.2017
Anonymous C	Urban planner at the Municipality of Aleppo and coordinator at the CDS executive team.	Semi- structured interview on the phone, 15.05.2017
Anonymous D	A social worker, who worked in Aleppo and Damascus with NGOs, CSOs, INGOs, the UNICEF, UNRWA and the Agha Khan (program coordination 2008-2011).	Semi- structured interview on the phone, 06.04. 2017
Mahmoud Ramadan	The CDS executive manager and a local expert at the GTZ team of Aleppo. He was as Assistant Director of the GTZ Urban Development Program in Aleppo for CDS as well as a Mediator. He worked with the technical team as a member of the urban and strategic planning of the old city started in 1997.	Semi- structured interview on the phone, 14.04.2017, 24.04.2017
Dr. Kamal Bitar	The Executive manager of the GTZ’ UDP for Aleppo and since 2007 also in Damascus. He worked between 2010 and 2011 on finalizing the CDS report in cooperation with the Cities Alliances. The work he managed in the UDP has focused on old cities rehabilitation and informal settlements.	Semi- structured interview on the phone, 06.04. 2017
Dr. Sonja Nebel	A researcher, lecturer and an advisor on development and urban rehabilitation of historic cities in Syria (1996-2000).	Personal Communication in Berlin, on 10.09. 2013
Franziska Laue	Architect and planning advisor at the GTZ Urban Development Program (UDP) in Aleppo (2007-2011).	Personal Communication at the University of Stuttgart, Institute of Urban Planning and Design, on 31.01.2014
Dr. Salam Said	Lecturer, Researcher and Scientific Adviser. An economist specialized in the Arab region and expert in the reconstruction in post-war Syria.	Personal Communication on 16.09. 2019

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List of Abbreviations

ADA	Alexandria Development Agency
AUDI	Arab Urban Development Institute
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ).
CA	Cities Alliance
CBAs	Community Based Associations
CDAs	Community Development Associations (Egypt)
CDS	City Development Strategy
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CMI	Center for Mediterranean Integration
CPM	Communist Party of India (Marxist)
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DAs	Development Agencies
DCs	Developing Countries
EC	Executive Council (Egypt)
ERF	Economic Research Forum
ERSAP	Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FYP	Five-Year Development Plan
GC	Governorate Council
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council' Countries
GCESC	General Company for Engineering Studies and Consulting
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEB	Governorates' Executive Bureau
GIZ/GTZ	German International Cooperation
GoA	Governorate of Alexandria
GO-NGOs	<i>Governmental Non-Governmental Organizations</i>
GOPP	General Organization for Physical Planning
GNI	Gross National Income
GROs	Grassroots Organizations of various kinds in the South
HDI	Human Development Index
ICs	Industrialized Countries
IDOs	International Development Organizaitons
ISDF	Informal Settlement Development Facility (Egypt)
IESIA	Integrated Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
IFC	International Finance Corporation
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International monetary fund
JCI	Junior Chamber International
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LAS	League of Arab States
LDP	Local Development Plan
LEC	Local Executive Council (Egypt)
LED	Local Economic Development
LPC	Local Popular Council (Egypt)
MAM	Municipal Administration Modernization Program conducted by the EU commission
MCHLR	Ministry Of Construction for Housing and Land Reclamation (Egypt)
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MedCities	Mediterranean Cities Network
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MHC	the Ministry of Housing and Construction (Syria)
MHUUD	Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development (Egypt)
MISA	Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs (Egypt)

MLAE (formerly MoLA)	Ministry of Local Administration and Environment/ Ministry of Local Administration in Syria
MLSA	Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (Syria)
MODMP	Ministry of Defense and Military Production (Egypt)
MOLD	Ministry of Local Development (Egypt)
MOP	Ministry of Planning (Egypt)
NCPSLU	National Center for Planning State Land Uses
NGOs	Non-governmental Organization, Non-Profit Developmental Organizations, used here to describe all forms of civil society groups (munadhamat ghair hukumiyya)
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territories
PB	Participatory Budgeting
PDP	Participatory Development Program in urban areas (Cairo)
PPP	Public Private Partnerships
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PUPA	Participatory Urban Planning Approaches
RCUPD	Regional Centers for Urban Planning and Development (Egypt)
S.A.R.	Syrian Arab Republic
SCPUD	Supreme Council for Planning and Physical Development
SFD	Social Fund for Development
SIDA	Sweden international Development Agency
SMEC	Southern And Eastern Mediterranean Countries
SToD	Syrian Trust for Development
SUP	Strategic Urban Planning (Egypt)
SUPSC	of Strategic Urban Planning for the Small Cities (Egypt)
UCAT	Urban Community Assistance Team (in the US)
UDP	Sustainable Urban Development Program in Syria (by GTZ)
U/DAT	Urban Design Assistance Team of the American Institute of Architecture
UK	United Kingdom
UMP	Urban Management Program of the UN-Habitat
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WG	Working Group
ZOPP or GOPP	Zielorientierte Projektplanung (in German), Goal Oriented Project Planning (in English)

A. Appendixes

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1. Appendix 1: Explaining the ladder of participation by Arnstein 1969

8. Citizen control	Where citizens can govern a program or institution, be in full charge of policy and management and are able to negotiate the conditions under which 'outsiders' may change this.
7. Delegated power	Where citizens achieve dominant decision-making authority over a particular program
6. Partnership	Through agreements to share planning, decision-making and other responsibilities, power is redistributed between citizens and power holders. This works best where there is an organized power base in the community which is accountable to community members and which has financial resources
5. Placation	Citizens begin to have some influence but provision for this by power holders is still tokenistic. For instance "worthy" representatives of the poor are put on a board – where they are in a minority and where they are not accountable to a constituency in the community.
4. Consultation	The extent of participation depends on how much the consultation influences what is done and how it is done (and with whom). It may be done through surveys where there is little provision to ensure the findings influence anything. Governments often use measures of consultations (how many people attended meetings or answered surveys) as measures of participation when these do not measure real participation.
3. Informing/ Tokenism	Informing citizens of their rights, responsibilities and options can be the most important first step towards legitimate citizen participation but this is tokenism when the emphasis is on a one-way flow of information from officials to citizens with no provision for feedback or for citizens to renegotiate. Examples include organizing 'community' meetings dominated by officials' presentations with little opportunity for questions and discussions
2. Therapy	The real objective is to change participants' attitudes and behaviors that local government officials do not like under the guise of seeking their advice – for instance getting resident groups to help clean up their neighborhood rather than question the lack of government services
1. Manipulation/Non participation	citizens placed on advisory committees that have no power or where they have no power

2. Appendix 2: Further models of planning in relation to the participatory planning approach

Further three models of planning in relation to the participatory planning approach, summarized from Schönwandt 2008:

- a) In the “model of equity planning”, locals are empowered and get access to the needed resources to participate in the planning. Planners represent the rights of the disadvantaged, are considered the experts or “primary agents” and they work together with their supportive politicians on the high levels of administration, unlike advocacy planners, who works mainly and closely with the locals. Dialogue is central in this model with both the local administration as well as the stakeholders from the locals. The task of the planner is to gather the data, analyze them, and define the problem, besides mediating the results with the authority (mayors and city council. etc). While the power of the planner is in the possibility to raise particular problems or highlighting them and discuss them with authority, the risk is when a change in the supportive authority members in the administration which leads to the ineffective role of the planner and the proposed plans (Schönwandt 2008:11).
- b) In the “model of social learning and communicative action”, the planning process turns to a process of learning and knowledge exchange between the planners or experts and the people or stakeholders that ensure the mutual acceptance of the results. The knowledge possessed by the locals is essential, and interaction is key in the whole process (Schönwandt 2008:12-14), which requires particular rules to be arranged between different actors, e.g., respect, power assertion, and open and mutual criticism of others' suggestions, etc. (Schönwandt 2008: 14 cited from Flyvbjerg 1998).
- c) In this respect, planners have the task to have the skills to help open up an interactive channel for an exchange instead of relying completely on their planning professional knowledge and expertise and to critically reflect on the collected data, rather than the facts in deciding on the planning action, which should be taken (Schönwandt 2008:12-14). Power in this model is identified in the planning process, particularly where inequality in society implies. In this term, the discussion about power focuses on the influence of the existing power on the planning process (Schönwandt 2008:14, referring to Flyvbjerg 1998 and Foucault 1982).
- d) In the “liberalistic model of planning”, planning serves the well-being of the individuals, ensures that individuals get their rights protected in the free market system. Planning to the minimum in this model is maintained, from the economic perspective, where resources for planning are also used to the minimum. The critic on this model focuses on the limited accessibility of different groups to the free market, in addition to raising the question of equity and also of supporting “public planning”, which implies the restriction of participation of the private actors (Schönwandt 2008:17).

3. Appendix 3: The difference in defining PRA

The PRA participatory techniques are sometimes used for rapid information gathering and sometimes they aim at empowering the local people in the process, like the PRA – Participatory Rural Appraisal. PRA focuses on processes for empowering local people, whereas RRA is mainly seen as a means for

outsiders to gather information. In this research, PRA participatory techniques used for rapid information gathering (UNICEF 2003 based on Chambers²⁷² 1996).

Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA): focus on empowerment and can be described as “a family of approaches, methods and behaviors that enable people to express and analyze the realities of their lives and conditions, to plan themselves what action to take, and to monitor and evaluate the results. Its methods have evolved from Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA).” (UNICEF 2003).

Participatory Rural Appraisal used the same techniques as the rapid one, but with more focus on community participation. It is defined as “a semi-structured process of learning from, with and by rural people about rural conditions”. People as actors and not as passive participants, which differs from the rapid techniques in that, they do not include just the data gathering approach but also data analysis and presenting with the people, which are essential in participatory planning processes, for example methods like participatory mapping, which are applied in the profiling²⁷³ Phase of the planning process (ibid). Moreover, Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA) “is an interactive data collection process conducted at a community level or with a specific community group of interest. PRA is applied at the design, early implementation and evaluation phases of a project cycle or used for environmental and socio-economic research.” (The SAGE Encyclopedia of Action Research²⁷⁴ 2014).

It is also “a label given to a growing family of participatory approaches and methods that emphasize local knowledge and enable local people to do their own appraisal, analysis, and planning. PRA uses group animation and exercises to facilitate information sharing, analysis, and action among stakeholders. Although originally developed for use in rural areas, PRA has been employed successfully in a variety of settings. The use of PRA enables development practitioners, government officials, and local people to work together on context-appropriate programs.” (World Bank no year).

Further methods²⁷⁵ used in participatory rural appraisal (PRA) are:

“Visualised analysis: Participatory mapping and modelling, Aerial photograph analyses, Transect and group walks, Seasonal calendars, Daily and activity profiles, Historical profiles and trend analyses, Timelines and chronologies, Matrix scoring and preference ranking, Venn and network diagramming, Flow diagrams on systems and impact, Pie diagrams.

Interviewing and sampling methods: Semi-structured interviewing, direct observation, Focus group, Key informants, Ethno-histories, Futures possible, Well-being and wealth ranking, Social maps.

Group and team dynamics method: Team contracts, Team review sessions, Interview guides, Rapid report writing, Work sharing (taking part in local activities), Villager and shared presentations, Process notes and diaries” (Cornwall, Guijt, and Welbourn 1993: 22).

4. Appendix 4: The dimensions of participatory urban governance (see Appendix 10)

On the national level: the national government promotes democratic and participatory local governance through decentralization. It requires the national government to have enough resources and skilled and accountable elected local actors or councils to the institutions at higher levels as well as for the citizens.

²⁷² Chambers, Blackburn. 1996. The power of participation: PRA and policy. IDS Policy Briefings, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton. In <http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/bookshop/briefs/brief7.html>.

²⁷³ Profiles should be participatory and interactive, rapid and basic, open-ended and considering of gender sensitivity and comprehensibility (UN-Habitat 2001: 28-30).

²⁷⁴ Edited by: David Coghlan & Mary Brydon-Miller. 2014. Participatory Rapid Appraisal. In: <https://methods.sagepub.com/reference/encyclopedia-of-action-research/n244.xml>. [Accessed on 03.09.2019].

²⁷⁵ See also Methods and Tools in <http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01028/WEB/IMAGES/PARTICIP.PDF>. [Accessed on 03.09.2019].

On the Urban level including multi-municipal or multi-governmental cooperation at the city level. The governments should provide the political commitment to the participatory governance, which includes providing the legal and institutional framework or a governance policy for all the municipal actors in the city. They form a policy or structures to promote participation in service delivery, in political processes, and in maintaining transparency in decision-making and accountability to the citizens. Local businesses, citizens and CSOs are key actors to develop such policy. For that purpose, identifying the urban issue for collaboration and participation is very important, like urgent environmental problems. The participatory processes initiated in practice like city consultation should be then institutionalized and formalized to maintain the practice and the process of mobilizing the stakeholders.

On the municipal level, the central government should empower the municipal actors and citizens to intervene, while promoting institutional reforms. The urban managers on the municipal level have the ability to transform governance through adopting effective strategies. First, there is a need to change the traditional model where the local government is the main actor for service delivery and the central power in the decision-making process, particularly technocrats, like planners, engineers or lawyers, etc. In this traditional model, the citizens are excluded, and their needs are ignored. Such a hierarchical system characterize undemocratic political system where clientelism is dominant among the officials and politicians elites. Service delivery tasks are concentrated in the hands of particular influential groups, that, in turn, hinders an effective urban management through the top-down approach and the fragmented municipal and political structures.

To promote participatory governance, a democratic political system has to be achieved in addition to moving to a strategic model of municipal management. This model should allow for effective urban management of the municipality through prompting the autonomy of the departments responsible for service delivery, infrastructure, housing, etc. Participatory urban governance require that the planning process consider the interdisciplinary cooperation among the departments' teams which is based on interaction and coordination with the target groups of the poor. The staff and agencies who is working directly with the residents should be empowered to organize and deliver the services. This can be done through capacity building training programs.

Moreover, political empowerment should target allowing more political and civic engagement and leadership, particularly from the urban poor and CSOs, and these formations together with the formal and informal private sector. Through the strategic model, a sense of purpose and commitment will be developed, especially from the politicians and elected leaders to the citizens' needs. Municipal leaders will set medium and long-term goals and engage the citizens in monitoring. The efficiency in this model will empower the municipality to negotiate and lead more effectively.

The relations with CSOs are defined in three forms of action, like participation in policy and political decision-making, resource allocation, service delivery and monitoring at the municipality. The partnership with the municipality "community-municipality" regarding poverty reduction and service delivery leads to promoting collaboration, raising awareness and deepening citizenship.

To promote participation and community development through participatory governance in that where the municipality can improve its relationship to the CSOs and utilize their potentials and their inputs, and involve them in all levels of municipal activities from strategic planning to evaluation. Community participation is mostly encouraged when resources for development are limited, for example, supporting municipal-community partnerships, also financially. Furthermore, civic education means engaging the citizens in the municipality works through informing them, which lead to making them more responsible apart from the role of the elected council, which can build a culture of democratic participation.

In participatory governance, a sustainable role of the private sector and business community in the strategy should be improved in terms of strengthening the partnerships, and actively involving them in local economic development strategies and encouraging corporate citizenship. Municipalities through its institutional reforms encourage the role of local economy and help it to restructure itself and promote inward investment through the process of local economic development. The municipality help with skills, resources and ideas to revitalize the economy in the time of national and global changes, like taking measures regarding poverty reduction and job creation or strategies to develop a policy framework for the local economic development, for example in promoting small, micro, and medium enterprises or human capital development training. The city and local governments are main actors as services providers in the local economy. A participatory governance requires including the informal economy, particularly in growing cities, this sector is the main provider of services and good to the urban poor. Therefore, its potentials should be acknowledged by the local government and facilitated and controlling abuse actions by this sector (summarized from Pieterse 2000: 20-33). Vertical and horizontal governance relations and networks are summarized in Appendix 10, based on the figures 3.1 and 3.2 in the paper by Pieterse 2000:18-19.

5. Appendix 5: Institutionalized participation on the national level in the case study Uganda

Participatory governance in Uganda is a far-reaching goal of the decentralization process which has been adopted on the national level through a constitutional reform in 1995. The constitutional reform was a result of the political transition from centralized to decentralized structural system that aims at democratization (WandM 2011: 25). The aim of the decentralization process is to empower all actors to take part in the decision-making process, from governmental actors, locals, and actors from the private sector (Steiner 2006).

The institutionalized participatory process according to this action, involves forming representatives of the local government structures in the urban and rural areas, like for example hierarchal structures in the rural areas; village councils, parish councils, sub-county councils, county councils, and district councils. The district in the rural areas and city in the urban areas are the highest level in the local government and have an administrative structure including officers and planning committees, which ensure the role of the lower levels in the participatory planning and budgeting ²⁷⁶ (WandM 2011 and Steiner 2006: 6-7), *“The district technical planning committees are responsible to collect and integrate plans of lower local governments in order to allow for bottom-up participatory planning and budgeting”* (Steiner 2006:7).

The responsibilities of the central government differ from that of the local government and there is no interference for example, the local governments are responsible for service provision, the central government responsible for security and developing national policies. The local governments are empowered financially through collecting the taxes and getting intergovernmental grants. The local governments get the majority of their funding from the central government (Steiner 2006: 8).

The identified Challenges:

- Keeping the central control hinders the implementation of this reform. Decentralization in Uganda came rather for political needs than that for improving local conditions (WandM 2011: 16).the national government cannot easily give up its power to the lower levels especially the ministries, and therefore decision-making over action priorities is still

²⁷⁶ Further divisions of the local administrative system in Steiner 2006: 6-7.

determined on the national level. In addition to the absence of an autonomous institution that is responsible for the realization of decentralization and ensures the policies and programs relating to it (Steiner 2006: 9).

- Lack of the required financial resources due to inadequate intergovernmental grants. In addition to low revenues from local taxes, which attributed to lack of awareness, municipal capacity, transparency between the authorities and the locals (Steiner 2006:12)


Lack of skilled staff in the local governments especially in the peripheral regions leads up to delays and inefficiency in delivering the plans and services. Lack of educated workers is especially among the elected politicians and in the administration like, planners, engineers, accountants, due to the low education level in Uganda and low wages. In addition, employees are usually selected not for their qualification but patronage and clientelism play the main role in the employment (Steiner 2006; Francis and James 2003.) .as a result unaccountable local actors create mistrust, between higher and lower levels, in their capability to manage the transferred resources. This affects the process of decentralization, where the local planes are rarely considered or integrated by the higher levels (Steiner 2006; Francis and James, 2003).this is also due to delays in the local level and also due to incompetence of the local actors following the rule due to lack of transparency and information exchange or training and information ground the local required to come along with the higher level (Steiner 2006:13-21). On the participatory process expected to be proceeded through decentralization: no consultation between locals and the local government. Meetings demands high costs and this one reason why the attendance is low, besides limited resources, ignoring the role of the citizens, the matters are mainly technical and not interesting for all the stakeholders, and it required so many meetings which is time consuming process, the citizens are not well informed on the change through decentralization and what their role turned to be (Francis and James 2003; Steiner 2006; WandM 2011). Further challenges are Corruption and patronage (Steiner 2006; Francis and James 2003) and the focus on the technocratic approach (Francis and James 2003).


6. Appendix 6: Logical Framework Matrix (ZOPP/GIZ)

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK MATRIX				
PROJECT DESIGNATION: DATE:				
	Intervention Logic Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Sources or Means of Verification	Major Assumptions
IDO Contribution	<i>How is the project contributing to the achievement of the CRP's IDO/s?</i>	<i>What are the key indicators related to the IDO/s achievement of the project? (How many beneficiaries reached, contributed change, e.g., income increased by 20%)</i>	<i>What are the sources of information or methods used to verify the achievements of the indicators?</i>	
Overall Objective	<i>What is the overall or broader objective to which the project will contribute? (i.e. what are the direct benefits for target groups/final beneficiaries, especially the poor)?</i>	<i>What are the key indicators related to the overall objective? (Indicators should, if possible, be specified in quantity, quality and time, i.e. how much, how good and by when)</i>	<i>What are the sources of information or methods used to verify the achievements of the indicators?</i>	
Project Purpose	<i>What specific objective is the action intended to achieve (i.e. what is the intended utilization of the research outputs by recipients/direct clients)?</i>	<i>What are the key indicators related to the project purpose? (Indicators should be specified in quantity, quality and time, i.e. how much, how good and by when)</i>	<i>What are the sources of information or methods used to verify the achievements of the indicators?</i>	<i>What are the important assumptions (factors outside project management's control) that may impact on the purpose to overall objective linkage/hypothesis?</i>
Outputs	<i>What are the research outputs (or tangible/intangible products) delivered by the project? (about five to seven outputs that should be enumerated)</i>	<i>What are the key indicators related to each individual output? (Indicators should be specified in quantity, quality and time, i.e. how much, how good and by when)</i>	<i>What are the sources of information or methods used to verify the achievements of the indicators?</i>	<i>What are the important assumptions (factors outside project management's control) that may impact on the output to purpose linkage/hypothesis?</i>
Activities	<i>What are the key (or major) activities to be carried out in order to produce the research outputs? (activities should be grouped according to research outputs and enumerated accordingly)</i>	<i>Major Milestones for key activities</i>	<i>What resources are required to carry-out the activities (brief summary of the budget/budget lines); What are the major sources of funding?</i>	<i>What are the important assumptions (factors outside project management's control) that may impact on the activity to output linkage/hypothesis?</i>

7. Appendix 7: The stages of the CDS

The main stages of a CDS, the first figure is based on Tebbal 2012:2, and the second figure is cited from CA 2006: 42.





8. Appendix 8: The participatory approach through the CDS stages

The Participatory approach along the CDS process/ stages (the process from initiation to beginning of the implementation (not more than one year))			
	aim of the approach	actors	Techniques and activities Which related to activating and strengthening the participatory approach
Stage1 Initiating the Process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Form a Key stakeholders committee max.10 city representatives, who set the guidelines of the process - The end aim is to reach wide possible Consensus, commitment, and sustainability of the approach <p>consensus is important but cannot fully be achieved, otherwise the participatory process would be cosmetic, the community manipulated and not willing to participate (a case often observed in town meetings)</p> <p>commitment of all key groups require negotiations the Key Stakeholder Group conduct with interest groups which means contestation for the group to reach a consensus and commitment to implementation according to the later defined strategic thrusts.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The members of the committee should be representatives of the city residents and their interests through organizational groups. - Work closely with the existing institutions. Initiating new ones, should be an outcome of the CDS - Leading institution e.g., the mayor's office should act as a catalyst coordinator, ensure political support, etc. - Inclusiveness of all interest groups of the city, which have to get the chance to take part in the process (CA 2006:43) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Initial meeting to set the guidelines - Concentrated activities and consultation in time and content which save the efforts of the stakeholders and the costs of external experts - At least one public meeting in the town hall should be organized to provide the information and reach out larger groups in the city for feedback, another option is an interactive website, in case internet is accessible for the majority of the citizens - The organizations of the activities should be 6-8 weeks before the meetings with the key actors from economic sector, spatial planning environment.
Stage2 Establishing Initial Parameters	<p>Aim of the participatory approach</p> <p>Detailed assessment to identify and scoping of the priority areas. Sometimes more focused areas from the already determined areas by the city.</p>	<p>The city and the key stakeholders and the CDS team</p>	<p>Scoping analysis and assessment.</p> <p>3-4 weeks initial field assessment</p> <p>conduct interviews, think-tank meetings with actors from the academia</p>

<p>Stage3 Initial Assessment</p>	<p>Assessment will be conducted by a team consisted of best-qualified local and international experts, particularly young researchers. (duration 6-8 weeks)</p>	<p>Leaders or representatives of the local economy including those of the local economic development agency, chambers of commerce, trade associations, informal economic associations (e.g., vendor associations, etc.)</p>	<p>cluster analysis based on in-depth interviews with leaders of the local economy, which leads to understanding the recent situation and get ideas of future needs</p> <p>Scanning of public services, economic and social scanning Environmental scanning and spatial scanning e.g., local city planners and actors from the real estate market. On the city scale, diversity of views is expected. Important inputs can be organized through CDS website or other media platforms to reach out most of the groups of the city.</p> <p>Scoping focusing the assessment to key issues or areas e.g., in the economy, scoping through interviewing managers of big firms in fast growing businesses and get their ideas on future development. in social field, meeting with leaders of social groups, social workers, or educators etc</p>
<p>Stage4 Formulating a Vision</p>	<p>Key stakeholders group involvement in formulating a vision²⁷⁷ using the results of the assessment. The vision is an important statement for guiding and consolidating the efforts of the stakeholders and ensuring their commitment for a better future of their city. “A Vision is a statement of where a city wants to be, usually in 10–15 years. A city’s Vision needs to be specific, internally consistent, and realistic but challenging. It has to not only inspire and challenge, but also be meaningful to all the residents.” CA 2006:49</p>	<p>“The key stakeholders group or an equivalent body, chaired by the mayor and representing the executive leadership of a city, should develop the Vision. “ International experts help in keeping the vision realistic and positive and discuss their views with the local experts who conducted the assessment work</p>	<p>The techniques used to formulate the vision are for example: meetings with each of the focus groups, radio, internet sites, newspaper, etc., so they can get input from diverse groups in the city.</p>

²⁷⁷ “A Vision should reflect the unique attributes of the urban region: (i) its comparative and competitive advantages; (ii) its values and preferences of its residents; (iii) its relationship to the global, domestic, and subnational economies (especially its hinterland and competitor cities); (iv) its history and culture; and (v) its physical characteristics, such as location, climate, terrain, water supply, and scenic attributes.” (CA 2006: 49).

Stage5 SWOT Analysis	The key stakeholders group will conduct the SWOT analysis. Internal and external features that affect the city will be identified. Internal features like the key actors and institutions of the three sectors. External like political, economic or social changes.	The main actors for the analysis are the key stakeholders group who conduct the whole process. For the participatory approach identifying and building on the potentials, leadership and commitment of the existing actors and Institutions. Institutions can be identified if they can be supportive or opposing the strategy and work on win their support or adapt the strategy.	No information on how the meetings, or the input will be organized in conducting the SWOT Analysis
Stage6 Setting Strategic Thrusts	The key stakeholder group identifies max. Five strategic thrusts: "Thrusts are a set of means (actions), pursued with discipline and intent to produce results within a given period, as measured with key indicators against targets." The risk of a CDS with high participatory processes to end up with a wish list, not focused and achievable thrusts.	The main actors for setting strategic thrusts are the key stakeholders group. However, the responsibility is of all the involved institutions.	Building partnerships, meetings and communication among the involved key actors (e.g., local government with large firms) to ensure funding and implementation of each strategic thrust.
Stage7 Awareness Building	To gain the support of most of the community to the CDS to ensure its success, particularly key stakeholders. The results regarding the vision and the strategic thrusts will be disseminated in this stage to the whole city.	City leaders in the public, private, third sectors (manage the CDS) and citizens (feedback and later involved as actors).	Awareness Building campaign through media to reach out as much citizens for feedback e.g., through interactive Internet website, radio, newspaper, models, exhibitions, and video shows, television, and public meetings. etc.
Stage8 Implementat ion	Formulating an action plan for each strategic thrust, which combine a set of actions, and forming partnerships and negotiating with city actors for funding.	Agencies or enterprises will take part in implementation. Task forces of local experts will be initiated for each strategic thrust to proceed the action plans. Particularly they have to arrange the funding of the action plans. They should be trusted by the city actors for their transparent work.	Through their mission in Procuring financing, the task forces should communicate and negotiate with key actors to gain their financial support e.g., from property developers, bankers, and investors. A rapid implementation will be undertaken, through catalytic initiatives, which are of high profile and low-risk. This will ensure the city actors, the credibility of the CDS and encourage their commitment for future implementation. Measures for conflict resolution processes will be established for the implementation and a monitoring system will be initiated.

This table presents the analysis of the participatory approach based on the CDS process methodology in CA 2006: 41-55).

9. Appendix 9: Indicators for successful consultation and participation in Colombo' CDS

The Colombo CDS process included: *“a proposed set of indicators for successful consultation and participation. These comprised:*

- *Type of stakeholders;*
- *Number of stakeholders;*
- *Level of participation in stakeholder group discussions;*
- *Number of stakeholder meetings;*
- *Type of institutional structures created for stakeholder participation;*
- *Number of representatives from CSOs including NGOs who have access to CDS Taskforce, Steering Committees and Working Groups;*
- *Contributions by each municipal council for CDS process and for implementation of strategy in terms of time and money;*
- *Political support for CDS process and implementation;*
- *Outputs/documents produced.”* (ECON Analysis and CLG 2005: 38-41).

10. Appendix 10: Dimensions of participatory urban governance

They include national, urban, and local/municipal scales, in addition to the external relations. In each of these scales, interventions should be undertaken in policy decision-making to support participatory governance, for example, providing the regulatory framework and organizing decentralization arrangements on the national level. On the urban level, there is a need to support collaborative actions between urban actors through consultation and formalization of the related processes. On the local level, it is important to engage the citizens in municipal policy reforms and management, to ensure effective service delivery. External relations are essential, to build partnerships with the private sector, CSOs, and other citizenry organizational and non-organizational bodies, and engage them in planning and implementation of the municipal plans (based on Pieterse 2000: 20).

Table 3.1: Dimensions of participatory urban governance	
Scale of Policy intervention	Examples of interventions
National Scale: Purpose is to enable participatory governance at local level through national regulatory frameworks	decentralization framework democratization program capacity building framework legislative reform to decentralize authority and powers inter-governmental fiscal reform
Urban Scale: Purpose is to enable participatory governance at local level through national regulatory frameworks	Collaborate reforming regulatory instruments, incentives, and structures that are jointly shaped by the local authority and powerful (well organized) urban actors institutionalizing formal processes and mechanisms to deliberate, make decisions and ensure feedback to constituencies and citizenry establish formal and productive working relations with other municipalities within the urban area through appropriate representative bodies
Municipal Scale: a) internal Administrative Dimension Purpose is to ensure that the internal structure, systems and communication reinforces a participatory	Restructure political/administrative interface to enable strategic management and effective leadership Institutional transformation to advance integrate service delivery Financial reform to incentivize outcome-based/impact performance and facilitate greater community input Performance management systems Reform Human Resource Development systems to align with service delivery, transparency, responsiveness and impact-based approach

governance municipality does	Introduce and/or refine monitoring procedures and indicator frameworks empower the frontline in the context of an area-based service delivery model that allow for direct citizen input and fostering community management systems develop policy frameworks to guide action on: participation, partnerships and enablement of civil society	
b) External relations: Purpose is to foster open, strong and vibrant relations with organized stakeholders in civil society, the private sector and citizenry, especially marginalized and vulnerable groups who do not have a voice	Civil society organizations	Foster meaningful participation through involvement at policy and political levels (including elections); resource allocation processes; service deliver; and monitoring
	Private sector	Foster strategic & mature partnerships Active involvement in local economic development strategies Promote corporate citizenship
	Public sphere	Transparency mechanisms, e.g., citizen scorecards, public access to municipal records, etc. Fostering responsiveness to citizens Deepen public awareness about municipal agenda through appropriate communication strategies

Source: Pieterse 2000: 20.

11. Appendix 11: Further definitions of participation

Participation as such is defined in oxford English dictionary, as *“The action of taking part in something”*. From the wide groups of definitions, participation as a process is presented in relation to the act of involving wide variety of stakeholders in the decision-making process regarding their public concerns. The purpose of participation in the development is mainly empowering the people to take part in governance, by influencing the policymaking in managing their resources. This eventually aims to give them the lead in governance; from planning and formulating policies to implementation and monitoring. This is mostly the focus in the multiple definitions by development institutions and organizations among others; the UN, the World Bank, the IFAD, and the GIZ (Imparato and Ruster 2005: 19-21).

The UN-HABITAT has defined participation in review of different definitions as: *“Participation: the process of decision-making and problem solving, involving individuals and groups who represent diverse interests, expertise and points of view and who act for the good of all those affected by the decisions they make and the actions that follow.”* (Fischer 2001: 15; cited also by Connelly 2010: 344).

The World Bank has defined it: *“Participation is a process through which stakeholders’ influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them”* (World Bank 1994).

A participatory process is *“a democratic process in which people, particularly the weak and the poor, are not passive receivers of a development project at the end of a top-down approach, but are requested to identify their needs, voice their demands, and organize themselves so as to improve their livelihood with the help of the financial, technical, and human resources offered by the development project, as well as their own”* (IFAD, IDB 1997a, cited by Imparato and Ruster 2005, 19-21).

In the work of the GIZ, the focus of participation is to collectively and innovatively find solutions for development problems and change: *“Participation means bringing national and local agencies, local community organizations, the private sector, and academic institutions together in a search for innovative development ideas that lead to reform.”* (GIZ cited by Abdrabo 2008, Alexandria GIZ).

A Participatory approach is: *“a self-help approach characterized by the involvement of target groups in project design, implementation and evaluation, which aims to build the capacity of the poor to maintain*

structures created during project implementation and continue their own development." (The Canadian International Development Agency, IDB 1997a cited by Imparato and Ruster 2005: 19-21).

In different development interventions, participation is adopted as an instrument in the planning process, where the stakeholders are empowered, given the resources and political support, to take part in planning and development processes.

The concept of participation today has a "*diffuse [...] and fragmented*" connotations. It is related to taking part in group activities, e.g., social or economic, which concern the group and its common sense. It is at the same time related to notions that are challenging the concept of shared identity groups (Huxley 2013: 1531 cited from Patton 2005: 253-4). This contradictory character of participation is also seen in its implications in the planning practices and policies (Huxley 2013: 1531).

According to Hicky and Mohan 2004 "*the mainstream form of 'participation in development' of the 1980s onwards*" puts more importance on the interests of the locals, and transforming the role of the development agents from technocratic role to facilitating and enabling role, as well as transforming the roles of state and the local in relation to the development matters (Hicky and Mohan 2004: 11). Power relations regarding the development matters was in this sense the core of the discussion in the 1990s (Hicky and Mohan 2004: 11). Rahnema 2010 refers to different forms that participation can take "*participation could be either transitive or intransitive; moral, amoral or immoral; either forced or free; either manipulative or spontaneous*". This view of participation refers to the need to examine how participatory processes in the development interventions have been developed and implemented. Particularly, there is a need to look on what outcome, impact has the participatory approach in development, and who are the beneficiaries of adopting this tool.

Viewing different discourses on participation in development and planning, the participatory approach has been criticized while it is mostly developed and adopted as a top-down approach. In most cases, this form of participation leads to a passive participation where as an outcome, social activism is sought to be encouraged to induce a sustainable change. Through this approach, the bottom-up forms of participation, for example the Self-help approach or 'autonomous participation' is usually not considered. This is because most of the debates are based on the central role of the state in the participatory planning, without taking into consideration informal forms that are based on 'autonomous participation' through self-organization in dealing with urban problems, and the importance of these forms in influencing urban governance (Lombard 2013: 139 cited from Ziccardi: 2004; Beebejaun and Vanderhoven: 2010).

12. Appendix 12: The participatory approach based on the CDS process methodology

See appendix 8.

13. Appendix 13: Some of the participatory mechanisms, activities planned in the CDS

City Consultation: The most common form of participatory events is the City Consultation. It aims at bringing the stakeholders together, who seek to develop a common and better understanding of the issues and to "*[...] agree on priorities, and to seek local solutions built around broad-based consensus.*" (UNCHS Habitat 2001: 49). Chiefly the kickoff event (3 to 5 days) is essential where the consultation is organized on a wide scale, mobilize a large number of stakeholders for collaboration and building consensus, and with this momentum marks the start of the participatory urban decision-making process. Yet, city consultation can be arranged on different levels, forms and scales (ibid). It is also "*a high profile city-wide event, normally held at the end of the "preparatory phase" (start-up and situation analysis) of the over-all Participatory process.*" (ibid), further smaller scale consultations are normally organized in later phases of the process. *Moreover, A City Consultation "[...] facilitates information*

sharing, consensus building and broad based stakeholder participation. [...]". The main principles of the city consultation are inclusiveness of the marginalized, continuity of consultation processes, bottom-up process, aim at cooperation, and conflict resolution (UNCHS Habitat 2001: 49-51).

Stakeholders working group: „ *A working group is an institutional mechanism to follow-up the results of the city consultation. Through a Working Group, stakeholders negotiate strategies, develop action plans and initiate demonstration projects.*". They can also be called task groups, technical advisory groups, coalitions etc. (UNCHS Habitat 2001: 62). The members of these groups are formed from the consultative and discussion groups generated in the startup stage and in the city consultation. They are also representatives of stakeholder groups and institutions, who work on the strategic planning and action planning *"to be negotiated and agreed, and demonstration projects to be developed. Their composition and size, and intensity of work, varies with the different stages of the process and project cycle, allowing flexibility and dynamism."* (UNCHS Habitat 2001: 62-63). The main purposes of these groups are to elaborate, consolidate, and build on the consensus reached at the city consultation and to ensure cross-sectoral linkages and coordination in decision-making (UNCHS Habitat 2001: 62-63). Further mechanisms are the PRA techniques: Participatory rapid appraisal (see Appendix 3).

14. Appendix 14: The purpose of Action planning

Action planning is an important tool to translate the agreed strategies to actions or to link planning to implementation that affect the lives of the citizens. After a city consultation, the WGs need to gain the commitment of the stakeholders to the action plans, in order to ensure implementing the strategies also for particular issues. The main purposes of the action planning are:

1. To elaborate in detail the agreed courses of action: *An action plan translates a broadly agreed set of policy frameworks and strategies into concrete actions. It defines the necessary activities together with the responsible actors and their required commitments of resources, all within a clear timeframe for implementation along with a monitoring system for overseeing the process.*

2. To reconfirm and make explicit the commitments of partners and stakeholders.

The action planning process requires continuous detailed negotiation amongst the various working group stakeholders, to reach agreement on the inputs necessary for implementing an agreed set of actions. This requires in turn that working group representatives inform, advocate and negotiate with, and secure commitments from their respective institutions. These commitments are often formalised in an urban pact and/or in inter-organisational memoranda of understanding."(UNCHS Habitat 2001: 67-71).

15. Appendix 15: Urban Pact

The Urban Pact can be defined as: *"[...] a negotiated agreement designed to formalize the commitments of the partners in a particular set of sustainable urban development initiatives. In the framework of participatory urban governance process, this tool is generally used at the end of a City Consultation [...]*". In the Urban Pact, there is a documentation of the collective intention of the stakeholders according to the city consultation, which can be called also 'City Declaration': *"[...] This Pact articulates the vision, goals, strategic objectives, and action areas, which stakeholders have agreed upon, including specific follow-up activities [...]*". For official approval, the Urban Pact will be presented to the Municipal Council. Moreover, it confirms the formalized collective visions, agreements and commitments to realize the plans (UNCHS Habitat 2001: 58).

16. Appendix 16: Table of the ranking and values of the HDI for the Arab countries in 2011

Ranking	Country	Value/ index
Very high human development	Qatar	0.856
	Saudi Arabia	0.847
	United Arab Emirates	0.840
	Bahrain	0.824
	Kuwait	0.800
High human development	Oman	0.796
	Lebanon	0.763
	Algeria	0.745
	Jordan	0.741
	Tunisia	0.725
Low human development	Somalia	0.285 (2012 est.)
	Djibouti	0.473
	Yemen	0.482
	Sudan	0.490
	Comoros	0.497
	Mauritania	0.513
	Syria	0.536
Medium human development	Morocco	0.647
	Iraq	0.649
	Palestinian National Authority Palestine Authority	0.684

Source: UNDP 2014: 164.

17. Appendix 17: Examining the participatory approach in the 1st stage of the CDSs

Examining the participatory approach organized in the CDS' first stage in comparison:

CDS stage 1: Preparing the launching of the CDS and define the leaders
<p>Identified actors in the participatory activities</p> <p>All case studies had a leader, and formed steering and technical committees. Leaders are mostly the mayor or governor, steering committees, in addition to key actors from the public and private sectors and academia, representatives of the communities, including disadvantaged groups of women and youth, CSOs and international partners (funders and technical experts). The organizers, managers and the supervisors of the participatory process and activities are the technical committee headed by the project manager, who initiates participatory activities, like workshops, conferences, meetings etc. (CMI and MedCities 2011: 28).</p>
<p>Inclusiveness of actors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There were cities, which included mainly public and private sectors, like in the case of Setta, Aleppo, Sfax Tunis and Tetouan. - Cities, which additionally included representatives of civil society, like Alexandria, Alfayhaa and Eljadida (CMI and MedCities 2011: 25). - Few cities had initiated a participatory process to include wider range of participants from the city, for example in Alfayhaa/Lebanon: "A citizen forum with representatives of authorities and civil society approves the principal stages." (CMI and MedCities 2011: 25). In Alexandria, a forum of partners, including "elected councilors, heads of districts, local and central public agencies concerned, and donors active in Alexandria" (CMI and MedCities 2011: 25). In Aleppo, there were missing actors from the civil society, and focused participation from "[...]Steering Committee (headed by the mayor and composed of representatives of the private sector, chambers of commerce and industry, etc. Academia, professional associations and GIZ [...])" (CMI and MedCities 2011: 25).
<p>Communication tools</p> <p>The communication tools between the actors and the technical committee of the CDS affect the commitment and ownership of the stakeholders to the CDS process. In the SEMC case studies, efforts to develop communication channels were variable, Aleppo and Ramallah provided good cases for well- developed communication tools; for example: "In Ramallah and Aleppo, CDS communication was conducted through</p>

*well-designed and carefully organized actions while in Tetouan 1 and Tunis communication was sporadic. These differences generated different levels of mobilization of actors and of the population behind CDS projects. Tetouan 2 and Sfax prepared remarkable communication campaigns that included brochures and films, while other strategies produced websites that are still operational” (CMI and MedCities 2011: 29). Other communication tools like **Websites** were developed in all the cities. Additionally, **forums** were held with different stakeholders from the private sectors, civil society, representatives of the population living in informal settlements, etc (CMI and MedCities 2011: 29).*

18. Appendix 18: The priorities of the CDS classified in six themes

Strategic goals in all the strategies cover all sectors/themes due to the extent of weaknesses identified in these cities. The assessments and priorities of the examined cities can be categorized in six themes: “1. Economic and social development; 2. Transport and traffic management systems; 3. Urban infrastructure, equipment and services; 4. Slums upgrading and urban regeneration; 5. Governance with regards to management and modernization of the local administration and finances; 6. Urban environment.” The similarities in the focus themes indicated the similarities these cities share regarding the economic, social and spatial issues, where the identified differences are of great importance to consider that reveal particular characteristics of the cities(CMI and MedCities 2011: 30).

19. Appendix 19: Similarities in the strengths and weaknesses regarding:

The identified shared strengths and weaknesses can be summarized in the following table cited from the source: CMI and MedCities 2011: 34.

strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The city’s geographic location, the climate, its convenient location within road and railway networks; - Cultural and architectural heritage; - Available infrastructure and facilities, such as an airport, a university, etc.; - Available land and industrial zones for investment projects; - The city’s attractiveness for major projects and investors; - Available human resources. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The city’s economic base; - Problems related to unemployment, immigration and urban poverty; - Problems related to urban settlements and urban sprawl; - Problems related to basic facilities, transport and traffic management; - Environmental problems; - Problems related to local management and qualifications of the local administration’s personnel.

20. Appendix 20: The CDSs’ city visions

City visions developed in the Arab cities, cited exactly from the source: CMI and Medcities 2011: 42.


City	Vision Components
Aleppo	Aleppo’s prosperous economy is competitive both on local and international markets. The city adapts its products to changing demands and offers employment opportunities for its increasingly educated citizens, including women. It is a city where the private sector may flourish. (Excerpt from the vision of the working group on local economic development.) Well-trained municipal personnel working in decentralized structures where there will be no place for corruption... (Working group on improving the administration.)
Rehabilitation of the old city of Aleppo	Protect the old city’s identity and improve the quality of life of its residents.
Al Fayhaa	The developed cities united in Al Fayhaa play a key role in the region; citizens enjoy living in Al Fayhaa and their well-being and open-minded attitude are derived from its historic heritage and values.
Alexandria	“Alexandria takes advantage of its competitive endowments, better manages its local assets, and removes constraints to private sector-led growth, while ensuring the socio-economic integration of the poor”. (Alexandria City Development Strategy, Cities Alliance, p.9)

Amman	Together with the citizens of Amman, our objective is to achieve excellence in municipal services delivery exceeding the aspirations of the population and of economic sectors, to further maintain, and expand public facilities to improve Amman's competitiveness while preserving the unique cultural heritage and spirit of the city.
El Jadida	The vision is confused with a long-term strategic thrust, i.e. strengthening Greater El Jadida's industrial and tourism capacity. There is neither a slogan nor a visual identity for the city.
Izmir	Izmir seeks to be counted among cities that pass on the heritage of civilization to future generations, placing the Mediterranean's abundant resources at the disposal of its citizens and the world, and whose philosophy will be remembered. Izmir aims to become a symbol of democracy where all may live free and in peace.
Ramallah	Together we seek to develop a prosperous zone underpinned by an economy based on reliable services and infrastructure, by adopting good governance principles that will ensure public participation, respect diversity and the rights of citizens and preserve its environment and heritage.
Settat	"Settat 2030" is the slogan used to characterize the vision chosen by city actors. Limited public communication campaign using this slogan.
Sfax Phase 1	The slogan "Greater SFAX 2016" was largely publicized through advertisements, brochures, CD-ROMs and short films.
Sfax Phase 2	The city maintained the "Greater SFAX 2016" slogan.
Tetouan 1	There is no explicit vision statement. However, it may be inferred from the CDS strategic targets: The city of Tetouan is a cultural and tourism center and a regional capital. Tetouan must strive to become once more the "Metropolis of the Mediterranean coast" and a major regional crossroads, because it could face strong competition on the Fnideq-Rabat axis by the attractiveness of the new Mediterranean port.
Tetouan 2	The "VISION OF TETOUAN 2020" states that Tetouan 2020 will no longer be a stopover but a meeting point, a cultural, tourism and economic reference of Morocco and the Arab world in the Mediterranean.
Tunis	The participatory process engaged to formulate the vision of Tunis was never completed. The Tunis CDS team could not (or did not think to) come up with a slogan or logo for the city's vision. The vision is therefore indirectly implied in the strategic goals.

21. Appendix 21: Successful and efficient CDS


The following aspects should be considered for achieving a successful and efficient CDS, based on CMI and Medcities 2011. The CDS should be adopted as **"A complementary planning tool to be associated to existing planning tools**, where traditional planning instruments seems ineffective. **A local tool underpinned by a structuring project"** to make the CDS operational, it should be connected to projects and to practice, to show the wanted impact. **A tool that will benefit from a favorable urban governance context"**: in western countries of the Mediterranean, the optimal governance conditions for the CDS are there: An institutional and legal framework that grants broad powers to local authorities, qualified and motivated human resources. The presence of a local leader who drives the project, qualified municipal personnel and active civil society; Self-governing local authorities that have management and decision powers over the allocation of financial resources; Reliable information systems and relatively healthy and transparent management structures for human and financial resources. "

22. Appendix 22: The organizational structure of the GOPP



23. Appendix 23: The key actors in the planning process on the local level

The key actors in the planning process on the local level by Nada 2011 cited in Ghattas 2015.



24. Appendix 24: Actors involved in producing and approving urban plans and policies

The table below shows some of the key institutions responsible for producing, approving and implementing urban plans and policies in Egypt (based on Mustafa 2015; Ghattas 2015; Worldbank 2006, and Tadamun.info).

Institution	Key actors	Produce ²⁷⁸ (P) or Approve (A) urban plans and policies	Level of action
Cabinet	Prime minister and ministers	approves plans	All levels
MODMP	Operation Authority for Military Force	approves plans	All levels
SCPUD the Supreme Council for Planning and Urban Development	Prime Minister heads of the bodies for urban development and uses of State land, experts (Article 5, Law 119/2008)	-approves goals and policies of urban development - approves the plans and programs -evaluates plans (when implemented) -coordinate between related bodies.	All levels
Egyptian Authority of Antiques (Ministry of Culture), Ministry of Awkaf, and Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs		approves the local plans regarding the development of the owned land	Local level
MHUUD	The minister The GOPP	approves plans produces plans	Regional and local
National Agency for El Taseek El Hadari Civil Coordination		prepares regulatory framework and proposals for the plans to improve the visual images of	All levels

²⁷⁸ Producing plans in addition to _among other_ conducting studies and consultation, drawing policies, and managing the implementation and follow-up processes.

(initiated in 2001, follows ministry of culture)		the urban and rural landscapes and architecture	
GOPP	Regional Centers for Planning and Urban Development Local planning	- produces regional, rural and urban development plans - produces and Implement urban plans - Approves local plans (preliminary) -draws Urban polices -Initiates development programs and projects	Regional and local
New Urban Communities Authority (follows MHUUD)		prepares and follows-up master plans and detailed plans for new cities, towns and villages and draws policies	Local level
The Egyptian National Urban Observatory (NUO) (follows GOPP)		monitors and evaluates national development policies and provides decision and policy makers with information on urban conditions and trends, coordinates among the various partners involved in monitoring and evaluation activities, and Prepares for the establishment of local urban observatories and establish an integrated network to link them.	
EEAA	Regional offices	prepare the national plan for environmental protection and related projects, in addition to participating in preparing integrated national coastal plan (Mediterranean and Red Sea) and formulating environmental policies, environmental protection plan and environmental maps	National and regional
Informal Settlement Development Facility		prepares policies for developing unsafe areas and develops plans for informal settlements development (with the priority of removing unsafe areas)	National and local
Organization for Reconstruction and Development of Egyptian Villages		proposing general plan for village development	local
Supreme Council for Local Administration	The minister of local administration, The governors, and Heads of local popular council of the governorate	- local administration - coordinate - review of the administrative framework regarding legal and regulatory issues	on all levels
Local Development Ministry (MOL)		planning resources, participating with ministry of agriculture and governments in preparing and documenting <i>cordons</i> borders maps	national
Ministry of Planning	Regional offices in the governorates		Mainly regional level
Financial planning ministry and finance ministry		prepares and approves the financial plans	national

Further actors are among others MOP and MOALR.

25. Appendix 25: Parameters for assessing PUPAs in two participatory programs

This table below shows quality assurance principals “efficiency” of participation in planning, cited exactly from Hassan et al. 2011: 206-207. The authors have summarized the principles based on Bruce and Mitchell²⁷⁹ 2005 and D. Ridder and C. Pahl- Wostl²⁸⁰ 2005.

Principal to be assured	What does it mean for Planning
1. Transparency	Understanding the action of the different people involved in the complex remediation process requires providing and disseminating information – Well-defined decision structures and precise responsibilities/competences are also for the concerned of utmost importance (role of participants should be clearly defined and communicated) – The concerned should have a very comprehensive and uncomplicated admission to documents which concerns their own estate – It should be made clear that final decision-making/taking remains with the relevant authority
2. Openness	Refers to the perception that the object of trust is open for concerns, opinions or criticism – Being ready to enter into a dialogue, it also means to provide info., discuss openly, to take sorrow and fears of concerned seriously, and also to speak about deficits and problems – The concerned have to get the opportunity to form their opinion
3. Earliness/early involvement	To provide information and participation at early stage is essential requirements for building trust, thus it's possible to make offers and to act instead of react – It's also an advantage to start at the early phase, because there is usually less pressure
4. Completeness	Participants should represent a “typical” cross section of the population or all interest groups should be involved
5. Continuity	Instruments for participation and information should continuously be applied – It's also an advantage, if there is a sustainability of contact persons
6. Reliability	Refers to the perception that one can rely on others work or performance and that others adhere to decisions, keep conditions and promises – To meet deadlines as well as the quality of information are important requirements for establishing trust – To detect concealed information often means an irreparable loss in trust – Participants should receive adequate and timely feed-back, showing how their inputs have been used
7. Competence	Participation process should be designed in ways, which enhance the learning capacity of the participants in the process – Ability to develop, with consultants, adequate community-based indicators – Ability to build development scenarios based on the combination of proposed measures and perceived consequences
8. Benefits	Benefits to all partners. If there is not the prospect of benefits for all partners, and if the benefits will not be distributed or shared equitably, the prospects for a sustained partnership are low – Also short-term benefits must be visible besides mid or long-term community improvements
9. Shared Vision	a participation likely will be enhanced if there is a shared vision to which there is a strong, mutual commitment
10. Equitable power	This does not mean equal power, even when differential power is held by partners, all partners must be able to be involved, and feel valued

²⁷⁹ Participatory partnerships: engaging and empowering to enhance environmental management and quality of life, Soc. Indicat. Res. 71 (2005) 123–144).

²⁸⁰ Participatory integrated assessment in local level planning, Reg. Environ. Change. 5 (2005) 188–196.).

11. Communication channels	Potential for misunderstanding and miscommunication always exists, even in the presence of mutual trust and respect – Often, not enough time and resources are allocated to ensuring sufficient communication. – This need becomes even greater if partners are in different physical locations
12. Adaptability	This allows participants to respond positively to the inevitable change, uncertainty and conflict which will be encountered
13. Integrity, patience and perseverance	Obstacles will need to be overcome, and progress will not always occur as quickly as everyone would like. Combined with mutual trust and respect, these three attributes help partners deal with difficult situations

26. Appendix 26: Procedures for formulating a master plan indicated in the Law 3/1982

The procedures in formulating and approving a master plan for a city or a village according to the Law 3/1982 (translated and edited by the author based on grey material from GOPP No year).

Article NO.	procedures in formulating and approving a master plan in the Law 3/1982
Article 1, Part1	The first step is conducting structural planning in the framework of regional planning. This includes defining the long-term objectives, strategies, and policies, besides determining factors of development of a city or village and its surroundings (the planning Law 3/1982: 38)
Article 2, Part1	The GOPP should approve the locations and uses defined for the planning, which are not included in the master plan
Article 3	The GOPP and the administrative local units should work together in the planning process
Article 4, Part1	Two groups of actors are indicated in the law: - Specialized in planning, e.g., architecture, transportation, agriculture, industrial, environmental, legal, etc. - Interested in planning refers to a number of members of the LPC of the governorate, of a city or a village where the planning is done and a number of the residents as representatives of different society or community segments (ibid: 39)
Article 5, 6 and 7, Part1	- A planning committee will be established in the governorate, formed of technical and administrative staff - This committee works on the governorate level within the framework of the regional planning considering the social, economic and environmental needs - The approval of the ministers of defense, of construction and local administrative should be considered - The committee commissions one of her specialist departments in the local unit or a private planning agency to prepare the plan (ibid: 39)
Article 9, 10 and 11	The comprehensive planning of a city or a village includes several plans and reports based on studies regarding the social, economic, environmental, and special development of a city or a village. The plans are a land-use plan, transportation plan, public and administrative services plan, and public utility plans. The plan should be reviewed every five years by the local unit (Law 3/1982: 40-41, article 20: 43).
Article 12, Part1	- The prepared master plan ²⁸¹ will be published in the local unit for the public for one month - The local unit announces the date and time for public hearing meeting for comments from the public, in two newspapers at least two weeks before the date (ibid: 42)
Article 13, Part1	- The members of the LPCs in the attentive local units (e.g., districts or villages) will be invited to a meeting to discuss the master plan and present their comments. - The GOPP planners will explain the master plan to the public in the meeting, and respond to the questions and inquiries from the public and will document their comments and recommendations (ibid: 42)

²⁸¹ The official term is in Arabic “Mashroo3 Al takhteet Al3am”, in English “General Planning Project”, it refers with this term to the master plan, which includes the general uses and is followed with detailed individual plans.

Article 14, Part1	- After the public hearing, the GOPP will review the master plan and make the changes considering the comments - In case of disagreements, the plan with the comments will be forwarded to the GOPP for the final resolution considering the public policies and spatial development plans on the national level (ibid: 42)
Article 15, Part1	- The master plan will be presented again to the LPC of the governorate for approval before it forwarded to the Minister of MHUUD for ratification (ibid: 43)
Article 16, Part1, Law 3/1982 (p 43)	- In case of disapproval from the Minister, it should returned to the LPC of the governorate with the comments. The LPC decides to include the changes (in one month) or develop a new master plan (in four months), this should be done together with the GOPP (ibid: 43)
Article 17, Part1, Law 3/1982 (p 43)	- When the minister agree on the plan, then the plan will be issued with a resolution and published in the Official Gazette (ibid: 43)
Article 18, Part1	- After preparing the master plan, the Planning committee with the GOPP prioritize the projects according to their importance and implementation arrangements. After review of the master plan from the GOPP, it will be presented to the people before approval from the related ministry (ibid: 43)

27. Appendix 27: The role of planners, consultants, and the social groups in the planning process

The consultants or planners ensure during the phase of preparing the overall strategic plan of the city or village, that the plan meets the national and regional conditions and comply with the updated data. They will study and analyze the current situation and develop the future vision for the development of the city considering the available resources and capabilities, besides taking into account the possible risks.

The planning process therefore requires participatory methods from the beginning until the end. It is not enough that the planning office prepares a plan and submit it to the public for comments. It must provide an opportunity for all development partners and groups interested in participating in different aspects of the planning process to participate in setting long and short-term objectives, strategies and the action plan to achieve the vision.

The consultants should after that prepare, implement and submit a report about the appropriate participatory program as a supplement to the planning project. This program demonstrates how the consultants of the commissioned planning office reaching out different socially marginalized groups; the elderly, the disabled, young people and minorities.

Involving social groups in the planning process is an important condition to realize sustainability which will be seen in the output of the process in all aspects of sustainability; economic, environmental, social, cultural, institutional physical and in the service sector (TOR 119/2008: 6, translated by the Author).

28. Appendix 28: Restrictions of the Law 84/2002

"Organizations shall not be allowed to conduct any of the following purposes or activities: 1. Set up military or Para-military formations or detachments; 2. Threaten national unity, violate public order or morality or advocate discrimination against citizens on grounds of sex, origin, language, religion or creed (Article 11); 3. Practice any political activity exclusively restricted to political parties under the parties of union activity exclusively restricted to trade unions under the trade law (Article 11) and 4. Seek profit or practice any profit-oriented activity." Source: Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of insurance and Social Affairs, Law (84) of 2002 of Non-Governmental Organizations and Foundations, May 2002 (cited in USAID 2003: 4 and in Sika 2012).

Article 11 from the law 84/2002 for establishing local associations in Egypt:

The associations work to achieve their purposes in various development fields of the society in accordance with the rules and procedures prescribed by law and with the Regulations (TOR). The associations are allowed - after having the approval of the competent unions and the administrative body - to operate in more than one field. However, establishing secret associations is prohibited of exercising an activity of the following activities:

1. Formation of bridges or any other military formation.
2. Threatening the national unity or violate public order or morals, or the call for discrimination between citizens on the basis of gender, ethnic, color, language, religion or believe.
3. Any political activity is limited to the political parties under the law of political parties, and any syndicate activity is limited to syndicates in accordance with the laws of the syndicates.
4. The work of the associations, which targets a profit or involve in an activity for profit.

29. Appendix 29: The constraints facing Egyptian private voluntary organizations

The constraints facing Egyptian private voluntary organizations based on a UNICEF survey conducted in 1993 with private voluntary organizations in the Governorates of Cairo, Alexandria and Assiut (Eiweida 2000: 131-132 adapted from UNICEF (1994).

Financial obstacles	insufficient financial resources to carry out independent development project; and lack of financial and moral incentives for NGO staff and Volunteers.
Managerial obstacles	lack of adequate knowledge of the regulating articles; inadequate skills in assessing needs, project planning and management skills, including lack of innovative project ideas; problems in communication and management among NGO board of directors, NGO full-time staff and social affairs directors; inadequate technical and administrative capacities of NGO staff and shortage of technical and managerial skills; and shortage of NGO trained leaders and volunteers.
Institutional obstacles	Inadequacies in the laws and regulations governing civil society; non-availability of information on community needs; the frequent changes in government and donor policies; and lack of co-ordination among NGOs themselves.
Cultural obstacles	inadequate public relations on the part of NGOs and the lack of attention given to them in the mass media; men often dominate gender projects; and women's perspectives are often ignored in such projects.

30. Appendix 30: A brief summary on Alexandria SUP 2032 (2010-2014)

Participatory approaches in preparing the Strategic Urban Plan Alexandria 2032 - Alexandria SUP 2032 (2010-2014)²⁸².

The Alex SUP 2032 presents the new vision of the urban development of the city of Alexandria using new methodologies in planning and ensures sustainability through citizen participation in preparing and implementing the plan. The Unified Building Law No. 119 of 2008 and its executive appendix of 2009 states the need for each Egyptian city to have its strategic urban development plan.

"[...] Strategic Plan is the plan that determines the future vision of urban development. ... It includes goals, policies, and plans for economic and social development and the built environment that is essential for sustainable development. It also states the future needs for urban expansion, land use, and the program, priorities, mechanisms, and financing sources on the planning level[...]" (GOPP/Law No 2008, Article 2 cited from AS and P 2012 Vol-01-City Profile).

The plan proceeds in three phases; the urban development vision, the plan and pioneering projects and the implementation work plan. From 2010-2012 phase one was completed, until 2014 the second consultation session was hold in March 2014 (reports on phase 2 not available yet although the plan

²⁸² A project by the General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) of the Arab Republic of Egypt and its Regional Planning Center Alexandria (AS&P 2012).

has been approved from the minister and the governor wants to conduct another consultation meeting).

“The consultant team, a consortium of Egyptian and international consultancies, conducted many workshops and interviews with ministries, national and local authorities, civil institutions, and ordinary citizens alike to learn about their ideas and about the challenges facing Egypt and Alexandria. Numerous constructive stakeholder meetings were held during Phase one. Organized into themed working groups, local experts challenged common assumptions, and worked with participants to look for new and different angles with which to elaborate a complete and in depth picture of Alexandria. The participatory planning methodology used in this process has generated a very high level of confidence in the resulting analysis and vision for Alexandria 2032.” (AS and P²⁸³ 2012 Vol-01-City Profile).

The city consultation sessions²⁸⁴ have been conducted in the Alexandria bibliotheca²⁸⁵ as meeting place. The invitations and the participants were the same, mainly representatives of governmental institutions or advocates of the governor. The governor dominated the session with his questions and requests on the consultant or the members of the planning agency/office AS and P (based on Personal Communication with two “Save Alex”²⁸⁶ members 2014).


²⁸³ AS and P in cooperation with MHUUD - Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development, Egypt, General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP), Organizational Unit for Development Assistance (Ouda).

²⁸⁴ City consultation conference: Vision of the city - Alexandria the great (12 March 2014).

²⁸⁵ Alexandria bibliotheca: is a governmental institution financed from the national level (presidency of the council of ministers).

²⁸⁶ Save Alex is an initiative by young architects to save the ancient buildings and built heritage of Alexandria city. “An initiative committed to protecting and enhancing the built environment of the city of Alexandria. It aims at increasing public awareness of what is left of Alexandria's rich architectural heritage and of other urban challenges it is facing today.” (Based on the Official page of Save Alex Initiative, Facebook © 2014).

31. Appendix 31: ADA structure and working action plan



ADA structure and working action plan (Alex Med 2005).

32. Appendix 32: Stakeholders involved in the ADP

Stakeholders who are directly or indirectly involved in the ADP (cited from Annex 8 in GoA 2007:161-164).

Stakeholders who are directly or indirectly involved in the ADP			
A: National Government Ministry of Local Development Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation Ministry of Health Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development – GOPP Ministry of Investment Ministry of Labor and Immigration Ministry of Planning - Regional Planning Alexandria Ministry of Trade and Industry Ministry of Environment – EEAA Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) B: Local Government Alexandria Governorate - Financial and Admin Affairs - Monitoring and Planning - AGGP PMU - Comprehensive Planning Authority - Development Dept. - Directorate Tourism - Economic Affairs - Housing Dept - Information Centre - Investment - Local Council - Secretariat General - Urban Planning District Offices (Central, Eastern, Western, Gomrok, Montazah, etc.) Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency - Regional Branch	C: Authorities and Operators Alexandria Chamber of Commerce Alexandria Port Authority. Alexandria Sanitary Drainage Company (ASDCO) Alexandria State Land Protection Agency (AMLEK) Alexandria Water Company (AWCO) Dekhila Port Authority EEAA - Cairo Egyptian Survey Authority (ESA) General Authority for Free Zones and Investment (GAFI) General Authority for Industrial Development Free Zones and Investment (GAID) GOPP - Regional Centre for Planning Holding Company Water Supply and Sanitary Drainage Lake Marriout Development Land Protection Authority New Communities Authority North Coast Development, Real Estate Publicity Department (REPD) Regulator Water Supply and Sanitary Drainage Roads and Bridges Authority D: Scientific Community Alexandria University Bibliotheca Alexandria, Alex-Med Centre d'Etudes Alexandrine Centre of Environment and Development for the Arabic and European Region (CEDARE) Institute of graduate studies and research. Marine Institute Post Graduate and Research Institute Urban Studies and Planning Centre	E: Business Community Abou Keir Fertilizers Company Al Nahda Investors Association Alexandria Businessmen Association Alexandria Petrochemicals Company Borj Al Arab Investors Association Business Facilitation Centre Dekhila Iron Company Egyptian Liquefied Natural Gas Hotels Chamber in Alexandria Investors Association Merghem Investors Association F: Communities (people) Stakeholders groups pilot area (3*) CDA G: Donors, implementing agencies and projects IFC-PEPMEN and FIAS, Business Enabling Environment, Arab Urban Development Institute, Riyadh BDSSP- CIDA Cities Alliance Consulate General de France	EPAP II FIAS GEF-Coastal Zone Management GTZ - Upgrading Program IFC - PEP-MENA SFD - Human Development Group, SFD - Health and Population Department, SFD - Public Works Department SFD - Urban Upgrading Consultant SFD - Western Delta Bureau, UNICEF H: Consultants and Contractors Consultant - Urban Upgrading EHAF/Chemonics Hydroplan/MCE Moharam and Bakhoum I: NGOS Alexandria Rotary Club Friends of Environment Association J: Others Press -TV5

33. Appendix 33: Upgrading in three slum areas in Alexandria

Upgrading in three slum areas in Alexandria, Egypt in the framework of the program PDP and the CDS of Alexandria (Cities Alliance 2007: 54).

Naga El Arab	El Amrawy	Hadra El Gedida
Health Centre	Tree planting	Land for health centre (made available)
Police Station	Health centre (done)	Land for youth and sports (made available)
Primary school	Youth centre	Land for two schools (made available)
Youth and sports activities	Sanitary drainage	Sanitary drainage (done)
Fund for roads and public lighting (made available)	Paving roads	Water network
Wall off railway line (done)	Pedestrian bridge	Road paving
Tree planting (done)	Covering canals	Street lighting
Community centre	Market and workshops	Street widening and resettlement
	Bus stops	

The community development associations involved in the upgrading of the three slum areas:

(i) in El Amrawy, there are three strong and active CDAs (Association for Development of Prince el Qibli, Association of Environmental Pioneers, and Association of ElSalaam) and two weak but with potential (Association of Masgid el Amrawy and Association of Rabita Arama);

(ii) in Naga Al Arab, three active CDAs (Association of El Fayoum, Association of Gharb district, and Association of Rabitat Ahaly El Wardian), and one weak (Association of Naga El Arab);

(iii) in El Hadara El Gadida, two active CDAs (Association of El Mansheya El Gedida, and Association of Mohandessin district), and two weak ones (Association of Ezbet El Gamaa and Association of El Sobhia).


“Participating NGOs in the CDS process include Friends of Environment, Alexandria Rotary Club, Alexandria Businessmen Association, Merghem Investors Association, Al Nahda Investors Association, Borj Al Arab Investors Association , El-Manshia Investors Association, Hotels Chamber in Alexandria, Environment Pioneers Society, Alexandria-Mediterranean Research Center (Alex-MED), and Centre d’Etudes Alexandrine.” (CA el al.2008: 75).

34. Appendix 34: Google map of Aleppo 2011




35. Appendix 35: Distribution of informal settlements in Aleppo urban area

Distribution of informal settlements in Aleppo urban area with variable densities from high to low cited from Bitar 2012: 76, based on P. Wakely, R and Abdulwahab.



36. Appendix 36: Aleppo Informal Settlements Map



The Map legend below presents the informal settlements, as they are indicated numbers in the map:

1. Tal Al Zarazeir	10. Ashrafeyeh 2	19. Sheikh Khodr
2. Al Ahiaa Al Janoubeyeh	11. Ashrafeyeh Beni-Zeid	20. Sheikh Najja R
3. Al Ahiaa Al Janoubeyeh (Extension)	12. Ein Al Tal	21. Al Malkeyeh
4. Ansari Gharbi	13. Haida Reyeh	22. Sheikh Seied East
5. Sheikh Ma Qsoud	14. Handerat (Camp)	23. Sheikh Seied West
6. Al Neirab Camp	15. Haret Al Shahhadin	24. Aweja
7. Al Maasa Ranyeh	16. Jabal Badro	25. Dwereneh
8. Ansari Village	17. Ka Rm Al Jazmati	26. Khan Al-Assal
9. Ashrafeyeh 1	18. Sheikh Fa Res	27. Al Neirab Village

Source: City of Aleppo and GIZ booklet of informal settlements 2011: 15.

37. Appendix 37: The main objectives of City Development Strategies

Following the main objectives of the City Development Strategies, set by Cities Alliance 2006: *“City Development Strategies are intended to enhance urban performance on a sustainable basis, measured in terms of: (i) economic growth linked to improved livelihood opportunities, (ii) poverty prevention and alleviation, and (iii) improved environmental and public health status, inclusive of poor and informal urban communities.”* (CA 2006: 12).

The program of Aleppo’ CDS was put into action in its first working phase in 2008. The development areas included in the CDS in Aleppo covered seven topics which were activated at the same time:”

- Development of local economy
- Improve the urban form and spatial fabric through open spaces, centrality, better transportation, density and land uses
- Control informal settlement and dealing with their problems
- Improve service sectors and service delivery in the city
- Environmental protection in the urban fabric
- Consider the youth needs
- Modernize the administration of the municipality “ (City of Aleppo et al. 2010)

38. Appendix 38: CDS Principles


The following principles are cited from Madinatuna website (City of Aleppo et al. 2010).

CDS principles	
Political backup	The Aleppo CDS was lucky enough to have the Mayor of Aleppo agree to contribute time and political capital to the CDS process. If the Mayor (or another equivalent senior official) were not willing to fully support the CDS, the whole process would have been abandoned.
The “Right” Stakeholders Mix	The Aleppo CDS acquired the “right” stakeholders mix. It has a strong steering committee chaired by the Mayor and “true” representatives of the key stakeholders in the City. Moreover, the CDS has great work groups, whose members can speak and bargain on behalf of their constituencies
Local Ownership	All of the members of the Aleppo CDS team are residents of Aleppo, and the majority of them are volunteers. These people are the ones who prioritize problems and formulate the strategy.
Participation	Preparation of the Aleppo CDS is participatory. We give the voice to all three sectors: the public sector, the private sector, and the civil society (more on participation in another section).
Action vs. Talk	The Aleppo CDS is not just about “talk”; it is about “action”. Small and quick projects are implemented on the ground while strategies are being prepared on paper.

Institutionalization	The Aleppo CDS will be 'institutionalized', that is, integrated into the city's routine operating procedures and systems (both existing and new systems under development).
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39. Appendix 39: The institutional structure of CDS Aleppo

The institutional structure of the CDS Aleppo is cited from Madinatuna website (City of Aleppo et al. 2010).



40. Appendix 40: Participatory activities organized throughout the CDS Aleppo

The following table summarizes the participatory activities in the CDS Aleppo. The information are derived from the Website *Madinatuna.com*, which is despite the suspending of the CDS is was still online and updated (reference year 2017).

Participatory activities	Time/location	Purpose	actors
2008			
Start-up Forum (A one day conference) Output: a report of the result an executive summary	November 2008, Sheraton hotel	To present a preliminary rapid assessment of the city development needs and establish the institutional structure of the CDS	
2009			
Cooperative activities	Jan 2009	Cooperating with the Cultural Directorate on cultural centers for children in Azizieh and Firdos neighborhoods.	
		Cooperating with the Health Directorate on CFC and informal settlements activities	
		Cooperating with Education Directorate in CFC and informal settlements activities	

		Cooperating with UNRWA on CFC ²⁸⁷ activities	
		Cooperating with UNICEF on CFC activities and training	
NGOs Cooperation Agreements		Municipality of Aleppo Signing a cooperation agreement with: Small Flowers NGO and “alsh2oun” to work with them and with all NGOs regarding the CFC projects	
Activities / Facilitation Techniques Municipality of Aleppo	February 2009	Training: A three days training program for members of working groups on facilitation techniques ²⁸⁸	Working groups staff
Activities /Cleaning Campaign	March 2009	Awareness raising campaign on the rubbish problem in Aleppo City.	CDS supported the MOA in preparing and managing the campaign
Cultural activities	April-June 2009	Music and exhibitions	
Activity: Physiotherapy Center In Kadi Askar	July 2009, Municipality of Aleppo provided the location and equipment.	Established and launched a physiotherapy center for disabled children with the Small Flowers NGO in one of the poor neighborhoods of Aleppo.	Small flowers NGO is running the center and providing health care.
A two days’ workshop CFC: children friendly city	September 2009, Municipality of Aleppo	100 participants from children and youth from different social segments? In framework of the program “towards Aleppo a child friendly city” which initiated by the city council of Aleppo through the urban observatory and CDS project “Madinatuna”, and the cultural committee under the supervision of the executive bureau of culture and tourism sector in the city council in addition to a number of volunteers from NGOs and organizations and CSOs.	City council, Aleppo urban observatory, Volunteers from NGOs and CSOs, and the media
Activities Open City - Diverse City , Municipality of Aleppo A one day stakeholders workshop	September 2009, Municipality of Aleppo	Themes: spatial development methodology for the city and an analysis of the Master plan of Aleppo.	
Activities Basic Concepts for Social Development with Children and Youth 3 days workshop was held.	December 2009, Municipality of Aleppo	The workshop focused on capacity building for staff involved in social development issues with Children and Youth.	Municipality of Aleppo in cooperation with UNICEF
Activities / Open City - Diverse City, one day workshop	December 2009, Municipality of Aleppo	focused the decision-making on the spatial development strategy of Aleppo	Municipality of Aleppo

²⁸⁷ Children Friendly City program.

²⁸⁸ Tools and skills to manage workshops

2010			
Activities / Wax Flower Book	January 2010, Aleppo	publish children story for raising awareness on inter-family marriages (endogamy)	Small Flowers NGO funded by CDS
Activities / Quaik River Beautification Project	January 2010, Aleppo	The project aims at improving the riverbed to serve an ecological function insuring biodiversity, good air quality, and managing rainwater floods.	Agha Khan designed, Military Housing Corporation implemented, CDS participated (CDS participated in the preparation and construction supervision of the project of the Quaik River Beautification project (technical, legal, urban design issues).
Activities / NGOs cooperation Agreements	January 2010, Municipality of Aleppo	Signing a cooperation agreement with JCI ²⁸⁹	
Activities / PPP cooperation Agreements	January 2010, Municipality of Aleppo	Signing a cooperation agreement with SEBC ²⁹⁰	
Workshop with parents „School, Home, City”, A two days’ workshop	January 2010, Municipality of Aleppo	For children’s parents discussing children’s and parents behavior patterns at home, at school, and in the neighborhood.	Families
Book Launch	February 2010, Engineers Syndicate, Aleppo	The book “informal settlement in Aleppo” was launched publically. The book offers rapid profiles for all informal settlements in Aleppo.	
Heritage Ambassador	February 2010, Shibani School, Old City of Aleppo	Teaching a group of selected school kids’ photography techniques for taking pictures in the old city. Introducing the kids about the old city and how to present it to their friends back at school.	
Field trip for experience exchange	February 2010, Ghazi Intab, Turkey	A two days field trip to Ghazi Intab, Turkey, for heads of working groups to see the lessons learned about the decentralized development of the city. Focus was on the work flow in the municipality, the old city rehabilitation, the museum, the informal settlements, and the greening belt.	CDS heads of working groups
training program on Strategic planning (three days)	February 2010, Old City Directorate	For heads of working groups, and member of the municipality and the private sector on Strategic planning.	

²⁸⁹ JCI (Junior Chamber International) is a worldwide community of young active citizens who are changing the world, one community at a time. It is worldwide membership-based nonprofit organization (website/facebook).

²⁹⁰ The Syrian Enterprise and Business Centre (SEBC) is a Syrian non-profit making institution established in 2006 as an NGO according to Syrian laws. Working on developing the business sector in Syria (namely the Syrian-European Business Centre (1996-2006). <http://www.sebcysyria.org/web2008/index.php>.

Workshop	February 2010, Municipality of Aleppo	for identifying headlines for the CFC strategy	
Training program „Skills for Informal Settlements” a 1 year training program	March 2010, SEBC, Aleppo	Training for 18 young people (aged 18-25 years old) from the informal settlements. The training for increasing their employability by providing new skills and competences in entrepreneurship development, management, language, and interpersonal Communication. The program included 6 months theory courses and 6 month hands-on training in the private sector.	
Activities / Madinatuna Brand Awareness Campaign 2 weeks	April 2010, Aleppo	Brand awareness campaign was implemented to launch Madinatuna. Mass advertising media channels were used.	From street vendors to university professors, musicians, celebrities, etc.
Activities / Mid-Term Forum A two days conference and workshops	May 2010, Sheraton hotel	to draw a vision for the future of the city	
Activities / Aleppo Scope A monthly bulletin	November 2010, Aleppo	Issued by the city council of Aleppo, containing a program of cultural activities held in the city.	

41. Appendix 41: Volunteers registration forms and options

The following volunteering registration forms and options are based on the source: Madinatuna Web Site (2010).

- Option 1: as a member of “Friends of Medinatouna”. No specific skills required
- Option 2: as a Professional Volunteer in any of the following themes
 - Local Economy
 - Urban Form
 - Informal Settlements
 - Children and Youth
 - Cultural Development
 - Urban Environment
 - Urban Service Delivery
 - Urban Risk Reduction
 - Administration and Financial Modernization.

Volunteer Registration

First Name

Last Name

Date Of Birth

Gender

Email

Phone

Place Of Residence

Highest Educational Degree
 Post graduate degree or equivalent
 Bachelor degree or equivalent
 Bachaloria
 Middle school degree
 Elementary school degree
 Experience

Volunteer Options

Option 1: as a member of (friends of Madinatuna). No specific

Option 2: as a professional volunteer in any of the following themes

- Local Economy
- Urban Form
- Informal Settlements
- Children & Youth
- Gender
- Cultural Development
- Urban Environment
- Urban Service Delivery
- Urban Risk Education
- Administration & functional

Register

Areas of expertise (select all)

- Agriculture
- Architect & building
- Arts, music & culture
- Business & administration
- Computing
- Engineering & engineering trades
- Physical sciences
- Security services
- Social & behavioral science

42. Appendix 42: CDS thematic components in Aleppo and in Alexandria in comparison

Thematic components in the CDS in Aleppo and Alexandria in comparison, cited from (CMI 2011: 67).

CDS thematic components in Aleppo	CDS thematic components in Alexandria
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local economic development, regarding delivery of urban services and disasters management. - Urban environment. - Spatial development. - Modernization of municipal administration and finance. - Child welfare. - Informal and disadvantaged settlements. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local economic development, regarding creating a local business environment more favorable to investors - Developing priority economic infrastructures to support local economy development (mainly through the environmental rehabilitation of the Lake Marriout area and development of neighboring areas). - Participatory urban upgrading of informal settlements. - Human development and participatory strategic planning (health, education, etc.). - Sustainability of the CDS process through the creation of the Alexandria Development Agency.
Strategic Thrusts	Strategic Thrusts
<p>The five themes identified for the CDS of Aleppo as initially engaged are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Local economic development. 2. Delivery of urban services in order to improve infrastructure and to meet the population's needs in transport, habitat and economic activity. 3. Urban environment (air, land and water pollution, quality of the built environment and green spaces and leisure areas). 4. Spatial urban development and particularly a debate on the master plan to determine if it is consistent with the city's sustainable development objectives. 5. Modernization of the city's administration and finance. <p>6. During the CDS process, two themes were added to the initial five:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Issues related to the youth (assistance and support to the youth and children). 8. Informal Settlements. <p>(CMI 2011: 76)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Local economic development (aimed particularly at creating a local business environment more favorable to investors). 2. Developing priority economic infrastructure to support local economic development (chiefly the environmental rehabilitation of the Lake Marriout area and land development in neighboring areas). 3. Participatory urban upgrading of informal settlements. 4. Human development and participatory strategic planning (health, education, etc.). 5. Sustainability of the CDS process through the creation of the Alexandria Development Agency. <p>(CMI 2011: 76)</p>

43. Appendix 43: City vision in Aleppo and in Alexandria in comparison

City vision of Aleppo
<p>“Long-term Vision for the City of Aleppo Aleppo’s prosperous economy is competitive both on local and international markets. The city adapts its products to changing demands and offers employment opportunities for its increasingly educated citizens, including women. It is a city where the private sector may flourish. (Excerpt from the vision of the working group on local economic development.)</p> <p>...well-trained municipal personnel working in decentralized structures where there will be no place for corruption... (Working group on improving the administration)</p> <p>Green and Safe Aleppo: safe and sustainable constructions; adequate social and health safety; women are considered key social actors... (Working group on urban development) ...alert, educated, healthy children who play a role in the community, protected by a sensitive family and supported by society, and who live in a clean and safe environment enjoying the benefits of a school education... (Working group on children) „ (CMI 2011: 87).</p>
City vision of Alexandria
<p>“Vision for the Lake Marriout Zone in Alexandria, Egypt: “The Alexandria comprehensive plan for the development of Lake Marriout zone aims at optimizing the utilization of natural resources without causing any ecological disequilibrium in this vital zone. The wise utilization of this zone brings economic, social, and environmental sustainable development which ensures equal opportunities for generations to come.” “(CMI 2011: 75)</p>

Lebenslauf

Siba Said (Seba Asaaied)

Staatsangehörigkeit Syrisch_ Deutsch
E-mail Adresse sibasaid@yahoo.de

Berufserfahrung

- 02.2018_07.2020 Anfertigung der Dissertation "Participatory Planning Approaches in the Arab Region" und Feldforschung unter der Betreuung von K. Pallagst, TUK
- 10.2010 - 01.2018 Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Lehr- und Forschungsgebiet „Internationale Planungssysteme“ (Prof. Karina M. Pallagst) an der Technischen Universität Kaiserslautern (TUK)
- Forschung: Partizipation und Urban Governance in arabischen Ländern, Mitarbeit an dem EU-Forschungsprojekt „PlanShrinking“
- Lehraufgaben: Planung und Durchführung der Vorlesung „Planen in Entwicklungsländern“ für Bachelor-Studenten des fünften Semesters, Mit-Betreuung von Bachelor-Arbeiten. Konzipierung, Management und Koordinierung des Bachelorprojekts in SoSe17 zu Stadtentwicklung von Banda Aceh in Indonesien
- Verwaltungsaufgaben: Koordination studentischer Mitarbeiter, Verantwortliche für Beschaffung, Mitarbeit an Anträgen für Drittmittelprojekte
- 07.2009 – 10.2009 Beraterin für Architektur in einem Umbauprojekt, Museum für Islamische Kunst, Berlin
- 04.2007 – 07.2007 Praktikum im Bereich Architektur und Städtebau bei „PAD Büro für Planung, Architektur und Design“, Weimar
- Aufgaben: Szenarioplanung für die Umgestaltung des Wohngebietes „Roter Berg“ in Erfurt, Deutschland
- 05.2005 - 06.2006 Architektin in Sanierungsprojekten, Architekturbüro Dr. Mikhael, Damaskus, Syrien
- 12.2005 - 03.2006 Architektonische Dokumentation des Khans (Karawanserei) "Al-Jukieh" innerhalb eines Restaurierungs- und Dokumentationsprojekts in der Altstadt von Damaskus, Deutsches Orient-Institut, Beirut, Libanon, Betreuer: Dr. Stefan Weber
- 06.2004 - 08.2006 Architektin im „Directorate of Building and Licensing“, Ministerium für Tourismus, Damaskus, Syrien, Aufgaben: Überprüfung von touristischen Bauvorhaben auf Einhaltung von Normen und Gesetzen im Rahmen der Lizenzierungsprüfung der Vorhaben

- 02.2004 - 06.2004 Mitarbeit als Stadtplanerin in einem nationalen Wettbewerb für die Gestaltung des East Parks in Damaskus, Architekturbüro Dr. Mikhael, Dr. Abboud & Dr. Ghaith, Damaskus, Syrien
- 02.2001 - 06.2001 Architektonische Dokumentation des "Mari Ajami" Hauses in der Altstadt von Damaskus, Deutsches Orient-Institut, Damaskus, Syrien, Betreuer: Dr. Stefan Weber

Konferenzen

- Juli 2014 *WCOMES²⁹¹ 2014, Ankara: Präsentation zum Thema "Analyzing Success Factors of Participatory Urban Development in the Arab Cities Alexandria and Aleppo"*
WCOMES 2014, Practices of Urban Governance, Moderation
- Juli 2012 *AESOP 2012, 26th Annual Congress, Ankara: Aufsatz und Präsentation zum Thema "Dealing with Urban Growth in Damascus, Syria: Challenges and Recommendations"*
- Oktober 2012 *DAVO²⁹² 2012, DAVO-Congress, Erlangen, Präsentation zum Thema "Bad Urban Governance as Motive of the Uprising in Syria, Case Study: Damascus"*

STUDIUM

- 06.2013- 07.2020 Promotionsstudium "Raum- und Umweltplanung" an der Technischen Universität Kaiserslautern
- 04.2009- 07.2010 Fortsetzung des Studiums "europäische urbanistik" an der Bauhaus-Universität Weimar mit Abschluss Master of Science
 Masterarbeit: „*Planning and Managing Urban Landscapes and Green Spaces in Shrinking Cities*“ über den Stadtumbau der Stadt Dessau
- 10.2007 - 03.2009 Master of Science in "urban management", Technische Universität Berlin
 Thema der Masterarbeit: "*Sustainable Open Space Management in Damascus*"
 Studienthemen: Trends in der Urbanisierung, lokale Regierungsführung, Sozialplanung, Stadtanalyse, strategische Planung, Stadtökonomie, Projekt-management und Prozessorganisation, Landmanagement, Umweltmanagement, Infrastrukturmanagement und Management öffentlicher Dienstleistungen, Gesundheitsversorgung in Städten, Wassermanagement
- 10.2006 - 09.2007 Studium "europäische urbanistik" an der Bauhaus-Universität Weimar (Master of Science) (zwei von vier Semestern)

²⁹¹ World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies

²⁹² Deutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft Vorderer Orient für gegenwartsbezogene Forschung und Dokumentation e.V.

- Studienthemen: Städtebau, Projektentwicklung, Stadtsoziologie, Stadtgeschichte, Raumplanung und Moderation
- 09.2003 - 08.2004 "Postgraduate Diploma" (einjähriges Aufbaustudium) in "BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION SCIENCE", Damaskus Universität, Syrien
- Studienthemen: Umweltarchitektur, Bautheorie
- 09.1997 - 08.2003 Bachelor in Architektur (fünfjähriges Studium), Damaskus Universität, Syrien
- Studienthemen: Entwurf, Städtebau, Innenarchitektur, Architekturtheorie, Bau-konstruktion, Baustoffkunde, Stadtplanung, Stadtsoziologie, Geschichte der Architektur
- 07.1997 Abitur, Damaskus, Syrien

Ehren

- 10.2007 - 03.2009 Stipendium des DAAD (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst) für die Durchführung des Master-Studiums "Urban Management" an der Technischen Universität Berlin

Sprachen

Arabisch: Muttersprache

Englisch: verhandlungssicher

Deutsch: verhandlungssicher