Selfish Bin Coloring

  • We introduce a new game, the so-called bin coloring game, in which selfish players control colored items and each player aims at packing its item into a bin with as few different colors as possible. We establish the existence of Nash and strong as well as weakly and strictly Pareto optimal equilibria in these games in the cases of capacitated and uncapacitated bins. For both kinds of games we determine the prices of anarchy and stability concerning those four equilibrium concepts. Furthermore, we show that extreme Nash equilibria, those with minimal or maximal number of colors in a bin, can be found in time polynomial in the number of items for the uncapcitated case.

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Author:Leah Epstein, Sven O. Krumke, Asaf Levin, Heike Sperber
Serie (Series number):Report in Wirtschaftsmathematik (WIMA Report) (123)
Document Type:Report
Language of publication:English
Year of Completion:2009
Year of Publication:2009
Publishing Institute:Technische Universität Kaiserslautern
Date of the Publication (Server):2009/10/16
Tag:Nash equilibria; algorithmic game theory; bin coloring; price of anarchy; price of stability; strong equilibria; weakly/ strictly pareto optima
Faculties / Organisational entities:Kaiserslautern - Fachbereich Mathematik
DDC-Cassification:5 Naturwissenschaften und Mathematik / 510 Mathematik
Licence (German):Standard gemäß KLUEDO-Leitlinien vor dem 27.05.2011