Luisa Horsten

• Research across virtually all subfields of psychology has suffered from construct proliferation, often resulting in redundant constructs that strongly overlap conceptually and/or empirically. Such cases of old wine in new bottles, i.e., established constructs with new labels, are instances of the jangle fallacy and are problematic because they lead to fragmented literatures and thereby considerably impede the accumulation of knowledge. The present thesis aims at demonstrating how to scrutinize potential jangle fallacies in a theory-driven, deductive, and falsificationist way. Using the example of the common core of aversive traits, D, I discuss the ways one can find and test differences between more or less overlapping, competing constructs. Specifically,the first paper tests the plausibility of a potential jangle fallacy with respect to D and a Fast Life History Strategy, concluding that the latter is unlikely to represent the common core of aversive traits at all. The remaining three papers test the distinctness of D from FFM Agreeableness, HEXACO Honesty-Humility, and a blend of the two, AG+, all of which are conceptually and empirically remarkably similar to, but could nevertheless be dissociated from D, thereby also refuting an instance of the jangle fallacy. Although research often places emphasis on similarities, it is impossible to conclusively prove the equivalence of constructs. I therefore conclude that a falsificationist approach is more informative in that it allows to test whether any differences identified on a conceptual level can be confirmed empirically. Stated differently, if a new construct is dissociable both theoretically and empirically, one may assume that it is functionally distinct and no instance of the jangle fallacy.